

Aristotle's *Categories*
in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin Traditions

Abstract

Hardly any other philosophical book has had as many readers over so many centuries as Aristotle's *Categories*, the influence of which is manifest in our everyday language when we speak of quantities or qualities, of relations or of the substance of the matter. In late antiquity the *Categories* –supplemented with Porphyry's *Isagoge*– became the indispensable introduction to any course of philosophy in the Greek-speaking culture, and later it got a similar position in the Latin and the Arabic cultures. In Western Europe, digests of the doctrine of the *Categories* were taught in schools long after Cartesianism and other modern systems had demoted Aristotelianism from its position as the predominant form of philosophy. The twelve essays collected in this volume demonstrate the book's importance in all three language areas.

Aristotle's *Categories*

in the Byzantine, Arabic
and Latin Traditions

Edited by

Sten Ebbesen

John Marenbon

Paul Thom



Scientia Danica. Series H, Humanistica, 8 vol. 5

DET KONGELIGE DANSKE VIDENSKABERNES SELSKAB

Publications of the Centre for the Aristotelian Tradition, vol. 2

© Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab 2013
Printed in Denmark by Special-Trykkeriet Viborg a/s
ISSN 1904-5492 · ISBN 978-87-7304-372-1

Submitted to the Academy August 2012
Published September 2013

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Introduction

The research project ‘The reception of Aristotle’s *Categories* in the Byzantine, Arabic and Latin traditions’ brought together scholars from all over the world. They first met at a conference in Byron Bay (Australia) sponsored by Southern Cross University in 2006. Subsequent meetings were held at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, and the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen. The project was funded under a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. The essays in the present volume represent a selection from the papers read at those conferences. It is a great pleasure for me to join with the other leaders of the project, Sten Ebbesen, John Marenbon, and Tony Street, in offering this volume to the scholarly community, and in thanking all those who participated in the project.

Paul Thom
Sydney, July 2012

CHAPTER I

Photios on the Non-Synonymy of
Substance: *Amphilochia* 138

Börje Bydén

It is only natural that the *Categories* is the Aristotelian work that spawned the greatest number of commentaries in antiquity, from the lost commentaries by Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus of Sidon, and Ariston of Alexandria to the likewise lost commentary by Stephanus of Alexandria, who was appointed to a chair at Constantinople after Heraclius' accession in 610, and thus probably the last of the pre-iconoclastic commentators.¹ In the early seventh century the Greek-speaking world went into a rather steep cultural decline, and during the next 250 years very few and only very elementary Greek philosophical works saw the light, most notable among them perhaps the *Dialectica* by John of Damascus (c. 720). All these works rehashed material deriving ultimately from late antique commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*.²

And so it is hardly surprising, either, that the first Aristotelian commentary produced in post-iconoclast Byzantium was also one on the *Categories*. This commentary is extant in two versions: (a) in the form of a few relatively extensive scholia transmitted together with Ammonius' commentary but attributed in the manuscripts to St. Photios the Great, patriarch of Constantinople (858–67 and 877–86);³ and (b) as a continuous text carrying the title *Clear Summary of*

1. The first-century BC commentaries by the Peripatetics Andronicus, Boethus, and Ariston (as well as those by the Platonist Eudorus and the Stoic Athenodorus) are all mentioned by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 159.32. On Stephanus and his *Categories* commentary, see Wolska-Conus 1989 (esp. 9 n. 19).

2. On the philosophical works of this period, see Roueché 1974, 1980 and 1990.

3 There are also scholia on the *Isagoge* attributed to Photios; these were transcribed from Mon. gr. 222 and Par. gr. 1928 by Busse 1891: xx–xxii. The ones on the *Categories*

the Ten Categories and filling eleven chapters of some redactions of the *Amphilochia*, an unsystematic collection of essays by the selfsame Photios mostly on theological subjects.⁴ Hergenröther (PG 101: 759–60) and Westerink (1986: 5: 140) drew the conclusion that the scholia must have been culled from a different –and probably earlier– version of the *Clear Summary*. The *Clear Summary* has been preserved in three Byzantine (and a few later) manuscripts.⁵

The title is really a misnomer. For in these eleven chapters, Photios deals with the antepredicaments and nine categories only; that is to say, he includes five of those categories that were not (or only very cursorily) treated by Aristotle, but omits that of ἔχειν or Having. In the present paper I have set myself the task of investigating whether it is possible to trace the influence on some later writers of what is after all the earliest surviving text of post-iconoclast Byzantine philosophy. One reason why one would want to do that is that it would be interesting to know more about the extent to which relatively early Byzantine philosophical works were actually used by relatively late Byzantine philosophical writers. For the most part, it is difficult to tell with any degree of certainty, since so much of the material in all Byzantine philosophical works derives from ancient works. And as a rule, Byzantine philosophical writers do not reveal their sources. So in order to carry out this kind of inquiry it is necessary to find an earlier work of some originality with which to compare the later ones.

In this respect, Photios' summary would seem like a promising choice. Chapter 145, on the category of Where (ποῦ), was discussed

are reported (from Mon. gr. 222) in the footnotes of Hergenröther's edition of the *Amphilochia* (PG 101: 757–812).

4 There are five different redactions of the *Amphilochia* (or *Ad Amphilochium Quaestiones*). The total number of essays in all five is 329. The redaction thought by Westerink to be Photios' original edition numbers 313 essays; the ones containing essays 314–24 and 325–29 also date back to the author's lifetime. Only two redactions (including the original edition) contain the *Clear Summary* (although it was inserted also in one MS of another redaction as early as the 14th century) (Westerink 1986: 4: v–xiv).

5 The Byzantine MSS are: Par. gr. 1228 (11th cent.); Vat. gr. 1923 (a descendant of the former, 13th cent.); Par. Coisl. gr. 270 (the relevant part dated to the 14th cent., the rest of the MS to the 11th cent.). An important later witness (representing a different redaction) is Par. gr. 1229 (17th cent.) (Westerink 1986: 4: v–xiv).

not so long ago in a couple of papers by Jacques Schamp, who did pose the question of originality, and answered it in the affirmative.⁶ And it was noted quite recently by Katerina Ierodiakonou that in chapter 142 Photios offers a solution to a problem concerning the last six categories which has no precedent in the ancient tradition.⁷ Less encouragingly, it also seems to have made no impact on the later Byzantine tradition. (The problem is that each of the last six categories seems to be compounded of Substance and one of the remaining three: e.g. Where seems to be compounded of Substance and Quantity, and thus reducible to these; Photios' solution is to insist that an entity can emerge as a result of the coming together of two other entities without being reducible to either or both of them: this, he says, is true e.g. of friendship.)

I have chosen to focus especially on chapter 138, which is on Substance.⁸ In this chapter Aristotle comes in for some pretty heavy criticism, especially on account of one inadequacy, which Photios himself says that “most people have failed to notice”.⁹ This inadequacy has to do with the lack of unity of the category of Substance, or differently put, with the non-synonymy of primary and secondary Substance.

To begin with, it may be useful to have a plan of the chapter. It appears to divide rather naturally into the following 14 sections:

1. Five irrelevant senses of ‘substance’ (2–25).
2. The relevant sense of ‘substance’ formulated: it is the self-existing thing (26–30).
3. Division of Substance (30–76).
4. Primary and secondary Substance according to Aristotle (77–91).
5. Criticism: non-synonymy of primary and secondary Substance (91–104).

6. Schamp 1996a and 1996b.

7. Ierodiakonou 2005: 24.

8. Anton 1994 discusses chapter 138 at some length, but his emphasis is not so much on a close analysis of the text, which is what I will attempt here, as on the theological context.

9. “μη λανθανέτω δὲ ἡμῶς ὅπερ σχεδόν τι τοὺς πλείστους διέλαθεν” (138.91–92).

6. Afterthought: the *infima species* or nature is a ninth sense of ‘substance’ (105–13).
7. Characteristics of Substance (1): not to be in a subject. True of all Substance, but not exclusively (114–20).
8. Characteristics of Substance (2): not to have a contrary. True of all Substance, but not exclusively (121–25).
9. Characteristics of Substance (3): not to admit of a more and a less. True of all Substance and nothing else (126–36).
10. Characteristics of Substance (4): to be numerically one and still be able to receive contraries. True of all Substance and nothing else (137–42).
11. Rebuttal of objection to (10), following Cat. 4a21–b12 (142–62).
12. Two remaining characteristics of Substance: (5) to signify a certain ‘this’ and (6) to be predicated synonymously. None of them true of all Substance (163–76).
13. Additional characteristics following from Aristotle’s account, confirming the non-synonymy of primary and secondary Substance (177–88).
14. Conclusion: Aristotle’s reasons for considering individuals to be more substances than universals are not sufficient for considering individuals—or genera—to be substances at all (188–208).

The relationship between this plan and version (a) of the commentary, i.e. the Photian scholia transmitted along with Ammonius’ commentary, will be briefly discussed below (pp 27–28).

It is common knowledge that most ancient Greek commentators from Porphyry onwards held that the proper subject matter of the *Categories*, being the first item on Aristotle’s logic syllabus, is simple, primary, and general words, insofar as they signify things, whereas the things (and concepts) that are signified by these are a subsidiary subject matter, insofar as they are signified by words.¹⁰ But since

10. “... ἔστιν μὲν ὁ σκοπὸς οἰκείος τῇ λογικῇ πραγματεία περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ γενικῶν φωνῶν, καθὸ σημαντικαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν, συνδιδάσκειται δὲ πάντως καὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πράγματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα, καθὸ σημαίνεται τὰ πράγματα ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν” (Simplicius, *In Cat.* 13.12–15).

‘simple, primary, and general’ words primarily signify sensible individuals, it is only reasonable on this view that Aristotle in the *Categories* assigns priority to individuals over universals.¹¹

It is not immediately clear what Photios thought was the proper subject matter of the *Categories*. He reports Aristotle as saying that individual substances (e.g. ‘Socrates’) are more indicative of the thing under discussion than are universal substances (e.g. ‘man’ or ‘animal’); perhaps we can infer from this that he considered the word ‘substance’ in this context to refer to words rather than things.¹² But evidently he did not align himself with the tradition, starting not with Porphyry, but long before him (Ps.-Archytas, Boethus), that understood the range of things signified by the words discussed in the *Categories* as being limited to the sensible realm. It is true that he begins chapter 138 by putting to one side a number of senses of the word ‘substance’ which he claims are not relevant to logic (this is section 1 in the plan above). To begin with, transcendent and causative substance is the subject matter of First Philosophy (presumably understood as apophatic theology: cf. *Amphil.* 180.17–21), whereas form and matter are concepts of natural philosophy. ‘Substance’ can also mean ‘property’, but this, says Photios, is political rather than philosophical usage; and ‘existence’, in which case it indicates all things homonymously. The only thing which is eligible to be called ‘substance’ in the categorial sense is, according to the somewhat tautological formula endorsed by Photios, the “self-existing thing, which does not require anything else for its existence” (sect. 2).¹³ But some of the examples he proceeds to offer of the categorial sense of ‘substance’ are incorporeal and thus immaterial things: the nature of angels and intellect, whose operation is instantaneous, and soul, whose operation in-

11. “... ἐπειὶ περὶ λέξεων σημαντικῶν ἢ πρόθεσις, αἱ δὲ λέξεις πρώτως ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐτέθησαν ... εἰκότως ἂν ταῖς λέξεσι πρώτα κατονομάσθῃ (ἔστι δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ ἄτομα), πρώτας οὐσίας ἔθετο” (Porphyry, *In Cat.* 91.19–23).

12. “... διότι μάλιστα, φησίν, ἢ ἄτομος οὐσία φανερώτερον ποιεῖ τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ καθόλου οὐσία. ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν Σωκράτην ἐπίδηλον μᾶλλον ἐποίησεν τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις εἰ τύχοι φιλόσοφον παρὰ τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἢ ζῷον” (138.193–97).

13. “πρῶγμα ... αὐθύπαρκτον, μὴ δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρὸς ὑπαρξιν” (138.27–28).

volves movement (sect. 3).¹⁴ In consequence, the category of Substance *cannot* according to Photios be limited to the sensible realm, although it is limited to the boundaries of Creation.¹⁵

What did Photios understand by a ‘category’? There are some indications that he understood a highest genus in the strict sense. I take it to be characteristic of a genus in the strict sense that it is always predicated synonymously, i.e. according to the same name and definition, of all its species and of all the individuals subsumed under these.¹⁶ One indication that this is what Photios understood by a ‘category’ is his very attempt to provide a universal formula of Substance, as well as an exhaustive division, running all the way from corporeal and incorporeal substances down to a few representative *infimae species*. The formula is borrowed from John of Damascus, who expressly discusses the categories in terms of the highest genera of being.¹⁷ The division, on the other hand, is imported from a different context, namely that of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and commen-

14. “καὶ ταύτης ἢ μὲν κατὰ ἐπιβολὴν καὶ ἀθρόον ἐνεργεῖ, ὡς ἀγγέλων φύσις, εἶτα δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἢ δὲ μετὰ τινος κινήσεως τὰς ἐνεργείας ἔχει προαγομένας, ὡς ψυχὴ. ὅν εἰ καὶ διάφορος ἢ ἐνεργεῖα καὶ ἢ ὑπαρξις, ἀλλ’ οὖν κοινὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ καλεῖσθαι ἀσώματα· ὅσα γὰρ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου εἶδους ἀνακεχώρηκεν, εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἀσώματου λόγον μεταβέβηκεν. κἄν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κυρίως καὶ πρῶτως ὄν ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ὑπερούσιον ἀγαπῶσι ταῦτα σῶμά γε καὶ εἶναι καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὖν τὴν ἐνυλον καὶ σωματικὴν διαφυγόντα παχύτητα τῆ τοῦ ἀόλου φύσει συνοικειοῦται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον” (138.33–41).

15. When Photios says, at 138.41–42, that “this belongs to another, more profound discussion”, Anton 1994: 172 takes him to mean that “the type of discourse that deals with sensible reality cannot cover the whole of *ousia*”. It seems to me more likely that the question referred by Photios to another discussion is one prompted by what he says in the immediately preceding lines (see note 14), namely how to conceive of the exact relation of the nature of angels, intellect and soul to the strict incorporeality and immateriality of God on the one hand, and the coarse materiality and corporeality of sensible things on the other. At any rate, it is perfectly clear from 138.30–33 that the nature of angels, intellect and soul are all subsumed by Photios under categorial Substance, which is what is discussed in Aristotle’s *Categories*.

16. Cf. Aristotle, *Top.* 2.2, 109b4–7: “ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς γὰρ γένους παρωνόμως ἡ κατηγορία κατὰ τοῦ εἶδους λέγεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα συνωνόμως τὰ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται· καὶ γὰρ τοῦνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τῶν γενῶν τὰ εἶδη.”

17. “Ορίζονται δὲ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν οὕτως· Οὐσία ἐστὶ πρῶγμα αὐθόπαρκτον καὶ μὴ δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρὸς ὑπαρξιν” (*Dialectica*, rec. fus., 4.61–64). A similar but not identical formula is given by the Damascene in a number of other places. Other early occurrences of similar formulae include *Doctrina Patrum* 40.25–26 and Meletius, *De nat. hom.* 154.9–11.

taries on that work. And indeed, Porphyry in the *Isagoge* does talk of Substance as a highest genus.¹⁸ So Photios may well have been influenced by these two sources to take a similar view. — It may be worth noting, in passing, that John of Damascus refers to the formula as a current definition (ὀρίζοντα), notwithstanding the fact that a highest genus cannot strictly speaking be defined.¹⁹ A definition is also what Photios calls it in version (a) of the commentary, but in the *Clear Summary* itself the words ‘define’ and ‘definition’ are carefully avoided. That their absence is not coincidental is strongly suggested by Photios’ distinction in the preceding chapter (137.7–9) between definitive and descriptive formulae.²⁰

Another, admittedly not very strong, indication that what Photios understood by a ‘category’ was a highest genus in the strict sense is his emphasis on the ‘difference’, as he puts it, between category and homonymy (although he never says they are contrary terms).²¹ What seems to me to be decisive, however, is that his criticisms of Aristotle’s account of Substance suggest that he thought its deficiency lay in its failure to meet the requirements for an account of a genus. Especially, he contends (in sect. 5) that primary substances, i.e. individuals, and secondary substances, i.e. universals, did not obtain the name of Substance synonymously, whether in relation to each other or in relation to the <generic> Substance of which the formula and the division were given. Surely, if they are called substances by virtue of the common definition of generic Substance, they have their name synonymously with each other as well as with the latter.²²

The formula and the division of generic Substance referred to here are the ones given in sections 2 and 3 according to the plan

18. *Isag.* 4.21–27.

19. Elsewhere, the Damascene seems to agree that a definition must contain both genus and constitutive differentia: *Dial.*, rec. fus., 8.16–18; 8.90–93.

20. Cf. Anton 1994: 171.

21. “διέστηκε δὲ πολλῶν κατηγορία καὶ ὁμωνυμία” (138.24–25).

22. “... τὰ ἄτομα, πρῶται οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι, καὶ τὰ καθόλου, δευτέραι οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι, οὐχὶ συνωνύμως οὔτε πρὸς ἑαυτὰς οὔτε πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ἧς ὅ τε λόγος καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἀποδέδοται τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὄνομα ἀπηνέγκαντο· τῷ μέντοι κοινῷ λόγῳ τῆς γενικῆς οὐσίας οὐσίαι καλούμεναι ἑαυταῖς τε κάκεινῃ συνωνύμως ὀνομάζονται” (138.93–96).

above. Aristotle obviously does not mention any generic Substance of which primary and secondary Substance are supposed to be two different species; and the characteristics (the so-called pseudo-differentiae) of Substance that he offers in lieu of a definition do seem in some cases to belong exclusively to either primary or secondary Substance (and in some cases to belong also to other categories). Photios in fact allows that two of these characteristics are properties in the strict sense (such that for every *x*, if and only if *x* is a substance, the property belongs to *x*), namely (a) to be numerically one and still be able to receive contraries (sects. 10–11), and, more importantly, as we shall see below, (b) not to admit of a more and a less (sect. 9). But all his emphasis is on the failure of the other four to be at the same time a necessary and a sufficient condition for substantiality: only primary substances signify a certain ‘this’, and only secondary substances (along with differentiae and all the other categories) are synonymously predicated (since primary substances cannot be predicated at all) (sect. 12);²³ on the other hand, it is not only substances that are not in a subject—also substantial differentiae are not—(sect. 7) and that have no contraries—also quantities do not—(sect. 8).²⁴

It is understandable if considerations like these give rise to doubts as to whether there are really any grounds for thinking that

23. “Ὁ μέντοι γε Ἀριστοτέλης προχειρότερον, ἵνα μὴ λέγω ῥαθυμότερον, περὶ οὐσίας διαλαβόν, καὶ ἕτερα δύο ἴδια τίθησιν οὐσίας· ἐν μὲν τὸ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ὅπερ εἶη ἂν ἴδιον οὐ τῆς ἀπλῶς οὐσίας, τῆς δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῦ κληθείσης πρώτης οὐσίας· καὶ ἕτερον πάλιν τὸ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖσθαι, εἶη δ’ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἴδιον τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῦ κληθείσης δευτέρας οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει μόνης ἐστὶ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας· μόνη γὰρ ἢ μερικὴ οὐσία, χειρὶ δεικνυμένη ἢ ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τοιοῦτῳ, τόδε τι λέγεται εἶναι· τὸ δὲ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν μόνης τῆς δευτέρας οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν...” (138.163–71).

24. “Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβέστερον ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ δὲ γε οὐσία ἧς ὁ τε λόγος καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἀποδέδοται, ἥτις καὶ δύναται ἂν τὴν τε τῆς κατηγορίας ἔννοιαν καὶ τὴν κλησὶν ἐπιδέξασθαι, ἔχει ἴδια, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴδιον παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἶδει τῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, πρόσσεσι γὰρ καὶ ταῖς οὐσιώδεσι διαφοραῖς· αὗται γὰρ, οἷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, δηλὸν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκότα δύναται εἶναι. Δεύτερον ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μηδὲν αὐτῇ ἐναντίον εἶναι· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ παντὶ τῷ εἶδει τῆς οὐσίας ἀρμόζει καὶ οὐ μόνῳ· οὐδεμία μὲν γὰρ οὐσία καθὼς ἐστὶν οὐσία ἔχει τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῇ ἐναντίον· οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ γε καὶ τῷ ποσῷ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, τοῖς γὰρ δέκα ἢ τοῖς ἐπτά ἢ τοῖς ὁμοίοις φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον” (138.114–25).

‘substance’ is predicated of both individuals and universals in the same sense. And in that case, one may go on to wonder whether it is really true that, as Aristotle claims (*Cat.* 3b4–5), if the subject is an individual, everything that is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject; but if this is in doubt, the whole theory of syllogism will rest on a shaky foundation. To solve this problem in a satisfactory way I guess one needs to have recourse to something like a theory of supposition. Photios showed in another chapter in the *Amphilochia* (ch. 77) that he was completely innocent of any such theory: there we find him grappling with the problem whether the incorporeality of secondary substances such as *man* would not entail the incorporeality of primary substances such as Socrates. His solution is to allow for secondary substances to be in a sense incorporeal, namely insofar as they lack the properties of bodies, and in a sense corporeal, namely insofar as they are significant of bodies. And thus, he thinks, the transitivity of predication can be saved.²⁵

To return to chapter 138. Photios regards the very fact that Aristotle does not speak of individuals and universals simply as ‘substances’, but adds an ordinal number, as sufficient proof of their non-synonymy (although he says he could adduce many more).²⁶ One may suspect that he does so on the strength of the rule, endorsed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* B 3,²⁷ that “in the case of things in

25. “Τίς οὖν ὁ λόγος ὁ ταύτας πάσας διαφεύγων τὰς λαβὰς; εἴρηται μὲν ἐμφατικώτερον ἴσως καὶ πρόσθεν, καὶ νῦν δὲ τρανότερον λεγέσθω. σωματικά μὲν ἐστί τὰ γένη καὶ εἶδη τῶν σωμάτων, οὐ σώματα δέ, καὶ δηλωτικά τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οὐ δηλούμενα δέ, καὶ ἀναπτύσσοντα τὴν ὑπαρξίν τούτων, οὐχ ὑφιστάμενα δέ, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν τὴν οὐσίωσιν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, οὐ παρέχοντα δέ, καὶ ὀνόματα καταλλήλοις νοήμασι καὶ οἰκείοις τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὰς ὑποστάσεις σημαίνοντα, οὐ τοῖς οὐσι καὶ αὐταρκεσιτάτοις ὅν μὴ δέονται ταῦτα δι’ ἑαυτῶν παρεχόμενα ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ σοφὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόανθρωπον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατηγορήματα, εἰ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνέργειαν ἢ πάθος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δηλοῖ, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὑπαρξίν καὶ οὐσίωσιν ἢ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας” (77.177–87).

26. “ὅτι δὲ δευτέραι οὐσίαι καὶ πρῶται οὐσίαι ταῦτα λεγόμενα οὐχὶ συνωνύμως οὔτε ἑαυταῖς οὔτε τῇ γενικῇ οὐσίᾳ λέγονται, πολλὰ λέγειν ἔχων, ἐκεῖνο τέως διὰ τὸ φιλοσόφητον ἐρῶ, ὡς αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς αὐτὰς καλεῖσθαι οὐσίαις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προσθήκης, τὴν μὲν πρῶτην, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν, σαφῆς ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκατέρα τούτων κέκληται οὐσία, καὶ πολλῶν πλέον τι καθ’ ἑτέραν πάλιν ἢ γενικῇ” (138.97–102).

27. And cf. *De an.* 2.3, 414b20–22; *Pol.* 3.1, 1275a34–38. On the rule, see in general the classic paper by Lloyd 1962.

which the distinction of prior and posterior is present, that which is predicable of these things cannot be something apart from them” (trans. Ross).²⁸ The examples given by Aristotle are those of number and geometrical figure: there cannot be a generic number or figure over and above the specific ones. If this rule were to be applied to substance, as one may suspect it is by Photios, the result would seem to be that there cannot be a generic substance over and above the individuals and the universals.

This suspicion is in some measure reinforced by Photios’ discussion (in sect. 9) of what he calls the ‘third characteristic’ of substance (in the standard order it is the fifth), namely that it does not allow of a more and a less. In contrast to Aristotle, who takes care to point out that this characteristic is not meant to imply that there can be no substance which is more a substance than another one, as e.g. a species is more a substance than its genus (3b33–36; cf. 2b7–8), Photios insists that

according to the very formula of Substance without qualification, no substance could be said to be more a substance or less a substance than another substance, whether one compares particulars to particulars or universals to universals, *nor if one compares particulars to universals*.²⁹

In other words, he accepts the characteristic as valid for generic Substance; but if generic Substance encompasses both individuals and universals this seems to imply that no individuals or universals can possess a lower or higher degree of substantiality than any other substances. In order to see how this conundrum is dealt with by Photios, we must examine what he thinks Aristotle means by “higher and lower degree of substantiality”. Photios addresses this question especially in section 14. Aristotle, he says, holds that individuals have a higher degree of substantiality than universals, especially

28. “ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷον τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα” (999a6–8).

29. “οὐδεμία γὰρ οὐσία τινὸς οὐσίας ὅλως κατὰ γε αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς ἀπλῶς οὐσίας λόγον οὐκ ἂν ῥηθεῖν οὔτε μᾶλλον οὐσία οὔτε ἥττον, οὔτε ἂν μερικὰ λαβὼν μερικοῖς συγκρίνοις, οὔτε ἂν καθολικοῖς καθολικά, ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἂν μερικὰ πρὸς τὰ καθόλου” (138.127–30).

on the ground that they *are more indicative* of the thing under discussion.³⁰ (It has to be said that this is a blatant misrepresentation of Aristotle's view, which is that individuals are pre-eminently substantial on account of being the subjects of everything else: 2b15-17.) The same is true, Photios continues, in the case of universals: the species is thought to have a higher degree of substantiality than the genus because it is closer to and more indicative of the individual.³¹ 'Consequently', he says,

from what Aristotle advances we are allowed to infer that he calls the substance which is more expressive and indicative of the thing proposed 'more a substance' than that which is lacking in this respect. But it does not fall within the purview of the present work to examine critically how that which is more expressive and indicative of the thing proposed can be conceived of as more a substance, or indeed as a substance at all. So far so much on substance.³²

If I interpret this correctly, what Photios suggests in sections 9 and 14 is not that Aristotle is wrong in making "the distinction of prior and posterior" between individuals and universals, and that all substances really have an equal degree of substantiality; what he suggests is that this distinction *is* present in individuals and universals, in as much as they are more and less indicative of the thing proposed, and that consequently either individuals or universals have to be eliminated from the category of Substance, for otherwise some substances will have more substantiality than others, and this is im-

30. "ἀξιοὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μερικὴν οὐσίαν τῆς καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι οὐσίαν, διότι μάλιστα, φησίν, ἢ ἄτομος οὐσία φανερώτερον ποιεῖ τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ περ ἢ καθόλου οὐσία" (138.193-95).

31. "ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῆς καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους, ἐν μὲν διότι ἐγγύτερον ἐστὶ τῆς μάλιστα οὐσίας, ἢτοι τῆς ἀτόμου, τὸ εἶδος παρὰ τὸ γένος, δευτερον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ εἰπὼν τὸ εἶδος μᾶλλον δηλοῖ τὸν Σωκράτην ἢ ὁ εἰπὼν τὸ γένος ..." (138.198-202).

32. "ὥστε ἐξ ὧν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπιχειρεῖ διδῶσιν ἡμῖν συμβαλεῖν ὡς μᾶλλον οὐσίαν καλεῖ τὴν μᾶλλον οὐσίαν ἐξαγγελτικὴν καὶ ἐρμηνευτικὴν τοῦ προκειμένου παρὰ [retaining Hergentöther's text] τὴν ἐνδεῶς πράττουσαν τοῦτο. πῶς δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐρμηνευτικὸν καὶ ἐξαγγελτικὸν τοῦ προκειμένου ἢ ὅλως οὐσία δύνανται ἐννοηθῆναι ἢ μᾶλλον οὐσία, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος σκοποῦ διελέγχειν" (138.203-7).

possible. The question is, then, which of the two Photios wants to eliminate. His phrasing may seem to suggest that he wants to eliminate “that which is more expressive”, i.e. individuals. One problem with this is, of course, that if individuals are eliminated, some universals (species) will still have more substantiality than others (genera); and this is, again, impossible. In addition, it may seem a priori reasonable to eliminate those items in the category which differ by defect rather than those which differ by excess, and individuals are after all held by Aristotle to be pre-eminently substantial. So there seems to be some reason to think that Photios wants to eliminate universals.

But there is more reason to think that he does not. For even if Photios concedes to Aristotle that the distinction of prior and posterior is present in individuals and universals, it is far from clear that he agrees on their relative order. He tantalisingly says that he has dealt with the question as to whether Aristotle was right or wrong in calling the individual primary and the universal secondary in another work,³³ but his repeated emphasis on the fact that these are *Aristotle's* terms suggests that he thought he was wrong. And even if the original problem would remain unsolved in a category consisting of universals on different levels of universality, there is also the option of retaining only universals *on a certain level*. Why not, for instance, only *infimae species*? Photios ends his first discussion of the non-synonymy of primary and secondary substance in section 5 by telling us that

each of these are called ‘substance’ in accordance with different concepts, and generic Substance is much rather <called ‘substance’> in accordance with *yet another* <concept>.³⁴

A couple of lines later (in sect. 6) he tries to explain what he has in mind:

33. “εἰ δὲ καλῶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἢ μὴ τὴν μὲν πρώτην οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ἐκάλεσεν, ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐ παρέργως εἴρηται” (138.103–4).

34. “... ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκατέρα τούτων κέκληται οὐσία, καὶ πολλῶν πλέον τι καθ’ ἑτέραν πάλιν ἢ γενικῆ” (138.101–2).

It is necessary to know the following, which I almost overlooked: there is *another thing* ready to use besides the enumerated significations of ‘substance’, and this is the species proximate to the individuals, according to which this human being as well as this horse, although they are same-substantial with respect to the common definition of the substance, all the same we know them to be and call them other-substantial when referring them to this signification. The latter we are also wont to call ‘nature’. According to this concept, then, we affirm Socrates and Plato to be same-natured, but any particular human being to be other-natured than his horse. Thus, the significations of substance hitherto reviewed would be nine in number.³⁵

This is exactly the sense in which Photios uses ‘substance’ also in *Amphilochia* 77.61–63,³⁶ and no doubt in other passages too. It is a sense which he is likely to have conceived of as specifically Christian. For that is how it is described in John of Damascus’ *Dialectica* 31. According to John, the distinction made by the pagan philosophers between substance and nature was not upheld by the Holy Fathers. They, in contrast, used the words ‘substance’, ‘nature’, and ‘form’ (μορφή) interchangeably for the most specific species, i.e. *angel, man, horse* and the like. Particular entities, such as Peter and Paul, they called ‘individual’, ‘person’, and ‘hypostasis’. The hypostasis, as described by the Damascene, “is such as to have substance with accidents, to subsist independently, and to be envisaged by sense-perception, i.e. in actuality”.³⁷

35. “Εκείνο δὲ εἶδέναι χρῆ, ὃ μικροῦ παρέδραμεν ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰ κατηγορηθῆναι σημαίνοντα οὐσίας πρόχειρον ἐν τῇ χρήσει, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ προσεχέστατον τοῖς ἀτόμοις εἶδος, καθ’ ὃ καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἵππον, ὁμοουσίους ὄντας τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ, ὅμως εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀναφέροντες τὸ σημαίνοντα ἕτερουσίους ἴσμεν τε καὶ ὀνομάζομεν. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ φύσιν εἰθίσμεθα λέγειν· καθ’ ἣν ἔννοιαν καὶ Σωκράτην μὲν Πλάτωνι ὁμοφυῆ φαμεν εἶναι, τὸν δεῖνα δὲ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἵππου ἕτεροφυᾶ. ὥστε ἐννεῖα τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶη ἂν τὰ ἀνακύψαντα τέως τῆς οὐσίας σημαίνοντα” (138.105–113).

36. “Ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τυχὸν σωματικὸν μὲν, ὅτι τὸν Σωκράτην ἢ τὸν Πλάτωνα σῶμα ὄντα ὀνομάζει, καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἀναπτύσσων τῶν ὁμογενῶν τῇ κλήσει διαστέλλει.”

37. “Ὅτι μὲν ἔξω φιλόσοφοι κατὰ τὸν προλελεγμένον λόγον διαφορὰν εἶπον οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως Οἱ δὲ ἄγιοι πατέρες παρεάσαντες τὰς πολλὰς ἐρεσχελίας τὸ μὲν κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενον ἦγον τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ μορφήν ἐκάλεσαν, οἷον ἄγγελον, ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, κῦνα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα Τὸ δὲ μερικὸν ἐκάλεσαν ἄτομον καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ

I think this is most probably the sense of ‘substance’ that Photios wished to reserve for the category of Substance. At any rate this seems to be the hypothesis that best accords with the quoted passages from sections 5 and 6, at the same time as it charitably credits Photios with an account of Substance which escapes his own criticism of Aristotle’s account. Thus I think he equated the self-existing thing with the *infima species*. This appears to commit him to the view that an *infima species* could in principle exist independently, without individuating matter or accidents. Such a view may seem exceedingly strange; yet the equation is borne out by Photios’ first examples of self-existing thing, namely “*man, ox, fire, earth and the like*” (138.28–29). Possibly the awkwardness can be mitigated by the assumption that Photios considers ‘substance’ in this context to refer to words signifying things rather than the things themselves. In that case the formula in section 2 might be taken not as a formula of Substance, but quite literally of that which is said to be a substance (λέγεται οὐσία: 138.26), i.e. the subject of substantial predication. Nothing prevented Photios from identifying this as the individual, even if he denied that it itself was a substance; and Substance would then simply be anything which is substantially predicated of the self-existing thing.

The above-quoted passage from John of Damascus also furnishes a clue as to what sort of entity Photios thought individuals were, if they were not substances. Most probably, he thought they were hypostases. And most probably he had an ulterior motive for trying to put hypostases and substances in different categories, namely to harmonize Aristotelian logic with Orthodox Christian theology, but it would lead us too far to embark on that discussion here.³⁸

As for the higher-level universals that he also (if my interpretation is correct) wants to eliminate from the category of Substance, there is little point in speculating about what destiny Photios has in mind for them. If he believes, as I have argued, that the categories

ὑπόστασιν οἷον Πέτρος, Παῦλος. Ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις θέλει ἔχειν οὐσίαν μετὰ συμβεβηκότων καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ αἰσθήσει ἡγουν ἐνεργεῖα θεωρεῖσθαι” (*Dialectica* 31).

38. The relation of Photios’ Aristotelianism to his ‘philosophical theology’ is the subject of Anton 1994.

are strictly speaking the highest genera of being, then obviously the higher-level universals either have to be pressed into one or more of the nine categories already existing alongside Substance (presumably Quality), or else a category of Genus must be specially established. In either case, since the higher-level universals are of varying degrees of universality (or generality), the number of categories will multiply. Which is anyway a necessary consequence of the view that I have ascribed to Photios, since there are individuals and universals in all the categories. But as I said, there is little point in speculating.

To sum up, then, Photios criticizes Aristotle's account of Substance for bringing together two different things, which cannot belong to the same genus in the strict sense. "For how", he exclaims,

can the name be synonymous or the formula of the essence be one and the same of things which have ... completely unrelated and conflicting characteristics?³⁹

His central argument seems to be that in order for all substances to belong to the same genus, they cannot, as Aristotle claims, have different degrees of substantiality. This would create a hierarchy or an ordered series, and an ordered series cannot constitute a genus. Their degree of substantiality, according to Aristotle, is in inverse proportion to their level of universality. Either, then, (a) all universals on all levels have to be put on a par with individuals, or (b) all universals on all levels have to be eliminated (leaving only the so-called primary substances in the category of Substance), or (c) the individuals *plus* all universals on all levels *but one* must be eliminated. But (a) is impossible, since individuals and universals on different levels are after all not equally expressive. In the choice between (b) and (c) it seems that Photios, on the authority of the Fathers, opts for (c), and more specifically, for the view that the category of Substance really consists exclusively of *infimae species*.

39. "ὅν γὰρ τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τὸ δοκοῦν εἶναι μάλιστα κοινὸν ὄνομα παντελῶς ἐστὶν ξένα καὶ ἠλλοτριωμένα, τούτων πῶς ἂν εἴη συνώνυμος ἢ ὀνομασία ἢ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος;" (138.190-93)

Is this criticism valid to any extent? I think it should be granted to Photios that, *assuming* that Aristotle thinks of the category of Substance as a highest genus in the strict sense, he might be hard pressed to say what it is that entitles us to subsume both individuals and universals under it. It seems very doubtful, however, that Aristotle really would have thought of his categories in this way. Apart from everything else (such as the fact that most pseudo-differentiae of Substance are either not necessary or not sufficient conditions for substantiality), the first remark of *Categories* 8 is that Quality is a homonym, which seems to suggest that it is not strictly speaking a genus; and the final remark of the same chapter, if authentic, even opens up the possibility for things to belong to more than one category (incidentally and problematically called ‘genus’ in this context).⁴⁰

But regardless of its merits or demerits, what we want to know is whether there is anything original about Photios’ criticism. So is there? Yes and no. There seem to be no extant Greek ancient commentaries (or any other texts) in which similar criticism is actually levelled against Aristotle. That should be enough for our present purposes, since, in order to ascertain whether Photios’ criticism was influential with later writers, we only need to be able to exclude the possibility that any later writers who respond to his arguments, be it positively or negatively, draw on earlier sources. But it deserves to be noted anyway that there *are* ancient passages in which similar criticism forms part of the background against which Aristotle’s account is discussed—and for the most part defended. Most important among these is Plotinus’ famous discussion of the genera of being in *Ennead* 6.1–3.⁴¹

In the beginning of this discussion, Plotinus raises a problem, which is likely to originate from the Middle Platonist Nicostratus:⁴² (1) is it possible to conceive of Substance as one single genus? For if, Plotinus says (6.1.2), this genus is supposed to cover both the

40. On this remark, see the classic discussion in Frede 1987.

41. My interpretation of Plotinus is much indebted to de Haas 2001. See also Strange 1987.

42. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 76.13–14.

intelligible and the sensible realms, it will be predicated of both intelligible and sensible substances; but since intelligible substances are prior to sensible ones, this will violate the rule that there can be no genus of an ordered series.⁴³ Moreover, the genus will be neither corporeal nor incorporeal, which is impossible. Plotinus then proceeds to investigate (2) the possibility of a genus of sensible Substance only. But the result is again negative, for on the one hand (2a) form, matter and their compound are all said to be substances, but not in the same degree; on the other hand, (2b) so-called secondary Substance cannot have anything in common with primary Substance, since it derives the name of ‘substance’ from it. That is to say, the different kinds of sensible Substance, too, constitute ordered series. Plotinus’ conclusion is that even though it may be possible to give characteristics of Substance, it cannot be said *what* it is. That is to say, ‘substance’ cannot be defined, not for the trivial reason that Substance is a highest genus, but because it is strictly speaking not a genus at all. Indeed, Plotinus even casts doubt on whether one of the two characteristics recognized by Photios to be properties in the strict sense, namely, to be numerically one and still be able to receive contraries, will be applicable to all substances. In 6.1.3 he goes on to suggest that an Aristotelian category must be a different type of collection, with a looser kind of unity than a genus: such, for instance, that all its members share some important characteristics with all or some of its other members, even if not a definition or formula of the essence. No doubt he is right.

Plotinus’ discussion obviously played a role in the history of the interpretation of Aristotle’s *Categories*. This is amply testified by Dexippus’ and Simplicius’ commentaries, both of which are heavily indebted (directly or indirectly) to Porphyry’s reaction to it (in his *Commentary to Gedalios*).⁴⁴ As Plotinus hinted, the impossibility of a genus including both intelligible and sensible substances told

43. “ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπὶ τε τῶν πρώτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων οὐκ ὄντος γένους κοινοῦ ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον” (6.1.1.26–28).

44. Dexippus, *In Cat.* 40.13–41.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 76.13–78.3. Hadot (1990) argued that Dexippus followed Porphyry and Simplicius followed Iamblichus in these parallel passages; Iamblichus, on the other hand, “for the most part copied Porphyry’s commentary to the very letter” (Simplicius, *In Cat.* 2.10–11).

strongly in favour of the traditional view (Ps.-Archytas, Boethus) that Aristotle's account was only concerned with the sensible realm. Most later commentators saw no problem with this. All that was needed was an explanation as to why it should be thus restricted, and this was provided by Porphyry's theory that the proper subject matter of the *Categories* was significant words.

Both Dexippus and Simplicius seem to consider Porphyry's theory sufficient to dispose of Plotinus' first problem. But neither acknowledges the fact that Plotinus had already examined the hypothesis of a genus of sensible Substance only and arrived at a negative conclusion, on the ground that the different kinds of sensible Substance, too, be they compound, form, and matter, or universals and individuals, constitute ordered series, and there can be no genus of an ordered series. Perhaps this indicates that Porphyry, too, passed over this part of Plotinus' discussion in silence.

It is not clear whether the problem of the synonymy of primary and secondary substances antedates Plotinus. It seems to have left no traces in the commentary tradition between Plotinus and Photios. However, if Photios was convinced of its urgency by his reading of Plotinus, he apparently was not too impressed by Plotinus' solution: it is his insistence on the understanding of a category as a highest genus in the strict sense which makes it necessary for him to eliminate universals from the category of Substance.

In sum, then, if we find any later responses to this problem, we may be fairly certain that they were provoked by the reading of Photios. So do we? Before I try to answer this question, I think it may be useful to summarize briefly the fortuna of Aristotle's *Categories* in Byzantium. Fortunately, this can be done without much effort, thanks to the recent publication of a very handy and to all appearances reliable account of 'The Byzantine Reception of Aristotle's *Categories*' by Katerina Ierodiakonou (2005), on which I will draw heavily for the next few paragraphs. I shall only make a couple of insignificant corrections and additions of my own.

Most of the relevant texts can be divided into three genres: (1) sets or collections of scholia; (2) summaries or compendia; (3) treatises on particular topics related to the *Categories*. In addition to these, there are three works that stand out as being on a larger scale

than the rest, namely (a) Sophonias' hybrid paraphrase, composed around 1300 (edited by Hayduck 1883); (b) George Pachymeres' long commentary on the *Organon* (unedited: not to be confused with Book I of his *Philosophia*, which belongs to genre 2);⁴⁵ and (c) George Scholarios' (the later patriarch Gennadios II) even longer commentary on the *Ars vetus*, from the early to mid-1430s (edited by Jugie & al. 1936). I will briefly return to Scholarios' commentary towards the end of the paper.

Of (1) sets or collections of scholia, the oldest is of course version (a) of Photios' commentary, which still awaits its first critical edition (see n. 3 above). As I have already mentioned, both Hergenröther and Westerink believed that version (a) had been excerpted not from the *Clear Summary* but from an older commentary ('commentariolus', Westerink; 'compendium', Hergenröther). The only reason for thinking that there has been such an older commentary seems to be that Photios occasionally in the *Clear Summary* claims to have dealt with a question in more detail elsewhere.⁴⁶ These claims may of course refer to other independent essays rather than to another commentary (indeed, if these questions were considered by Photios to merit discussion in a commentary on the *Categories*, there is no reason why he would omit them in the *Clear Summary*). Apart from that, it should be noted how different the two versions are not only in length but especially in orientation. Most of those sections of the *Clear Summary* which are not also included in version (a) either express criticism (sects. 5, 13-14) or present material which is not strictly Aristotelian (sects. 1-3, 6). The only exception is sect. 11. Those sections which *are* also included in version (a) have in some cases been adapted in such a way as to lend support to the critical argument (sects. 9 and 12), or at least facilitate its flow (thus the sections on the characteristics of Substance have been rearranged: in version (a) they naturally follow the Aristotelian order). Conversely, version (a) contains only quite neutral explanatory material. Especially, it entirely lacks any discussion of the non-synonymy of Substance—the closest it gets is when Photios points up the contrast

45. See Golitsis 2007: 54-56.

46. *Amph.* 138.104; 138.114; 141.22-23; 146.35-36.

between the general scope of John of Damascus' definition and the applicability of Aristotle's pseudo-differentiae (which are also called 'definitions') only to individual and universal substance respectively (771–72 n. 28). In sum, my impression is that Hergenröther and Westerink were very probably right in thinking that the *Clear Summary* is more recent than version (a); but the hypothesis that version (a) stems from a continuous commentary or compendium seems unfounded and superfluous.

In the generation after Photios we find Arethas of Patras (d. after 932), later archbishop of Caesarea, filling the margin of his personal copy of Aristotle's *Organon*, preserved to us as Vaticanus Urbinas graecus 35, with annotations on the *Isagoge* and *Categories* 1–5. These were edited in 1994 by Michael Share. Then we have, from the late 12th or early 13th century, Leon Magentenos' scholia, which cover the whole *Organon*, and are provided with prefaces for each Aristotelian work: of the *Categories* scholia only two specimens have been edited, by Sten Ebbesen (1975: 383–384; 1981: 2: 278–279). And finally, a single autograph manuscript dated to 1393/94 (Angelicus graecus 30) preserves the Cretan monk (Joseph) Philagrios' contribution to the genre.

(2) Summaries of the *Categories* are in some cases part of more comprehensive compendia, such as the so-called Anonymus Heiberg's *Logica et Quadrivium* of 1007 (ed. Heiberg 1929). Other examples include Nikephoros Blemmydes' *Epitome logica* from the mid-13th century (ed. Wegelin, in Migne: PG 142), and George Pachymeres' *Philosophia* from around 1300 (last edition of Book 1 on the *Organon*: Oxford 1666). Three works relating to the *Categories* are printed by John Duffy among the *incerta et spuria* in Michael Psellos' *Philosophica minora*, one (opusc. 52) being a short compendium of the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione* and the first seven chapters of the *Prior Analytics*, the second (opusc. 50) an even shorter one of the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*, and the third (opusc. 51) something more like a running commentary on the two last-mentioned works (middle-distance track, I guess, since it runs, in fact, to about 750 lines).

(3) Among the genuine works of Psellos we find a handful of short treatises on particular topics related to the *Categories* (ed. Duffy, opusc. 6–9); similar treatises were also composed by Psellos' pupil

and successor John Italos (*Quaestiones quodlibetales* 25–27, 35, 72 Joannou). Then, in one of his letters, Theodore Prodromos in the mid-12th century advanced a series of arguments against Aristotle's views in *Categories* 6 that *large* and *small* are (a) relatives and (b) not contraries. This text was edited by Paul Tannery in 1887.

There, I think I have mentioned practically all the works that we have on the *Categories* written in Greek from the ninth century to the fall of Constantinople. Obviously, their quantity, in number and in bulk, is not very impressive; on the whole I think the same could be said of their quality. So is it possible to trace any Photian influence on the account of substance in any of these texts? Many of them do in fact reproduce the definition of John of Damascus, and some of them immediately add a Porphyrian tree in the same way that Photios did. I do not know of any earlier works that follow exactly the same pattern, so it may be the case that Photios set an example in this respect. However, if one looks carefully at the wording of the definition, one will find that it nearly always exhibits a variant reading, which is found in other passages in John of Damascus, but not in Photios.⁴⁷ So obviously Photios is not the source of that.⁴⁸

And it never really goes beyond this formal and imperfect resemblance. I have browsed through most of the printed works included in the list above in search of a discussion of the non-synonymy of substance that might seem to bear some relation to that of Photios, but my results have been very poor indeed. One has to go beyond the pale of works primarily and properly dealing with the *Categories*, namely to the great controversy over the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle in the mid-fifteenth century, in order to find some discussion at least of the relative order of individuals and universals; but the only thing that emerges clearly from this discussion is that some authors, notably George Gemistos Plethon, now chose to ignore

47. Instead of ὑπαρξιν (n. 17 above) they have οὐσιασιν. This is true of all the edited works on the *Categories*. The only texts in TLG corresponding exactly to Photios are *Suda*, ο 961.15; Nikephoros Gregoras, *Historia Romana*, vol. 2, 952.12; vol. 3, 309.13; *Antirrhetika priora* 2.6, 325.5–6; 333.23–24.

48. Both Anonymus Heiberg and Psellos discuss the Damascene's definition: see Ierodiakonou 2005: 26–27.

one basic lesson taught by most ancient Greek commentators, namely that the secondary substances in the *Categories* were not Platonic Forms.⁴⁹

Both Plethon and his most formidable adversary, George Scholarios, were well aware of the rule that there can be no genus of an ordered series. Plethon denied its validity: neither primary and secondary bodies, nor different numbers nor indeed being things in general, he maintained, are said to be what they are (i.e. bodies, numbers, and being) homonymously (*De differentiis* 323.5–324.27). To this Scholarios replied, in his *Defence of Aristotle*, that the postulate of a highest genus of being synonymously predicated of all being things is both impossible and unnecessary: Aristotle was right in thinking that being is predicated analogically of all being things with reference to a single ultimate cause, which is God (Jugie: 4.44.21–54.24). However, neither Plethon nor Scholarios discusses the application of the rule to primary and secondary Substance.

The level of discussion was not always very high. An example is Plethon's suggestion (*De differentiis* 325.16–23) that assigning a higher degree of being to particulars (τὸ κατὰ μέρος) than to universals (τὸ καθόλου) is tantamount to admitting that a part (τὸ μέρος) can be larger than a whole (τὸ ὅλον). This was attacked by Theodore of Gaza, who pointed out that there is a difference between size and degree of substance (*Adversus Plethonem* 3.2). Plethon was already dead by then, but Michael Apostoles responded on his behalf, denying any relevant difference in meaning between the words μάλλον and μᾶλλον, and maintaining that anyone who affirmed such a difference must be deluded by the Western scholars, who try to philosophize without even mastering the language (*Ad Theodori Gazae* 6.1–3).

Since the history of the *Categories* in Byzantium is bookended by two famous patriarchs, it would of course be especially nice to find some traces of Photios' discussion in the commentary by George Scholarios (which is after all the most extensive *Categories* commentary written in Byzantium). Some of Scholarios' questions (ζητήματα) inevitably touch upon matters having to do with the unity of Sub-

49. See Plethon, *De differentiis* 324.28–325.23 and George Scholarios' reply (Jugie: 4.60.1–63.6). See also Woodhouse 1986, 195–96; 253).

stance as a category, but never in a way which reveals the influence of his illustrious predecessor. For instance, Scholarios replies to the question why Aristotle does not start with generic substance, defining and dividing this as he does with all the other categories, by saying that this is precisely what he does: the distinction between one kind of substance ‘neither being said of nor being in a subject’ and another kind of substance ‘being said of but not being in a subject’ is the first division of substance generally (Jugie: 7.140.27–35). By implication, then, ‘not being in a subject (but having existence *per se*)’ is the common formula of substance (cf. Jugie: 7.153.6–7). But he never quotes the definition of John of Damascus.

Also, Scholarios attributes to Porphyry (cf. *Isagoge* 4.21–25) the view that “substance is a genus of material and immaterial substances.” He himself agrees with this view, but adds that they are only in the same logical genus (since they have a common formula apart from the formula of the differentiae, which is to have existence *per se*), not in the same physical genus, since they do not have a common matter (Jugie: 7.139.17–24).

I suspect that these replies owe more to the ‘Western scholars’ than to the Byzantine tradition. I have not made any attempt to track down their sources, but it was shown by Sten Ebbesen and Jan Pinborg that a very large proportion of the material in all parts of Scholarios’ *Ars vetus* commentary derives from Radulphus Brito’s *Quaestiones super Artem veterem*.⁵⁰ This may well be the case also with his questions on Substance. They do not show any influence from Photios, that much is clear.

To conclude our investigation: even if the possibility must be left open that the results presented here will be contradicted by new findings in one or other of the unedited Byzantine works on the *Categories*, it seems as though Photios’ treatment of Substance on chap. 138 of the *Amphilochia* met with the same fate as his discussions of other categories in *Amphilochia* 142 and 145. It was ignored by posterity. One might be tempted to speculate that this had something to do with precisely the fact that his discussions do display more than a modicum of originality; but of course it might also have been

50. See Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981–82.

simply because they were buried in a mainly theological miscellany that few if any later authors would think of consulting when writing an Aristotelian commentary or compendium.

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CHAPTER 2

Aristotle and the Icon: The use of the *Categories* by Byzantine iconophile writers

Ken Parry

Introduction

The use of Aristotelian logic terminology in the writings of Byzantine defenders of images during the iconoclast controversy has not received the attention it deserves. I included a chapter on the subject in my monograph *Depicting the Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries* published in 1996,¹ but as far as I am aware not much work has been done since. My intention here is to draw attention to an interesting but largely neglected aspect of the iconoclast controversy by revising and updating my earlier contribution.

The period of iconoclasm in the eighth and ninth centuries marked a turning point in Byzantine history. It changed the relationship between church and state, and gave rise to a flowering of art and architecture which we now associate with Byzantium in the middle ages. This in turn impacted upon the Latin West and Islamic worlds, as well as shaping the future of Eastern Europe and Russia. While this is well known, the writings of those who came to the defence of icons, and therefore to the defence of anthropomorphic art in Christianity, are perhaps not so well known, and indeed the arguments of the iconophiles have only begun to be re-examined in more recent times.

1. Marie-José Mondzain has published articles and translated into French the writings of the Patriarch Nikephoros dealing with Aristotelian logic terminology, see Mondzain 1989. See also Mondzain 2005.

Iconoclasm

In Constantinople during the eighth and ninth centuries a total of six emperors promulgated and imposed a policy of iconoclasm on the Byzantine church and state.² Leo III (r. 717-741), the instigator of the policy around 726, broke the Arab siege of Constantinople in 717 and gained a reputation as a strong military leader. He is reported to have declared: "I am both emperor and priest."³ His motives for introducing iconoclasm remain largely unknown as very few words of his own have come down to us, and those that have are probably not authentic. In the reputed correspondence between Leo III and the Umayyad caliph 'Umar II (r. 717-720), the emperor favours veneration of the cross and finds no scriptural justification for the practice of venerating images.⁴ With his son Constantine V (r. 741-775), however, we are on firmer ground. Three of his so-called theological 'investigations' (πεύσεις) were incorporated into the writings of the ninth-century iconophile and deposed patriarch of Constantinople, Nikephoros (r. 806-815). And the Definition (*Horos*) of the Iconoclast Council of Heireia (an Asiatic suburb of Constantinople) convened by Constantine V in 754 was preserved in the proceedings of the Seventh Ecumenical Council held at Nicaea in 787.

The Second Council of Nicaea in 787 was convened by the empress Irene in order to overthrow the iconoclast policies of her own ruling dynasty, but nowhere do the bishops of this council condemn the imperial authorities, preferring instead to blame those within the ranks of the church. The *Horos* of 754 does at least give us the official pronouncements of the iconoclast bishops who attended that synod and some insight into their thinking.⁵ The proceedings of a second iconoclast council held in Constantinople in 815 are also preserved, this time in the writings of the patriarch Nikephoros.⁶

2. For background and sources for the period, see Brubaker & Haldon 2001. See also id. 2011, in which our theme is briefly discussed on pp. 375 and 785.

3. On the question of 'caesaropapism' in Byzantium, see Dagron 2003.

4. See Jeffrey 1944.

5. See text in Krannich, Schubert & Sode 2002.

6. Edited by J. Featherstone in 1997.

Apart from some acrostic poems and a few other fragments, that is the sum total of iconoclast literature known to have survived.

Iconoclasm means the breaking of images, in particular those images considered to be sacred and venerated in the icon cult. This movement saw the destruction of many icons and wall paintings in Byzantine churches, and the imprisonment and martyrdom of several leading iconophiles. Under pressure from the authorities, both imperial and ecclesiastical, many secular clergy and some monastics went over to the iconoclast side. But it was mainly the monks who remained steadfast in their support of the icons and their veneration, and it was from among their ranks that most of the resistance to iconoclasm came.

The patriarchate of Constantinople was compromised by the intervention of the iconoclast emperors who promoted their own supporters to positions in the church hierarchy. The iconoclast patriarchs of Constantinople were criticised not only by the popes of Rome, but by the Greek patriarchs in Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem, who were living by this time under the Umayyad caliphate. In fact both Rome and the Eastern patriarchs consistently condemned the iconoclast emperors for their support of an unorthodox teaching. This was not the first time that Byzantine emperors had promulgated heretical doctrines, as John of Damascus (ca. 675-749) reminded his readers when defending the cult of icons in the eighth century.⁷

John knew that the emperor Valens in the fourth century had supported Arianism, and that the emperors Zeno and Anastasius in the fifth and sixth centuries had favoured the non-Chalcedonians, and that Heraclius and Constans II had promoted Monothelitism in the seventh century. As each of these emperors had supported heretical doctrines for political ends, John viewed Leo III as the instigator of yet another heresy and condemned him for writing his own gospel according to Leo.⁸ Although he does not use the term, John could see that 'caesaropapism' was alive and well in the Byzan-

7. John of Damascus, *Contra imaginum calumniatores*, p. 114.

8. John of Damascus, *Contra imaginum calumniatores*, pp. 113-114.

tine state. His condemnation of Leo III was known to the Iconoclast Council of 754 because he was anathematised by the bishops at that council and his Arab name Mansur was ridiculed.⁹

First Iconoclasm

Mention of John of Damascus brings us to the most important iconophile writer from the first period of iconoclasm. John wrote not only three works in defence of icons and their veneration, but in his work the *Fount of Knowledge* (*Πηγή Γνώσεως*) he included a section known as the *Dialectica*, in which he provides an introduction to philosophical terminology useful to the Christian theologian.¹⁰ The *Dialectica* is in fact largely a handbook of Aristotelian philosophical terminology and it contains several chapters based on the *Categories*.¹¹ This was the most comprehensive text of its kind written in Greek in the eighth century, and subsequently became influential in both the Byzantine and Latin medieval worlds.

There are in fact two versions of the *Dialectica*, a shorter version (*Dialectica brevior*) probably compiled first, and a longer version (*Dialectica fusior*) which is largely a reworking of the earlier version.¹² In the longer version John arranges the material from the *Categories* into various chapters. In chapter 49, for example, he lists the ten categories in the Aristotelian order: substance, quantity, relation, quality, place, time, state, position, action and passion. He then discusses each category individually in chapters 49-57. He again lists the ten categories in chapter 37 and says that except for the first one, substance, all the rest are accidents.¹³

But having mentioned John's interest in Aristotle, we must now point out that he himself does not use the terminology of the *Categories* in his three apologies in defence of the icons. It would seem that these three works were written early in his life at the monastery of

9. Krannich et al. 2002: 69.

10. On the Arab Muslim context of John's writings see Parry 2003 and Griffith 2008. Louth 2002 situates John in his Byzantine rather than in his Melkite environment.

11. The main study of the *Dialectica* is still Richter 1964.

12. Louth 2002: ch. 4.

13. John of Damascus, *Dialectica*, pp. 113-129; 104.

Mar Sabas in Palestine, and that the *Dialectica*, as part of the tripartite *Fount of Knowledge*, was written towards the latter part of his life. So we cannot point to his use of the *Categories* in relation to his iconophile writings. However, the situation changed during the second period of iconoclasm in the ninth century, when we find several iconophiles using terminology from the *Categories* in their defence of Christian images.

Before turning to second iconoclasm, however, we should mention that there are several anonymous handbooks and epitomes of logic terminology from the sixth and seventh centuries.¹⁴ These are based in part upon the writings of the Alexandrian Neoplatonist school of Ammonius, Olympiodorus and David, but go back ultimately, of course, to Porphyry and Aristotle. They are Christianised logic handbooks for use in private schools or other institutions of learning. I hesitate to use the word ‘university’ as much controversy surrounds the question of whether such an institution of higher learning can be identified in Constantinople in this period.¹⁵ However, an example from one of these handbooks will suffice to demonstrate its Christian character.

The particular text in question is dated to the seventh century and provides the following definition of a homonym: “An homonym is when two things have one name in common, such as an image of Paul and Paul himself, for both are called a man, but they only have the name in common, while they differ as far as the thing is concerned.”¹⁶ It can be seen from this how Aristotle’s original example of a man and a picture has been Christianised by substituting the name of Paul. However, this definition differs in a more fundamental way from that given by Aristotle himself.

In the opening passage of the *Categories* he writes:

14. These are discussed by Mossman Roueché in a series of articles (Roueché 1974, 1980, 1990).

15. See Speck 1974.

16. Roueché 1974: 72: “Ὁμόνομον ἔστιν, ὅταν δύο πράγματα μόνῳ ὀνόματι κοινωνοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ εἰκόνας καὶ τοῦ Παύλου· τὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι κοινωνοῦσι, τῷ δὲ πράγματι διαφέρουσι.”

When things have only a name in common and the definition of being (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. They have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different.¹⁷

It is the phrase *λόγος τῆς οὐσίας* which is missing from the seventh century text. There were in fact two distinct versions of this passage, both claimed as genuine, recorded by ancient commentators.¹⁸ The difference between the two versions was that one included this key expression, and it is this version that we find being used by ninth-century iconophiles.

In addition we have from the seventh century commentaries on parts of the *Categories* by Anastasius of Sinai and Maximus the Confessor.¹⁹ And to complete the picture, after iconoclasm we find the patriarch Photius (r. 858-867 and 877-886), in the second half of the ninth century, commenting on the *Categories* in his *Amphilochia*.²⁰ This interest in Aristotle was probably shared at the time by Leo the Mathematician and Constantine the Philosopher, better known by his monastic name Cyril, of the brothers Cyril and Methodius fame. From this it is possible to assert that there was an on-going interest in the *Categories* in Byzantium both before and after iconoclasm. It is important to note this because most scholars have concluded that it is only in the second half of the ninth century, with the revival of learning under Photius, that knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy is again apparent in the Greek-speaking world. We need, however, to push this so-called 'revival of learning' back into the second half of the eighth century.²¹

17. Cat. 1a. See Anton 1968.

18. See Anton 1969.

19. Anastasius of Sinai, *Hodegos*, PG 89: 52B-53C, ed. Uthemann 23-75; Maximus the Confessor, *Opuscula theologica et polemica*, PG 91: 149B-153B; 213A-216A; 260D-268A.

20. Photius, *Amphilochia* 127-147. On the reception of the *Categories* from Photius onwards see Ierodiakonou 2005 and chapter 1, above.

21. The German Byzantinist Paul Speck published important articles in the 1980s on the beginnings of this "byzantinische Renaissance". The articles are now available in English in his 2003 collection, XII, XIV; see also Lemerle 1986.

Turning to Syria in the first decades of the ninth century we have the Melkite bishop of Harrān and iconophile, Theodore Abū Qurrah (ca.750-825), to whom is attributed an Arabic translation of some of Aristotle's logical works.²² However, he does not resort to Aristotelian terminology in his *Treatise on the Veneration of the Holy Icons*.²³ Unlike his fellow iconophiles in Byzantium this work is directed at Jewish and Muslim critics of the Christian cult of icons. The defence of icons was after all a Chalcedonian pre-occupation as there is no evidence for an iconoclast movement among so-called 'Miaphysite' and 'Church of the East' Christians under Arab rule in this period.²⁴ The Byzantine iconoclast controversy was largely confined to Constantinople and its sphere of influence, and only indirectly impinged upon the Melkite communities of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Roman pontiffs routinely condemned the iconoclast policy of the Byzantine emperors and their interference in church affairs.

John of Damascus took up the iconophile cause because he was well placed to challenge Byzantine imperial authority from his monastery of Mar Sabas. It is not without irony that he came to the defence of Christian image-making while living under a caliphate that was engaged in promoting an aniconic culture. He would have seen the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem built by the caliph Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705) in 695 and the Great Mosque in Damascus completed by al-Walid (r. 705-715) in 715. Unfortunately, John does not make any reference to these early Islamic buildings, no doubt because he saw them as Byzantine structures and because he viewed Islam as a heretical form of Christianity. Like other Melkites at the time he probably expected the Arabs to be driven out and Byzantine imperial control restored.²⁵

22. Lamoreaux 2002.

23. See Griffith 1997.

24. Miaphysite has replaced 'Monophysite' in recent literature, see Winkler 1997; while Church of the East is a more accurate description than 'Nestorian', see Brock 1996.

25. Reinink 2005, XII. See Alexander 1985 for Byzantine literature of the period dealing with the myth of the last emperor and a restored empire. On the relation of Byzantine iconoclasm to the Arab invasions, see Young 2008.

Second Iconoclasm

The two most important iconophile writers of the second period of iconoclasm are Theodore the Studite and the Patriarch Nikephoros, and both demonstrate familiarity with Aristotelian logic terminology in their writings against the iconoclasts. It is of course the application of logic terminology to the image question, rather than the study of logic per se that interests them. Theodore the Studite takes his name from the Stoudios monastery in Constantinople where he became a monk and later, as abbot (ηγούμενος), a reformer of the Studite rule. He was exiled on two occasions for his criticism of the imperial policy of iconoclasm and from his place of exile in Asia Minor created a centre of iconophile resistance. His letters are an important source for studying this resistance.²⁶

At one point in his work against the iconoclasts Theodore takes a swipe at those who use excessive logic to prove their arguments. He writes: “I shall use some syllogisms to present the subject of my treatise, not indeed with the technical structure of the Aristotelian system, or rather the silliness of it, but with a more simple form of expression, relying on the might of truth.”²⁷ Quite clearly Theodore is aware of the misuse to which the syllogism can be put, but he may also be aiming at its use by heretics. It had become something of a topos for orthodox theologians to accuse heretics of using syllogisms to dress up their arguments.²⁸

The similarity between iconophile and iconoclast methodology during second iconoclasm is exemplified in a letter Theodore the Studite wrote to the (future) iconoclast patriarch, John the Grammarian (r. 835-842). In it he says:

26. Edited by G. Fatouros in 1991.

27. Theodore Studites, *Antirrheticus* III, PG 99: 389A: “Συλλογισμοῖς δὲ πῶς χρῆσομαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσι μὲν ἔντεχνον τὴν πλοκὴν κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστοτελικὴν τεχνολογίαν, εἴτ’ οὖν φλωαρίαν ἀπλοϊκωτέρω δὲ φθέγματι, τῷ κράτει τῆς ἀληθείας ἐρηρησμένοις.”

28. For example, Gregory of Nazianzus against the Neo-Arians, see McGuckin2001: 280, 287.

We are taught according to the definition of philosophy that things are said to be named ‘homonymously’ if, though they have a common name, the definition of being (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) corresponding to the name differs for each, as in Christ and his portrait ...²⁹

It appears from some unedited fragments attributed to John the Grammarian that he too was familiar with this logic terminology and had used it himself in his iconoclastic pronouncements.³⁰ The fact that Theodore the Studite, the Patriarch Nikephoros, and John the Grammarian all show familiarity with this terminology would seem to suggest that it was on the school curriculum which each had studied at one time or another.

This is confirmed by Ignatius the Deacon (ca.795-870) in his *Vita* of the Patriarch Nikephoros in which he stresses his learning in logic and dialectic.³¹ Ignatius also wrote a *Vita* of the patriarch Tarasios (r. 784-806), another iconophile hero, in which he also draws attention to his knowledge of secular learning.³² This is an interesting development and stands in contrast to earlier hagiographies of Byzantine saints. It seems to reflect the urban environment of Constantinople with its opportunities for further education available to aspiring students in the second half of the eighth century. It is of interest too that all these iconophiles grew up during the reign of iconoclast emperors and it suggests that education did not suffer as a result of their policies. The iconoclasts are often portrayed in iconophile sources as enemies of culture and learning, but the evidence from Ignatius does not bear this out. Ignatius himself had been an iconoclast before converting to the iconophile cause and composing hagiographies of iconophile saints, probably in order to appease the authorities after the restoration of icons in 843.³³

29. Theodore Studites, *Epistulae*, Letter 528, vol. ii, p. 790: “ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ φιλοσοφίας ὄρον ὁμώνυμά ἐστι διδασκόμεθα, ὃν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον αὐτὸς Χριστὸς καὶ ὁ ἐγγεγραμμένος”

30. Guillard 1981, VIII.

31. Ignatius Diaconus, *Vita Nicephori*; trl. Fischer ch. 5.

32. Ignatius Diaconus, *Vita Tarasii*, 6-7.

33. Ignatius Diaconus, *Vita Tarasii*, 50.

In an important passage in his *Life* of Nikephoros, Ignatius details the syllabus followed by the patriarch during his student days. As it is too long to quote in full I will select a couple of passages relevant to our theme. It begins:

After he had made distinct and thorough acquaintance with these four handmaidens of true knowledge [viz. the quadrivium], he proceeded directly and unerringly to their mistress, I mean to philosophy, and to the topics considered in philosophy. For he examined in some detail which and how many are the terms of philosophy, and what the particular nature of each of them is, what sort of term serves as a subject and what is the predicate, and whether it is predicated of every or none, or as in a whole, and other similar questions. He studied what ‘elements’ means according to philosophers, and whether it is a homonym of physics and geometry alone. He investigated how many kinds of premisses of a syllogism there are, in what way they are convertible, and what the power of a contradiction is; he studied what kinds of additional predicates there are, which quantifiers there are, and which quantifiers their ‘indefinite’ corresponds to; further, how many modes of syllogism there are, the kinds and number of syllogistic figures, what sort of syllogism is hypothetical, what sort is categorical, and in what way they differ’.³⁴

Here he is clearly referring to instruction in Aristotelian categorical syllogistic supplemented with some training in hypothetical syllogisms.

Although Ignatius’ description of the patriarch’s education is tendentious and somewhat arbitrary, it is nevertheless an important

34. Ignatius Diaconus, *Vita Nicephori* 150: “Ταύταις ταῖς τέσσαρσι θεραπειαῖσι τῆς ὄντως ἐπιστήμης προσομιλήσας σαφέστατα, ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων δέσποιναν, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φημί, καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἐξ ἐτοιμῶν ἐβάδισεν ἀπλανῶς θεωρήματα. τίνες γὰρ ὅροι ταύτης καὶ πόσοι ἐπιεικῶς ἠκριβώσατο, καὶ τίς ἰδιότης αὐτῶν, ποῖος ὑπόκειται, καὶ τί τὸ κατηγορούμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα κατὰ παντός, ἢ οὐδενός, ἢ ἐν ὅλῳ, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. τί ποτε δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα θέλει δηλοῦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ εἰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἢ γεωμετρικῶν ταῦτα μόνων ὁμόνομα· προτάσεις δὲ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς ἀντιστρέφουσι· τίς ἀντιφάσεως δύναμις· τὰ προσκατηγορούμενα δὲ ποῖα, προσδιορισμοὶ δὲ τίνες, καὶ τίσιν ἀναλογεῖ τὸ κατ’ ἐκείνους ἀόριστον, τρόποι δὲ πόσοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν· ὅποια καὶ πόσα τὰ σχήματα· ποῖος ὑποθετικὸς, ποῖος κατηγορικὸς, καὶ τί διαφέρουσι.” The translation above is a modification of Fischer 54-55

witness to a new category of intellectual saints and confessors who require their educational qualifications to be emphasised. The stand taken against iconoclasm by the Patriarch Nikephoros and Theodore the Studite led to their banishment from Constantinople, and in the case of Theodore he was given a hundred strokes of the lash at the age of sixty.³⁵ One of the more famous cases of disfigurement during second iconoclasm was that of the brothers, Theodore and Theophanes Graptoi, two Melkite monks from Palestine. Iambic pentameters were engraved on their foreheads (hence their soubriquet) which drew attention to their Palestinian origins and their unwelcome stay in the imperial capital.³⁶ The saintly sufferings of iconophiles in defiance of the imperial authorities led to their eventual inclusion in the tenth-century *Synaxarion* of Constantinople.³⁷

Particular arguments

We have already mentioned that the opening paragraph of Aristotle's *Categories* begins with the definition of a homonym. The example given by Aristotle of a man and a picture was naturally seized upon by writers wanting to define an image as something distinct from the person it represented. It was introduced to refute the iconoclast definition of an image which maintained that an image needed to be consubstantial with the subject it represented. That is, the only true image was one whose prototype and image were of the same essence (ὁμοούσιος).³⁸ It can be seen from this that iconoclasts and iconophiles were working with different definitions of an image.

But it can also be seen that the iconoclast use of the term 'ὁμοούσιος' had theological overtones and a pedigree in the pronouncements of the ecumenical councils. The iconoclasts deliber-

35. *Vita B*, PG 99: 296A-297C. See Cholij 2002: 58. In a letter of 819 to his exiled monks Theodore describes his imprisonment and beating (Letter 382, *Epistulae*, vol. ii).

36. Parry 2003: 149.

37. 11 November for Theodore the Studite; 13 March and 2 June for Nikephoros, see *Synaxarium ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae: Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Novembris*,

38. Parry 1996: ch. 18.

ately took up the ‘ὁμοούσιος’ vocabulary in developing their image theory because it had become the watchword of ‘orthodoxy’ since the Council of Nicaea in 325, and they were at pains to demonstrate their ‘orthodox’ credentials. The iconoclasts wanted to be seen to be endorsing the traditional teaching of the church, and were anxious to deflect any accusations of ‘innovation’ levelled at them. In working out the implications of their image theory they had in fact only one thing in mind which met their definition of an image, namely the Eucharist. For them the Eucharist was the only true image of Christ because he had said: “This is my body, this is my blood.”³⁹

A form of the ‘ὁμοούσιος’ argument can be seen in the early Christian polemic against pagan idols in which pagans are accused of identifying the statues of their gods with the beings they represent. It was a common Christian assumption that pagans believed the gods dwelt in their statues. This accusation was refuted by the Middle Platonist Celsus in the second century,⁴⁰ and by the Neoplatonist Porphyry in the third century,⁴¹ and interestingly enough the arguments used by Platonists like Celsus and Porphyry to defend the pagan cult of images, were precisely those taken up by Christians later on in defence of their own image cult. The image needed to be distinguished from its archetype in order to avoid the image being mistaken for an idol.

In fact, the distinction between an icon and an idol was made by Christian writers as early as Origen in the third century.⁴² But no Byzantine theologian of the eighth and ninth centuries appears to have known this, and even if they had known it, they would have been unlikely to cite Origen as an authority. After the anathemas against Origen at the Fifth Ecumenical Council convened by Justinian in 553 his name was not one that orthodox thinkers would pronounce.⁴³ In looking around for an authority who could be cited

39. See Gero 1975, Baranov 2010.

40. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, trans. Chadwick, p. 446.

41. Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, trans. Hofmann, p. 85.

42. See Parry 2004.

43. On this see Davis 1987: 245-247.

on this question, the iconophiles turned to Aristotle's definition of a homonym, or at least what came down to them in their handbooks and epitomes.

There was also precedence in the Greek patristic tradition for applying the notion of a homonym in theological and christological discourse.⁴⁴ This was an important source of authority for iconophile writers. In fact, both sides in the controversy compiled extensive florilegia in support of their respective positions.⁴⁵ From an analysis of the patristic quotations in iconophile writings it is possible to assert that the Cappadocian fathers are quoted the most often, especially Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus. But it is also of interest to note the inclusion of seventh century theologians, such as Maximus the Confessor and Leontius of Neapolis.⁴⁶ This is in opposition to the iconoclasts who quote only fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. Thus iconophiles had recourse to more recent authorities than the iconoclasts, and they did not hesitate to draw these into the patristic tradition of the church.

By the time of iconoclasm all theological discourse and conciliar procedure in the East took place on the basis of appeal to the church fathers. The christological debates from the fifth through to the seventh centuries had made it imperative to identify the orthodox fathers of the church, a process begun by Basil the Great in the fourth century. Originally the term 'fathers' was used with reference to the bishops of the Council of Nicaea, but Basil had used the term to refer to ante-Nicene writers as well. He was one of the first to provide a list of patristic authorities in support of a theological position, and he claimed not to be an innovator precisely because he listed writers who were pillars of the church.⁴⁷ This was taken a stage further by Cyril of Alexandria in the fifth century who started the process whereby a canon of select fathers began to take shape.⁴⁸

44. See Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 29, 14.

45. Parry 1996: ch. 15, and also Alexakis 1996.

46. Parry 1996: 155.

47. Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, 29.72-73.

48. Gray 1989.

John of Damascus comes near to the definition of a homonym when he writes: “An image is of like character with its prototype, but with a certain difference. It is not like the prototype in every way.”⁴⁹ In other words, although there is a relationship between an image and its prototype, they are clearly separate and distinguishable. To confuse the two clearly violates the definition of a homonym, although John neither uses the term nor speaks of the difference in terms of *λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*. The definition of an image given by John is more like that used by Porphyry when he writes: “If you make an image of a friend you do not confuse the image with the friend or believe that parts of your friend’s body are incorporated into the representation.”⁵⁰ Porphyry wrote this in his work *Against the Christians* in order to refute the Christian accusation that pagans believed their gods dwelt in their images.

In the sixth century John Philoponus in his work *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World* remarks:

The king himself is the subject of a royal portrait, but this does not mean that a soon as the king exists a portrait of him must also exist. It is one thing for the king *qua* king to be a man, another for him to be the subject of a portrait. Whenever he *is* a subject, then in every case there is also a portrait, just as whenever he becomes a father, a son is always implied as well. But there is not immediately the subject of a portrait as soon as a king exists, just as someone is not immediately a father ... or anything else that falls under [the category of] relatives (*pros ti*).⁵¹

Theodore the Studite applies the category of relatives in a similar way. He writes:

49. John of Damascus, *Contra imaginum calumniatores*, 83-84.

50. Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, p. 85.

51. John Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi* 36.5-15: “τῆς βασιλικῆς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐστὶν παράδειγμα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἅμα τῷ εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ κατ’ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν τῷ βασιλεῖ ἢ βασιλεῖ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, κατ’ ἄλλο δὲ τι εἶναι εἰκόνας παραδείγματι· ὅταν γὰρ ἢ παράδειγμα, τότε σύνεσιν πάντως καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν· ὡσπερ, ὅταν πατὴρ γένηται, συνεπινοεῖται πάντως καὶ ὁ υἱός, οὐ μὴν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι βασιλεὺς εὐθύς ἐστὶν εἰκόνας παράδειγμα, ὡσπερ οὐδ’ ἅμα τῷ εἶναι τις ἄνθρωπος εὐθύς ἐστὶν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δεσπότης ἢ δεξιός ἢ τι τῶν ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι.” Trl. M. Share, 2.36.4-14.

Even if the natural is not simultaneous with the artificial, as Christ with his image, nevertheless by its potential existence even before its iconographic production we can always see the image in Christ: just as, for example, we can see the shadow always potentially accompanying the body, even if it is not given form by the radiation of light. In this manner it is not unreasonable to reckon Christ and his image among things which are simultaneous ... The prototype and the image belong to the category of relatives (*pros ti*), like the double and the half.⁵²

Here we have an echo of *Categories* 7.7b15-17 “Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature; and in most cases this is true. For there is at the same time a double and a half, and when there is a half there is a double” (Ackrill’s trl.).

And the patriarch Nikephoros writes:

Let me say that the icon is related to the archetype and that it is the effect of a cause. Therefore, it is necessary that the icon be one of the relatives (*pros ti*) as well as being called such. Relatives are said to be just what they are of other things, and reciprocate with their correlatives. For example, the father is called the father of his son, and inversely, the son is called the son of his father... Anyone who asserts that the icon does not concern a relation can no longer assert that it is an icon of something.⁵³

These observations are based in part on passages found in *Categories* 7.6a36-37 and 6b28-29. He continues:

52. Theodore Studites, *Antirrheticus* 3.D3-3.D4, PG 99: 429B: “Εἰ καὶ οὐχ ἕμα τὸ φύσει τῷ θέσει, οἷον ὁ Χριστὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνι· ἀλλ’ ὅμως τῷ δυνάμει εἶναι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τεχνικῶς γενέσθαι, ταύτην ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ ἀεὶ ἔστιν ὄρα· ὡς φέρε εἰπεῖν, καὶ τὴν σκιὰν ἀεὶ παρεφυστῶσαν τῷ σώματι, καὶ μὴ φωτὸς βολίδι σχηματίζεται· καθ’ ὃν τρόπον οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος τῶν ἕμα λέγειν Χριστὸν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα. ... Τὸ πρωτότυπον, καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν, τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ἡμισυ.”

53. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 1.30, PG 100: 277CD: “Οὐκ ἄκαιρον δὲ οἶμαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, καὶ τοῦτο προσθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἡ εἰκὼν σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, καὶ αἰτίου ἐστὶν αἰτιατόν· ἀνάγκη οὖν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι τε ταύτην καὶ λέγεσθαι. Τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει τῇ σχέσει πρὸς ἄλληλα· ὥσπερ ὁ πατήρ υἱοῦ πατῆρ, καὶ ἑμπαλιν ὁ υἱὸς πατρὸς λέγεται υἱὸς ... καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις ἄσχετον εἰκόνα τοῦ τινοσ εἰκόνα φαίη.”

The icon and the archetype are introduced and are considered simultaneously, the one with the other. Even if the archetype disappears, the relation does not in the least cease to exist. Indeed, the principle of the simultaneous abolition of the terms of the relationship does not apply in all such cases. There are times, in fact, when relationships are maintained unchanged, even when they are torn away from and deprived of the real terms of that relation, as in the case of the father and son ...⁵⁴

Again the basis for these observations can be found at *Categories* 7b.15-25. And continuing he says:

Making visible, as if it were present, what is absent through similitude and memory of the outward form, the icon preserves the relationship coextended with itself in time. Consequently, then, the resemblance is a kind of middle relation that mediates between extreme terms: I mean the thing resembled and what resembles it, uniting them by the visible form and relating them, even if the terms are different in nature... Moreover, the resemblance confers homonymy on the icon and its archetype. The designation is one and the same for both the icon and the archetype. The icon of the king is called “the king”, and might well say: “the king and I are one”, despite the evident fact that they are different in essence. We have said these things in order to demonstrate the way in which the image, which is considered together with the archetype, is related to it’.⁵⁵

54. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 1.30, PG 100: 280A: “ἅμα γὰρ συνεισάγεται καὶ συνεπιθεορεῖται θατέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον· κἄν που οἴχοιτο τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἀλλ’ ἢ γε σχέσις οὐ συναπολήγει· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὁ τοῦ συναναιρεῖσθαι διήκει λόγος· ἔσθ’ ὅτε γὰρ καὶ αἱ σχέσεις καταλιμπανόμεναι διασώζονται, τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπορφανίζόμεναι καὶ στερόμεναι· ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει.”

55. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 1.30, PG 100: 280AC: “Ὡς παρόντα γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἀποιχόμενον διὰ τε τῆς ἐμφερείας καὶ μνήμης ἢ μορφῆς ἐμφανίζουσα, συμπαρακτεινομένην τῷ χρόνῳ διασώζει τὴν σχέσιν· ἢ γούν ὁμοίωσις σχέσις τις μέση τυγχάνουσα, μεσιτεύει τοῖς ἄκροις, τῷ ὁμοιωμένῳ φημὶ καὶ τῷ ὁμοιούντι, ἐνοῦσα τῷ εἶδει καὶ συνάπτουσα, κἄν τῇ φύσει διήνεγκεν. ... Ἐκ περισσίας δὲ καὶ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν χαρίζεται ἢ ὁμοίωσις· μία γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν ἢ προσηγορία· βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ ἡ βασιλέως εἰκὼν λέγεται· εἶποι δ’ ἄν, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἓν ἔσμεν, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας διάφορον. Ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν εἰρηται, ὥστε παραδείξει τὸν τῆς εἰκότος τρόπον· καθ’ ὃν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον θεωρουμένη, τὴν σχέσιν ἔχει.”

The example of the king or emperor and his portrait is a topos fully exploited in the writings of our iconophiles. Finally the patriarch remarks:

Neither has the image acquired the same identity as the archetype in terms of its essence, nor need everything that is predicated of the archetype qua archetype to be predicable of the image of it. Indeed, the archetype may be animate, while the image is inanimate. The archetype may be rational and able to move, while the image is without reason and motionless. Consequently, these two are not identical, but they are similar to each other in their visible form and dissimilar from each other in essence. It is because the image is one of the relatives that it is glorified together with the glorified archetype, and, inversely, why it is dishonoured along with the dishonoured archetype.⁵⁶

This last remark is linked to a quotation from Basil the Great who wrote, apropos of the emperor and his image: “The honour given to the image passes over to the archetype.”⁵⁷ This quotation was cited by iconophiles to detract attention away from the suggestion that the icon itself is honoured, and thereby an idolatrous act of worship takes place. It is not the icon itself that is venerated but the person depicted in it. Nikephoros’ use of the Aristotelian definition of a homonym maintains the basic Platonic distinction between archetype and image, while at the same time promoting the case for icons as non-ὁμοούσιος and therefore non-idolatrous. From an iconophile point of view the moment the distinction between archetype and image is erased the definition of an icon is compromised. Therefore the iconoclasts’ definition of an icon does not stand up to examination. For Nikephoros the example of the eucharist cited by them not only contravenes the laws of logic, but blasphemes the words of

56. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 1.30, PG 100: 280BC: “οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν τὸ ταυτὸν κεκτημένη, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ ἀρχετύπου κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τῆς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰκόνας κατηγορήσεται πάντως. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ τύχοι, ἔμψυχον· ἢ δὲ ἄψυχος· ἢ λογικὸν καὶ κινούμενον, ἢ δὲ ἄλογος καὶ ἀκίνητος· οὐκοῦν οὐ ταυτὸν ἀμφοτέρω, ἀλλὰ πῆ μὲν ἔοικεν ἀλλήλοις τῷ εἶδει, πῆ δὲ ἀπέοικε τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν ἐν σχέσει ἢ εἰκῶν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ συνδοξάζεται τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ δοξαζομένῳ, καὶ ἔμπαλιν ἠτιμωμένῳ συνατιμοῦται.”

57. Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, 18.45.

institution spoken by Christ himself. He was not talking about an image when he said; “This is my body, this is my blood”.⁵⁸

In fact for our iconophiles not only is an image relative but the worship offered to the person depicted in it is also relative. Although Christ as the second person of the Trinity is God he nevertheless receives a lesser worship when represented in an icon. There is an absolute worship (λατρεία) reserved for God alone, and a relative worship (σχετικὴ προσκύνησις) reserved for those portrayed in an icon.⁵⁹ John of Damascus had taken care to define this distinction and had enumerated several types of relative worship in his writings against the iconoclasts.⁶⁰ The iconophiles of second iconoclasm continued to operate with this distinction and to nuance it even more. Incidentally, it is precisely this distinction that is blurred in the *Libri Carolini* or *Opus Caroli regis contra synodum* of 793, the Latin response to the Seventh Ecumenical Council of 787, undertaken at the instigation of Charlemagne. It is of considerable interest that the author of this work, Theodulf of Orléans, draws on Aristotelian syllogisms to refute the iconophile position of the Seventh Council.⁶¹ It would appear that the application of the Stagirite’s logic to the image question by Theodulf predates its application by Byzantine iconophiles.

In addition to the eucharist the only other acceptable ‘images’ for the iconoclasts were the cross and the *Imago Dei*, the image of God in the human person. The iconophiles had no problem in accepting the latter as a legitimate image, but for them the cross could not be categorised as an image. The debate focused on the relation of an iconic depiction to a symbolic representation. The patriarch Nikephoros offers ten proofs for the superiority of the icon over the cross. He argues in one of these proofs:

58. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 2.3, PG 100: 336AD.

59. Parry 1996, ch. 17.

60. John of Damascus, *Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres*, pp. 135-141.

61. Mitalaïté 2007: 122-23. Freeman 2003: I. 82-87 cites Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* as configured by Boethius as the source of Theodulf’s syllogistic reasoning. In an otherwise excellent study T. F. X. Noble does not discuss the use of Aristotelian logic in his 2009 book.

The cause precedes the effect, and even more so the efficient cause. For what precedes something is more worthy of honour than what follows. Thus, because the cause of the form of the cross is the passion of the body of Christ, and because his body is the antecedent cause of the form of the cross, consequently, the icon of the body of Christ, as the efficient cause, is more worthy of honour than the form of the cross.⁶²

Here the patriarch prioritizes the icon over the cross by appealing to the Aristotelian definition of an efficient cause. We understand him to mean that because the body of Christ crucified is the means by which the cross takes its form, the icon that depicts the crucifixion must therefore be more worthy of honour than the cross itself. We should keep in mind that it is the plain cross which is being discussed here and not the crucifix. The iconoclasts promoted the plain cross as a legitimate image, not the depiction of Christ hanging on the cross. The patriarch concludes by saying that if the iconoclasts truly venerate the cross they must venerate the icon even more.⁶³

Conclusion

Although there is more that could be said on the subject, what we have tried to show in this paper is that logic terminology originating in the *Categories* is embedded in iconophile thought of the first half of the ninth century, and that this seems to be evidence for reassessing higher learning in Byzantium in the eighth century. This evidence has hardly been explored in relation to the so-called ‘revival of learning’, usually assigned to the period of the patriarch Photius in the second half of the ninth century. The iconophiles of second iconoclasm took the defence of images onto a different level when they chose to apply the terminology of the *Categories*. It goes without saying that only those with a certain degree of education and sophistication could have understood the value of applying it to the image question.

62. Nikephoros, *Antirrheticus* 3.35, PG 100: 432BC.

63. Parry 1996: 188.

We have also tried to show that the use of this terminology met the needs of iconophiles in their efforts to counter iconoclast ideology. The Seventh Ecumenical Council of 787 failed to prevent a second outbreak of iconoclasm in the ninth century, and it fell to the next generation of iconophiles to nail the arguments of the iconoclasts once and for all. After he was deposed in 815 the patriarch Nikephoros spent the last thirteen years of his life in exile, devoting his time to writing his works against the iconoclasts and revising his *Brief History*.⁶⁴ He was best remembered for this last work, as there is little evidence that his iconophile writings continued to be read once the controversy was officially over in 843.

Likewise with Theodore the Studite, he became better known in the Byzantine world for his monastic reforms and for his *Catecheses*, which are still used for instruction in Eastern Orthodox monasteries today. These iconophile saints who came to the defence of Christian images did the job required of them at the time, and their deeds were subsequently recorded in the Constantinopolitan *Synaxarion*. More appropriately perhaps, their own icons were painted and displayed in churches as a reminder of the stand they took against the iconoclast heresy. Today their icons still bear witness to their efforts to safeguard the legitimacy of anthropomorphic imagery in the Christian tradition.

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64. See Mango 1990.

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CHAPTER 3

The *Categories* in Avicenna: Material for developing a developmental account?

Heidrun Eichner

The absence of a detailed discussion of the *Categories* in Avicenna's philosophical *summae* (with the exception of the *K. al-Šifā'*) is a feature of his writings which has attracted some attention. The problem of whether the categories should be dealt with in logic or rather in metaphysics links Avicenna's approach to discussions in Late Antiquity. There, the ontological status of the categories constituted a challenge for those who wished to integrate Aristotelian and (Neo) Platonist ontologies into one coherent system. In the introduction to the part on the *Categories* of the *K. al-Šifā'*, Avicenna states explicitly that in including the categories in logic, he follows Aristotle. He further claims that Aristotle had just been following earlier conventions.¹ As a result, the comprehensive treatment of the categories in the logic-part of the *K. al-Šifā'* stands quite isolated among Avicenna's writings.

The discussion of whether (and if so: how) we can assume and possibly trace a chronological development of Avicenna's philosophical doctrines, has been overshadowed by the discussion of how we are to conceive the nature of Avicenna's 'oriental wisdom', and how this relates to 'Peripatetic philosophy' as a tradition. Astonishingly, few attempts have been made so far to trace smaller (and we may add: less ideologically charged) doctrinal details throughout his writings, based on a close textual comparison.² Giv-

1. On this cf. Gutas 1988: 265-267. Gutas provides a translation of the relevant section from the introduction to the .

2. For such an approach see most notably D. Gutas' discussion of *ḥads*, Gutas 1988: 159-176. Cf. also Gutas 2001.

en this situation it appears even more problematic to talk about a development in his discussion of the categories – problematic given the fact that only one comprehensive discussion is known to exist. Moreover, the role of the categories in Avicenna’s project of re-formulating the conventions of Peripatetic philosophy is linked to the problem of how the interpretation of the canon of Aristotelian writings relates to the Neoplatonic traditions of Late Antiquity.

In the present article I wish to draw attention to some hitherto neglected textual material. This falls into two groups. The first group is constituted by one text. This is the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ fi al-mantiq*, a hitherto neglected work which has survived in several manuscripts. It contains a treatise on the *Categories* (about which more in Part II, below). Thus, a comparison of this section on the *Categories* in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* and the largely parallel but much more comprehensive text of the *K. al-Šifāʾ* can be carried out easily. The discovery of the discussion of the *Categories* in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* places the problem of a development in Avicenna’s discussion of the categories on a much firmer textual basis than it has been so far. Therefore, in the first part of this article, I shall indulge in a discussion of a more problematic second group of material, stemming from a very early period in Avicenna’s philosophical activity. In addition to passages from the *Compendium on the Soul* and the *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya*, in this context, the existence of a chapter on the ten categories inserted in the section on the *Analytica Posteriora* of the *K. al-Nağāt* will be discussed to some extent. The present contribution does not intend to provide a more in-depth discussion of philosophical problems involved but rather aims at pointing to the fact that this type of evidence exists.

PART ONE: Early texts: The *Compendium on the Soul*, the *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya* (“ḤA”) and related texts

The relevant material for the conception of the categories in Avicenna’s early writings consists of two sets:

- (a) a very brief remark in the *Compendium on the Soul* which describes the categories together with other items as “concomitants (*lawāḥiq*) of the existent insofar it is existent absolutely”

- (b) material from the *al-Ḥikma al-'Arūḍiyya* (partly also preserved in the *K. al-Nağāt*). This material mostly stems from the *Ilāhiyyāt* and corroborates that the sentence in the *Compendium on the Soul* is not just an isolated and misleading sloppy remark but rather forms part of a larger context.
- (c) The evaluation of the *ḤA* is complicated because it is transmitted in a unique manuscript. In a process of rebinding the manuscript some folios were misplaced, others are missing completely. The text of the *K. al-Nağāt* (in which large sections of the *ḤA* were integrated) may help in restoring the text of the *ḤA*.

1.1 *The Compendium on the Soul: The formula lawāḥiq al-mawğūd and other features*

The oddity of the description of the categories in the *Compendium on the Soul* has been noticed and pointed out by Amos Bertolacci in his analysis of Avicenna's discussion of the conception of the *Ilāhiyyāt*.³ However, Bertolacci's study is primarily a typological account, ultimately aiming at a more precise understanding of the structure and conception of the *K. al-Šifā'*. Therefore, it does not attempt to interpret the evidence of other writings as a testimony for a development of this author's thought. Rather, it focuses on features which are shared by all Avicennian writings and their general conception of *ilāhiyyāt/metaphysics*.

The *Compendium on the Soul* contains a list of the contents (not: the subject-matters) of the sciences, and the passage about the ontological part of the *ilāhiyyāt* runs:

knowledge of the principles of the existent absolutely insofar it is existent (*ma'rifat mabādi' al-mawğūd al-muṭlaq min haytu huwa mawğūd*) and its concomitants (*lawāḥiq*) such as potentiality and actuality, principle (*mabda'*) and cause (*'illa*), substance and accident, genus and species, contrariety and homogeneity (*al-muḍādda wa-l-muğānasa*), correspondence and difference (*al-ittifāq wa-l-iḥtilāf*), unity and multiplicity.⁴

3. Cf. Bertolacci 2006: 161-162.

4. *Nafs Iḥtišār*: 362, 4-6.

Here, the ontological part of the *al-'ilm al-ilāhī* is described as dealing with the “principles of ... existence and its concomitants” (*mabādi' al-wuḡūd ... wa-lawāḥiquhū*). This formula is *not* identical to the formula which states that the contents or subject-matter of the *ilāhiyyāt*/metaphysics is “the existent insofar it is existent and its essential accidents/properties/concomitants.”⁵ For the ḤA, the presence of the formula *mabādi' al-wuḡūd wa-lawāḥiquhū* can be traced precisely to the direct influence of al-Fārābī's *Aḡrād*.⁶

Since the *Compendium on the Soul* does not cover the full spectrum of topics as the other systematical Avicennian writings do, we possess only limited material that would permit us to discern Avicenna's conception of the categories. As its title indicates, the *Compendium* is primarily devoted to psychology, i.e. to a discussion of soul and intellection. What we *can* discern is that the entirety of cosmological and emanationist theories adhered to by Avicenna in his *Compendium on the Soul* differs from his later system. In particular, the link between the cosmological-ontological and epistemological functions of the heavenly intellects is not yet elaborated. In the *Compendium on the Soul*, emanation proceeds from the universal intellect (*al-'aql al-kullī*) which is not yet identified with the active intellect (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*) as giver of forms, as it is in other writings of Avicenna.⁷

In the context of an analysis of the conception of the categories, a development of Avicenna's emanative system affects primarily the distinction between substantial forms and accidental qualities. According to Avicenna's later system, substantial forms emanate from the active intellect as 'giver of forms'. Qualities are accidents, and from the interactions between accidental qualities (e.g. elementary qualities on the lowest level) a potentially infinite continuum of qualities results. These qualities prepare matter for accepting a specific form. While qualities are modified on a continuous scale, substantial forms change all of a sudden. Once the boundaries defining

5. For a comprehensive discussion see. Bertolacci 2006: 107-303.

6. Cf. for Avicenna's role Gutas 1988: 265-267. For the introduction to the *ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA (integrated in the *K. al-Naḡāt*) cf. Bertolacci 2006: 94-95.

7. *Nafs ḥtiṣār*: 362,9-11; 363,8-9. For a 'standard account' of Avicenna's theory of intellection, see Davidson 1992: 74-126.

a latitude in which modifications are tolerated and by which a piece of matter or substrate is prepared for a specific form are transgressed, matter instantaneously receives a new substantial form.⁸

On this basis Avicenna can extend the explanatory potential of this highly unified ontological theory to a wide range of philosophical problems discussed in the philosophical tradition, in particular at the boundaries between physics and metaphysics. He can also integrate his immaterialist conception of soul and intellection with a satisfactory explanation of the mind-body relationship. And beyond that, in his later works, his philosophical ontology can successfully integrate contemporary medical theories.

As can be discerned from relevant passages in the *Compendium on the Soul*, the concept of the 'giver of the form' has not yet been elaborated. Furthermore, he has not yet developed his theory of mixture based on the distinction between substantial forms and accidental qualities. Rather, he still operates solely with a matter/form distinction according to which the form of a compound may be more or less 'inclined' (*mā'il*) towards one of the simple forms of the elements.⁹

From these features we can discern that the *Compendium on the Soul* clearly differs from Avicenna's later conception (which appears for the first time in the ḤA), and we see that his conception is far less elaborate. Here there is a considerable *caveat* for a typological interpretation of the development of Avicenna's philosophical system: Whereas in Avicenna's later writings the relation between substances and accidents is an important motivation to refine details of his emanative system, we may not project this back to earlier writings. There is a considerable probability that the absence of relevant discussions in contexts where they would be expected in later writings simply shows that Avicenna was, at this stage, not yet aware of more subtle philosophical implications or of discussions by other authors.

8. On Avicenna's theory of mixture and 'substantial forms' see. Eichner 2005: 162-182; Cf. also Stone 2008.

9. On this cf. the third chapter 'None of the faculties of the soul originates from the mixture of the elements' (*fī taqrīr annahū laysa šay' min al-quwā al-nafsāniyya bi-ḥādīt 'an imtizāğ al-'anāşir bal wārid 'alayhā min ḥārīğ*) *Nafs İhtisār* 346-348.

1.2 *The al-Ḥikma al-'Arūdiyya*

The evaluation of Avicenna's conception of the categories is heavily affected by the problematic manuscript tradition of this work. This problem is even more acute in the case of this topic than it is elsewhere. The first four books of the part on *ṭabī'iyyāt* (physics) of the ḤA, however, are included in the *Kitāb al-Nağāt* (only the fifth book is not included there). Likewise, many chapters of the first book of the *ilāhiyyāt* ('divine science') have been included in the *K. al-Nağāt* while the second book of the *ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA was not at all included there. Instead, parts of the *al-Mabda' wa-l-Ma'ād* were chosen.¹⁰ Most problematic is the situation in the case of the part on logic: The text begins in the middle of the *Posterior Analytics*, then *Topics*, *Sophistics*, *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* follow. Not only was the part on logic most heavily affected by the loss of folios, it has no textual parallels in other Avicennian works, and from the parts preserved we can infer that its very conception differed considerably from that of other works. Some arguments from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are dealt with in a separate part on 'Ethics' that follows the part on logic. In the manuscript in its present state, the text begins with references to the categories. It has first been suggested by Y. Maḥdawī and corroborated by closer analysis by D. Gutas that the folios containing this discussion in fact form part of the *ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA. These folios were placed at the beginning of the manuscript (i.e.: at the beginning of logic) by mistake. In fact they should stand at the beginning of the *ilāhiyyāt*.

The following table illustrates the structure of the *Ḥikma 'Arūdiyya* in its relation to the *K. al-Nağāt*:

10. For the following: On the transmission of the ḤA and its relation to other works, cf. Gutas 1988: 87-94.

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| <i>al-Ḥikma</i> <i>al-'Arūḍiyya</i> | The <i>K. al-Nağāt</i> as a paralleling Avicennian Work | remarks |
| Logic [<i>mantiq</i>] | | |
| (beginning missing) | | According to al-Ğüzğānī, the <i>al-Nağāt</i> inserts the <i>al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar</i> . The part on logic of the <i>K. al-Nağāt</i> relates to the <i>al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ</i> but is not identical to it. |
| Ethics (<i>al-aḥlāq wa-l-infi'ālāt al-nafsiyya</i>) | | <i>cf. infra</i> |
| Physics (<i>al-'ilm al-'abī'ī</i>) | | |
| – book 1-4 – 5 (the soul) | – copied – not copied | the <i>Nağāt</i> inserts passages from the <i>aḥwāl al-nafs</i> |
| Metaphysics [<i>ilāhiyyāt</i>] | | |
| – book 1 – book 2 | – many chapters copied (<i>cf. infra</i>) – not copied | – the <i>Nağāt</i> inserts passages from the <i>al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād</i> |

(a) *The Categories and Status of the Part on Ethics in the HA*

A first issue to be discussed is the presence of a piece on ethics in this work. This piece has the length of two folios only, but formal features indicate¹¹ that it is considered to form an independent part on its own, just as logic, physics and divine science do. D. Gutas has argued that the presence of a seemingly independent section on ethics must go back to a problem in the transmission. The presence of this unit, Gutas concludes, should be explained by this chapter having been misplaced in the course of transmission, though – as is indicated by the way the text is placed on the folios – not in the manuscript itself. Gutas argues that corresponding arguments are dealt

11. It follows after the section on logic before the section on logic, and it is concluded by the remark *wa-l-ḥamd wa-l-mağd wa-qaḍ qulnā fi al-aḥlāq wa-l-infi'ālāt al-nafsiyya mā fihi al-kifāya* (p. 112). Comparable remarks stand at the ends of the other sections as well.

with in the *Kitāb al-Šifā'* "at its proper place", i.e. towards the end of rhetoric. Further he argues that the *al-Hikma al-'Arūdiyya* dealing with theoretical philosophy, would not accommodate such a piece on practical philosophy.¹²

This argument, however, may be questioned: The presence of a piece on ethics in the ḤA may indicate that in this early work Avicenna has another understanding of the role of ethics and the relation between practical and theoretical philosophy. We might assume that his later conception of this relation emerges only at the time when he writes the *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* and *al-Birr wa-l-īm*: The elaboration of the emanative system of the *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* represents a major break with the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA. In addition to the downward motion starting with God as the First it describes how the return to God is achieved by the intellectual activity of the soul. Already Gutas has pointed out that "[t]his monograph [i.e.: the *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād*, HE] marks a transition period in Avicenna's literary activity. With it he began to formulate his theories on these subjects in his own words and to strike a largely independent course that was largely independent from the transmitted Aristotelian models".¹³ Gutas labels this "metaphysics of the rational soul". It seems quite possible that during the stage represented by the *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* Avicenna has not only modified his views on how the redemption of the soul may be accommodated in the framework of theoretical philosophy (i.e. between *ṭabī'iyyāt* and *ilāhiyyāt*). And we might easily extend Gutas' observation to the relation between practical and theoretical philosophy as a whole.

In fact, we possess some positive evidence that when writing the ḤA, Avicenna conceived of ethics as just another case of a particular science that deals with a specific category of being. In a chapter integrated under the title *fi tartīb al-mawǧūdāt* ('On the order of existents') in the *K. al-Naǧāt* (a chapter which forms the first (truncated) chapter of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA in its present state) Avicenna

12. Gutas 1988: 92-93.

13. Gutas 1988: 99.

mentions the following categories in their relation to and as principles of the sciences:¹⁴

| | |
|---|--|
| continuous quantity: | principle of geometry (further branches: <i>tanğim</i> , <i>masāhā</i> , <i>atqāl</i> , <i>ḥiyāl</i>): |
| dis-continuous quantity | principle of arithmetic (further branches: music, <i>ilm al-zīğāt</i>). These mathematical sciences do not deal with substances |
| body, inseparable form [=substances] | principles of physics |
| ‘quality’, ‘quantity’, ‘where’, ‘position’, ‘action’, ‘passion’ | states are investigated in physics |
| ‘state’, ‘habitus’ | some kinds of them are principles of ethics |

A discussion of the subordination of ethics as one of the particular sciences standing under ‘universal science’ can be found in al-Fārābī and even in writings by Avicenna that do not include ethics in their actual structure. al-Fārābī’s short epistle on the *Posterior Analytics* simply names ethics as one particular science among others. Chapter I,2 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *K. al-Šifā’* mentions how physics, ethics, mathematics and logic relate to the subject-matter of the *ilāhiyyāt*.¹⁵ In the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*, ethics is described as dealing specifically with ‘the states of the rational soul’ (*aḥwāl al-naḥs al-nāṭiqa*).¹⁶ Even in the description of the contents of the *K. al-Šifā’* in the section on the *Isagoge*, Avicenna points out that topics of political science (*siyāsa*) and ethics are included in the science which relates to metaphysics (*al-ilm al-mansūb ilā mā ba’d al-ṭabī’a*), while he hopes to write also a

14. Cf. *Nağāt*: 513,11-15

15. Cf. *Šifā’, ilāhiyyāt*: 10,4-18 (the reference to ethics is p. 10,9) and p. 13,18-19: “the existent ... does not have to be specified as physical, mathematical, ethical etc.” (*fai-nnahū laysa yaḥtāğū al-mawğūd ... ilā an yataḥaṣṣaṣa ṭabī’iyyan aw ta’līmīyyan aw ḥulqīyyan aw ğayra dālīka*). Cf. al-Fārābī, *al-Burhān* p. 311 where *al-ta’alīm wa-l-ilm al-ṭabī’i wa-l-ilm al-ilāhī wa-l-ilm al-aḥlāqī* are mentioned as ‘ulūm ḥāṣṣa.

16. *Muḥtaṣar awṣaṭ fī*. 109a,10-11: *yanzuru fihā al-ṭabīb wa-l-ḥulqī ma’an, lākinna li-dāka ḥāṣṣiyyat al-naẓar fī aḥwāl al-badan, wa-li-hādā ḥāṣṣiyyat al-naẓar fī aḥwāl al-naḥs al-nāṭiqa.*

separate book on this.¹⁷ Thus, the existence of a separate part on ethics in the ḤA may attest to a stage in the development in Avicenna's conception of the constitution of the sciences that differs from his later writings. Then, ethics would be conceived of as dealing with beings pertaining to the categories of 'state' and 'habitus'.

(b) The Second book of the Ilāhiyyāt in the ḤA

As I wish to argue in the following, the second book of the *Ilāhiyyāt* in the ḤA is of particular importance for documenting a development in Avicenna's conception of the categories. At the beginning of the relevant section most probably one folio is missing, and therefore we do not know whether a title was given to this book. The text of this second book has no parallel in the *K. al-Nağāt*, it was replaced in its entirety by a part of the *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād*. As an analysis of the ḤA shows, this is, in all likelihood, to be explained by the fact that the description of the emanationist process in the ḤA differs considerably from Avicenna's later theory. D. Gutas has labeled this second book as 'natural theology'.¹⁸ In fact, comparing this book to other Avicennian writings, we see that this section on 'natural theology' follows a purely ontological conception. Specifically "theological" or "Islamic" features are completely absent; for example, topics covered in books 8 to 10 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *K. al-Šifā'* such as Caliphate and Imamate, prophecy, afterlife of the soul, resurrection and even divine attributes and providence, are not addressed in the ḤA. We may assume that in the ḤA only the proceeding of existents from the One was addressed, while the concept of *al-mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* 'provenance and return' was not yet developed. In later Avicennian writings, this concept of *al-mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* serves to link an emanationist ontology to an intellectualist conception of happiness in the hereafter.

At first sight, based on such a comparison with later Avicennian writings we might be tempted to describe this part on 'natural theology' as an equivalent to a sketch of the emanationist system as contained in other Avicennian writings, i.e. how the heavenly sub-

17. Cf. *Šifā', ilāhiyyāt* I,1, p. 4,14.

18. Cf. as supra Gutas 1988: 87-94.

stances proceed from the first, conceived of as the ‘necessary of existence’. Only the nexus with the ‘metaphysics of the rational soul’ would not yet have been established by the time when Avicenna was writing the ḤA.

A most substantial difference, however, can be detected in the concluding passages of the ḤA: The second book of the *ilāhiyyāt* in the ḤA describes how all categories (i.e. substance plus the nine accidental categories) originate in the course of an emanative process. This emanation is described as a ranking according to “being worthy of existence” (*fī istihqāq al-wuḡūd*).

In later writings the focus is on the origination of substances (intellects, souls and body as consisting of matter and form) only. Already in the ḤA, Avicenna’s sketch of the emanation of the substances is quite long, but the importance of the accidental categories can be seen from the concluding remarks. Avicenna states:

According to these ranks the substances exist from the first ones. The accidents exist in virtue of (*an*) the material forms and are effects (*ta’īrāt*) of the material forms. When the first body exists, ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ exist, and even (*wa-ḥattā*, or: up to ...?) ‘being-acted upon’. Then, when the second exists, ‘where’ and ‘position’ exist. Starting with the existence of the first caused, ‘relation’ exists. So, ‘substance’ is first, then ‘quality’ and ‘persistent quantity’, then ‘relation’, then ‘habitus’, then ‘where’, then ‘position’, then ‘action’, then ‘being-acted-upon’, then ‘when’ – I mean: according to ‘being worthy of existence’ (*fī istihqāq al-wuḡūd*).¹⁹

Avicenna then states that nature (*tabī’a*), which is the principle of *physics*, is constituted from the multiple receptivity of bodies for the action of essentially unitary intellects (*al-’uqūl al-aḥadiyya al-dāt*). He concludes the book:

Since we have arrived in our explanation of the principles of existence and its concomitants (*ṣarḥ mabādi’ al-wuḡūd wa-lawāḥiqihī*) at this end, let us conclude our book. It was asked for by the noble *Šayḥ Abū*

19. Ibn Sīnā, *Hikma ‘Arūḍiyya*: 163,13-19.

al-Ḥasan Alḥmad b. 'Abdallāh al-'Arūḍī. We have made it for him in the way he wanted it.

Praise to God and prayers upon our Lord, the prophet Muḥammad and his people. This book was written by the *al-Ra'īs* in the year 391.²⁰

Analysing the second book of the *Ilāhiyyāt* in the ḤA under the aspect of the role the categories play, we can distinguish four parts:

1. [beginning missing, the One, the Necessary of Existence, Divine self-intellection]; pp. 160,11-162,2;
2. emanation of the heavenly substances (intellects, souls, bodies): pp. 162,2-163,12;
3. accidental categories originating after the origination of material forms: p. 163,13-19;
4. nature as principle of *physics*: p. 163,19-23;

Thus, the passage on the accidental categories is a quite unique feature of the ḤA. Regarding the origination of accidental categories, Avicenna states that they are posterior to matter. The first reference to accidents as effects of material forms might be interpreted at first sight as referring to a conception of accidental elementary qualities vs. the form-matter compound that constitutes bodily substance (a feature of Avicenna's elementary theory apparently already present in the *al-Ḥikma al-'Arūḍiyya*, cf. *infra*). However, the remainder of the text (while containing some inconsistencies) shows that the complete series of accidental categories is viewed as originating in dependence from body. A problem seems to be posed in particular by 'relation': In Avicenna's emanative system, the relation between 'the one' and 'the first caused' makes the rise of multiplicity possible. It thus precedes the origination of matter and body. According to the ḤA - and other Avicennian writings as well - the causal relation between the essentially Necessary of Existence and the first caused is a precondition for the first caused to intellect more than one aspect.²¹ Thus it can cause multiplicity which is a precondition for the existence of matter.

20. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma 'Arūḍiyya*: 163, 24-164,4.

21. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma 'Arūḍiyya*: 160,17 -161,7.

The passage translated above contains two series mentioning the categories. The first (incomplete) series relates the origination of the categories to the existence of substances, while the second series is a complete enumeration. In the first series, the category ‘action’ is not mentioned but only ‘being acted upon’. Also ‘when’ as the category defining time is not mentioned, and the category ‘habitus’ is also missing. The following list compares the two sequences mentioning the categories:

| emanated items not in order of appearance | categories in order of appearance | categories in the second list (in order of mentioning) |
|--|--|---|
| first body second body first caused | (• substances) • quality • quantity • being acted upon • where • position • relation | • substance • quality • (persistent) quantity • relation • habitus • where • posi- tion • action • being acted upon • when |

In the context of *Physics*, the ḤA likewise refers to the priority of matter over accidents in the following passage:

The accidents are after matter by nature, and form is before matter in terms of being cause. Matter and form are before accident by nature and in terms of being cause.²²

As Avicenna states at the end of the book, this second book is devoted to an explanation of the “principles of existence and its concomitants.” Since the second book in its entirety is devoted to a discussion of how the categories emanate from the First and Its self-intellection, this might give us a way of understanding Avicenna’s conceptualization of the categories as ‘concomitants’. Throughout the ḤA, the notion of concomitance (*luḏūm*) (together with causation, ‘-l-ḏ’) is of central importance for the very conception of the emanative process of the substances.²³ The prominence of ‘necessi-

22. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma ‘Arūḏīyya*: 114,22-23 / *Naḡāt*: 192,9-11.

23. This is the case for the emanation of substances, cf. p. p. 162,2-163,12. Note, how-

ty³, of course, is a feature present in other writings as well and stands at the very basis of Avicenna's conception of the Necessary of Existence, but in the ḤA it is the only term employed for describing the process.²⁴ Moreover, the necessity in the process of emanation is not necessarily to be equated with the notion of concomitance in other contexts. In the ḤA, however, the connection between logical and ontological dimensions of concomitance is pointed out explicitly. Taken together with the prominence of the formula *mabādī' al-wuğūd wa-lawāḥiqhū* for the conception of the treatise, this is a remarkable feature. The ḤA describes the origination of the first caused:

The first has a relation to the existence of the relation [sic?] which is not a part of its essence (*laysat ġuz'an min dātihī*) and does not constitute it (*lā muqawwima lahā*). Rather they are like necessary things which follow (*ka-annahā tawābi' lahū lāzima*). It has been said in logic that between the 'constituent' and 'what follows' (*tābi'*) there is a difference. Since what exists from the first exists by necessity (*luzūm*), it is not possible that in what exists from the first there is existence of multiplicity. This is so because if it is in a state (*hayl*) from which follows (*yalzam*) the existence of something, from this state something else does not follow. If something else follows, then there is yet another state.²⁵

(c) *The first book of the Ilāhiyyāt in the ḤA*

Many chapters of the first book of the ḤA have been integrated in the *K. al-Nağāt*. The folios containing this first book, however, were placed at the beginning of the ms., i.e. after one folio containing a preface to the section on logic and before the section on logic. The reason for this was most likely the mention of the categories at the beginning of the text of the *Ilāhiyyāt*. The *fusūl* of this first book of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, however, are numbered. Therefore we know that only

ever, that in the sketch of how the accidental categories originate, Avicenna always uses *wuğūda* ('an).

24. Cf. e.g. the chapter *fī tartīb wuğūd al-'uqūl wa-l-nufūs al-samāwiyya wa-l-ağrām al-'ulwiyya 'an al-awwal* (p. 249-257). There, *luzūm* appears as well; however, it is supplemented by other terms, most notably *fay*.

25. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma 'Arūḍiyya*: 160, 22-161,4.

at the very beginning of the text one or two folios are missing. As a result, the text begins in the middle of a sentence because folios standing before it were lost in the ms. of the ḤA. However, since this passage stems from a chapter that was included in the *K. al-Nağāt* (with the title *fi tartīb al-mawğūdāt* ‘On the order of existents’) we have easy access to the context.

The question of how the beginning of the *Ilāhiyyāt*-sections of the two works relate to each other, and whether or not the entire chapter “On the order of existents” in *the K. al-Nağāt* stems from the ḤA is quite crucial in the present context. For discussing this, I am inserting a table that shows which chapters of the first book of the *Ilāhiyyāt* in the *K. al-Nağāt* stem from the ḤA,²⁶ and which chapters were added. As will be seen, the problem of which chapters from the beginning of the *K. al-Nağāt* were actually taken over from the ḤA (and are missing because the folios containing them were lost) is very important in the present context.

| ḤA <i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> | K. al-Nağāt: <i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> |
|------------------------------------|--|
| | (a) introduction (<i>nurīdu an naḥtaṣira ġawāmi’ al-‘ilm al-ilāhī ...</i>) |
| | (b) <i>musāwāt al-wāḥid li-l-mawğūd</i> |
| | <i>bayān al-a’rād al-ḍātiyya wa-l-ġarība</i> |
| | (c) <i>bayān aqsām al-mawğūd wa-aqsām al-wāḥid</i> |
| | (d) <i>uḥbāt al-mādda wa-māhiyyat al-ṣūra al-ġismiyya</i> |
| | (e) <i>al-ṣūra al-ġismiyya muqārīna li-l-mādda fi ġamī’ al-aḡsām ‘umūman</i> |
| | (f) <i>al-mādda lā tataġarrad’an al-ṣūra</i> |
| | (g) <i>uḥbāt al-taḥalḥul wa-l-takāṭuf</i> |
| [2.] [beginning missing] 2r-3rv | (h) <i>tartīb al-mawğūdāt</i> (• copied) |
| | (i) <i>al-waḥda min lawāzīm al-māhiyyāt</i> |
| | (j) <i>al-kayfiyyāt al-maḥsūsa a’rād lā ġawāhir</i> |
| | (k) <i>aqsām al-ilal</i> |

26. For the ḤA I follow essentially D. Gutas’ restoration of the order of chapters.

| | |
|--|---|
| | (l) <i>'illat al-ḥāğā ilā al-wāğib hiya al-imbān lā al-ḥudūt</i> |
| 3. Potentiality 3r5-ult | (m) (• copied) |
| | (n) the existence of the circle (directed against <i>kalām</i> atomism) |
| 4. Acting | |
| 5. Necessity and possibility | |
| 6. Pre-existent and originated | (o) same title, text replaced by other wording |
| | (p) <i>kull ḥādīṭ zamānī masbūq bi-l-mādda</i> |
| 7. The universal | (q) same title, text replaced by other wording |
| 8. Perfection and imperfection + 8i Four causes as principles - | (r) (• copied) |
| 9. Priority and posteriority + 9i essential creation + | (s) (• copied) (t) (• copied) |
| [types of unity and plurality, end is missing] | (u) |

Based on this comparison we see which chapters were added in the *K. al-Nağāt*: These include a discussion of unity as not constituting essence (i), a classification of causes (k) and two chapters relating to debates with the *mutakallimūn*, one arguing for the existence of circles (n) and a discussion of the notion of *ḥādīṭ* and its relation to possibility (*imbān*) explicitly directed against them (l). Yet another chapter deals with the relation of (temporal) origination and matter (p). The discussions of ‘acting’ (4) and ‘necessity and possibility’ (5) are not included in the *ilāhiyyāt* of the *K. al-Nağāt*. Some remnants are preserved in the discussion of two types of *mumkin* in the logic of the *K. al-Nağāt*.²⁷ The discussions of ‘pre-existent and originated’ (6) [cf. (o) and (p)] and ‘universal’ (7) (cf. (q)) are replaced by arguments bearing the same title. Thus they indicate a substantial change in Avicenna’s respective concepts.

27. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt ‘fi al-mumkin wa-taḥqīqihī*: 30-34.

An addition which explicitly has pertinence to the conception of the categories is the chapter on the status of sensible qualities as accidents and their distinctness from substantial forms (j). That Avicenna deems this addition in the *K. al-Nağāt* necessary shows at least a rise in prominence of this problem. However, it is not easy to determine whether or not Avicenna had already elaborated on this distinction when writing the ḤA. To me it seems quite probable that in the ḤA (like in the early *Compendium on the Soul*) this distinction had not yet been fully elaborated, and closely associated with this, the concept of a '[undetermined] corporeal form' (*al-ṣūra al-ğismiyya*) was possibly not yet used by Avicenna in the ḤA. As I am going to argue below, the chapters (d) to (g), and possibly chapters (b) to (g), were composed for the *K. al-Nağāt* and do not form part of the text of the ḤA. If this is true, then the *ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA do not discuss the concept of the '[undetermined] corporeal form' as a basic ontological concept for the explanation of physical beings. Turning to the only occurrence of this term in the part on physics of the *K. al-Nağāt* and comparing it to the text of the ḤA, we see that the text has been modified: Where the *K. al-Nağāt* reads 'corporeal form' (*ṣūra ğismiyya*), the ḤA reads 'forms of innate extension' (*ṣuwar al-miqdār al-fiṭri*). Otherwise, the two texts are nearly identical.

In the matter of a physical body are other forms than 'the forms of innate extension' (*Nağāt*: '[undetermined] corporeal form'). It has forms pertaining to the realm of 'quality' and 'where' and others. If this is like that, then the physical bodies taken absolutely have only two principles which are associated with them, i.e. matter and form. The concomitants of the physical bodies are accidents which accede to them from the nine categories.

One differentiates between forms and accidents. The forms inhere in matter which is not subsistent in its essence as to the nature of its species. Accidents inhere in a body which subsists by matter and form, and whose species is there.

The accidents are after matter by nature, and the forms are before matter by being cause. Matter and form are before accidents, both by nature and by being cause.²⁸

28. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt*: 192, 1-11, cf. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma 'Arūdiyya*: 114, 15-23.

Again, whether or not Avicenna's distinction between accidental qualities and substantial forms is already fully elaborated by the time he was writing the ḤA is not clear. It seems as if – just as in the *Compendium on the Soul* – the role of the active intellect (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*) as 'giver of forms' is not yet present.

The problem of the metaphysical foundations of physics leads us to the question how we can use the *K. al-Nağāt* for reconstructing which chapters were contained in the missing folios of the ḤA. This is important for a further evaluation of the chapter "On the order of existents", i.e. the chapter containing the references to the categories which stands at the beginning of the ḤA in its present state. For this we have to determine which passages standing now at the beginning of the *K. al-Nağāt* actually stem from the ḤA. In particular we have to pose the question whether or not the chapter "On the order of existents" in its entirety is derived from the ḤA.

Fortunately, the extant chapters in this section of the ḤA bear numbers in the manuscript, otherwise trying to answer this question would be completely hopeless. We know that the chapter 'On potentiality' is chapter (3), and the passage standing at the beginning forms part of the truncated chapter called 'On the order of existents' in the *K. al-Nağāt*.

From the above table, it can be seen that corresponding to chapters (a) to (h) in the *K. al-Nağāt* there are only two chapters in the ḤA. Possibly, one more introductory chapter was not counted in the ḤA. Yet another question is whether or not the beginning of chapter (2) in the ḤA coincides with the beginning of chapter (h) 'On the order of existents'. Here, one option (which, as will be seen, is not likely) would be that the chapter 'On the order of existents' in the ḤA forms only the end of a longer chapter, i.e. that it formed a unit e.g. with chapters (d) to (g). One other option poses much more serious problems, also for the problem of the categories: It is possible that only parts of the chapter in the *K. al-Nağāt* actually derive from the ḤA while the beginning of the chapter might have been written for the *K. al-Nağāt* only.

We can safely assume that chapter (a) in the *K. al-Nağāt* stems from the ḤA. This chapter (a) is a discussion of how the *Ilāhiyyāt* are constituted. We know this from a comparison with the introductory

passage from the *Physics*, where we possess both the text of the ḤA and the *K. al-Nağāt*. There we can see that the formula *nurīdu an nahtaṣīr ǧawāmiʿ al-ʿilm al-ilāhī fa-naqūlu/nurīdu an nahtaṣīr ǧawāmiʿ al-ʿilm al-ṭabīʿī* derives from the ḤA. More decisive is that these two introductory passages in the *K. al-Nağāt* taken together reproduce exactly the complete argument of al-Fārābī's *Ağrād*.

In the *Physics* of the ḤA, after the passage modelled on the *Ağrād* Avicenna elaborates somewhat on conceptions from the *Posterior Analytics*. Thus we may assume that in the case of the *ilāhiyyāt* the contents of chapters (b) and (c), too, had formed part of the ḤA, most likely integrated in one single chapter. After a classification of existents, (c) ends with the remark: “this is the principle of physics” – a remark which is in keeping with the argument of the Fārābīan treatise.

It is quite likely that (d) to (g) – all of them dealing with the metaphysical foundations of physics – are elaborations on this which were added only later in the *K. al-Nağāt* and do not stem from the ḤA. (d) begins with the words: “Let us add clarification of what this means”,²⁹ and (g) ends again with the words “all this are the principles of physics”.³⁰ In any case, for our present purpose the problem of whether or not (d) to (g) stem from the ḤA is not really important.

But what about the chapter (h) “On the order of existents”? Did this chapter in its entirety form part of the ḤA? Or was a passage added at its beginning? In its present state we can discern two distinct major parts in the chapter: The first part begins with a ranking of existents. Just as in the concluding passage of the second book of the *Ilāhiyyāt* in the ḤA, this ranking is described as a ranking according to ‘being worthy of existence’. The second part describes how the sciences relate to the categories (this is the passage used above when discussing the status of *ethics*). The ms. of ḤA begins only in this part, the beginning stands on a folio lost today. In the *K. al-Nağāt* both parts are connected by the following remark:

In each layer among these is a group (*ǧumla*) of existents which differ in existence. We have explained the states of the various spe-

29. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt*: 498,7.

30. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt*: 512,5.

cies of the categories (*anwā' al-maqūlāt*) in logic in such a way that this topic does not need any addition.³¹

Thus, we may discern three elements:

- (a) Ranking of substances according to being worthy of existence, accidents
- (b) Remark on the categories
- (c) The system of sciences and the categories

If we were to assume that the chapter in its entirety was taken over from the ḤA, the remark (b) would provide conclusive evidence that the ḤA originally contained a somewhat substantial discussion of the categories in the part on logic. Such a discussion, then, would form part of the lost beginning of the ms. This would leave us with several options regarding which parts of chapter (h) “On the order of existents” derive from the ḤA.

- 1. The chapter (a&b&c) in its entirety stems from the ḤA.
- 2. Only the last part (c) stems from the ḤA.
- 3. (a) and (c) stem from the ḤA but the remark separating the two parts (b) in the *K. al-Nağāt* was added and/or replaces a more comprehensive discussion of the categories in the ḤA.

(i) In the first case, the first part (a), i.e. the classification and ranking of existents, would be a kind of summary of the ontological aspects of the emanationist system in the ḤA (as laid out more comprehensively in the second book of the *ilāhiyyāt*). As in this second book, the notion *istihqāq al-wuğūd* is important. The other part (c), an epistemological sketch, elaborates on how ontological and epistemological functions of the categories relate to each other. The remark (b) attests the existence of a (lost?) discussion of the categories in the part on logic. Possibly, a discussion of the categories included in the section of the *Posterior Analytics* of the *K. al-Nağāt* might be a remnant of this discussion.

31. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt*: 512,17-18.

(2) Assuming that the first part (a) does not form part of the original text of the ḤA we may explain its presence in the text of the *K. al-Nağāt* by supposing that Avicenna inserted it as a kind of substitute for book 2 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the ḤA. This part would then be discussing a ranking of existents as the ḤA had done in the second book, however the by now outdated details of the emanative system of the ḤA would be eliminated.

(3) We might assume that in the ḤA a more comprehensive discussion of the categories had its place between the two parts (a) and (c) and was then replaced by the remark (b). Then we would have to consider whether or not the discussion of the categories included in the section on the *Posterior Analytics* of the *K. al-Nağāt* might be this discussion which was replaced. Accepting this option, the whole chapter would have been disproportionately long.

(d) *The Chapter on the Categories in the Posterior Analytics in the K. al-Nağāt*

The remark in the chapter ‘On the order of existents’ in the *K. al-Nağāt* refers to a discussion of the categories in logic. In fact, in the *K. al-Nağāt* we find a chapter dealing with the ten categories (‘the ten genera’)³² which, however, is inserted in the *Posterior Analytics*. The context which motivates this discussion is the theory of definition. More precisely, as Avicenna points out two chapters before ‘On how to acquire a definition’ (i.e. by composition, *tarkīb*),³³ these genera provide a classification for the individuals investigated, based on which we may identify all constitutive predicates. In other Avicennian works, the reference to the (high) *genera* in the theory of definition does not motivate a discussion of the categories.³⁴

Yet another question is whether or not the chapter ‘On the ten genera’ in the *K. al-Nağāt* derives from the ḤA. This chapter does not

32. Cf. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt* 153-157.

33. Cf. Ibn Sinā, *Nağāt* 149-151 ‘fi iktisāb al-ḥadd’; p. 149,10-11: *fa-ḍālīka bi-an na’mud ilā al-aṣḥāṣ allatī lā tanqasim fa-nanzuru fi ayy ḡius min al-’ašara allatī sa-naḍkuruhā*.

34. Cf. Ibn Sinā, *Ḥikma ‘Arūḍiyya* 46,7-47,4 *fi mabādi’ al-ḥadd*; *K. al-Šifā’*, IV,6 p. 242,8-15; p.245,8-13.

stand particularly close to the way in which Avicenna deals with the *Categories* in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* or in the *K. al-Šifā'*, thus the option that it actually derives from the ḤA might be taken into consideration. In the ḤA, it would have formed an independent section on the *Categories*. For determining this more closely we would need a careful investigation of how precisely the part on logic in the *K. al-Nağāt* relates to the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*. A possible connection between the part on logic of the ḤA and the *K. al-Nağāt* might be suggested by the fact that in his discussion of definition in these two works (but not in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* or in the *K. al-Šifā'*) Avicenna criticizes an alternative definition of definition which he ascribes to the 'commoners' (in the ḤA)/'recent ones' (in the *K. al-Nağāt*).³⁵

PART TWO: The *Categories* in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*

Regarding the quality and quantity of textual evidence, we stand on much firmer ground when now turning to a hitherto neglected Avicennian discussion of the *Categories*, i.e. in his *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* 'The Middle-sized Compendium'³⁶. As stated at the beginning, this work is preserved in several manuscripts. The reason why they have gone unnoticed so far is that in his catalogue of Avicennian manuscripts Y. Maḥdawī stated that the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* is more or less identical to the part on logic in the *K. al-Nağāt*.

The title *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* for the work is attested by the manuscript tradition³⁷. Maḥdawī's catalogue (#108) lists *al-Awsaṭ* 'The Middle-sized', *al-Awsaṭ al-Ġurğānī* 'The Middle-sized from *Ġurğān*'

35. Cf. Ibn Sinā, Ḥikma 'Arūḍiyya 45,15-17: wa-ḥadduhū annahū huwa al-qawl al-dāll 'alā māhiyyat al-šay' wa-'āmmat ahl al-naẓar yaḥudduhū bi-annahū qawl wağīz mumayyiz li-l-maṭlūb 'ammā siwāhu bi-ḡātihi. *K. al-Nağāt*, p. 151,14-15: wa-li-ḡālika mā ḥadda al-faylasūf al-ḥadd bi-annahū qawl dāll 'alā māhiyya wa-lam yaqul qawl wağīz yumayyiz kamā huwa 'ādat al-muḥdaṭīn.

36. An edition of the part on the *Categories* based on the two old ms. (Turhan Valide Sultan (Hatice) 213 and Nuruosmaniye 4894) is now accessible in A. Kalbarczyk, *Die Kategorienschrift*.

37. Cf. Ms. Nuruosmaniye 2763 fo. 137a,19 *tamma kitāb al-muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* by the hand of the scribe.

and [*al-*] *Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar* ‘The Small Compendium’ as alternatives.³⁸ These titles derive from al-Ġūzġānī’s bio-bibliographical sketch: Maḥdawī points out that *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* is most likely to be equated with the *al-Awsaṭ al-Ġurġānī* composed for Muḥammad al-Šīrāzī in Ġurġān.³⁹

Avicenna had dictated this treatise to al-Ġūzġānī, and at other opportunities al-Ġūzġānī refers to a [*al-*] *Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar*. Already Maḥdawī had observed that although the beginning of the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* is identical to that of the logic of the *K. al-Naġāt*, the very end of the treatises is not the same. He identifies the fact that Avicenna had integrated the part on *Sophistics* from the ḤA in the logic of the *K. al-Naġāt* as responsible for this. He also observes that the end of the *Posterior Analytics* is not identical in the two treatises.⁴⁰

A closer examination of the manuscripts of the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* shows that the relation between the logic of the *K. al-Naġāt* is more complex: Some chapters are identical, in some cases the *K. al-Naġāt* apparently contains a reworking of the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*. The most economical assumption so far is that the logic of the *K. al-Naġāt* is identical to the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar*, which in its turn is a reworking of the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*. Alternatively, we may assume that both the logic of the *K. al-Naġāt* and the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* (i. e.

38. Cf. Maḥdawī: 217, cf. also Gutas 1988: 112. Gutas refers only to the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar*.

39. A. Kalbarczyk could verify that Ibn al-Šalāḥ’s quotes from the *al-Awsaṭ al-Ġurġānī* (which have puzzled Gutas because they are not identical to the text of the *K. al-Naġāt*) in fact stem from the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ* as preserved in the Istanbul-mss., cf. Kalbarczyk, *Die Kategorienschrift* p. xvi-xx.

40. A preliminary stemmatization of the Istanbul mss. is easily obtained: The collective mss. of Avicennian works Carullah 1441 (Maḥdawī has a misprint 1144), Köprülü 869 and Nuruosmaniye 4894 are derivatives. Only two independent old mss. exist, i. e. Turhan Valide Sultan (Hatice) 213 (94 folio) and Nuruosmaniye 2763. Turhan Valide Sultan has no date but seems to be old. At the end, one folio is missing, and the text ends in the middle of the sentence. Turhan Valide Sultan is the ancestor of the collective mss.. This can be seen because these mss. likewise miss the end of the text, although some try to complete the last sentence. Only Nuruosmaniye 2763 (137 folio, dated 528/1133) has the end of the text. A facsimile of the last folio is found in Maḥdawī 1954: p. 225).

the works which possess as texts) stand in some kind of relation to a text called *al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar* which we do not possess today.

The following table contains a rough and very preliminary comparison of the structure of the parts on logic in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar*, HA and the *K. al-Nağāt*:

| al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar (NurOs 2763) | al-Ḥikma al- ‘Arūḏiyya | K. al-Nağāt |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| • [no Title for the <i>Isagoge</i>], like in the <i>Nağāt</i> the first chapter begins without title (fo.1b) | [folios at the beginning are missing] | |
| • Kitāb Qāṭiğūriyās ay al-Maḡlāt (5b) | | |
| • Kitāb Barirmīniyās (19a) | | |
| • Kitāb Anūlūṭiqā al-ūlā wa-huwa al-qiyās (39a) | [<i>Prior Analytics</i> , <i>Topics</i> covered] (6a-7b) | [<i>Prior Analytics</i>] |
| • Kitāb Anūlūṭiqā al-tāniya ay al-burhān (99b to 137b) | [<i>Posterior Analytics</i> , <i>Topics</i> covered] (7b-10a) | [<i>Posterior Analytics</i>] |
| | • Fī ma‘ānī Kitāb ṭūbīqā ay al-ğadal (10a-31a) | → K. al-Šifā’* |
| | • Ğumlat ma‘ānī Kitāb Sūfistīqā (31b-34a) | [<i>Sophistics</i> , from the HA] |
| | • Fī ma‘ānī Kitāb Riṭūriqā ay al- Balāğā fī al-Ḥukūma wa-l-Ḥiṭāba (34a- 45a) | → K. al-Šifā’* |

* At the end of the part on logic in the *K. al-Nağāt* Avicenna describes its contents and states referring to the *Topics* and *Rhetoric* (p. 184-185): If you wish to know this, seek it from the *K. al-Šifā’*.

As can be seen, the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-aṣḡar* contains the works of the Aristotelian *Organon* up to the *Posterior Analytics*. In its titles it preserves transliterations of the Greek names of the Aristotelian books, and it contains a treatise on the *Categories*. A first superficial perusal

of this treatise and a comparison of the sections on ‘substance’ strongly suggest that the part on the *Categories* stands quite close to the *K. al-Šifā’*, however, significant doctrinal differences and modifications have occurred between these two works. On several occasions, Avicenna refers directly to the text of Aristotle (*qāla al-faylasūf*). It is evident that any further serious discussion of the development of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the categories has to include a careful and detailed evaluation of the text of the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*.

The following table provides a table of contents of the treatise on the *Categories* in the *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ*, based on the ms. Nuruosmaniye 2763. “Corresponding” sections in the *K. al-Šifā’* are indicated:

| al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ Kitāb Qāṭiğuriyās ay al-maḳūlāt | al-Šifā’ |
|---|--|
| | 1 ġaraḍ al-maḳūlāt |
| [1] Fī munāsabat al-asāmī wa-l-ma’ānī (5b,11) | 2 al-alfāz al-muttafiqa wa-l-mutawāṭī’a wa-l-mutabāyina wa-l-muštaqqa wa-mā yağrī mağrāhā 3 bayān ma’nā mā yuqāl ‘alā mawḍū’ aw lā ... 4 šarḥ ḥadd al-‘ara ... 5 mizāğāt taqa’ bayna qawl ‘alā wa-wuğūd fī ... 6 ifsād qawl man qāla inna šay’an wāḥidan yakūnu ‘araḍan wa-ğawharan ... |
| [2] Fī nisbat al-ağnās ilā fuṣūlihā (7a,18) | 1 ḥāl munāsabat al-ağnās wa-fuṣūlihā al-muqassima wa-l-muqawwima 2 anna al-‘araḍ laysa bi-ğins li-l-tis’a ... 3 ta’aqquḅ aqwāl man awğaba fihā nuqṣānan aw mudāḥalatan 4 ḍikr umūr uḥimat annahā immā ‘amma li-šay’ min al-‘ašara ‘umūm al-ğisn aw ḥāriğa ‘an al-‘ašara |
| [3] Fī nisbat al-maw ū’āt ilā al-maḥmūlāt (7b,11) | |

| | |
|--|--|
| [4] Fī allaḍī yuqālu bi-ta'lif wa-bi-ğayr ta'lif (8a,10) | 5 ta'rif ḥāl 'adad al-maḡulāt |
| [5] Fī al-ğawhar (8b,12) | 1 al-ğawāhir al-uwal wa-l-tāniya wa-l-tāliṭa wa-bi-l-ğumla marātib al-ğawāhir al-kulliyya wa-l-ğuz'iyya fī al-ğawhariyya 2 al-ğawhar al-awwal wa-l-tānī wa-l-tāliṭ 3 rusūm al-ğawhar wa-ḥawāṣṣuhū |
| [6] Fī al-kamm (10,a1) | 4 ibtidā' al-qawl fī al-kammiyya 1 bayān al-qisma al-uḡrā li-l-kamm wa-bayān al-kamm bi-l-'araḍ 2 ḥawāṣṣ al-kamm |
| [7] Fī al-muḍāf (12a,13) | 3 ibtidā' al-qawl fī al-muḍāf ... 4 ḥawāṣṣ al-muḍāf 5 taḡqīq al-muḍāf |
| [8] Fī al-kayf (13b,3) | 1 ta'rif al-kayfiyya ... 2 ta'aqqub al-wuğūh allatī qassama qawm bihā al-kayfiyya ilā anwā'ihā al-arba'a 3 ta'rif ḥaqīqat kull naw'ayn min anwā' al-kayfiyya ... 4 irād al-šukūk ... 5 al-kayfiyyāt al-infi'āliyya wa-l-infi'ālāt 6 ḥall bāqī al-šukūk 1 ḍikr anwā' al-ğins al-rābī min al-kayfiyya 2 ta'rif ḥāl al-zāwiya 3 ta'rif al-farq bayna al-kayfiyya wa-ḍī al-kayfiyya 4 ḥall šakk yata'allaq bi-mudāḡalat anwā' min al-kayf |
| [9] Fī al-ayn (14b,5) | 5 al-ayn wa-matā |
| [10] Fī al-matā (14b,8) | |
| [11] Fī al-waḍ' (14b,11) | 6 bāqī al-maḡulāt al-'ašar |
| [12] Fī maḡulāt lahū (14b,17) | |
| [13] Fī an yaf'al wa-an yanfa'il (15a,6) | |
| [14] Fī al-ḡaraka (15a,14) | |

| | |
|---|---|
| [15] Fī al-mutaqaddim wa-l-muta'ahḥir (15b,6) | |
| [16] Fī ma'an (16a,6) | [16] Fī ma'an (16a,6) |
| [17] Fī al-mutaqābilāt (16a,10) | 1 al-mutaqābilāt 2 šukūk talzam mā qīla fi al-taqābul 3 al-ta'bīr 'an aḥkām wa-ḥawāṣṣ fi al-mutaḍāddāt 4 al-mutaqaddim wa-l-muta'ahḥar |

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CHAPTER 4

La substance première d'Averroès entre logique et ontologie

Cristina Cerami

Introduction : L'aporie de la substance première

Dans un célèbre article de 1983, en résumant les lignes générales du débat sur l'authenticité du traité aristotélicien connu sous le titre de *Catégories*, Michael Frede affirme que toutes les objections soulevées contre cette authenticité ont trouvé au cours de l'histoire une réponse satisfaisante, sauf une : la théorie de la substance dans les *Catégories* est absolument non aristotélicienne quand on la compare à celle de la *Métaphysique*¹. Nombre d'autres commentateurs et spécialistes de la philosophie d'Aristote, avant et après Frede, ont fait une remarque similaire², bien qu'ils en aient tiré des conclusions parfois divergentes.

De fait, le débat sur l'authenticité du traité des *Catégories* remonte au moins au premier éditeur du corpus d'Aristote³. Tous les commentateurs néoplatoniciens, en effet, l'ont abordée⁴ en évoquant

1. Frede 1983 in Frede 1987 : 26.

2. Dupréel 1909 ; S. Mansion 1946 ; *ead.* 1949 ; Bodéüs 2001. Ces auteurs ont tous considéré que la doctrine de la substance des *Catégories* diverge de celle de la *Métaphysique*.

3. En effet, sur la base des informations fournies par Simplicius dans son commentaire aux *Catégories*, Andronicos de Rhode n'aurait pas mis en doute la paternité aristotélicienne du traité dans son entier, mais simplement celle des cinq derniers chapitres, concernant ce qu'on a appelé d'après les commentateurs latins les *post-predicamenta*. Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 379.8-12. Sur la tension entraînée par la comparaison entre la théorie des *Catégories* et celle de la *Métaphysique* avant Alexandre d'Aphrodise, voir M. Rashed 2004 : 9-63.

4. La question de savoir si les *Catégories* étaient un traité authentiquement aristotélicien constituait l'une des questions préalables au commentaire de chaque œuvre du corpus du philosophe. Pour une analyse détaillée de cette question, voir I. Hadot 1990 : 1 : 19-160.

dans leurs commentaires les différentes raisons qui faisaient douter de la paternité du traité⁵. Parmi ces raisons, celle concernant l'apparente incompatibilité des théories *ousiologiques* des *Catégories* et de la *Métaphysique* occupe un rôle de premier plan. Dans son commentaire aux *Catégories*⁶, Olympiodore nous apprend ainsi que l'authenticité du traité avait été suspectée par certains avant lui. Il énumère les raisons portées à l'appui d'une telle contestation, sans toutefois dévoiler les noms de leurs auteurs. Selon la quatrième raison, la paternité du traité serait suspecte du fait qu'Aristote ne semble pas ici, comme dans les autres traités (*πραγματεία*), considérer la substance universelle (ἡ καθόλου οὐσία) comme plus estimable que la particulière (ἡ μερική).

Dans son commentaire⁷, Simplicius⁸ ne traite pas de la divergence entre les affirmations de la *Métaphysique* et des *Catégories* comme d'un argument pour refuser à Aristote la paternité de ce dernier traité, mais il nous confirme que plusieurs commentateurs avant lui avaient soulevé des apories concernant la primauté attribuée à la substance individuelle sensible.⁹ La première de ces apories, telle que Simplicius la rapporte, est la suivante¹⁰ : pourquoi dans les *Ca-*

5. La question concernant l'authenticité des *Catégories*, cependant, n'était soulevée que par un souci d'exhaustivité, car aucun commentateur ne doutait véritablement de l'authenticité de l'ensemble du traité. Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* p. 18.7-21 ; Philopon, *In Cat.*, p. 12.34-13.5 ; Ammonius, *In Cat.*, p. 13.20-14.2 ; David, *In Cat.*, p. 133.9-27 ; Olympiodore, *In Cat.*, p. 22.38-24.20.

6. Olympiodore, *In Cat.*, p. 22-24 ; Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 18 ; 13.

7. Simpl., *In Cat.* 82.1 et ss. C'est lors de son commentaire aux lignes 2211-14, et non pas comme le fait Olympiodore dans le prologue à son commentaire, que Simplicius, aborde et résout ces prétendues apories.

8. Pour une étude fouillée de la première partie du prologue et des quatre premiers chapitres du commentaire de Simplicius, voir I. Hadot 1990 : 3 ; Ph. Hoffmann 1987 : 61-90. Sur la postérité arabe du commentaire de Simplicius, voir Chase 2003 ; id. 2008.

9. De fait, l'authenticité des *Catégories* était pour Simplicius, comme pour tous les commentateurs néoplatoniciens, une donnée incontestable, il en est preuve le fait que, dans le prologue de son commentaire, il ne consacre que quelques lignes à cette question.

10. La même difficulté est soulevée par Porphyre, *In Cat.*, 90.12-92.35 ; Dexippe, *In Cat.*, 2.10-11 ; 44.32-45.11 ; Ammonius, *In Cat.*, 36.2-21 ; 40.4-5 ; Philopon, *In Cat.*, 50.1-51.21.

tégories Aristote appelle-t-il la substance sensible première, alors qu'il l'appelle ailleurs seconde, étant donné qu'elle est classée après la substance incorporelle ? Le texte auquel l'aporie semble faire allusion est celui de *Metaph.* 12.7 où Aristote paraît en effet accorder aux substances séparées, immuables et intelligibles une primauté par rapport aux substances sensibles sujettes à génération et corruption. La théorie exposée dans les *Catégories* semble en effet aller à l'encontre de la thèse proposée en *Metaph.* 12 selon laquelle Aristote, d'après les commentateurs néoplatoniciens, partage avec son maître l'idée que les substances séparées, immuables et intelligibles, à savoir les universaux appelés par la tradition *ante rem*, appartiennent à un ordre ontologiquement supérieur par rapport aux individus sujets à la génération et à la corruption.

L'opinion selon laquelle les *Catégories* et la *Métaphysique* présentent deux théories *ousiologiques* divergentes, comme on vient de le dire, a été reconsidérée par les interprètes modernes, quoique sur la base d'autres textes et d'autres présupposés que ceux qui fondaient les questionnements des commentateurs néoplatoniciens. C'est avec la théorie de la substance exposée dans le livre 7 de la *Métaphysique* que la primauté de l'individu sensible des *Catégories* semble être inconciliable. En effet, la plus grande partie des interprètes modernes s'accordent à reconnaître, au moins de prime abord, l'existence de plusieurs points de divergence entre ces deux traités : alors que les *Catégories* distinguent entre les substances premières (définies comme ce qui n'est ni dit d'un sujet ni dans un sujet) et les substances secondes (qui ne sont que les classes dans lesquelles se rangent les substances premières) et qu'elles attribuent la substantialité au sens strict à l'individu, la *Métaphysique* ne fait aucune mention de cette distinction et, fondant la primauté de la substance sur d'autres critères, attribue à la forme le rôle de substance première¹¹. Les inter-

11. En outre, le livre 7 de la *Métaphysique* semble directement s'opposer à la thèse soutenue dans les *Catégories* selon laquelle les substances secondes sont aussi des substances, quoiqu'à titre secondaire. En effet, dans le chapitre 13 de ce livre, Aristote réfute la thèse selon laquelle les universaux, conçus comme ce qui se prédique en commun d'une pluralité de choses, sont des véritables substances. Cette difficulté paraît en ce sens la plus facile à résoudre. On peut en effet admettre que dans le livre 7 tous les candidats au titre de substance première, qui sont exclus au fur et à mesure

prêtes se sont ainsi efforcés de résoudre ces discordances soit en admettant une évolution dans la pensée d'Aristote¹² soit en soutenant que la contradiction entre les deux traités était simplement apparente.

Dans l'horizon théorique de cette question, l'étude de la solution qu'Averroès en propose se révèle extrêmement fructueuse, non seulement parce qu'elle permet d'aplanir l'apparente divergence des affirmations des *Catégories* et de celle du livre 7 de la *Métaphysique* en faisant usage d'instruments conceptuels authentiquement aristotéliens, mais aussi parce que, conformément au souci de systématisation typique de l'exégèse d'Averroès, elle contribue à résoudre un problème plus général, celui des rapports des disciplines sous lesquelles les deux traités se rangent, à savoir la logique et la métaphysique.

Sans proposer sa lecture comme un argument censé résoudre une incohérence au sein de l'aristotélisme, Averroès affirme que la substance individuelle sensible et la forme substantielle sont toutes les deux des substances premières, mais selon deux critères d'ordre différents. En adoptant une position similaire à celle admise par Simplicius dans son commentaire aux *Catégories*, Averroès considère que la notion qui change de sens entre ce dernier traité et la *Métaphysique* est celle de primauté. Dans les *Catégories*, Aristote analyse et présente la description de la substance première « communément acceptée », à savoir celle qui de l'avis de tous est substance. La primauté qui entre en jeu est donc d'ordre chronologique ; il s'agit de ce qui est premier par rapport à nous. Dans la *Métaphysique*, en revanche, Aristote recherche la substance qui est première, en tant qu'elle est cause de ce qui est communément considérée comme substance. La primauté en jeu dans ce traité est alors d'ordre cau-

que la recherche avance, peuvent encore se dire substances, même si non pas au titre premier. Ce serait notamment le cas de l'universel. Les *Catégories* et la *Métaphysique* donc n'affirmeraient pas deux choses différentes ; elles arriveraient en revanche à la même conclusion, c'est-à-dire que les espèces et les genres ne sont pas les substances premières. De ce point de vue la divergence serait purement verbale.

12. C'est, comme on le verra, la thèse la plus répandue parmi les interprètes modernes. Voir Frede 1983 ; Graham 1987: 20-56 ; Furth 1988 ; Gill 1989: 27-32 ; Scaltsas 1994: 126 et ss. ; Dancy 1978: 372-413 ; Driscoll 1981: 129-159.

sal ; elle est, en d'autres termes, une primauté non pas par rapport à nous, mais par rapport à la nature¹³. En partant de ces considérations, la première hypothèse que je voudrais essayer de montrer est qu'Averroès considère la définition de la substance première des *Catégories* à la fois comme une définition logique, dans la mesure où elle la caractérise comme sujet ultime de prédication, et comme une définition « communément acceptée », car elle dénote ce que tout le monde s'accorde à considérer comme substance. De ce point de vue, on pourrait dire que le traité des *Catégories*, d'après Averroès, se rapproche plus de la dialectique des *Topiques* que de la théorie de la science des *Seconds Analytiques*. La métaphysique, en revanche, ne peut pas s'arrêter à cette définition logique et communément acceptée, mais doit parvenir à une définition ontologique de la substance première, celle qui désigne la cause de la substance. C'est là le cœur de la seconde hypothèse que je voudrais prouver.

Je voudrais, en effet, également suggérer que c'est sur la base de ce même raisonnement qu'Averroès peut conclure que la logique, en fournissant au métaphysicien une description communément acceptée de ce qui constitue l'objet de sa recherche, lui donne pour cela même les préalables de son étude. Les deux disciplines, la logique et la métaphysique, même si leurs résultats convergent, visent, en effet, pour Averroès, deux buts différents : la logique a pour but ultime d'étudier les êtres dans la mesure où ils sont désignés par les mots ; la métaphysique a pour but de rechercher les causes de l'être en tant que tel. Les façons qu'ont les deux traités des *Catégories* et de la *Métaphysique* de parler de la substance première s'articulent alors suivant ce même principe : le traité des *Catégories*, en tant que premier traité de l'art de la logique, part de la définition logique de cette dernière et se limite à ordonner les phénomènes en les distinguant en individus, espèces et genres, mais il ne nous explique pas ce qui fait d'une substance ce qu'elle est ; la *Métaphysique*, en revanche, en tant qu'exposition de la science qui porte le même nom, met l'accent sur cette question et recherche les causes des « phénomènes » qui dans les *Catégories* sont étudiés en tant que désignés par les mots.

13. Pour une étude d'ensemble du *Grand Commentaire* d'Averroès à *Metaph.* 7, voir le remarquable travail de M. Di Giovanni 2008.

S'il en est ainsi, *stricto sensu*, il n'y a pour Averroès ni compatibilité ni divergence entre les théories énoncées dans les deux traités, il y a plutôt passage d'un exposé factuel à un exposé causal¹⁴. Pour le dire différemment, alors, on peut conclure qu'il n'y a pas d'après Averroès deux théories ontologiques divergentes chez Aristote, simplement parce qu'il n'y a pas d'ontologie dans le traité que l'on s'accorde à appeler *Catégories*, à condition d'entendre par ontologie, comme le fait Averroès, la recherche de ce qui constitue le critère véritable de la substantialité de la substance.

I. Première pour nous, première par nature : l'aporie de la substance dans le commentaire de Simplicius aux *Catégories*

De la présentation rapide qu'on vient de proposer du débat séculaire concernant la primauté de la substance, on peut tirer la conclusion suivante : les commentateurs anciens et modernes s'accordent tous sur le fait que l'exposé des *Catégories* sur la substance semble diverger des doctrines de la *Métaphysique*, que cela constitue ou non un argument sérieux pour refuser à Aristote la paternité du traité¹⁵. L'étude que Simplicius consacre dans son commentaire aux *Catégories* à la présentation et à la résolution des apories de la substance soulevées par ses prédécesseurs et contemporains¹⁶ peut être prise à titre d'exemple. En effet, dans la partie de son commentaire déjà citée, Simplicius expose d'une manière extrêmement claire les termes du problème. La solution que Simplicius fait sienne va ainsi nous permettre de mieux comprendre la stratégie suivie par Averroès qui pour sa part utilise la même distinction entre un ordre chro-

14. Parmi les contemporains, R. Bodéüs a défendue une position similaire à celle d'Averroès, même s'il tire des conclusions différentes, dans la mesure où il estime que les *Catégories* devaient probablement constituer une introduction à une partie des *Topiques*. Cf. Bodéüs 2001 : xc-cii.

15. Pour une présentation des réflexions anciennes sur la question concernant l'authenticité des *Catégories* et plus en générale sur la question de la tension entre ce traité et celui de la *Métaphysique*, voir Moraux 1974 : 265-288 ; Bodéüs 2002 : xciv-ciii.

16. Simplicius ne fait pas les noms des exégètes ou philosophes qui avaient soulevées ces questions. Selon une suggestion de P. Henry (Henry 1973 : 234-265) les apories auraient été conçues par Plotin.

nologique et un ordre ontologique dans le respect des fondements de l'*ousiologie* aristotélicienne¹⁷.

En signalant que le premier chapitre de la *Physique* entraîne un type de difficulté semblable, car Aristote y affirme la primauté du particulier sur l'universel¹⁸, Simplicius affirme que dans les *Catégories* Aristote ne peut parler du même type de primauté dont il fait état dans la *Métaphysique*, à savoir celle d'après laquelle les substances intelligibles sont premières par rapport aux substances sensibles. En effet, l'affirmation de la primauté de l'individu substantiel sur la substance universelle écarte la possibilité d'une alliance entre l'aristotélisme et le platonisme dont Simplicius, comme tous les commentateurs néoplatoniciens, était convaincu¹⁹. Cette opinion, comme on vient de le signaler, était en partie étayée sur une lecture platonisante des affirmations de *Metaph.* 12. C'est à cette partie du corpus du Stagiritte que Simplicius semble renvoyer lorsqu'il énonce le noyau de la première aporie dont il fait état. Tout au long de son explication, Simplicius ne fait aucune mention explicite du texte et des doctrines de *Métaphysique* 7. Cela toutefois n'a rien d'étonnant, si l'on suppose que, dans sa reconstruction, *Métaphysique* 7 ne constituait qu'une étape intermédiaire dans la recherche des causes premières de l'être. En effet, comme on vient de le dire, le point final de la recherche de ce qui est substance première est, pour un platonicien comme Simplicius, le livre 12 ; car c'est ici qu'Aristote parvient aux véritables substances premières : les substances intelligibles séparées. Tout l'effort de Simplicius tendait donc à expliquer pourquoi les affirmations des *Catégories* ne contredisent en rien le texte de *Métaphysique* 12 ; pourquoi, en d'autres termes, la priorité peut être

17. L'état actuel des études concernant les traductions arabes des commentaires grecs qui étaient à la disposition d'Averroès ne nous permet pas de tirer des conclusions sur la connaissance directe que ce dernier avait du commentaire de Simplicius aux *Catégories*. Dans le cadre limité de ce travail, je me borne à comparer leurs approches au traité des *Catégories* et à son exposé sur la substance, afin de mettre en lumière leurs nombreux points communs.

18. Sur la question concernant le caractère idiosyncratique du texte de *Phys.* I, 1 et sur les solutions que les commentateurs anciens et modernes ont proposées, voir Cerami 2009 : 189-223.

19. Cf. Bodéüs 2001 : XCI-XCV.

attribuée en même temps et sans contradiction à la substance individuelle et à la substance intelligible séparée.

A la question de ceux qui demandent pourquoi, dans les *Catégories*, Aristote appelle la substance sensible première, alors qu'il l'appelle ailleurs seconde, Simplicius répond aussitôt qu'Aristote n'est pas dans les *Catégories* en train de discuter des substances intelligibles (περὶ τῶν νοητῶν οὐσιῶν), mais de rendre raison de l'ordre (τάξιν) des substances sensibles. Le fait qu'Aristote est en train de discuter des substances de l'expérience commune et non des intelligibles séparés est prouvé selon le commentateur par la manière même dont il s'exprime dans les lignes en question (*Cat.* 5.2a12), où il affirme qu'est dit substance au sens fondamental, premier et principal ce qui à la fois ne se dit pas d'un certain sujet et n'est pas dans un certain sujet. Pour Simplicius, en d'autres termes, le participe λεγομένη qui ouvre la discussion sur la catégorie de la substance doit s'entendre dans le sens impersonnel du verbe λέγεται²⁰. C'est dans le langage ordinaire (ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ), explique-t-il, que ce qui à la fois ne se dit pas d'un certain sujet et n'est pas dans un certain sujet est identifié comme la substance au sens fondamental, premier et principal. En effet, confirme Simplicius, c'est à la multitude (τοῖς πολλοῖς) qu'échappe ce qui est véritablement substance première, à savoir la substance intelligible. Aristote ne serait donc pas en train de dire son dernier mot sur ce qu'est la substance première, mais de rapporter ce qu'on dit à son propos.

Dans les lignes qui suivent, Simplicius confirme cette interprétation du texte d'Aristote et explique que cet état des choses est confirmé ou plutôt mis en lumière par la distinction célèbre que le Stagirite établit entre deux sens différents des termes « antérieur » (τὸ πρότερον) et « postérieur » (τὸ δεύτερον) : à savoir la distinction entre ce qui est premier ou postérieur par nature (τῇ φύσει) et ce qui l'est par rapport à nous (πρὸς ἡμᾶς). Par rapport à nous, explique Simplicius, c'est

20. Il s'agit de la lecture que P. Pellegrin et M. Crubellier considèrent dans leur traduction de ces lignes comme « habituelle » (Crubellier & al. 2007 : 220, n. 1). A la différence de Pellegrin et Crubellier, Simplicius ne trouve pas « curieuse » l'utilisation de la formule ἔστιν ἢ ... λεγομένη à la place de λέγεται. Pour une explication de la lecture proposée par M. Crubellier et P. Pellegrin *infra* n. 30

l'individu (τὸ καθ' ἑκάστων) qui est premier, car ce sont tout d'abord les individus qui se manifestent à nous. Par nature, en revanche, ce sont les simples (τὰ ἀπλά), les causes (τὰ αἴτια), les universaux (τὰ καθόλου), les immatériels (τὰ ἄυλα), les indivisibles (τὰ ἀμέριστα) qui doivent être classés premiers. C'est cette même distinction qui doit être envisagée pour expliquer le texte de *Phys.* I,1 qui affirme la postériorité du particulier et l'antériorité de l'universel. Dans les deux cas, en effet, il faut faire jouer la distinction premier pour nous/premier par nature pour pouvoir aplanir les apparentes divergences dans les textes d'Aristote. Si dans la *Physique* Aristote affirme que l'universel et antérieur au particulier, c'est parce qu'il oppose ce qui est premier par nature à ce qui est premier pour nous. D'une façon similaire, si dans les *Catégories* il affirme que l'individu est substance première, c'est parce qu'il range les êtres selon un critère chronologique qui va de ce qui est plus proche de nous à ce qui l'est moins.

Cette solution²¹ consiste donc à écarter l'apparente divergence entre les *Catégories* et la *Métaphysique* en recourant à une distinction entre différents types de priorité. Aristote ne parle pas dans les deux traités du même type de priorité, car alors que dans la *Métaphysique* il est question de ce qui est premier dans l'ordre ontologique des choses, à savoir les universaux *ante rem*, dans les *Catégories*, affirme Simplicius, c'est ce qui est premier selon l'ordre de la « relation sémantique » (ἀπὸ τῆς σηματικῆς σχέσεως) qui est en cause, c'est-à-dire la substance sensible. Mais que faut-il entendre par « relation sémantique », et pourquoi est-ce par ce biais que Simplicius pense pouvoir résoudre l'aporie de la substance première ? Ce n'est qu'en analysant le *skopos* que Simplicius attribue au traité des *Catégories* dans son ensemble qu'on peut répondre à cette question²². Sur la question du but et de l'objet des *Catégories*, Simplicius affirme reprendre l'exégèse qu'Alexandre d'Aphrodise avait proposée²³. Il ex-

21. Simpl., *In Cat.*, 82.15-20.

22. Je n'ai pas l'intention ici de présenter dans le détail l'interprétation que Simplicius propose de l'objet et du but des *Catégories*. Je renvoie pour cela à l'excellent article de Ph. Hoffmann (Hoffmann 1987: 61-90), dont je reprends les traductions des textes du commentaire de Simplicius cités par la suite.

23. Simpl., *In Cat.*, 10.8-19. Simplicius nous avise aussi sur le fait que cette interprétation était partagée par toute une lignée d'interprètes, parmi lesquels Boéthos de Si-

plique que, d'après cette lecture, le but des *Catégories* est d'étudier « les parties simples et suprêmement génériques de la proposition, qui signifient les réalités simples et les notions simples concernant les réalités simples ». En effet, il affirme, en donnant un premier aperçu du rapport qui lie les réalités, les notions et les parties de la proposition, qu'« il est clair que si le but <du traité> concerne les éléments lexicaux en tant qu'ils signifient, nécessairement sont aussi impliquées et les réalités et les notions qui sont produites dans l'acte de signifier »²⁴. Les trois termes se trouvent ainsi ancrés les uns aux autres dans un rapport de dépendance, mais Simplicius n'a pas encore expliqué de quelle façon il faut interpréter cette relation. C'est dans la suite de son commentaire que Simplicius explique et fixe l'ordre dans lequel ces trois termes s'articulent, lorsqu'il affirme que les *Catégories* étudient « les mots simples qui signifient les réalités simples par la médiation des notions simples »²⁵.

En d'autres termes, si les mots signifient les réalités par la médiation des notions, car « dire une réalité » suppose que l'on possède préalablement dans l'âme une notion de cette réalité et qu'on ne puisse avoir de notion d'une réalité sans en avoir d'abord fait l'expérience, il est évident que le processus qui fait parvenir aux genres suprêmes débute par l'expérience même des choses. Cette relation n'a d'après Simplicius rien d'arbitraire. Ainsi explique-t-il que c'est parce que les hommes avaient besoin de se signifier les uns aux autres les réalités, « en étant éloignés de l'intellection universelle »²⁶, qu'ils ont institué le langage et ont commencé par imposer les mots pour les réalités simples. C'est cette première institution (πρώτη θέσις) qui a fait émerger les catégories. Sur la base de ce que Simplicius nous dit concernant le but du traité dans son ensemble, on peut donc déduire que la relation sémantique ici évoquée est celle d'après laquelle l'homme parvient, une fois qu'il a fait expérience des choses

don, Herminos, Porphyre, Jamblique, Syrianus et Ammonius. Sur la question du *skopos* des *Catégories* d'après les commentateurs anciens je renvoie encore à I. Hadot 1990.

24. Simpl., *In Cat.*, 12.1-3.

25. Simpl., *In Cat.*, 13.18-21.

26. Sur cette notion et plus en général sur le rapport langage/intellection, voir Hoffmann 1987:78-90.

sensibles, à leur imposer des noms et à les regrouper en des genres de plus en plus communs. La substance première des *Catégories* est donc véritablement première, mais non pas selon l'ordre naturel des choses, à savoir l'ordre qui va de ce qui est plus être à ce qui l'est moins, mais simplement par rapport à nous, c'est-à-dire d'un point de vue purement chronologique. C'est en revanche la substance séparée intelligible à laquelle aboutit la recherche de la *Métaphysique* qui est véritablement première par nature.

Comme j'essaierai de le montrer, Averroès partage avec Alexandre et Simplicius l'idée que le traité des *Catégories* parle des choses en tant qu'elles sont signifiées par des expressions. Par rapport à Simplicius, on verra qu'Averroès accentue davantage l'aspect notoire et non scientifique des descriptions des catégories qu'Aristote fournit dans ce traité. De ce point de vue, la lecture qu'il propose des *Catégories*, surtout pour ce qui est de la place et du rôle du traité dans l'économie de l'enseignement d'Aristote, concorde à plusieurs égards avec celle d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise. D'une part, parce qu'après des générations de commentateurs *Catégories*-centristes, Alexandre semble avoir atténué, voire exclu, la portée ontologique du traité. D'autre part, parce que sa lecture implique la distinction entre une substance qui est première par rapport à nous et une substance qui est première par nature²⁷, ce qui permet à Averroès d'estomper la tension sous-jacente aux doctrines de l'*ousia* des *Catégories* et de la *Métaphysique* et de montrer finalement que la véritable substance première est la forme substantielle.

2. La substance première et le critère du sujet : *Catégories* 5 et *Métaphysique* 7.3

Comme on vient de le signaler, à la différence des Néoplatoniciens, pour la grande majorité des interprètes modernes, qui voient en *Métaphysique* 7 le cœur de l'ontologie aristotélicienne, le véritable défit consiste à rendre raison de la divergence qu'il semble y avoir entre les *Catégories*, et notamment son chapitre 5, et l'exposé de la sub-

27. Sur « la teneur sémantique » des *Catégories* et plus en générale sur la théorie de la substance d'après Alexandre, voir M. Rashed 2007: 42 et ss.

stance qui commence en *Metaph.* 7.3. C'est en effet ce deuxième texte qui, d'après les interprètes modernes, marque le véritable tournant dans la réflexion philosophique d'Aristote, qu'il prenne la forme d'un dépassement ou d'une clarification de la doctrine défendue dans le chapitre 5 des *Catégories*²⁸. On verra que, de la même manière, dans la reconstruction d'Averroès, c'est *Metaph.* 7.3 qui constitue l'axe charnière entre l'étude logique et l'étude ontologique de la substance première.

Avant de parvenir à l'analyse de *Cat.* 5, il faut reprendre brièvement ce qui le précède, parce que c'est sur la base de la combinatoire proposée en *Cat.* 2 et des propriétés fournies dans ce chapitre que la théorie de la substance de *Cat.* 5 va s'étayer. Après avoir distingué, dans le deuxième chapitre du traité des *Catégories*, entre les choses qui se disent d'un sujet, mais ne sont dans aucun sujet, celles qui sont dans un sujet, mais ne se disent d'aucun sujet et celles qui à la fois se disent d'un sujet et sont dans un sujet, Aristote définit comme indivisibles (ἄτομα) et numériquement un (ἐν ἀριθμῷ) les membres appartenant à la quatrième classe (celle qui résulte de la combinaison des deux propriétés indiquées et de leur négations). En effet, les choses qui à la fois ne sont pas dans un sujet et ne se disent pas d'un sujet sont nécessairement des indivisibles, car elles ne sont pas une classe que l'on pourrait encore diviser, et sont des unités numériques, c'est-à-dire des objets qu'on peut dénombrer.

Aristote consacre à l'analyse des choses qui à la fois ne sont pas dans un sujet et ne se disent pas d'un sujet le chapitre 5 du traité. Il les définit d'emblée comme les substances qui sont dites telles proprement, premièrement et avant tout et il les oppose aux espèces et aux genres auxquelles elles appartiennent. Les espèces et les genres des substances dites au sens premier, on le sait, ne sont que des substances secondes. Dès le début du chapitre, Aristote ordonne donc les individus et leurs classes en fonction de leur substantialité et attribue une certaine primauté aux individus qui à la fois ne sont pas dans un sujet et ne se disent pas d'un sujet. Dans une note à leur traduction des *Catégories*, Michel Crubellier et Pierre Pellegrin pro-

28. Pour une synthèse des interprétations modernes de la théorie aristotélicienne de l'*ousia* et de l'apparente divergence entre *Catégories* et *Métaphysique*, voir Steinfath 1991.

posent une lecture alternative de cette affirmation du début du chapitre 5²⁹. Aristote ne dirait pas qu'est dit substance proprement, premièrement et avant tout ce qui à la fois n'est pas dans un sujet et ne se dit pas d'un sujet ; il affirmerait plutôt que la substance est ce qui est dit proprement, premièrement et avant tout, tout comme l'est ce qui à la fois n'est pas dans un sujet et ne se dit pas d'un sujet. D'après cette hypothèse, alors, il ne s'agirait pas tant de distinguer dans cette phrase deux sens du terme « substance », mais plutôt d'affirmer que tout ce qui est dit signifie quelque chose parce que le discours se réfère en fin de compte à une réalité ultime qui est la substance. Cette lecture aurait l'avantage, d'après ses auteurs, de réduire la tension entre les *Catégories* et la *Métaphysique*, dans la mesure où Aristote ne serait pas en train d'affirmer une thèse ontologique forte, mais de formuler une distinction à utiliser comme un pur dispositif terminologique local. On a déjà vu que, selon l'exégèse de ces lignes proposée par Simplicius, la difficulté est écartée si l'on suppose un sens lâche du participe λεγομένη. On verra également que, tout en adoptant la lecture, pour ainsi dire, traditionnelle, Averroès ne se sent pas obligé de fonder sur ces lignes une thèse ontologique forte.

Indépendamment de la manière dont on lit ses premières lignes, le chapitre 5 semble nous fournir les linéaments essentiels d'une certaine *ousiologie*. Car, en étant consacré à l'*ousia* dans sa double acception de substance première et de substance seconde, il nous fournit six caractères visant à la décrire : 1) elle n'est pas dans un sujet ; 2) elle produit des prédicats synonymes ; 3) elle désigne un ceci ; 4) elle n'a pas de contraire ; 5) elle n'admet pas le plus et le moins ; 6) elle est capable de recevoir les contraires, tout en restant la même et numériquement une. Ces caractères pourtant n'appartiennent pas en propre à l'*ousia* ni dans son acception la plus propre ni dans son acception secondaire. En effet, certains de ces caractères, le 1), le 4) le 5), sont vrais également des choses qui ne sont pas des substances, à savoir la différence et la quantité ; d'autres ne sont vérifiés que par l'un des deux types de substance, mais non par l'autre. Ces caractères, de ce point de vue, peuvent difficilement être considérés comme une explication de ce en quoi consiste la substantialité des

29. Crubellier & al. 2007 : 220.

substances premières et encore moins des substances dans leur totalité. Toutefois l'intention ultime d'Aristote dans ce chapitre semble être véritablement d'identifier le propre des substances premières avec le fait que ces dernières soient des sujets ultimes. De ce point de vue, le fait d'être sujet ultime implique une sorte de primauté, dans la mesure où les substances premières sont les êtres dont l'existence conditionne celle de tous les autres. Cette condition générale n'est satisfaite que par les objets ordinaires, comme les hommes, les chevaux etc. qui, en étant sujets ultimes, fondent véritablement l'existence de tout le reste, à savoir de ce qui se trouve en elles et de ce qui est dit d'elles.

Or par rapport à ce cadre, les spécialistes modernes d'Aristote ont souligné que la discussion engagée en *Metaph.* 7.3 semble jeter des doutes sur le fait que le critère que l'on s'accorde à appeler du sujet puisse véritablement repérer la substance première. En effet, en *Metaph.* 7.3, Aristote formule pour la première fois la question de ce qui définit l'*ousia*, question qui constitue, comme 7.1 nous le dit, le but du livre dans son ensemble. Aristote propose, au début de 7.3, quatre candidats qui représentent autant de réponses possibles à la question sur ce qu'est l'*ousia* : le *τί ἦν εἶναι*, l'universel, le genre et le sujet³⁰. Le livre 7 dans son entier paraît être une analyse de ces quatre candidats. Le sujet est analysé dans le chapitre 3. Une étude de la notion de *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* occupe les chapitres 4-6 et 10-12³¹, alors qu'un examen de l'universel couvre la section comprise entre les chapitres 13 et 16. Le genre n'est pas soumis à une analyse séparée mais, comme semble le suggérer le résumé de *Metaph.* 8.1, on lui refuse le titre de substance pour les mêmes raisons que celles pour lesquelles on le refuse à l'universel.

Le *ὑποκείμενον* est donc le premier candidat à être examiné. Le sujet, affirme Aristote en reprenant presque la lettre des *Catégories*, pourrait prétendre au titre de substance³², car il est ce dont tout le

30. Arist., *Metaph.* 7.3, 1028b 33-36.

31. Les chapitres *Metaph.* 7.10-12 traitent en réalité de la question de la définition, de ses parties et de son unité. Mais il est manifeste que la définition n'est que le reflet épistémologique de l'essence. On peut donc admettre qu'une recherche sur la définition de la substance est bien le complément d'une recherche sur l'essence.

32. Arist., *Metaph.* 7.3, 1029a 1-2.

reste se dit, alors qu'il n'est pas à son tour dit d'autre chose. En *Metaph.* 7.1 Aristote a affirmé que tout, hormis la substance, est dit « être » en tant qu'il se prédique d'un sujet (1028a 25-27) ; seule la substance en effet est ὑποκείμενον. Dans le traité des *Catégories*, on vient de le voir, être le sujet de prédication était considéré comme un critère discriminant pour distinguer les substances premières de tous les autres êtres. Aristote ajoute pourtant dans la *Métaphysique* des éléments supplémentaires qui semblent nous obliger à modifier le cadre esquissé dans les *Catégories*. Il affirme d'abord que le terme ὑποκείμενον peut en même temps désigner la matière, la forme et la substance composée³³ ; il précise ensuite que la matière se révèle être sujet à un plus haut degré que le composé et la forme, étant donné qu'elle est apparemment le seul ὑποκείμενον qui demeure lorsqu'on soustrait mentalement tout genre de prédicats, accidentels et essentiels. Les prédicats accidentels seraient, en effet, prédiqués de la substance individuelle, alors que les prédicats essentiels le seraient de la matière. La matière constituerait en ce sens un sujet ontologiquement antérieur par rapport à la substance individuelle, du fait que celle-ci résulte de la composition de la forme substantielle et de la matière, alors que cette dernière serait quelque chose d'absolument simple. La nouveauté par rapport au cadre des *Catégories* est donc que les objets ordinaires de notre perception sont soumis à une analyse dans les termes de forme et matière. En d'autres termes, de l'avis de tous, les objets qui étaient considérés dans les *Catégories* comme des entiers non-analysés sont considérés dans la *Métaphysique* comme des objets composés. C'est ce qui constitue le véritablement tournant par rapport à l'*ousiologie* des *Catégories*.

On ne voit pas clairement, néanmoins, si ce qui a été défini comme une sorte de "strip-tease ontologique"³⁴ constitue, d'après Aristote, un procédé philosophiquement correct ou s'il ne faut pas plutôt considérer toute la démonstration de la primauté du substrat matériel comme un argument dialectique adressé à des adversaires qui ne sont pas bien définis³⁵. Je n'entends pas ici fournir une inter-

33. Arist., *Metaph.* 7.3, 1029a 1-5.

34. Stahl 1981: 177-180.

35. Dans leur commentaire, M. Frede et G. Patzig proposent une ligne d'interpréta-

prétation de *Metaph.* 7.3 dans le détail. Je me bornerai à signaler que, au delà des diverses hypothèses possibles, l'objectif de l'analyse de *Metaph.* 7.3 est de reformuler le critère du sujet, en ajoutant deux nouvelles conditions à remplir pour être substance première : être τὸδε τι et être χωριστόν.³⁶ Les analyses de *Metaph.* 7.3 paraissent en effet tendre à affaiblir, sinon à invalider, le critère du sujet. Le nouveau critère ou, si l'on préfère, le critère rénové prévoit que le sujet, pour être substance première³⁷, doit être en même temps quelque chose de déterminé et de séparé. Ce sont par conséquent la forme et le composé qui peuvent plus légitimement aspirer au titre de substance première³⁸ et la forme, en tant que dépourvue de matière, plus que le composé.

Sur la base de ces considérations, les interprètes sont partagés entre deux positions : une position que l'on a appelée "compatibiliste" et une position "incompatibiliste". D'après les tenants de la position "incompatibiliste", la *Métaphysique* marque une véritable rupture par rapport à l'ontologie des *Catégories*, dans la mesure où la forme remplace, en tout et pour tout, les individus dans leur rôle de substances premières. En ce sens, comme le fait M. Frede, il faut admettre que la *Métaphysique* manifeste un véritable dépassement de la théorie des *Catégories*. D'après les défenseurs de la position "compatibiliste", en revanche, il faut admettre que les individus des *Catégories* demeurent dans la *Métaphysique* des substances premières, mais en un sens différent par rapport à la forme. Les composés seraient donc substances en un sens *monoargumental*, c'est-à-dire substance tout court, alors que la forme serait substance en un sens *biargumental*, c'est-à-dire substance de quelque chose. On va voir que, par rapport au cadre que l'on vient de présenter, la reconstruction qu'Aver-

tion similaire et suggèrent que les adversaires visés par la critique aristotélicienne étaient des Platoniciens (Frede & Patzig 1988 : 42 et ss). Pour une présentation du débat contemporain sur la question, voir Galluzzo & Mariani 2006 : 89-132.

36. Arist., *Metaph.* 7.3, 1029a 27-28.

37. La question est de savoir si le critère du substrat est invalidé et remplacé par le nouveau critère, ou s'il est simplement complété par les deux nouvelles conditions de l'être τὸδε τι et χωριστόν. Sur les différentes positions sur la question, voir Galluzzo & Mariani 2006 : 89-132

38. Arist. *Metaph.* 7.3, 1029a 29-30.

roès propose se distingue doublement de la lecture de la plupart des contemporains, d'une part parce qu'il ne voit entre la doctrine de la substance des *Catégories* et celle de la *Métaphysique* ni une divergence ni une compatibilité au sens strict ; d'autre part, parce que sa lecture échappe à l'alternative qu'on vient d'évoquer entre un sens *monoargumental* et un sens *biargumental* et vise à montrer que la forme est substance première du fait même qu'elle est substance des individus composés.

3.1 Sujet et prédicat : la description logique de la substance première dans la Commentaire Moyen des *Catégories*

La lecture proposée par Averroès de la théorie de la substance première d'Aristote, comme on vient de l'annoncer, semble échapper à l'alternative qui divise les interprètes modernes en "compatibilistes" et "incompatibilistes" ; en effet, elle n'implique pas une distinction entre deux sens du terme substance, *monoargumental* et *biargumental*, mais une différence de point de vue entre l'étude des *Catégories* et celle de la *Métaphysique*. Les commentaires d'Averroès qui correspondent aux textes d'Aristote en question semblent confirmer cette hypothèse. Comme les "compatibilistes", Averroès affirme dans son *Grand Commentaire* à la *Métaphysique* que la recherche du livre 7 est en réalité une recherche des principes de la substance, mais, comme on l'a annoncé, il n'envisage pas la possibilité que le composé et la forme puissent être dits substance en un sens purement homonyme. La notion qui change de sens d'un traité à l'autre est celle de primauté. Comme on l'a vu chez Simplicius, on retrouve chez Averroès l'idée que la substance individuelle est première d'un point de vue chronologique, c'est-à-dire par rapport à nous, alors que la forme est première d'un point de vue ontologico-causale et donc pour cela même, première par nature.

Dans sa paraphrase des *Catégories*, le commentateur ne fait mention ni de la forme substantielle ni du sens du mot « premier » d'après lequel cette dernière serait substance première. Il se borne à expliquer en quel sens la substance individuelle est dite première. C'est la lecture qu'Averroès propose de ce sens qui nous permet d'étayer la thèse suggérée et de montrer que, d'après le Commentaire

teur, les deux traités des *Catégories* et de la *Métaphysique* considèrent la primauté de la substance de deux points de vue différents. Avant de passer à l'analyse de sa paraphrase à *Cat.* 5, et afin de pouvoir comprendre la conception qu'Averroès se fait de la substance première telle qu'elle est présentée dans ce chapitre, il faut s'interroger, fût-il brièvement, sur le rôle qu'Averroès attribue au traité des *Catégories* dans son ensemble. Car, comme on le verra, les deux questions sont intimement liées.

Au tout début de sa paraphrase³⁹, Averroès annonce d'emblée le but du projet qu'il entreprend : fournir une explication *ad sensum* du livre appelé *Catégories*, le premier des traités d'Aristote sur l'art de la logique⁴⁰. Cette affirmation nous permet de tirer au moins trois conclusions provisoires concernant l'approche d'Averroès au traité qu'il s'apprête à commenter : Averroès ne semble pas nourrir de doute concernant son authenticité, le titre que la tradition depuis Andronicos lui avait attribué, ainsi que la position qu'il occupe dans la réorganisation éditoriale que ce dernier avait proposé du *corpus* aristotélicien⁴¹. Dans les lignes qui suivent ces premières déclarations, Averroès présente l'objet et le but des différentes parties, mais il ne nous donne ni l'objet ni le but du traité dans son ensemble. Le traité, nous dit Averroès, est le premier des livres qui exposent la doctrine logique d'Aristote et se divise en trois parties : la première (couvrant les quatre premiers chapitres de notre traité) joue le rôle d'introduction générale du traité ; la deuxième fournit la description (*rasam*) propre à chacune des dix catégories, les divise selon leurs espèces communément acceptées (*al-mašhūra*) et présente leurs caractéristiques communément acceptées ; la troisième partie enfin (qui comprend nos chapitres 10-15) fournit les

39. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p.75, 5-7.

40. Sur le sens général de ces lignes et sur leur valeur historique, voir Butterworth 1981 : 368-375.

41. Le fait de commencer par commenter les *Catégories* et non pas l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre indique non seulement qu'Averroès n'englobait pas ce traité dans l'*Organon*, mais qu'il ne le considérait pas indispensable à la compréhension de la logique aristotélicienne. Averroès lui-même affirme d'ailleurs dans sa paraphrase à ce traité qu'il entreprend de le commenter parce qu'il est dans la coutume des commentateurs de le faire. Sur ce point, voir Bouyges 1932 : ix-x ; Davidson 1969 : 98.

propres et les accidents qui appartiennent à toutes les catégories en tant que telles ou à la plupart d'entre elles⁴².

Averroès nous fournit d'autres éléments à propos du but des *Catégories* lorsqu'il présente la division de la première partie du traité. Les sections de cette partie, qui correspondent à notre chapitre 1 et aux premières lignes de notre chapitre 2 (*Cat.* 1a15-20), ont comme objectif de présenter les conditions propres aux êtres en tant qu'ils sont désignés par les expressions linguistiques et d'indiquer ce que sont la substance et l'accident selon la manière dont la science de la logique les examine :

Dans la première section <de la première partie> Aristote indique les conditions propres aux êtres en tant qu'ils sont désignés par les expressions linguistiques. Dans la deuxième section, il indique ce que sont la substance et l'accident selon la manière dont cet art les examine, je veux dire la substance universelle et la substance individuelle, ainsi que l'accident universel et l'accident individuel⁴³.

Dès ces premières lignes, en effet, Averroès nous délivre des informations sur sa lecture du but et du statut de l'exposé de la substance. En faisant cela, il nous donne aussi des indications sur l'objet du traité dans son ensemble : il s'agit de montrer ce que sont la substance et l'accident du point de vue de l'art de la logique, ainsi que d'indiquer leurs propriétés communément acceptées. Averroès, toutefois, ne nous explique ni quelle est cette manière qu'adopte l'art de la logique pour examiner la substance et l'accident, ni en quel sens leurs propriétés sont communément acceptées.

On peut tirer plus d'informations concernant l'idée qu'Averroès se fait de la nature de l'analyse des *Catégories* de la manière dans laquelle il présente le premier chapitre du traité et les propriétés d'homonymie, synonymie et paronymie. Averroès affirme en effet que ces propriétés constituent les conditions propres aux êtres, non

42. La division qu'Averroès propose du traité montre que pour lui les chapitres des *post-predicamenta* constituaient une partie parfaitement intégrée dans l'ensemble du projet aristotélicien.

43. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 77. 3-5.

pas en tant qu'êtres, mais en tant qu'ils sont désignés par le langage. En d'autres termes, explique Averroès, ces trois relations n'intéressent pas les êtres en tant qu'êtres, mais elles leur appartiennent en tant que ceux-ci sont désignés par des noms. C'est en ce sens qu'Aristote, d'après Averroès, distingue entre les choses dont les noms sont communs, univoques ou dérivés. Les choses dont les noms concordent, c'est-à-dire sont communs (*muštaraka*), sont les choses qui ne partagent que le nom, mais non pas la définition qui dévoile l'essence. Les choses dont les noms sont univoques sont les choses qui partagent le même nom, ainsi que la définition qui désigne l'essence. Les choses enfin dont les noms sont dérivés sont celles qui sont appelées par le nom d'un concept avec une inflexion différente. L'on peut donc tirer une première conclusion de l'analyse qu'Averroès propose de ces trois propriétés : c'est que le premier chapitre a pour objet non pas des propriétés ontologiques des choses, c'est-à-dire des propriétés que les choses auraient en tant qu'elles sont des êtres, mais des propriétés qui leur sont propres en tant qu'elles possèdent des noms, autrement dit, en tant qu'elles sont désignées par des expressions linguistiques.

Cette lecture est confirmée, mais également précisée, dans le corps du commentaire qui correspond aux lignes 1a15-20, lignes dans lesquelles Aristote divise les « choses que l'on dit » en celles qui sont dites selon une combinaison et celles qui sont dit sans combinaison. En commentant cette division⁴⁴, Averroès opère en effet un glissement qui est loin d'être fortuit, car au lieu de parler de « choses dites », comme le fait Aristote, il parle de « concepts qui sont désignés par des expressions linguistiques ». D'après Averroès, en effet, Aristote ne considère ni de simples expressions linguistiques ni des êtres, mais des êtres dont la notion est désignée par une expression linguistique⁴⁵. D'après cette lecture, ce sont les concepts, en tant qu'ils sont désignés par des expressions linguistiques, qui se divisent en simples et combinés. De ce point de vue, on peut

44. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 78.10-13.

45. Je laisse de côté la question de savoir quelle est la nature des êtres dont les *ma'āni* sont désignés par des expressions complexes. Sur ce point je renvoie à Benmakhlof & Diebler 2000 : 47-67, ainsi qu'à la bibliographie mentionnée.

conclure que si le traité des *Catégories* étudie les êtres, ce n'est que parce qu'il les considère en tant qu'ils sont des notions qui sont désignés par des expressions linguistiques.

Cette même vision est confirmée par l'exégèse qu'Averroès propose des premières lignes du chapitre 4. On y retrouve en effet le même type de glissement qu'on vient de constater. Car, lorsqu'il commente l'affirmation d'Aristote selon laquelle « chacun des termes qui sont dits sans aucune combinaison indique soit une substance, soit une certaine quantité ... », Averroès parle à nouveau de concepts et non de simples « choses dites ». Ainsi affirme-t-il que « les expressions simples qui désignent les notions simples nécessairement désignent l'une des dix choses : à savoir soit une substance, soit une quantité etc. »⁴⁶. En effet, même si Averroès ne remplace pas dans ces lignes le terme « chose dite » par le terme « notion »⁴⁷, on constate un glissement équivalent à celui des lignes précédentes, dans la mesure où il paraphrase le texte d'Aristote, en affirmant que les expressions simples dénotent des concepts simples. La conclusion dans les deux passages reste la même : les êtres sont étudiés, dans les *Catégories*, en tant que concepts désignés par les expressions linguistiques. Mais comment entendre cette affirmation dans le cadre particulier de la substance première ? C'est à cette question que je voudrais essayer de répondre, à partir des quelques informations qu'Averroès nous a fournies concernant ce qui constitue d'après lui l'objet et le but des *Catégories*.

La réponse à cette question repose à la fois sur la lecture générale qu'Averroès propose du but du traité et sur son interprétation particulière des propriétés qui fondent la description logique de la substance. C'est l'exégèse que le commentateur propose du chapitre 2 qu'il faut maintenant analyser. A la suite d'al-Fārābī⁴⁸, Averroès interprète la quadripartition de *Cat.* 2 entre les choses qui se

46. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 82.2.

47. Il faut en réalité signaler que dans la variante attestée par le reste de la tradition, le glissement est exactement le même que celui constaté in Averroès, *CM*, p. 78.10-13. Cf. Davidson 1969 : 101, n. 25.

48. Al-Fārābī, *Livre des catégories*, p. 89-90. Pour une présentation générale des œuvres logiques d'al-Fārābī, voir Black 2007 : 179-84 avec la bibliographie citée. Sur le but et le rôle des *Catégories* d'après al-Fārābī, voir Vallat 2004 : 172-190.

disent ou pas d'un sujet et les choses qui sont ou pas dans un sujet à la lumière de la distinction entre substances (universelles et individuelles) et accidents (universels et individuels). Ainsi affirme-t-il, dans le corps du commentaire aux lignes 1a20-1b5, que l'expression « ce qui se dit d'un sujet » désigne le prédicat qui affirme la substance et l'essence de chaque chose dont il est prédiqué et que l'expression « être dans un sujet » signifie le fait que le prédicat affirme quelque chose qui est extérieur à l'essence. On remarque immédiatement que la lecture qu'Averroès, à la suite de Fārābī, propose de la seconde propriété (le fait de se trouver dans un sujet) exclut toute possible interprétation ontologique de l'analyse d'Aristote. Car, d'après cette interprétation, ce n'est pas d'un type d'existence ou de subsistance que le philosophe est en train de discuter, mais encore une fois d'une propriété liée à la prédication. Cette propriété, en effet, désigne un type particulier de prédication, celle qui attribue au sujet quelque chose qui est extérieur à l'essence. A la différence donc de la plupart des interprètes modernes, Averroès ne considère pas la propriété « être dans quelque chose » comme une propriété ontologique, mais il l'inscrit dans le cadre d'une logique prédicative. Or ce point d'exégèse n'est pas d'une importance mineure, lorsqu'on essaie de comprendre en quel sens la description de la substance dans les *Catégories* est pour Averroès une description logique. C'est même là qu'est la clé de toute la question.

En effet, si la description de la substance est pour Averroès une description logique c'est, comme je voudrais le suggérer, parce qu'il conçoit en un sens prédicatif les deux propriétés d'être dit d'un sujet et d'être dans un sujet. C'est en interprétant ces propriétés comme liées exclusivement à la prédication qu'Averroès peut considérer les descriptions de la substance seconde et première comme des descriptions logiques. La substance seconde, qu'Averroès appelle la substance universelle⁴⁹, c'est ce qui se dit d'un sujet, à savoir le prédicat qui affirme la substance et l'essence de chaque chose dont il est prédiqué, et qui n'est pas dans un sujet, c'est-à-dire qui n'affirme rien qui soit extérieur à l'essence de ce dont il se prédique. C'est dans ce même sens qu'Averroès interprète ces deux propriétés,

49. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 79, 2-6.

lorsqu'Aristote les refuse à la substance individuelle. Le commentateur affirme⁵⁰, ainsi, que la substance individuelle désignée est ce qui n'est pas prédiqué d'un sujet (et ne déclare pas la substance de quoi que ce soit), et qui n'est pas dans un sujet, (car elle n'est pas un prédicat qui déclare « quelque chose d'externe à sa substance »). La substance individuelle, pour reprendre les mots d'Averroès, est ce qui n'est prédiqué ni comme étant un prédicat essentiel ni comme étant un prédicat accidentel. Si la description de la substance première des *Catégories* est pour Averroès une description logique, c'est donc parce qu'elle n'est établie qu'à partir de propriétés liées à la prédication. La substance première est en effet décrite de façon négative comme ce qui n'appartient ni à la classe des prédicats qui affirme quelque chose d'extérieur à l'essence, ni à la classe des prédicats qui affirme la substance et l'essence d'une chose.

D'après cette lecture, la recherche de la substance dans les *Catégories* s'inscrit, pour Averroès dans la perspective de l'étude consacrée à la prédication. C'est en ce sens qu'il faut interpréter la caractérisation "logique" attribuée dans la paraphrase des *Catégories* à la description de la substance première. Définir la substance du point de vue de la logique, c'est-à-dire en tant qu'elle est quelque chose de désigné par une expression linguistique, veut donc dire concrètement l'envisager dans un horizon où l'on est soit un prédicat (qui affirme quelque chose d'intérieur ou d'extérieur à l'essence) soit un sujet.

L'idée que le *rasm* qui caractérise la substance première à la façon de la science de la logique est celle qui la décrit comme sujet ultime de prédication est confirmée dans la paraphrase de notre chapitre 5 consacrée à la catégorie de la substance. C'est dans cette partie, comme on va le voir, que le commentateur va également nous expliquer quelles sont les caractéristiques communément acceptées attribuées à la substance.

Dans la première des quatorze sous-sections par lesquelles Averroès divise la partie de la paraphrase qui correspond aux premières lignes du chapitre 5 (2a11-14), Aristote confirme, d'après le commentateur, que la substance première, celle qui est dite substance au

50. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 80, 1-5.

sens le plus approprié et premier, à savoir l'individu de la substance, est celle dont il a formulé la description dans le chapitre 2. Averroès interprète donc ces lignes à la façon, pour ainsi dire, traditionnelle, c'est-à-dire en admettant qu'Aristote y formule une distinction entre deux emplois du terme substance ; mais, à la différence de la plupart des interprètes modernes, il ne se sent pas obligé d'établir à partir de ces lignes une thèse ontologique forte, car la description selon laquelle la substance première est le sujet ultime est simplement, nous dit-il, la description faite du point de vue de la science logique :

Et <Aristote> affirme : les substances sont de deux sortes : premières et secondes. La substance qui est caractérisée comme première – à savoir celle qui est dite première en un sens plus approprié et antérieur – c'est l'individu de la substance dont on a donné auparavant la description – je veux dire ce qui à la fois ne se dit d'un sujet et ne se trouve pas dans un sujet – par exemple cet homme désigné ou ce cheval désigné⁵¹.

Ce texte nous permet de confirmer que cette façon de définir la substance première comme le sujet ultime de prédication est celle qu'Averroès a désigné⁵² comme propre à l'art de la logique. Or, en affirmant que la substance première est le sujet ultime de prédication, Averroès ne diverge en rien de celle qui sera la lecture des interprètes anciens et modernes. C'est dans le fait d'y voir une description qui n'est pas une définition ontologique, mais une description propre à une logique prédicative, qu'Averroès défend une position plus originale. La même position est maintenue lorsqu'Averroès commente les propriétés attribuées dans le chapitre 5 à la substance, celles qui constituent, d'après sa lecture, les propriétés communément acceptées et manifestes par induction. C'est à partir des affirmations qu'Averroès formule dans la partie de la paraphrase consacrée à la catégorie de la substance que l'on comprend que ces deux caractéristiques, à savoir le fait d'être communément accepté et manifeste par induction, constituent un trait essen-

51. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 86, 13-16.

52. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 77, 4-5.

tiel de sa lecture du traité des *Catégories* et de son exposé de la substance. En effet, ces deux caractéristiques font de la description selon laquelle la substance première est le sujet ultime de prédication une description inadéquate à la philosophie première, car elles placent la description de la substance première des *Catégories* plus du côté de la dialectique que de celle de l'analytique.

3.2 Induction et caractéristiques communément acceptées : vers l'exposé scientifique de la substance première

Au tout début de sa paraphrase⁵³, on l'a vu, Averroès divise le traité en trois parties et affirme que le but de nos chapitres 5-10 est de discuter de chacune des dix catégories, donnant la description qui lui revient, en la divisant selon les espèces communément acceptées et en fournissant ses propriétés communément acceptées. Averroès cependant ne précise pas dans sa division pourquoi il appelle « communément acceptées » les espèces et les propriétés attribuées ici à chaque catégorie. De fait, il ne nous explique jamais dans sa paraphrase pourquoi ce traité analyse les catégories de ce point de vue. Dans mon analyse, je me bornerai à considérer, les propriétés qui sont propres à la substance individuelle, afin de dégager l'enjeu des affirmations d'Averroès dans le cadre général de l'étude de la *πρώτη οὐσία*. L'idée que je voudrais avancer est que, pour Averroès, Aristote ne veut par ces propriétés ni définir le mot substance, ni en examiner les différents sens, ni dire ce que c'est qu'être substance, mais plutôt présenter des propriétés que tout le monde s'accorde à attribuer aux substances, qu'elles soient individuelles ou universelles, à la façon dont le dialecticien construit les lieux au sens des *Tōpiques*. Ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'Averroès considère les *Catégories* comme une introduction aux *Tōpiques*, comme certains l'ont suggéré⁵⁴, mais qu'il estime qu'Aristote y suit une méthode d'introduction adaptée à tous les genres de lecteur, c'est-à-dire une introduction fondée sur des notions et des propriétés que chacun est en mesure de saisir et de concéder.

53. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 75.11-13.

54. Cf. Bodéüs 2001: LXIV-LXXX.

La première propriété qui concerne la substance individuelle (2a34-b6) est celle sur laquelle se fonde sa description logique, à savoir la propriété d'être sujet ultime de prédication. La manière dont Averroès la présente confirme implicitement le caractère logique – au sens qu'on a élucidé – de cette description : la substance individuelle est la seule chose « qui ne se dit pas d'un sujet ni ne se dit dans un sujet »⁵⁵. Averroès justifie cette propriété de la substance première par la nécessité qu'ont les autres choses de posséder un sujet de prédication. Ainsi affirme-t-il que toutes les choses, sauf les substances premières, ont besoin d'un tel sujet pour exister. Cette nécessité explique la primauté des individus de la substance sur tout le reste, mais elle ne doit pas être interprétée comme une primauté ontologique absolue. Car la priorité de la substance individuelle s'entend toujours au point de vue d'une nécessité logique, pour les autres choses, d'avoir un sujet de prédication :

Tout, à l'exception des substances premières, qui sont les individus, soit fait partie des choses qui se disent d'un sujet soit des choses qui se disent dans un sujet. Et cela est manifeste par l'examen minutieux et l'induction – je veux dire leur nécessité d'un sujet. Par exemple, le vivant ne se prédique véridiquement de l'homme que parce qu'il se prédique véridiquement d'un certain homme désigné. En effet, s'il ne se prédiquait pas véridiquement d'un individu, il ne pourrait se prédiquer véridiquement de l'homme en tant qu'espèce. De même, la couleur se prédique véridiquement du corps, du fait qu'il se trouve dans un certain corps désigné. Il est donc nécessaire que tout, à l'exception des substances premières, se dit de ces dernières ou se dit dans ces dernières, c'est-à-dire des substances premières ou en elles. Les choses étant telles, si les substances premières n'existaient pas, il n'y aurait aucun moyen pour les substances secondes et pour les accidents d'exister⁵⁶.

Selon la division qu'Averroès propose au début de la paraphrase, c'est là la première caractéristique communément acceptée de la substance première : le fait que tout, sauf elle, a besoin pour exister

55. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 88.13-14.

56. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 88.13-89, 8.

d'un sujet de prédication. Averroès ne rappelle pas dans ce texte l'idée que cette propriété est communément admise, et il n'explique pas non plus ce qu'est un tel type de connaissance. On peut toutefois tracer les linéaments de la doctrine averroïste du *maṣhūr* à partir de ce qu'Averroès affirme concernant les prémisses communément acceptées dans son petit traité sur les *Topiques*, l'un de ses premiers ouvrages logiques (1160 ca.)⁵⁷. Au tout début de ce traité⁵⁸, Averroès explique que les prémisses communément acceptées constituent la « matière » des syllogismes dialectiques, dans la mesure où ce sont des prémisses dont l'assentiment résulte du témoignage de la totalité ou de la plupart des gens. Dans les pages qui suivent, Averroès donne une présentation complète des différentes classes de ce type de prémisses ; il distingue entre ce qui est communément accepté par tout le monde, par la plupart des hommes, par la majorité des hommes cultivé ou par la plupart d'entre eux. Il est difficile de dire à quelle classe appartiennent les propriétés qu'Averroès désigne, dans sa paraphrase aux *Catégories* comme communément acceptées. En effet, concernant la propriété d'être sujet ultime de prédication, il ne donne aucune indication explicite, mais dit simplement qu'elle devient manifeste par induction. On verra dans le *Grand Commentaire* à *Metaph.* 7.3 que cette propriété produit le consensus général à la fois des gens communs et des savants. De fait, dans la paraphrase aux *Catégories*, c'est précisément à partir du lien unissant ce type de propriété à l'induction que l'on peut comprendre la nature communément acceptée de la substance première de ce traité.

Dans le texte des *Catégories*, Aristote ne parle pas d'induction, mais il affirme simplement que cette caractéristique « apparaît clairement en partant de cas particuliers »⁵⁹. En donnant un sens très fortement orienté à cette affirmation assez vague d'Aristote, Averroès voit dans cette observation des cas particuliers une allusion au processus de l'induction. Ce glissement, encore une fois, est

57. Pour la datation et l'explication de la nature de ce traité d'Averroès, qui est loin d'être un commentaire de l'œuvre d'Aristote, voir l'introduction de Butterworth à son édition (Butterworth 1977 : 1-18).

58. Averroès, *Abrégé Top.*, p. 151-152, § 2.

59. Arist., *Cat.* 2a35-26.

d'une importance capitale dans la reconstruction de la vision qu'Averroès se fait de l'exposé de la substance des *Catégories* et, plus en général, de la nature du traité dans son ensemble.

Averroès confirme l'idée que les caractéristiques communément acceptées de la substance sont manifestes par induction dans la suite de sa paraphrase. Lorsqu'il commente celle qu'il considère comme la caractéristique première de la substance – le fait que, tout en restant numériquement une, elle admet des qualifications contraires – Averroès affirme que cette caractéristique est elle aussi rendue manifeste par induction. C'est en effet par un examen inductif des individus appartenant aux autres catégories qu'on prouve qu'il n'y a pas d'autre individu désigné qui puisse rester un, tout en accueillant les contraires :

On croit que la première caractéristique des substances est que la substance numériquement une est capable en elle-même de recevoir les contraires. Cela est manifeste par induction, car il n'est pas possible qu'existe à part la substance une chose désignée numériquement <une> capable d'accueillir les contraires. En effet ni la couleur numériquement une n'est capable d'accueillir le blanc et le noir, ni un seul acte n'est capable d'accueillir l'approbation et le blâme. Il en va de même des autres catégories qui ne sont pas la substance. ... Si tel est le cas, il est donc nécessaire que le propre de la substance soit qu'en étant numériquement une elle est capable d'accueillir les contraires⁶⁰.

La caractéristique qui nous permet de décrire la substance de la façon la plus appropriée est donc rendue manifeste par induction. Averroès explique que cette analyse inductive recense tous les cas qui potentiellement pourraient invalider la description d'après laquelle la substance première est ce qui reçoit les contraires, tout en demeurant numériquement un. L'induction confirme, en effet, qu'il n'y a pas d'autres individus, à l'exception de ceux qui se trouvent dans la catégorie de la substance, qui possèdent la même caractéristique. Dans la mesure où cette induction porte sur l'ensemble des dix catégories, qui couvrent quant à elles la totalité du réel, elle peut

60. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 96.6-12.

être définie comme complète. Cependant, dans ce texte, Averroès ne s'attarde pas sur la nature précise du processus inductif qui manifeste la véridicité des propriétés communément acceptées de la substance, ni sur sa valeur épistémique. Pour en savoir d'avantage, il faut à nouveau se reporter à son petit traité sur les *Topiques*, où il consacre à l'induction une longue section qui à plusieurs égards peut nous fournir des informations sur le statut de l'induction qui est en jeu dans les *Catégories*, ainsi que sur celui des connaissances communément acceptées.

Au tout début de ce traité, Averroès explique que la dialectique ne fournit qu'un degré d'assentiment limité⁶¹, car les arguments qu'elle produit sont constitués par des prémisses communément acceptées⁶². En effet, l'assentiment que l'on accorde à ces prémisses résulte du témoignage de la plupart ou de la totalité des gens et non pas, comme c'est le cas de la démonstration apodictique, *al-burhān*, de l'objet en lui-même⁶³. C'est ce qui fonde la distinction entre la science démonstrative, d'un côté, la dialectique et la rhétorique, de l'autre. En tant que les prémisses dialectiques sont fondées sur l'opinion, elles sont souvent « partiellement fausses » et parfois vraies. En effet, affirme Averroès, si les connaissances communément acceptées peuvent être vraies, elles ne le sont que par accident, parce qu'il se trouve que ce qui est communément accepté est « le même dans notre âme et à l'extérieur d'elle ». Cette correspondance entre ce qui est dans notre âme et la réalité qui est extérieure à elle n'intéresse pas le dialecticien, qui s'attache exclusivement à la nature persuasive de ce qui est communément accepté. Si la connaissance communément acceptée de la substance première est une connaissance par accident, c'est qu'elle ne donne pas la cause qui en fait une substance, à savoir la forme.

61. Sur cette notion et celle de représentation qui lui corrélée, voir Butterworth 1999 : 163-171. Sur l'importance de ces deux notions dans la logique arabe, voir le travail fondamental de Wolfson, (Wolfson 1943 : 1-15). Concernant l'idée que ce sont ces deux concepts qui permettent de distinguer les différentes parties de la logique, voir Black 1990.

62. Averroès, *Abrégé Top.*, p. 152, § 3, l. 4-6.

63. Pour une étude de la valeur épistémique du témoignage, voir Aouad 2005 : 131-144.

Lorsque Averroès passe en revue les différents arguments dialectiques⁶⁴, il présente la classe des arguments qui conduisent l'auditeur à l'assentiment en vertu de leur forme. Il range l'induction parmi ces arguments et affirme que, dans l'art de la dialectique, elle peut être utilisée pour vérifier la prémisse majeure dans un syllogisme de première figure, dans la mesure où elle vérifie, dans une prémisse communément acceptée, le lien entre le prédicat universel et le sujet. Or, étant donné que le but de l'induction est dans l'art de la dialectique de faire parvenir son adversaire à l'assentiment, il n'est pas nécessaire d'examiner tous les particuliers ; il suffit d'en examiner certains. Cette prémisse, ainsi établie, n'aura jamais la force d'une connaissance scientifique, mais elle conduira l'auditeur à l'assentiment.

Ce type d'induction est donc caractérisé par le fait que l'examen qui l'accompagne n'est pas un recensement complet de tous les cas possibles, mais une énumération d'un nombre suffisant à produire l'assentiment. Averroès envisage dans ce texte un autre type d'induction qui passe en revue la totalité des cas en question. Cependant cette induction en tant qu'induction, ne peut pas non plus « fournir le prédicat essentiel nécessaire », même si tous les particuliers dont ce dernier serait prédiqué pouvaient être recensés. En effet, le prédicat universel pourrait tout de même se prédiquer de tous les particuliers de façon accidentelle. C'est pourquoi les prémisses établies par ce moyen sont des prémisses communément acceptées.

Le passage consacré à l'induction se clôt sur une précision qu'Averroès ajoute à propos du rôle que cette dernière possède dans la démonstration et plus en général dans toute forme d'apprentissage. Car, en dépit de son caractère faiblement épistémique, Averroès précise que l'induction demeure un instrument d'une importance non négligeable dans la mesure où elle est utilisée pour guider vers la certitude. Or c'est précisément cet aspect de l'induction qui explique son utilisation dans le cadre du traité des *Catégories*. En effet, ce texte dans son ensemble nous fournit plusieurs éléments qui permettent de mettre au clair le rôle que l'induction a dans le traité des *Catégories*, ainsi que la relation qui existe entre elle et les connais-

64. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 153.11 et ss.

sances communément acceptées. L'induction, on vient de le voir, n'assure pas la nécessité du lien entre le sujet et le prédicat, mais il se peut qu'elle conduise à une proposition universelle qui est soit partiellement fausse soit vraie par accident. Cela est possible notamment lorsqu'elle est un recensement complet de tous les cas possible. Or, sur la base des affirmations de la *Paraphrase des Catégories*, on comprend que c'est exactement ce type d'induction qui rend manifeste les propriétés communément acceptées de la substance première. Cette induction, nous a dit Averroès, analyse toutes les *Catégories* autres que la substance ; il s'agit en d'autres termes d'un recensement exhaustif de tous les cas possibles. C'est pourquoi les propriétés communément acceptées qu'elle rend manifeste peuvent être soit partiellement vraies soit vraies par accident ; elles sont en tout cas dignes de constituer une première étape de la recherche qui conduit à la certitude. C'est exactement cet aspect des connaissances communément acceptées qui explique leur utilisation dans le cadre de l'exposé des *Catégories*. Certes, la vérité des prémisses communément acceptées est une vérité accidentelle et l'induction ne peut que pointer vers quelque chose qu'elle est incapable *stricto sensu* de démontrer⁶⁵. Il reste que ces prémisses peuvent véhiculer une vérité, une vérité qui, rendue manifeste par l'induction, suffit à expliquer le fait qu'une connaissance communément acceptée puisse constituer la première étape vers une recherche scientifique.

Cet aspect qu'Averroès attribue à l'étude des *Catégories* nous éclaire sur la vision qu'il a du but de ce traité et, en particulier, du statut de son exposé de la substance. Cette étude demeure, pour lui, une étude préalable ou, pour ainsi dire, préparatoire à celle qui nous conduira à la certitude concernant la nature de la substance. Les *Catégories* en effet ne font que guider le néophyte de la façon la

65. Les interprètes modernes de la philosophie d'Averroès s'accordent à nier une valeur foncièrement épistémique à l'induction ainsi que, dans un autre registre, au consensus gentium, voir à ce propos Hugonnard-Roche 2002 : 141-164 ; Aouad 2007 : 161-181. Je ne partage que partiellement cette hypothèse qui doit être reconsidérée à la lumière de la distinction envisagée par Averroès entre induction imparfaite et induction parfaite. En effet, dans un certain nombre de textes, Averroès semble énumérer l'induction parfaite au nombre des instruments qui ont un véritable rôle dans la constitution des *corpus* scientifiques ; voir Cerami [à paraître], chap. VII.

plus naturelle possible, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est premier pour nous, à savoir ce qui est communément accepté vers ce qui est certain et premier par nature.

On trouve confirmation de cette vision, dans la partie de la paraphrase consacrée à la catégorie de la relation où Averroès analyse une possible difficulté qui semblerait démentir la propriété selon laquelle les choses relatives existent toujours ensemble. Il s'agit du cas de la connaissance et de l'objet connaissable qui, tout en étant des termes relatifs, ne semblent pas être simultanés. Aristote affirme⁶⁶, en effet, que les objets connaissables existent déjà lorsque nous en prenons connaissance : car il est rare que l'objet connaissable naisse en même temps que la connaissance. En outre, d'un point de vue général, les objets connaissables et la connaissance ne semblent pas être simultanés, parce que lorsqu'il n'y a pas d'objet connaissable il n'y a pas de connaissance, mais lorsqu'il n'y a pas de connaissance, rien n'empêche que l'objet connaissable existe. Aristote laisse la question ouverte, il ne propose aucune solution et ne renvoie à aucun autre texte où elle pourrait se trouver. Averroès, en revanche, affirme que cette difficulté est seulement apparente et laissée sans solution dans les *Catégories*, parce que ce traité n'analyse les catégories que du point de vue de ce qui est communément accepté. Averroès affirme que la solution à une telle difficulté s'estompe lorsqu'on fait usage de la distinction entre puissance et acte. L'objet connaissable et la connaissance ne sont pas simultanés seulement si l'un est en puissance et l'autre en acte, mais si les deux sont soit en puissance soit en acte, ils sont nécessairement simultanés. Une telle solution, explique Averroès, n'a pas à être donnée dans le traité des *Catégories*, parce que la notion d'existence potentielle n'est pas une notion communément admise. C'est pourquoi Aristote a reporté la solution de cette difficulté à un autre moment. Averroès ne nous dit pas à quel texte il renvoie. H. A. Davidson⁶⁷ propose *De Anima* III, 2, 246a 15-19, où Aristote affirme que la sensation et l'objet de sensation ne sont pas forcément simultanés si on les considère dans leur existence potentielle. Le renvoi pourrait être, plus génériquement, à

66. Arist., *Cat.* 7b22-34.

67. Davidson 1969 : 110, n. 23.

Metaph. 8 où Aristote introduit les notions de puissance et acte. Quoi qu'il en soit, ce qui nous intéresse dans ce contexte, c'est que, pour Averroès, ce n'est pas dans les *Catégories* que l'on trouve les solutions des doutes qu'on peut soulever à propos de la doctrine du maître, car ce traité ne se fonde que sur ce qui est communément admis.

La même idée selon laquelle une notion non communément acceptée ne peut être utilisée dans les *Catégories* est confirmée dans la discussion des lignes suivantes où Aristote soulève une difficulté qui semblerait conduire à l'inclusion de ce qui est relatif dans la catégorie de la substance⁶⁸. Averroès nous dit que cette difficulté découle du fait que dans ce traité Aristote choisit de considérer les relatifs du point de vue de ce qui est communément admis. Ce qui veut dire que leur description formulée sur la base des propriétés *mašhūra* doit être modifiée en tenant compte de ce qui leur appartient véritablement. Si Aristote commence par fournir la description fondée sur ce qui est communément admis, précise Averroès, c'est parce que dans les *Catégories* il applique la méthode d'enseignement (*al-ta'lim*) la plus simple. En effet, il est plus facile de guider l'élève de ce qui est communément admis vers ce qui est certain que de lui imposer la certitude comme de l'extérieur.

On peut dès lors légitimement étendre la même idée à l'exposé de la substance et considérer qu'en étant fondée sur ce qui est communément accepté elle ne constitue que la première étape dans l'enseignement *ousiologique* d'Aristote. C'est à partir de ce qui est premier pour la plupart des gens, mais qui peut être partiellement faux ou accidentellement vrai, qu'il faut commencer la recherche. Dans le cas de la substance première, ce qui est communément admis, c'est qu'elle est le sujet ultime de toute forme de prédication. D'après ce critère, c'est donc l'individu sensible qui est substance première. Mais la recherche ne s'arrête pas là, car ce critère est, en un sens, à améliorer par l'étude causale de la substance. C'est alors à une autre science, à savoir à la métaphysique, qu'il revient d'identifier la substance qui est première selon ce critère causal : celle, donc, qui n'est pas simplement première pour nous, mais première par nature, à savoir la forme substantielle.

68. Averroès, *CM Cat.*, p. 108.5-10.

3.3 L'*ousia* première par nature : substance et principes de la substance dans le *Grand Commentaire* d'Averroès à *Metaph.* 7

L'hypothèse que les *Catégories* ne fournissent qu'une description communément acceptée de la substance qu'il faut revoir lorsqu'on en aborde l'analyse scientifique est validée à plusieurs reprises dans le *Grand Commentaire* de la *Métaphysique* et notamment dans le commentaire à *Metaph.* 7. Averroès confirme dans ce texte que la recherche du métaphysicien commence par la substance qui est décrite dans les *Catégories* selon l'opinion commune, mais qu'elle doit être poursuivie afin de trouver la cause qui fait de cette substance ce qu'elle est. Le texte du *Grand Commentaire* confirme des lors la lecture qu'on a proposée de la vision qu'Averroès se fait des *Catégories* comme d'un traité fondé sur une approche dialectique qui prépare à l'étude scientifique du réel. Les *Catégories* fondent en effet leur classification des substances sur un critère chronologique qui fait du composé la substance première ; la *Métaphysique*, en revanche, attribue le titre de substance première à la forme, car elle fonde sa classification sur un critère ontologique qui veut que la cause de la substance soit plus substance que son effet. Comme on l'a suggéré, donc, on trouve chez Averroès la même démarche exégétique que celle proposée par Simplicius : il n'y a pas de divergence entre le discours sur la substance du traité des *Catégories* et celui de la *Métaphysique*, car le premier parle de la substance qui est première pour nous, le second de la substance qui est première par nature. La distinction pour nous/par nature est toutefois adaptée à une ontologie parfaitement aristotélicienne où la substance qui est première par nature n'est pas l'universel *ante rem*, mais la forme substantielle. De ce point de vue, la forme, ainsi que le composé sont tous les deux substances premières, mais le composé selon le critère de ce qui est communément admis, la forme selon l'ordre de l'être.

On trouve des affirmations qui confirment qu'Averroès admet cette double primauté et, donc, implicitement, la complémentarité des deux points de vue, tout au long du *Grand Commentaire* de la *Métaphysique*. A plusieurs reprises, en effet, Averroès affirme que les individus composés sont des substances premières et que leurs formes

le sont aussi. A plusieurs reprises, en outre, il précise que l'individu substantiel est premier au sens des *Catégories*, c'est-à-dire en tant que sujet ultime de prédication, alors que la forme l'est en tant que cause de ce dernier.

On trouve un passage présentant de façon extrêmement claire cette lecture d'Averroès dans son *Grand Commentaire à Metaph.* 5,8⁶⁹, chapitre dans lequel Aristote distingue les différents sens de substance. Au début de son commentaire de ce passage, Averroès hésite sur la façon d'interpréter le premier des sens recensés par Aristote⁷⁰ qui peut indiquer, d'après lui, soit les individus substantiels soit les individus et les universaux substantiels. En effet, selon une première exégèse, Averroès affirme que les corps simples et les corps composés, dont Aristote nous dit qu'ils sont substances « parce qu'ils ne se disent pas d'un substrat », sont à identifier avec les substances premières des *Catégories*. Cependant, le fait qu'Aristote n'utilise pas la même formulation que celle des *Catégories* pour définir ce premier sens d'*ousia* et qu'il omette l'autre caractéristique propre aux substances premières (le fait de ne pas être dans un sujet) fait hésiter Averroès, qui propose une seconde exégèse. Ainsi suppose-t-il que, lorsqu'Aristote énonce le caractère de « ne pas être dit d'un sujet » comme condition de substantialité, il utilise la préposition « de » ('*alā*)⁷¹ dans le sens de « dans » (*fi*). Si l'on retient cette interprétation, conclut Averroès, ce premier sens de substance désignerait à la fois les substances individuelles ainsi que les universaux substantiels. Dans ce cas là alors, la correspondance avec les *Catégories* sera parfaite. En effet, la caractéristique de ne pas être *dans* un sujet appartient aux substances premières autant qu'aux substances secondes⁷². Quoi qu'il en soit, Averroès ne doute pas qu'Aristote fasse allusion dans ces premières lignes du chapitre au sens de substance fourni dans les *Catégories*.

69. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 564.11-565.10.

70. Arist., *Metaph.*, 5,8 1017b10-14.

71. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 565.6-10.

72. Arist., *Cat.*, 5 3a7-9.

Dans les lignes qui suivent⁷³, Aristote évoque le deuxième sens du terme *ousia*, selon lequel c'est « la cause de l'être, présent dans toutes les choses telles qu'elles ne se disent pas d'un substrat »⁷⁴ qui est substance. Aristote n'explicite pas quelle entité de son « parc ontologique » correspond à ce sens, mais il fournit un exemple clair : c'est l'âme par rapport à l'animal. L'omission d'Aristote est vite comblée par Averroès qui, sans hésitation, identifie la cause de la substance avec la forme substantielle des individus composés. En effet, ce deuxième sens désigne « ce en vertu de quoi l'individu de la substance est substance, à savoir sa forme et sa cause en vertu de laquelle <il> est substance »⁷⁵. Le cadre ontologique qu'Averroès reconstruit dans son *Grand Commentaire* est donc clair dès le début : l'individu des *Catégories* demeure substance, mais il y a un autre sens du terme *ousia*, celui qui désigne la cause de la substantialité de cet individu même. D'après ce sens, c'est la forme du composé qui est substance ou, plus précisément, comme Averroès le dit, la seule forme qui se trouve en lui en acte, comme c'est l'âme par rapport à l'animal qui, à la différence des formes des éléments qui le composent, se trouve en lui en acte.

La thèse selon laquelle les individus des *Catégories* restent dans la *Métaphysique* des substances premières est confirmée par nombre d'autres passages du *Grand Commentaire*. Dans plusieurs de ces passages, Averroès explique, comme il l'avait fait dans la paraphrase des *Catégories*, que la priorité des individus est une priorité chronologique : les individus sensibles sont substances premières parce qu'ils sont communément considérés comme tels. C'est pour cette même raison qu'ils constituent le point de départ de la recherche de ce qu'est l'*ousia*, à savoir la recherche du principe de ces substances. Averroès explique ce point de façon extrêmement nette dans un passage de son *Grand Commentaire à Metaph.* 7.2 :

Compte tenu de ce désaccord qui s'est produit parmi les anciens, nous devons placer le début de l'examen premièrement dans le prin-

73. Arist., *Metaph.*, 5.8 1017b14-16.

74. Arist. *Metaph.*, 5.8 1017b15-16 ; traduction française dans Jaulin 2008 : 195.

75. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 565.8-9.

cipe de la substance que les gens reconnaissent comme la plus digne du nom de “substance” et qui est première et une ; nous dirons à son propos ce qu’elle est ... Nous plaçons le début de l’examen dans le principe de la substance individuelle parce que les gens s’accordent <à dire que> les corps individuels qui subsistent par soi sont substances et qu’il y a un principe en eux ... En effet, tout le monde admet que la nature de la substance est manifeste dans les corps désignés. Et cette substance, qu’il entend étudier en premier lieu, comme il l’a évoqué, est celle à propos de laquelle il montrera par la suite que c’est la forme⁷⁶.

C’est en ce sens que les substances sensibles sont premières du point de vue de la recherche. En effet, les gens, explique Averroès, tombent d’accord pour considérer les composés sensibles comme des substances premières. Le fait qu’ils soient substances ne soulève de doute pour personne⁷⁷. La primauté des individus sensibles est donc prouvée, dans le *Grand Commentaire de Métaphysique*, comme dans la paraphrase aux *Catégories*, par un certain *consensus gentium*. Les substances sensibles sont de façon éclatante des substances et des substances premières. C’est pourquoi, dans l’examen sur ce qu’est la substance, il faut partir à la recherche de leur principe. En effet, tout le monde s’accorde aussi sur le fait que ces substances premières ont un principe, c’est leur nature composée sujette à génération et corruption qui le manifeste. Elles sont donc postérieures à leurs principes et c’est pourquoi l’on doit s’interroger sur ces derniers et quitter le point de vue des *Catégories* pour celui de la *Métaphysique*.

En effet, si les gens tombent d’accord sur le fait que les composés sont substance, les savants se divisent sur l’identification des principes qui en déterminent la substantialité. A la différence du critère logique des *Catégories*, le critère qui fait que le principe de la substance est substance n’est pas quelque chose d’évident ou de communément admis. C’est ce qui explique, d’après Averroès, la néces-

76. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p. 761. 5-15.

77. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p. 762.17-763.1 : « ... que les substances individuelles soient substance, cela ne soulève aucune difficulté ».

sité qu'Aristote a éprouvé de déployer une démonstration de sa propre thèse⁷⁸.

Le passage de l'analyse de ce qui est communément accepté à l'étude de la métaphysique s'explique donc comme le passage de ce qui est évident par soi, les substances sensibles, à ce qui est encore inconnu ou sur lequel les avis sont partagés, le principe de ces substances. C'est ce qu'Averroès confirme en commentant la fin de notre 7.3⁷⁹ :

Par les mots : “il nous faut donc laisser de côté maintenant la substance composée des deux, c'est-à-dire de la matière et de la figure”, <Aristote> veut dire : laissons de côté l'examen portant sur la substance composée de matière et forme qu'il désigne ici sous le nom de figure. Et quand il ajoute : “Car c'est une substance postérieure et évidente aussi” <Aristote> veut dire : si nous devons laisser de côté l'examen de <la substance> composée, c'est d'abord parce que celle-ci est une substance postérieure aux deux autres substances dont elle est composée. Or l'étude ne doit porter que sur les causes des choses et non sur leurs effets, puisque les choses sont connues par elles-mêmes, alors que leurs causes ne sont pas connues. De plus, il est évident que le composé est substance⁸⁰.

Ce texte confirme que les substances composées sont premières parce que leur nature est quelque chose d'évident, mais que cette primauté est aussi la raison pour laquelle la recherche doit les laisser de côté pour en déceler les principes. La démarche naturelle dans la connaissance est en effet celle qui progresse, d'un point de vue épistémologique, de ce qui est connu à ce qui est inconnu et, d'un point de vue ontologique, des effets aux causes. Dans cette démarche, les substances composées sont premières en tant qu'elles

78. L'idée que le livre 7 possède un caractère dialectique, dans le sens d'une réponse à d'autres théories rivales, est prouvée, entre autres choses, par le fait que les parties qui le constituent sont autant de réponse aux thèses platoniciennes. Cette thèse, déjà énoncée par Alexandre d'Aphrodise dans son commentaire à *Metaph.* 12, est à plusieurs reprises énoncée par Averroès dans son commentaire à 7. Pour plus de détails sur cette question, voir Cerami à paraître, chap. IX.

79. Arist., *Metaph.* 7.3 1029a30-34.

80. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p. 778. 7-13.

sont reconnues par tout le monde, mais postérieures en tant que causées par autre chose. La science de l'être est donc pour Averroès la science qui suit cette démarche analytique, qui conduit des effets, la substance qui est communément acceptée, vers les causes, le principe en vertu duquel cette substance est substance. Or c'est précisément cette démarche que, d'après Averroès, Aristote préconise et entame en *Metaph.* 7.3.

Dans le *Grand Commentaire* à *Metaph.* 7.3, Averroès confirme cette vision et la thèse selon laquelle le but d'Aristote est d'examiner les diverses théories et les prétendus candidats au rang de principe de la substance, en partant de la description communément admise, afin d'établir lequel d'entre eux est le véritable principe et la véritable substance première. Parmi ces candidats, Averroès énumère la *quiddité*, l'universel et le genre⁸¹. On s'aperçoit donc que, de la liste présentée au tout début de notre chapitre 3 (1028b 34-36), Averroès omet le sujet, le *ὑποκείμενον*, qu'Aristote énumère dans ces lignes comme quatrième sens du terme substance. La raison de cette omission est claire : le sujet qu'Aristote évoque ici ne fait pas partie des sens de substance à examiner, il n'est pas en effet l'un des candidats possibles au rôle de cause de la substance, mais constitue ce sur quoi porte la recherche et ce dont il faut trouver la cause. Il s'agit en d'autres termes de la substance « auto-évidente » du traité des *Catégories* :

Puis <Aristote> ajoute : “Et, en quatrième lieu, le sujet”, entendant par là la substance individuelle ; et c'est pour cela qu'il en donne la définition par laquelle il la définit dans le traité des *Catégories* en disant : “Le sujet, c'est ce dont les autres <choses> se disent, alors que lui-même ne se dit pas d'autre chose”, ce qui signifie : ce <sujet>, c'est ce dont se prédique tout le reste, alors que lui-même n'est prédiqué d'aucune chose. <Aristote> déclare ensuite : “C'est pour cela que nous devons d'abord étudier cette substance” ce qui veut dire : c'est pour

81. Averroès paraît ultérieurement réduire ces trois candidats à deux. La quiddité, explique-il, a été considérée par certains comme étant l'universel spécifique, c'est-à-dire ce qui dans la liste est appelé *al-kullī*, et par d'autres comme étant l'universel générique, c'est-à-dire *al-ġins*.

cela qu'il nous faut d'abord étudier cette substance qu'est le sujet. C'est-à-dire <qu'il faut rechercher> sa cause⁸²

La lecture qu'Averroès propose de *Métaphysique* 7.3 diverge donc de la lecture des interprètes contemporains à plusieurs égards. Premièrement parce que, comme on l'a vu, il estime que le sujet n'est pas l'un des quatre sens de substance à examiner, mais la substance communément acceptée dont il faut trouver le principe. Deuxièmement, parce qu'à la différence de la plupart des modernes, Averroès estime que le terme qu'Aristote attribue dans les lignes 1029a2-3 à la forme, à la matière et au composé n'est pas le titre de sujet, mais celui de substance. D'après Averroès, la forme ne peut aucunement se dire sujet ; seuls la matière et le composé peuvent l'être, quoiqu'à des titres différents :

Ensuite il dit : “et tel est dit en un sens la *hylè*, en un autre sens la forme et en un troisième sens ce qui <résulte> des deux” et il veut dire : “substance” se dit, d'un côté, de la *hylè*, d'un autre côté de la forme et d'un autre encore de l'ensemble des deux. Et s'il dit “en un sens la *hylè*, en un autre sens la forme” c'est parce que la *hylè* est substance en tant qu'elle est le sujet de la forme et la forme est substance en tant qu'elle fait subsister le sujet ; le composé des deux est substance du fait qu'il est composé des deux⁸³.

En dépit de ces aspects de sa lecture, Averroès estime, comme le font la plupart des interprètes contemporains, que le but du chapitre 3 est de tester la fiabilité du critère des *Catégories* et d'établir les conditions qu'une chose doit remplir pour être la cause de la substance⁸⁴. L'examen de *Metaph.* 7.3 vise ainsi d'après Averroès à montrer l'ambiguïté d'une définition de la substance qui la présente comme ce qui est sujet ultime de prédication. C'est en posant comme seul critère celui des *Catégories*, qu'on a précédemment appelé “le

82. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 769.4-9.

83. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p.769.13-18.

84. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p.768.8-9 : « <Aristote> veut dire : il nous faut avant cela distinguer en combien de sens se dit la substance et examiner lequel d'entre eux est la cause de la substance recherchée ».

critère du sujet”, que l’aporie mise en évidence par Aristote reste indépassable. Car si l’on admet que le seul critère permettant de repérer ce qui est substance est celui qui la décrit comme “ce dont se prédiquent les autres choses, alors qu’elle-même ne se prédi que d’aucune chose”, on est du même coup contraint d’admettre que la matière est la substance des choses :

Il se peut que par les mots “Mais il ne faut pas distinguer <la substance> de cette façon seulement, car cela n’est pas suffisant”, <Aristote> entende faire référence à la description communément acceptée de la substance, c’est-à-dire <celle selon laquelle> elle est ce dont se prédiquent les autres choses, alors qu’elle-même ne se prédi que absolument de rien. Ainsi donc, s’il dit cela, c’est parce qu’une telle description implique nécessairement que la matière mérite le nom de substance plus que la forme⁸⁵.

Comme dans la paraphrase aux *Catégories*, la description (*rasm*) d’après laquelle la substance est dite « sujet ultime de prédication » est définie comme communément acceptée (*mašhūra*). Et comme il l’avait fait dans la paraphrase aux *Catégories* à propos de la description de la relation, Averroès affirme ici très clairement que la description de la substance des *Catégories* est à revoir. Il y a en effet, affirme Averroès, deux autres conditions propres à la substance dont la description logique ne tient pas compte et que la matière ne respecte pas : « “ce qui est séparé” et “ce qui désigne la *quiddité* en exprimant <l’être> de cette chose” semblent appartenir notamment à la substance ». Par ces deux expressions, le traducteur arabe a voulu rendre les deux conditions de substantialité posées à la ligne 1029a 28 : l’être χωριστόν et l’être τόδε τι. Il est difficile de comprendre les raisons qui l’ont poussé à traduire l’expression τόδε τι par la périphrase : « ce qui désigne la *quiddité* en exprimant <l’être> de cette chose ». Quoi qu’il en soit, cette expression ne paraît pas poser de difficulté à Averroès qui interprète les deux conditions comme étant remplies par la forme substantielle. Ainsi explique-t-il qu’« être séparé » signifie être séparé « au niveau de la compréhension »,

85. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p. 773.8-12.

c'est-à-dire être une notion saisie par elle-même et non par rapport à une autre chose. Quant à la seconde condition, Averroès déclare qu'elle désigne la forme de la substance individuelle, puisque c'est la forme qui est l'essence que la définition désigne⁸⁶. "Ce qui désigne la *quiddité* en exprimant <l'être> de cette chose" n'est donc que la définition qui exprime l'essence, c'est-à-dire la forme, de la substance sensible.

Ce sont ces deux nouvelles conditions qui nous permettent d'identifier ce qui est substance au sens véritablement premier. La description communément acceptée, présentée dans les *Catégories*, qui veut que la substance soit le dernier sujet de prédication, est de ce point de vue jugée par Averroès comme non suffisante. Il faut en effet supplanter le critère du sujet, ou du moins lui accoler le nouveau critère du τὸδε τι. Considérer la substance comme ce qui est sujet de tous les prédicats ne suffit pas à définir sa véritable nature, c'est-à-dire son principe ; il faut croire que ce qui est substance en ce sens doit aussi bien être saisissable en lui-même et capable de définir la substance individuelle dans tout son être. De ce point de vue, ce qu'on a appelé critère du sujet n'est pas pour Averroès un critère permettant de repérer la substance première, mais c'est la description qui nous indique le point de départ de la recherche, à savoir la substance composée.

Le chapitre 7.3 marque donc le début de la recherche du principe de la substance, c'est pourquoi, en un certain sens, il représente encore d'après Averroès un stade introductif de la recherche, car Aristote n'y parvient pas à des résultats positifs, mais seulement négatifs. Il nous dit simplement que la matière, en tant qu'elle est quelque chose d'indéterminé et de non-séparé, ne peut pas être la substance première. Dans le chapitre 3, Aristote nous fournit donc simplement

86. Averroès, *GC Metaph.* p. 777.6-11 : « Il n'est pourtant pas possible que la seule matière soit la substance, puisqu'on peut constater que les notions qui sont séparées au niveau de la compréhension, à savoir celles qui ne sont pas comprises par rapport à une autre chose (comme c'est le cas de la matière), mais qui sont comprises par elles-mêmes, méritent plus que tout le nom de substance. Et c'est la notion qui donne l'être de cette chose désignée et ce que la définition désigne. C'est pour cela qu'on voit que la forme est également substance, parce qu'elle est la *quiddité* que la définition désigne ».

un critère préalable pour définir ce qui est substance première. Mais il reste encore à repérer ce qui remplit véritablement les conditions requises. Ce sera l'objectif des chapitres suivants, dans lesquels Aristote va examiner "la substance que la définition désigne"⁸⁷ et démontrer que ce principe n'est que la forme de la substance sensible.

C'est donc ainsi que l'on passe à la véritable recherche du principe ontologique de la substance. Toutefois, cette recherche ne conduira pas à un sens de substance équivoque par rapport à celui qui vaut pour le composé sensible. Car, s'il est vrai que la description qui fait du composé la substance première est incapable de repérer la substance qui est première « par nature », il reste qu'elle désigne une véritable substance, même si elle n'est première que « pour nous ». Comme on l'a suggéré, bien que la description communément acceptée ne soit vraie que par accident, elle est tout de même une description vraie. Lorsqu'on quitte le domaine de la logique prédicative et que l'on se place dans l'horizon de l'ontologie, la substance sensible demeure substance, mais à un degré inférieur par rapport à sa forme.

Dans un passage d'un traité considéré comme un œuvre de jeunesse, l'*Epitomé de la Métaphysique*, Averroès confirme l'idée que l'individu sensible est substance de façon éclatante et donc premier par rapport à nous, mais non pas par nature. Il confirme également que ce dernier a une priorité d'ordre différent par rapport à son principe et que c'est pour cela que les deux sont, quoiqu'à des titres différents, premiers : le composé est premier d'un point de vue chronologique, son principe, la forme, d'un point de vue ontologique. C'est pour cette même raison, explique alors Averroès, que la multitude reconnaît la substance qui est première dans le temps et non pas celle qui est première quant à l'être :

Si les choses sont telles qu'on les a présentées et qu'il est manifeste que la substance sensible c'est la matière, la forme et l'union des deux, alors quelqu'un pourrait demander : si les substances sensibles sont

87. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p.782.6-10. Sur l'interprétation de tout se pan de doctrine, voir Di Giovanni 2008.

des composés de forme et matière, que désigne le terme « substance sensible », la forme, la matière ou le composé des deux ? Il est évident que le terme, tel qu'il est compris d'une façon générale, désigne le composé des deux. Et s'il est dit tantôt de la forme tantôt du composé des deux, c'est seulement selon l'antériorité et la postériorité, puisque le composé en tant que composé ne possède l'existence que par la forme, à laquelle le nom s'applique le plus proprement. C'est pourquoi lorsqu'on compare ces deux modes de signification, <on comprend que> celui selon lequel <le terme> signifie le composé est antérieur selon le temps et postérieur dans l'être, alors que celui selon lequel ce terme signifie la forme est postérieur selon le temps et antérieur dans l'être. En effet, ce n'est pas dans la nature de la masse d'analyser de cette manière les substances individuelles.⁸⁸.

Dans ce texte, donc, Averroès explique encore une fois que la recherche de ce qu'est la substance première est fondée sur le postulat qui veut que les substances sensibles soient indéniablement des οὐσίαι. Les substances sensibles sont le point de départ de toute connaissance humaine, parce que leur existence et, si l'on peut dire, leur "substantialité" sont quelque chose d'évident par soi qui ne peut être mis en doute. Les formes de ces substances, en revanche, sont substances premières en fonction d'un critère non pas chronologique, mais ontologique. En effet, si les substances composées sont assurément des substances et que le principe d'une chose est ce qu'est cette chose, mais à un degré plus élevé, la forme, en étant principe pour le composé du fait qu'il est substance, sera substance à un degré supérieur. C'est la même conclusion qui est explicitement affirmée dans le commentaire à *Metaph.* 7.3 où Averroès explique que, si le composé est substance, la forme sera a fortiori substance à un plus haut degré, dans la mesure où le composé n'existe en acte en tant que substance qu'en vertu de sa forme :

Si la forme est antérieure par rapport à la matière quant à l'être et qu'elle est plus être en vertu du fait que la matière existe en puissance, alors que la forme existe en acte, elle sera également antérieure par

88. Averroès, *Abr. Metaph.*, p. 68-69.

rapport au composé des deux, car le composé des deux n'existe en acte qu'en vertu de la forme⁸⁹.

Cette même thèse est énoncée dans le *Grand Commentaire* à la *Physique*⁹⁰, lorsqu'Averroès résume son principe fondateur dans la formule *causa rei est dignior causato*. Le composé est plus « digne » de s'appeler substance que la matière, parce que celle-ci est en puissance, tandis que le composé est en acte. La forme, cependant, est encore plus digne que le composé de recevoir ce nom, puisque c'est grâce à elle que le composé est en acte. La forme et le composé sont tous les deux des substances, et même si l'une est première d'un point de vue ontologique, l'autre d'un point de vue chronologique, il ne faut pas conclure que la notion de substance soit prédiquée des deux en un sens purement équivoque, car, comme Averroès l'explique dans son commentaire à *Métaphysique* 4.2 le terme « substance » se dit de la forme et du composé en un seul mode, non pas par synonymie, mais selon le plus et le moins :

certaines choses se disent <d'une autre chose> en un seul mode, mais elles diffèrent selon le moins et le plus, comme par exemple le nom "substance" qui se dit de la forme et de l'individu⁹¹.

La forme et le composé sont tous les deux "substance" et, quoique ce terme leur soit prédiqué selon « le plus et le moins », ils appartiennent à un genre unique, à savoir la catégorie de la substance. Les choses qui se disent en un sens unique, mais selon le plus et le moins, appartiennent, en effet, à un même genre, même s'il s'agit d'un genre

89. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 770.6-10.

90. Averroès, *GC Phys.*, f. 50, A2-8 : « Compositum igitur est dignius habere hoc nomen substantia quam materia, quia est in actu et materia est in potentia ; et forma est dignior habere hoc nomen substantia quam compositum quoniam per illam est compositum in actu; et causa rei est dignior causato. « Le composé est donc plus digne que la matière de porter le nom de substance, parce qu'il est en acte, alors que la matière est en puissance ; mais la forma est plus digne que le composé de porter le nom de substance, puisque c'est en vertu d'elle que le composé est en acte et que la cause est plus digne que le causé ».

91. Averroès, *GC Metaph.*, p. 303, 6-8.

qui n'est pas prédié par synonymie⁹². A propos de la relation d'antériorité et de postériorité qui lie les différents sens de substance, Averroès explique qu'elle n'est ni une relation de synonymie ni une relation d'homonymie. C'est cette forme de relation hiérarchique, impliquant l'existence d'un genre au sens large, qu'Averroès attribue à la forme par rapport aux autres acceptions de "substance", à savoir la matière et le composé. L'antériorité et la postériorité d'une substance sur l'autre est fonction, pour ainsi dire, de leur degré de causalité. Si, en effet, explique Averroès, la substance composée est cause des accidents et donc des autres catégories, sa forme sera plus substance qu'elle dans la mesure où elle est la cause de son existence. C'est par elle, en effet, comme on vient de le voir, que le composé existe en acte. Sur la base de ce raisonnement, la forme devient *a fortiori* plus substance que le composé, précisément dans la mesure où elle en est la cause. La forme donc sera elle aussi substance première.

De ce point de vue, on comprend pourquoi l'enquête sur le principe de la substance sensible devient pour Averroès une enquête sur la substance tout court. Car, comme on vient de le voir, la cause de la substance est, en tant que telle, substance par excellence. La cause et son effet ou, selon la terminologie de *Metaph. 7*, la substance désignée et sa *quiddité*, constituent un seul et même genre, même s'ils appartiennent, pour ainsi dire, à deux niveaux ontologiques différents. Il serait en partie trompeur, pour cette raison, de lire l'interprétation d'Averroès à la lumière de la distinction utilisée en logique entre une notion *mono-argumental* de substance et une notion *bi-argumental*. Une telle distinction n'a pas de place dans l'ontologie averroïste, étant donné que, comme on a essayé de le montrer, la substance *de* la substance est, pour cela même, *la* substance et la substance première.

Conclusion

J'ai essayé de démontrer l'hypothèse que la doctrine ontologique présentée en *Metaph. 7*, qui fait de la forme la substance première, ne s'oppose pas d'après Averroès à la doctrine exposée dans le traité

92. Wolfson 1938 : 151-173; DI GIOVANNI 2008 : 79-95.

des *Catégories*, car la description fournie dans ce traité, qui fait de la substance première le sujet ultime de prédication, n'est que la description de ce qu'est la substance du point de vue de la science logique. Cette description de la substance, ainsi que les caractéristiques qui sont communément acceptées et rendues manifestes par l'induction, correspondent à ce que dans son *Grand Commentaire* à la *Métaphysique* Averroès considère comme le premier pas de la recherche qui nous conduira à la substance qui est première non pas pour nous, mais première quant à l'être. C'est en effet le sujet ultime des *Catégories*, à savoir le composé de forme et matière, qui constitue la substance dont le métaphysicien va rechercher les principes. J'ai également montré que c'est sur la base de ce même raisonnement qu'Averroès peut conclure que la métaphysique est une science qui, suivant une démarche analytique, nous conduit des effets aux causes, c'est-à-dire de ce qui est premier pour nous, la substance composée, mais postérieur par nature, vers ce qui est postérieur pour nous, mais premier par nature, à savoir la forme. On pourrait ainsi conclure que la logique, en fournissant au métaphysicien une description communément acceptée de ce qui constitue l'objet de sa recherche, lui donne pour cela même les préalables de son étude.

De ce point de vue, on peut affirmer que la véritable question qui se pose à Averroès, lorsqu'il commente *Metaph.* 7, n'est pas de confirmer ou de remplacer une ontologie par une autre, mais bien plutôt de déterminer ce qui constitue le critère scientifique de la substantialité de la substance et de repérer ainsi la substance qui est première par nature. Cette substance, affirme Averroès, est la forme substantielle. La primauté ontologique de la forme sur la matière et le composé dans l'explication causale laisse subsister la primauté de l'individu sur l'espèce ou le genre dans l'exposé logique des phénomènes. Bien que la science métaphysique puise plusieurs de ses prémisses dans l'art de la logique, les approches qui caractérisent ces deux arts et les résultats qu'elles obtiennent restent absolument distincts.

A partir des considérations concernant la lecture qu'Averroès propose de la description de la substance première des *Catégories*, la conclusion plus générale que j'ai avancée, consiste à dire que ce traité décrit moins pour Averroès la structure profonde des choses que la manière dont elles nous apparaissent. Certes les catégories,

conçus comme genres de l'être, et la substance comme le premier de ces sens, constituant, pour le commentateur, l'objet d'étude de la science métaphysique, c'est pourquoi, d'ailleurs, les phénomènes mis en évidence dans les *Catégories* sont plus des régularités bien fondées que des *doxa*. Reste que pour Averroès les *Catégories* traitent des critères de la substantialité qui sont, pour reprendre les termes dans lesquels M. Rashed retrace la position d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, « subjectifs (pour nous) mais non objectifs (en soi) »⁹³. Ce qui revient à dire, pour les deux commentateurs, que le traité parle des substances, mais non, véritablement, de la substantialité.

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93. Rashed 2007 : 42 et ss.

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CHAPTER 5

The Tradition of Studying the *Categories* in the early Middle Ages (until c. 1200): a revised working catalogue of glosses, commentaries and treatises

John Marenbon

Those who specialize in medieval philosophy are used to the idea that commentaries on authoritative texts are the places where they will find much of the most thorough, systematic and original thinking of the time. But they have been inclined, at least until recently, to neglect *anonymous* commentaries. Most strikingly, Charles Lohr's catalogue of medieval commentaries on Aristotle is organized alphabetically, by authors, and omits those which cannot be attributed to a named master.¹ As a result, this indispensable tool for later medieval philosophy is almost useless as a guide to the Aristotelianism of the twelfth century and earlier. This Aristotelianism, based on the logical corpus available then, survives to a great extent in anonymous commentaries. The one celebrated counter-example, the commentaries of Peter Abelard, is precisely the exception which proves the rule, or at least which throws it into sharp relief.²

In order to make this wealth of material, central for understanding early medieval philosophy, more available, in the early 1990s I

1. All references are by short-title. Full titles and bibliographical details are to be found in the bibliography. See Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries'.

2. There is, indeed, now doubt about the authenticity of all but the *Logica Ingredientibus* commentary by Abelard: see below under C₅ and note 10, below; and , for the *Logica Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum*, see Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, Chapter 1.

compiled a 'Working Catalogue of Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, Before c. 1150 AD', which included commentaries on the two Aristotelian texts in the pre-1150 school syllabus, the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, along with those on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which had been part of the logical curriculum since antiquity. Although I was able to examine in the flesh or by microfilm most of the manuscripts concerned, the Catalogue drew greatly on the work of others. Though neglected, these commentaries had not been completely ignored. A handful of scholars, including some of the greatest, had examined them: from Cousin and Hauréau in the nineteenth century to Grabmann and De Rijk and Luscombe in the twentieth century, and, most recently, Yukio Iwakuma.³ My main purpose in the Catalogue was to bring together and systematize their work, especially by providing a simple system for referring to the individual commentaries, and for distinguishing between the main different types, indicating what studies and editions existed and suggesting, where possible, a rough date or milieu.⁴ Seven years later, I took the opportunity provided by a volume of my collected articles to add a supplement to the Catalogue, and to extend the finishing date to c. 1200.⁵ A great part of the extra information and additional entries came from Yukio Iwakuma, whose knowledge of the whole field is rivalled only by his generosity in sharing it. Yukio has also been the most important influence on this present, third version of the Catalogue, confined – in keeping with the volume – to the *Categories*. Initially, my intention had been just to amalgamate the original and the supplement into a single list, adding any new bibliography and also a few treatises, which are closely related to the commentary tradition. By providing me with transcriptions of almost all the material, Yukio made it possi-

3. See the entries under these names in the bibliography.

4. My model was the Catalogue of commentaries on Boethius's *De topicis differentiis* and Aristotle's *Topics* in Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition*. Like him, I gave each commentary an alphanumeric tag ('C1 ...' for the *Categories*, for example). These tags are now commonly used by specialists.

5. Marenbon, 'Supplement'.

ble for me to augment and revise my earlier list more substantially.⁶ Often, with more evidence, historians learn that they know less: some of these changes consist in removing suggested attributions or making datings broader and vaguer.

The Introduction to the original version of the Catalogue discusses in detail the literary genre of early medieval glosses and the typology of the twelfth-century commentaries, along with the techniques they used. Here I shall give only the briefest summary, so as to clarify the way the Catalogue is presented and the technical terms it uses. Following it, I provide a brief guide to the material catalogued, and some suggestions for further research.

The Types of Material: paraphrases, treatises, glosses and commentaries

There is a simple rule about how, in the main, scholars went about assimilating and teaching logical texts (and many other school-texts) in the early Middle Ages. In the earliest period, until the late ninth century, they worked by compilation and paraphrase. This period overlaps with one, starting c. 850, in which glossing became the usual method of study until it was replaced by teaching preserved in the form of continuous commentaries. The earliest such commentaries which survive date, with one exception, to 1100 or not long before, but it is likely that they were being produced during the later eleventh century.⁷ With regard to the *Categories*, the first two periods correspond roughly to the time when the main school-text for studying Aristotle's *Categories* was the *Categoriae Decem*, a Latin

6. Yukio Iwakuma is planning to make all his material available on a web-site. There are, however, considerable technical difficulties and, until then, any student or scholar contemplating serious work in this area should contact Professor Iwakuma.

7. See Marenbon, 'Synthesis', 199. The earliest datable continuous commentaries, other than *glossae collectae* and C4 – and its paired *Isagoge* commentary (P2) – which abbreviate and modify Boethius, are a commentary on *De topicis differentiis* (B3) and fragments of commentaries on the *Isagoge* (P4a and P4b) in MS Pommersfelden Schlossbibliothek 16/2764, which have been dated to the late eleventh century. B3 has been dated to c. 1090 and tentatively attributed to Arnulf of Laon: see Hansen, 'An Early Commentary', 46-7.

paraphrase, wrongly attributed to Augustine. From about 1000, a Boethian translation of Aristotle's own text came into general use.⁸

The term 'glosses' might suggest an individual reader's notes, but the interlinear and marginal annotations in question usually fall into sets, and it is clear that in many cases, either a text would be copied along with a set of glosses, or else a set would be added as a whole. But, although there are manuscripts which can be said to have the same (or, rather, similar) glosses, the sets of glosses lack the integrity and stability of independent literary works. Glossators add, omit, rearrange, combine and separate material; sometimes they copy glosses from more than one source; sometimes the same manuscript has glosses added at different times by different hands (the glosses in ms Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 12949 are a prime example). In the case of the *Categoriae Decem* glosses, the most important distinction is between a set of glosses heavily influenced by ideas from John Scottus Eriugena (see below) and a set of standard glosses, but it is important to bear in mind that neither set remains exactly the same from manuscript to manuscript, and there are also 'eccentric' glosses, not found elsewhere, in every copy. There are very few glossed manuscripts of the *Categories* itself in translation, as opposed to the *Categoriae Decem*, because it was only coming into use at the time when glossing was ceasing to be the main method of study. These glosses seem to be the work of individual readers.

Although glosses are sometimes written out to form a continuous commentary (*glossae collectae*), as in the case of C1 and C18, commentaries proper constitute a different genre. One of the bases for the logical commentary tradition were Boethius's commentaries on

8. See Minio-Paluello, 'Note' and Marenbon, 'The Latin Tradition', 38-9 and Marenbon 'La logique en occident latin' on the replacement of the *Categoriae Decem* by study of Aristotle's text in translation and the wider setting of this change in the turning from a 'Roman' to a 'Boethian' tradition of logic. Two Boethian translations of the *Categories* have been distinguished by their editor (see Catalogue below, (1)), one of which is his original translation, the other a composite version, probably made up from Boethian material. The composite version was the text normally used by twelfth-century logicians, and references to passages in the text below are given to the pages and lines of the edition of it in *Aristoteles Latinus*.

Aristotle and Porphyry – in the case of the *Categories*, a single one (if he wrote two, as he did for the *Isagoge* and *On Interpretation*, the second did not survive to the Middle Ages). A vivid illustration is provided by C₄, which antedates the other commentaries by nearly a century: it simply re-arranges material from Boethius in question-and-answer form.

Boethius continued to provide both the model and the basis for far more original and ambitious commentaries, but medieval teachers introduced a novel, non-Boethian element into their method. Boethius had assumed that he was writing for readers who, even if beginners, could understand the basic structure of Aristotle's argument. His commentary therefore takes the form of discursive discussion of Aristotle's points and their implications. Medieval teachers of logic tended to think that their pupils, who were often children or hardly older, needed more help in understanding the literal meaning of the text. They therefore introduced word by word explanation of the authoritative text, sometimes undertaken by means of explanatory paraphrase (which would often be put into the mouth of the author). In most cases, this literal element was joined with more discursive comments (on the Boethian model) to form what are called here 'composite commentaries'. Sometimes, however, a commentary consists just, or almost entirely, of the literal element ('literal commentary'). There are also a few commentaries ('problem commentaries') which include no detailed discussion of the letter of the text.

The distinction between what should count as a fragmentary commentary and what are merely logical notes is a fluid one. I have erred on the side of generosity here in including and numbering separately (C₂₉, C₃₀, C₃₃) note-like material which might well be taken from longer commentaries, or at least be based on lectures which, themselves, would have been commentaries on the *Categories*. By contrast, the twelfth-century works listed in Section 2 – the sections on the *Categories* in the *Dialecticas* of Garlandus and Abelard, and the *Tractatus Lemovicensis de praedicamentis* are substantial treatises, but in all three cases based very closely on the tradition of commentary on the *Categories*.

A Survey of the Material

The material divides neatly at around the year 1100: too neatly, indeed, since it most likely that some commenting on the translation of the *Categories* on the twelfth-century model went on in the eleventh century; C₄, mentioned above, an abbreviation of Boethius's commentary, put into dialogue-form, is the only remaining trace of it. In the earliest period, there are the simplified accounts of Cassiodorus and, largely based on it, Isidore. Alcuin's *Dialectica* uses these two works, but he also includes long excerpts from the *Categoriae Decem*, thereby giving far more space to the *Categories* than to any other branch of logic. Fifty or so years later, Eriugena, impressed like Alcuin by the theological use Augustine made of the *Categories* in his *De trinitate* and by the supposed fact that he was responsible for the treatise which brought them to Latin readers, would give them prominence in his *Periphyseon*, and the tradition of *Categoriae Decem* glosses which grew up at the end of the ninth century would repay the compliment, by explaining the logical treatise in, often totally inappropriate, Eriugenian terms. There was also a strand (represented by the 'standard glosses') of more sober, logical explanation, which by the eleventh century ousted nearly all Eriugenian traces. The glossators to the *Categoriae Decem* manage for the most part without the help of Boethius's commentary (which, of course, is not a commentary on the text they had in front of them). But in Sankt Gallen 274, from the late ninth century, which combines Eriugenian, standard and other glosses, Boethius's commentary is used.⁹

The twelfth-century commentaries divide into five classes, though the first of them has just one member, and the fifth is an *omnium gatherum*. They consist of: I] C₁₀ – Abelard's *Logica Ingredientibus* commentary; II] C₇, C₈ and C₁₄ (the 'C8 Complex') – a 'standard' twelfth-century commentary on the *Categories*; III] C₁₅, C₁₆, C₁₇, C₂₀, C₂₁, C₂₅, C₂₉ – commentaries which report the views of Alberic (and sometimes other views), or are linked to such commentaries; IV] C₁₂, C₂₆ – commentaries which derive from particular

9. This is a quick summary of ideas I have developed at greater length elsewhere: *From the Circle*, 'The Latin Tradition', 21-40; 'La logique en occident latin'.

later twelfth-century schools (other than that of Alberic); V] C5, C6, C11, C13, C18, C22, C24, C27, C28, C30, C31, C32, C33 – others. I shall look at each group briefly in turn: -

I. Twelfth-century logicians are hardly ever named as the authors of their commentaries (and, in many cases, these commentaries are far from being literary works by a given, single author). Peter Abelard is the great exception. Probably because he was the most famous logician of the age, his name was attached both to a commentary of which he is certainly the author, the *Logica Ingredientibus*, and also to other commentaries which he probably did not write.¹⁰ Not only, then, is C10 the one twelfth-century *Categories* commentary which can be securely attributed to an author. It is also, thanks to knowledge about Abelard's life and the chronology of his works, the one commentary that can be dated with reasonable precision. Most probably, Abelard issued the *Logica Ingredientibus* as a whole c. 1119. Possibly he wrote up the commentaries one by one, but even so, there would not be reason to date the one on the *Categories* much later. Possibly he inserted a few discursive passages later – but this hypothesis is unproven.¹¹ Abelard's commentary therefore provides

10. The *Logica Ingredientibus* commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *Categories* and *On Interpretation* in ms Milan Ambrosiana M63 sup each have incipits and explicits attributing them to Abelard, and the commentary to *De differentiis topicis* in MS Paris Bibliothèque Nationale lat 7493 also has an attribution to him. The only other copy of part of this commentary (apart from a fragment), on *On Interpretation* in MS Berlin Staatsbibliothek 2° 624, is anonymous. Commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *On Interpretation* and *De divisione*, preceding C5 in MS Paris Bibliothèque Nationale lat 13368 are attributed to Abelard (but by a hand different from the scribe of the text): the case for dis-attributing them is made in the articles by Cameron and Martin cited below, in the entry for C5. The commentary on the *Isagoge* known as the *Logica Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum* is attributed to Abelard in the only manuscript, MS Lunel Bibliothèque Municipale 6. Although most of the material here probably records Abelard's teaching, there is reason to believe that it is not a work compiled and checked by Abelard himself: see Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, Chapter 1. (My conclusions are subject to correction by the findings of Peter King and Chris Martin in their new edition, which will look much more thoroughly into the question of authenticity.)

11. See Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*, Chapter 1, for detailed discussion. The suggestion that Abelard inserted some longer, discursive passages some time after he

researchers with a precious fixed point of reference. Not only are Abelard's discussions themselves fascinating – the best evidence, along with parallel passages in his *Dialectica* and a few texts in his *Isagoge* commentary, for his metaphysics; they may also offer a way of beginning to order and understand some of the other material.

II. A brief scan of the Catalogue will show that, in general, the *Categories* commentaries (and the same is true for commentaries on other logical texts) are each found in no more than one manuscript. But there is an exception. There are five manuscripts of C8 (counting the two different copies in the London codex as separate manuscripts), and C7 and C14 (each in a single manuscript) are close enough to C8 to be considered, in a broad sense, the same commentary, the 'C8 Complex'. The C8 Complex represents a common pattern in twelfth-century commentaries: for the other logical textbooks, there is also in each case a commentary which was copied in a few manuscripts and so might be called a 'standard' commentary; and the same phenomenon of standard commentaries is found for other school-texts: for example, the early twelfth-century *Glosulae* to Priscian, in five manuscripts, or William of Conches's commentary on Boethius's *De consolazione philosophiae*.¹²

The standard commentaries to logical and grammatical texts are, however, each single works only in a broad sense – they are layered, adaptive compositions: successive masters have taken an existing text, changing and adding to it according to their own ideas. Yukio Iwakuma has worked out in detail the textual relations between the different manuscripts of the C8 Complex.¹³ The earliest version of the text that survives is that contained in *L*, *L** and *M*, and which breaks off before Chapter 6 on quantity. It might well itself be made up of earlier layers; at its foundation is Boethius's commentary. *V* and *P* each add different extra material to this com-

had written the rest of his commentaries is made in Jacobi and Strub, 'Peter Abaelard'.
 12. On the *Glosulae*, see Grondeux and Catach, 'Les *Glosulae*'; counting a treatise version, the early printed edition and lost or conjectural copies, there are 14 witnesses in all. For William's commentary, see William of Conches, *Glosae*, lxxx – cxii.

13. See 'Vocales Revisited', 89-91. I have been able to add some more detail by using Iwakuma's own collation of the texts and transcriptions.

mon text, and *P* re-writes various passages of the common text. For these chapters, *A* (C14) contains a text of which about a third consists of passages identical (or nearly) to ones in the common text, and two thirds of its own additions, and *Q* (C7) has its own text, which has some parallels with the common text and some with the additions in *V*. Chapter 6, on quantity, shows great diversity in the theories offered in the different manuscripts that include it (*VPAQ*), but also phrases in common. From Chapter 7 until they finish, *Q* and *A* have substantially the same text. From Chapter 7 until early in Chapter 8 (64.14; 9a14) *V*'s text has parallels with that of *QA* and fewer with that in *P*, but from then onwards *P* and *V* have largely the same text, with a few additions peculiar to each. The *QA* and *PV* texts from 9a14 onwards are different, but with some passages in common.

This comparison of the versions shows that each text is the result of a complicated process, many stages of which have probably vanished without trace. It is certainly unlikely that all the texts can be put into a single line of development, although for Chapters 1-5 it is at least reasonably sure that the *L*, *L**, *M* text and the layer of *VP* which it constitutes are earlier than the additions in *P* and *V*, the changes in *P*, the new material in *A* and the *Q* text.¹⁴ Iwakuma once attributed C8, as a whole, to William of Champeaux, but he now thinks that only the common material in Chapters 1 to 5 are by him, and that the *V* revision is the work of a pupil.¹⁵ Yet, despite the credit Iwakuma's deep familiarity with the material deserves, his arguments for this attribution are far from solid.¹⁶ In one case which has been studied – the question of to which category *vox* belongs –

14. Iwakuma also believes (*Vocales Revisited*, 90-1) that *P* and *Q* can be seen as fairly independent revisions of the common text; *V* as based on the common text, *P* and *Q*; and *A* as based on *V* and *Q*.

15. Iwakuma made the attribution in 'Pierre Abélard', 102-8, but in 'William of Champeaux on Aristotle's Categories', he restricts the attribution to the common text, and refines that position in *Vocales Revisited*.

16. For criticism, see (as well as the article cited in the following footnote) Cameron, *William of Champeaux*; Cameron, 'What's in a Name?'; Jacobi, 'William of Champeaux', 268-70 (who accepts that Iwakuma's arguments show that C8 and other texts belong at least (270) "to the surroundings of Master William."

where William's views are known from direct reports such as Abelard's, it seems that none of the versions of C8 presents them precisely, although his ideas have clearly been influential on many of them.¹⁷ The same study shows that there is also clearly a close connection between the issues discussed in these texts and those considered by Abelard in his *Dialectica* and *Logica Ingredientibus* in the second decade of the twelfth century. But it is not yet possible to place particular versions of C8 with any confidence before or after these works.¹⁸ Because of the way changes and additions between the texts highlight developments in thought, the C8 complex contains very precious evidence about the evolution of thought about logic and metaphysics in the earlier twelfth century, which it is not, however, possible, in the present state of research, fully to interpret.

III. Alberic was probably the leading logician in Paris in the 1130s apart from Abelard, and he was Abelard's determined opponent. His most notable achievement was to have pointed out the fatal flaw which undermined Abelard's beautifully contrived system of propositional logic.¹⁹ But he attacked Abelard on many issues, and presented himself as the opponent of vocalism or nominalism. No work attributable to him survives,²⁰ but de Rijk has discovered commentaries, including two on the *Categories* (C15, C17), which stem from his milieu and report his views. To this group a number of others can be added, either because they refer to him (C16, C25, C29)

17. Rosier-Catach, 'Vox and Oratio'; cf. Grondeux and Rosier-Catach, 'Sur la nature catégorielle'.

18. Iwakuma dates the common material to the very beginning of the twelfth century ('Vocales Revisited', 171 and the V revision to before 1110 ('William of Champeaux', 320), but he places the latest version (A = C14) as late as the mid-twelfth century ('William of Champeaux', 323-4).

19. This achievement has been documented and discussed by Christopher Martin: see, e.g. C.J. Martin, 'Logic', 191-2.

20. In 'Vocalism, Nominalism', 55, I suggested that C21, the fragmentary beginning of a commentary, was Alberic's, because views attributed elsewhere to Alberic are put forward here by the writer himself. But there is not an exact correspondence, and this method of attribution is unreliable in an area where ideas were routinely taken and repeated.

or are linked in their concerns to these five commentaries (C16, C20, C21). Abelard, too, is an important presence in some of this material. In particular, C15 and C17 very often juxtapose the views of ‘Master P.’ (Abelard) and ‘Master A.’ (Alberic), whilst C20 (a fragment which does not, in fact, name Alberic) mentions the views of Roscelin and Abelard, but rejects them (and, indeed, is generally critical of those who hold the *sententia nominum* or who say that genera and species are *voces*). Although the links with Alberic allow these commentaries to be grouped together and suggest that those which contrast his views with Abelard’s are reporting on logical teaching in Paris in the 1130s, some of them may be later. For example, C16 – which like C20 is strongly critical of the *vocales* – refers to what happened “before the time of Alberic”, before giving Alberic’s views and then his own, suggesting that its writer is a master of the generation after Alberic.²¹

IV. The *Albricani*, or followers of Alberic, formed one of the logico-philosophical schools of the second half of the twelfth century. Two commentaries have been shown to stem from members of two other, important schools: the *Porretani*, followers of Gilbert of Poitiers (C16), and the *nominales*, followers of Abelard (C 26). These two texts are among the most substantial philosophically, but also the most challenging, of all those catalogued – fortunately they have both been properly edited by Sten Ebbesen who has also begun the business of interpreting them.²²

V. The list of commentaries which do not fall into any of these classes may seem dauntingly long, but half of its members (C11, C13,

21. The fullest study of one of these commentaries, that by Joke Spruyt (‘Twelfth-century glosses’) on C15, concludes that the work is lacking in depth compared with Abelard, and points out especially the peculiarity of this commentary – that it contains many *instantiae*-like arguments: objections and counter-arguments which seem like logical exercises, unrelated to the text. But perhaps scholars should not be attempting to evaluate a text like C15 as a work in its own right, but should see it as a valuable record, through the eyes of a student, of discussions that were going on in the classrooms.

22. See bibliography under C16 and C26.

C22, C28, C30, C31 and C33) are very short fragments, and one (C18) is a throw-back to earlier centuries, a set of *glossae collectae* on the *Categoriae Decem*. C6 is a literal commentary of the most extreme pedantry, clearly aimed at beginning students. C5 is the commentary which, until recently, was thought to be by Abelard. Yukio Iwakuma still considers it to be his, and to be an important witness to his thinking when he arrived in Paris c. 1100. Once the attribution to Abelard is removed, however, there seems to be no pressing reason to date it early, and the loose resemblances it has to Abelard's *Logica Ingredientibus* commentary may well be because it looks back to it. Another commentary which poses problems about attribution is C27. This text, discovered by Yukio Iwakuma, is one of the rare exceptions to the rule of anonymity, since it is attributed to 'Ros.' – an abbreviation which almost certainly stands for Roscelin. Whoever wrote this attribution therefore probably thought that it was the work of this famous master. But the commentary seems clearly to depend on Abelard's teaching from the time of the *Logica Ingredientibus*, and it is hard to believe that Roscelin, who was Abelard's bitter enemy, would have followed the ideas of his former pupil in this way, even at the end of his life.

C24 is interesting primarily because of its form. The element of literal commentary has been dropped entirely, and the writer discusses each section of the text by raising a question (such as, for instance, at the beginning of Chapter 6 on quantity: "It is usual to ask whether the division which Aristotle makes at the beginning of the chapter on quantity – 'One sort of quantity is continuous, the other discrete' – is sufficient.") The contents of these questions are not, however, generally different from what was normally discussed in the course of a composite commentary. The most recently discovered of all these commentaries, C32, is unfortunately very short, hardly extending beyond the Prologue. It does, however, speculate – as some of the commentaries linked to Alberic also do – about Boethius's lost second commentary on the *Categoriae*, designed for more advanced students.

The three twelfth-century treatises listed are closely connected to the commentary tradition. Abelard's *Dialectica* is clearly based on the same teaching material – though almost certainly an earlier ver-

sion of it – as he wrote up in the *Logica Ingredientibus*.²³ Garlandus, who seems to be a representative of the linguistic approach to logic linked to the name of Roscelin, follows the logical set-texts closely through his *Dialectica*, offering in effect a commentary on them in continuous form. The same seems to be true for the *Tractatus Lemovicensis*, although parts of it seem very rough and more like notes than a literary work. This treatise needs more study: its discoverer, Yukio Iwakuma, sees in it an important witness to the linguistic (‘protovocalist’) approach to logic at the turn of the twelfth century, but the writer’s allegiances are not altogether clear, nor is the date firmly established.²⁴

Future Research

The aim of the survey above is to divide up the material, so that researchers are not faced with an undigested list. But the serious work of studying these texts and seeing their precise relations to each other and to other writings of the time has still to be done. Here are a few pathways.

One method would be to use Abelard’s *Logica Ingredientibus* commentary as a fixed point. How do the problems raised and solutions given in the anonymous commentaries compare to what is found there? Can the comparison be used to establish a chronology? It is true that, so far, this method has not given any definite results when used in connection with the C8 complex, but then it has only been applied to one issue. As the treatment of a wider range of problems is compared, the lines of development may become clearer.

Another method – useful for those working on the ‘Alberic’ group (Class III) – is to try to reconstruct views master by master, treating the commentaries not as integral works but as reports of what different masters proposed. It would be possible, from looking at texts such as C15 and C17, to build up a good idea of Alberic’s views on problems connected with the *Categories*, and indeed to build

23. See Marenbon, *Abelard*, 44.

24. On language-centred logic at the turn of the twelfth century, see Marenbon, ‘Synthesis’ 201-15 and the references cited there.

up an idea of Abelard's views which might well not correspond exactly to what is found in the *Logica Ingredientibus*.

Alternatively, researchers could orientate themselves problem by problem – establishing what questions were raised in connection with a given passage and what was the range of solutions. The difficulty here is the lack of an external chronological guide and the danger of making assumptions about which positions and arguments are more developed than others.

Finally, an easier, but still demanding route is to stick to the commentaries that are most solid and philosophically interesting – not just Abelard's but the Porretan commentary (C16) and the Nominalist one (C26). There is still plenty of analytical work to be done here, and it is less dangerous for the researcher's sanity than studying C8.

Catalogue

- 1 Translations and paraphrases
- 2 Encyclopaedic and text-book presentations
- 3 Glosses
- 4 Commentaries
- 5 Bibliography

1. *Translations and paraphrases*

The *Categories* was known in two versions of Boethius's Latin translation – one his own, final translation (*AL*[*Aristoteles Latinus*] I, 1-5, 5-41), the other a composite version, apparently derived in part from Boethius's final translation, in part from another translation, perhaps an earlier draft by Boethius.²⁵ There was also a Latin paraphrase of the *Categories*, incorporating elements of commentary, known as the *Categoriae Decem* and usually attributed in the early Middle Ages to Augustine (*AL* I, 1-5, 133-75). Internal references to the fourth-century Roman philosopher Themistius suggest that it

25. Boethius's own version: (*AL* [*Aristoteles Latinus*] I, 1-5, 5-41); composite version: (*AL* I, 1-5, 47-79; cf. *ibid.* ix-lxiii and Minio-Paluello, 'Note').

originated in his circle (cf. *ibid.*, lxxviii), although a suggestion has recently been made, based on conjecture rather than strong evidence, that the author of the paraphrase was Marius Victorinus (Kenny, 'Les Catégories', 130-3).

2. *Encyclopaedic and text-book presentations*

[No bibliography is given for the first three items, which are well-known encyclopaedias. Brief comments and further references concerning the sections on logic are found in Marenbon 'Latin Tradition', 21-2]

- (5th C.) Martianus Capella *De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*, IV, ed. Willis, 115-29 – paraphrase.
- (late 6th C) Cassiodorus *Institutiones*, II, 9-10, ed. Mynors, 113-4 – brief, encyclopaedic presentation.
- (early 7th C) Isidore of Seville *Etymologiae* II, 26, ed. Lindsay – brief, encyclopaedic presentation.
- (late 8th C) Alcuin, *Dialectica*, *Patrologia Latina* 101, 954-64 – text-book discussion.

[See Prantl *Geschichte*, 16-19; Lehmann, 'Cassiodorstudien. VIII', 370-83; Bullough, 'Alcuin and the Kingdom of Heaven'; Kneepkens, 'Some Notes'; Bullough, 'Alcuin before Frankfort'; Marenbon, 'Alcuin', 606-9; Bullough, *Alcuin*; Bohn *Candidus*; Marenbon, 'Logical Tradition', 23-4; Marenbon, 'Postfazione'; Marenbon, 'La logique' 8-9]

- (early 12th C) *Tractatus Lemovicensis de praedicamentis* in ms Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 544, fol. 94r-101v – a treatise on the *Categories*, unfinished and anonymous, discovered by Yukio Iwakuma.

According to Yukio Iwakuma, who discovered it, the treatise should be placed in Paris, c. 1100, and it may come from the (lost) *Dialectica* of Robert of Paris.

[See Marenbon, 'Logic at the Turn', 71, 74-5; Iwakuma, 'Vocales Revisited', 86-9, 116-24 (extracts); Iwakuma, 'Alberic of Paris']

- (early 12th C) Garlandus *Dialectica* I, ed. De Rijk, 12 – 41 – detailed text-book presentation, involving his own interpretation. Iwakuma gives a strong argument for a dating to the first decade

of the twelfth century; but a later dating remains possible (Marenbon).

[See De Rijk's Introduction to his edition; Iwakuma, 'Vocales', 47-54; de Vregille, '2. Gerland'; '3. Gerland'; Marenbon, 'Logic at the Turn', 70; Marenbon, 'Synthesis', 194-6]

- (c. 1110 or earlier - 1117) Peter Abelard *Dialectica*, ed. De Rijk, 51-120 (first section missing) - detailed, interpretative discussion.

[There is a large secondary literature about the content of this very important work, though only a little of it concerns the section on the *Categories*. For recent discussion of the dating, see Mews, 'On Dating' 1985, 74-104; Marenbon, *Abelard*, 41-43; Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*.]

3. Glosses

(a) *To the pseudo-Augustinian paraphrase (Categoriae decem)*

Standard glosses (S-glosses) are found in a number of mss; glosses linked to the thought of John Scottus Eriugena (E-glosses) are found on their own in one manuscript and mixed with S-glosses in some others. There are other sets with striking peculiarities - for example, the glosses in ms St Gallen 274.

Edition: a selection of glosses in Marenbon, *From the Circle*, 185-206.

Literature: Peter Abelard, *Ouvrages inédits*, 618-24; Cousin, *Fragments*, 252-62; Hauréau, *Histoire*, I, 84-96 (with extracts); Barach, 'Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus', 5-22; Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, II, 40-1 and 44-5; Reiners, *Nominalismus*, 5-9 and 22-5; Van de Vyver, 'Vroeg-Middeleeuwsche wijsgeerige verhandelingen', 175-6; Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries', *Traditio*, 24, 214; Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin*, 121-138 and 173-9; Jeauneau, 'Israël Scot', 7-20 (for the St Petersburg ms and Paris BN 12949); Marenbon, 'Glosses and Commentaries', 25-29; Luscombe, 'Dialectic and Rhetoric', 5,9; Marenbon, 'Latin Tradition', 35-6

Manuscripts:

- [AL 406] Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale, 229 (s. x), fols 194r-229v: mainly S
- [AL 2036] Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, 206 (s. x), fols 24r-39v : mainly S
- [AL 1698] St. Petersburg, Publichnaja Biblioteka im. M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina, E V. class lat 7 (s. ix), fols 34v-40v, 1r-10r: mainly S
- [AL 2159] Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, B 71 sup. (s. ix), fols 34r-68v: E
- [AL 2106] Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 6373 (s. x), fols 1r-32v: mainly S
- [AL 2104] Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 6367 (s. xi), fols 2r-16v: mainly S (AL mistakenly prints the number '6327')
- [AL 2062] Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 1750 (s. x ex/xi in), fols 12r-27r: mainly S
- [AL 621] Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 12949, (s. x), fols 24r-39v: S + E
- [AL 2126] St Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 274 (s. ix^a), pp. 4-65: S + E and a considerable number of non-standard glosses; use of Boethius's commentary
- [AL 2190] Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 567 (s. xii), fols 53f-66v: S
- [AL 2187] Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 233 (s. xi), fols iv -27r: mainly S
- [AL 2023] Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cvp. 843 (s. x), fols iv - 36r: mainly S

Less fully glossed:

- [AL 2090] Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Phillipps 176 (s. x): abbreviated glosses, some based on S
- [AL 2119] Bern, Burgerbibliothek, C 219 (s. ix ex/ x in): abbreviation of S-glosses
- [AL 2152] Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. Plut. LXXXIX sup. 80 (s.xi/xii): mainly S-glosses
- [AL 2054] Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale, 263 (s. x): mainly non-standard

[AL 1653J Vercelli, Archivio Capitolare Eusebiano, CXXXVIII (143) (s. ix).

(b) *To the Categories in the 'composite' translation.*

Literature: Leonardi, *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici*, I, 38 (for the Florence MS); Ferrari, *Sancti Willibrordi*, (for the Luxembourg MS); Marenbon, 'Glosses and Commentaries', 29; Marenbon, 'The Latin Tradition', 37.

Manuscripts:

[AL 839] Cologne, Dombibliothek, 191 (s. xi), fols 23L 70v: few glosses after fol. 47r.

[AL 1386] Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, S. Marco 125 (s. xi/xii), fols 1 L 1 Sf: probably from school of Alberic.

[---] Luxembourg, Bibliothèque Nationale I:9 (c. 1100), ff. 21v-40v, 57r-80v; 49r-50v.

[AL 1511] Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, Scaff. XXII, 553 (s. xii), fols 12r-32v.

[AL 1698] St. Petersburg, Publichnaja Biblioteka im. M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina, E V. class 1ar. 7 (s. ix) fols 21/23L 32/34 v.

(c) *To the Categories in Boethius's genuine translation*

Literature: Minio-Paluello, 'The Genuine Text', 158; *Bibliothèque nationale. Catalogue général des manuscrits latins*, IV, 65-6; Aristotle, *Categories*, xiii; Senko, *Repertorium*, I, 12 (where the glosses are wrongly ascribed to Peter Abelard); Marenbon, 'Glosses and Commentaries', 29; Marenbon, 'The Latin Tradition', 37.

Manuscript: [AL 538] Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 2788 (s. x^{ex} for this section), fols 49r-50v.

4. *Commentaries*²⁶**C1** (to *Categoriae decem*)

Type: collected glosses.

Date: compiled in first half of the tenth century.

Edition: extracts in Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin*, 181-206. *Incipit:* *Disciplinaque a disciplina ars quaelibet...*

Explicit: (incomplete; ends, badly damaged, glossing *Categoriae*, p. 147.11 ff.).

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 13953, fols 50L-54v.

Affiliation: consists of S-glosses (see Section A above); cf. C18.

Literature: as for glosses to *Categoriae decem* (Section A above).

C3

Author: Notker Labeo.

Type: brief additions to text used in his German translation of the *Categoriae*. *Date:* early eleventh century.

Edition: Notker the German, *Die Werke*, V.

Literature: Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, II, 62-3; Van de Vyver, 'Les Étapes', 441; Lewry, 'Boethian Logic', 93-4.

C4

Title: *Excerpta Categogarum et Isagogarum*

Date: probably early eleventh century.

Type: question-and-answer treatise, closely based on Boethius's commentary

Manuscript: Vatican, Reg. lat. 1281, ff. 18v-25r.

Edition: *Excerpta Isagogarum*, ed. G. D'Onofrio

26. I have decided to omit the entries for testimonies to works that no longer survive, which were each given a number in my earlier catalogue. They are C2 (Richer on Gerbert's teaching); C9a, b (list of books at Michelsberg monastery Bamberg in 1112-23); C19 (12th-century catalogue of St Amand); C23 (before 1178 in Abbot Frowin of Engelberg's list of schoolbooks). In the bibliography, I have not cited my 'Logic at the Turn' where I just briefly list a commentary there, which I or others discuss in greater detail elsewhere.

Literature: Van de Vyver, 'Vroeg-Middeleeuwsche verhandelingen', 183, 195; De Rijk, 'On the Curriculum', 57-64; D'Onofrio (in edition)

C₅

Author: Until recently attributed to Peter Abelard, but this attribution has been convincingly challenged. Unlike the other commentaries from the same manuscript also attributed to Abelard, this one is a fragment without any ascription.

Date: early twelfth century, more probably second quarter than first. But Iwakuma dates it to c. 1100.

Type: fragment from a composite commentary. (begins commenting on *Categories*, p. 49.5, ends glossing *Categories*, p. 55.15).

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 13368, ff. 164r-168r.

Edition: Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, 43-67.

Literature: dal Pra, 'Le glosse', 147-9; Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, xxiii-xxvi; Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries', *Traditio*, 28; Senko, *Repertorium*, I, 140; Barrow, Burnett and Luscombe, 'Checklist', 249-50; Mews, 'Dating', 74-5; Marenbon, 'Logic at the Turn', 69; Iwakuma, 'Vocales Revisited', 116-71; Martin, 'A Note'; Cameron, 'Abelard's Early Glosses' (esp. 658-61).

Remarks: This commentary is often treated as if it formed a set with the commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *Peri hermeneias* and *De divisione* in the same MS, Paris, BN lat 13368. But it is often a different type, part of a composite commentary rather than a literal one. Moreover, although the other commentaries do have ascriptions to Peter Abelard, there are strong arguments against Abelard's having been their author either: see the articles by Martin and Cameron cited above. Iwakuma, however, is strongly persuaded that it is the work of Abelard.

C₆

Date: twelfth century.

Type: literal.

Incipit: <S>ubtilis indagator rerum Aristotiles de decem generibus que pro excellentis continentie causa...

Explicit: (unfinished; ends glossing *Categories*, p. 29.23-4).

Manuscript: Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, MacClean 165 [AL 258], fols 102r-116v. *Literature:* James, *A Descriptive Catalogue*, 316-9; Marenbon, 'Glosses and Commentaries', 33.

C7 < cf. C8 Complex >

This commentary (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 17813, fols 19bis-54v) is sufficiently close to the different version of C8 and to C14 to be seen as a version within a single 'complex'.

C8 < cf. C8 Complex >

This commentary in its various versions is sufficiently close to C7 and C14 to be seen as a version within a single 'complex'.

C8 Complex

Author: See above, pp. 147-148.

Date: evolving during the first half of the twelfth century

Type: composite.

Incipits: <In>tentio Aristotelis est in hoc opere de decem primis vocabulis decem prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod res significant disputare... (Vatican MS; minor differences in other MSS); Decem sunt collectiones rerum a se invicem naturaliter diverse que predicamenta vocantur (BN 17813 – C7).

Explicit: ... [various; some end with Chapter 5, others continue to the penultimate chapter, 14, on motion]

Manuscripts: (A) Assisi, Biblioteca Conv. Franc. 573, fols 15v-48r (= C14); (L) London, British Library, Royal 7. D. XXV, fols 55r-63r (ends glossing 49.26; 2b7); (L*) London, British Library, Royal 7. D. XXV, fols. 60v-62r (from 47.15; 1a16 to introductory discussion to Chapter 5, 48.12; 2a12) (M) Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 14458, fols 95r-102r (finishes at 54.13; 4b17); (P) Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 13368, fols 195r-214v; (Q) Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 17813, fols 19bis-54v (= C7); (V) Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, reg. lat. 230, fols 41r-71r

Affiliation: See above, pp. 146-148.

Literature: Hauréau, *Notices et extraits*, V, 333-8 (with a few extracts); Wilmart, *Codices reginenses Latini*, I, 546-7; Senko, *Repertorium*, II, 93; de Rijk, *Logica modernorum*, II.I, 49; Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, xix, n.

13; Senko, *Repertorium*, I, 140; Barrow, Burnett and Luscombe, 'Checklist', 268; Marenbon, 'Glosses and Commentaries' 34, 36-9; Marenbon, 'Vocalism', 52-3; Marenbon, *Abelard*, 110-11, 134, 140, 145-6, 171; Biard, 'Le langage', 233; Iwakuma, 'Pierre Abélard', 101-8, 118 (extracts); Iwakuma, 'Introductiones', 17-25 (extracts); Iwakuma, 'William of Champeaux' (extracts), *passim*; Cameron, 'What's in a Name?' (extracts); Iwakuma, 'Vocales revisited', 89-171; Cameron, 'When does a word signify', 183-5; Grondeux and Rosier-Catach, 'Sur la nature catégorielle'; Rosier-Catach, 'Vox and Oratio'.

C10

Title: Glossae magistri Petri Abaelardi super Praedicamenta Aristotelis.

Author: Peter Abelard.

Date: c. 1117-21.

Type: composite.

Manuscript: Milano, Bibl. Ambrosiana, M 63 sup., ff. 16ra-43vb.

Edition: Peter Abelard, *Philosophische Schriften*, pp. 111-305.

Affiliation: some relation to the C8 Complex (see above, pp. 146-148)

Literature: prolific: cf. Barrow, Burnett and Luscombe, 'Checklist', p. 250; Mews, 'Dating', pp. 76-92; Marenbon, *Abelard*, 46-8; Marenbon, *Abelard in Four Dimensions*

C11

Date: twelfth century.

Type: mainly literal; with a little fuller discussion of problems.

Incipit: <Q>UOCIENS SOLET OPPONI. Expeditis omnibus predicamentis cur praeter

propositum suum... (lemma = *Categories*, p. 69, apparatus to line 12; beginning of gloss

= beginning of Book IV of Boethius's commentary).

Explicit: huiusmodi mutatione in contrarium qualitatis alteratur subiectum. A causa.

Finis laboris.

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 13368, fols 185r-191r.

Literature: Peter Abelard, *Scritti di logica*, p. xix, n.13 (where it is said, wrongly, to begin on fol. 183r).

C12

Author: a follower of Gilbert of Poitiers

Date: probably middle or later twelfth century

Type: composite

Manuscript: Paris Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 7094A, fols 74ra-79ra.

Edition: Ebbesen, 'A Porretanean Commentary'.

Literature: Ebbesen, 'Porretaneans'

C13

Date: probably first half of twelfth century.

Type: literal (fragment).

Incipit: (only a few paragraphs of the very end of the commentary survive; first gloss is to *Categories*, p. 78.6).

Explicit: ... id est qui in frequentiori usu habentur. OMNES PENE ENUMERATI SUNT. Et de predicamentis ista sufficiant.

Manuscript: Oxford, Corpus Christi College, 233, fol. 127r.

Literature: Thomson, *Catalogue*, I, 268-70.

C14 < cf. *C8 complex* >

This commentary (Assisi, Biblioteca Conv. Franc. 573, fol. 15v-48r is sufficiently close to C7 and C8 to be seen as a version within a single 'complex'.

C15

Date: late 1130s (de Rijk).

Type: problem commentary (with many *instantia*-type discussions)

Incipit: ... universale, ergo nec divisio illa est totius universalis nec vocis nec ... (the commentary is missing its very beginning; but it starts in the introductory section).

Explicit: ... Aristotiles tractaverat de predicamenta... fine predicamen ...

Manuscripts: Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2087, fols 1-48vb.

Affiliation: material in common with *C17* (de Rijk); and also with *C16*, *C20*, *C21*.

Literature: de Rijk, 'Some New Evidence', 36-9; de Rijk, *Logica modernorum*, II.1, 89-90 and 214-5 (where the manuscript number is mistakenly given as 2084); Marangon, *Alle origini dell' aristotelismo padovano*, 14, 27; Bottin, 'Quelques discussions', 57-72; Ebbesen, 'Opinion', 72-

73 (short extract); Iwakuma and Ebbesen, 'Logico-Theological Schools', 175 (brief extract); XIII Marenbon, 'Vocalism', 55, 59-60; Marenbon, *Abelard*, 51; Iwakuma, 'Prologues'; Spruyt, 'Twelfth-century glosses', *passim* (extracts); Ebbesen, 'Anonymous D'Orvillensis on the *Categories*', 359 (with extract)

C16

Date: probably 1140s or later

Type: composite.

Incipit: (The section treating the *antepredicamenta* is missing or was never there) *Premissis quibusdam que ad predicamenta necessaria sunt de ipsis tractare incipit. Agit autem de predicamento substantie ...*

Explicit: ... ut ostendat ex praemissis sequi ista, et sic firmior est argumentatio. (unfinished; finishes glossing *Categories*, 52.1).

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque de l' Arsenal, 910, fols 145r-147r.

Affiliation: material in common with C 15, C17, C20, C21.

Literature: de Rijk, *Logica modernorum*, I, 116-20; Senko, *Repertorium*, II, 131 (for description of MS; this commentary is not itself noted by either); Marenbon, 'Vocalism', 55

C17

Author: probably a pupil of Alberic (de Rijk).

Date: late 1130s or 1140s.

Type: composite.

Incipit: <D>icit Boethius in comento predicamentorum: Intentio Aristotelis est tractare de primis vocibus . . .

Explicit: ... convenientius dicere quod quies secundum eundem locum sit contraria motui secundum locum (possibly unfinished; no discussion of *Categories*, 78.23 ff.)

Manuscript: Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 624, fols 81r-87v.

Affiliation: material in common with C15 (de Rijk); and also C16, C20, C21.

Literature: Grabmann, *Kommentare zur aristotelischen Logik*, 18; Minio-Paluello, *Twelfth-Century Logic*, II, xii-xiii; de Rijk, 'Some New Evidence', 31-6 (with extracts); Marenbon, 'Vocalism', 55-6; Ebbesen,

‘Opinion’, 72, 74 (short extracts); Ebbesen, ‘Anonymous D’Orvillensis on the Categories’, 363; Iwakuma ‘*Vocales revisited*’

C18 (to Categoriae decem)

Type: collected glosses.

Date: compiled in the twelfth century; much of the material is earlier.

Edition: some of the material in Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin*, 181-206, but this MS is not noted.

Incipit: <C>ategorie grece cum aspiratione latine dicuntur praedicamenta...

Explicit: (unfinished).

Manuscript: Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, S. Marco 113, fols 26r-28v.

Affiliation: consists in part of S-glosses, but also contains non-standard material; cf. C1.

Literature: Leonardi, *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici*, I, p. 32-3.

C20

Author: a follower of Alberic.

Date: probably 1130s-50s.

Type: composite.

Incipit: Ut ait Boethius in commento: intentio Aristotelis in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus ...

Explicit: ... differentiam inter passibilem qua<litatem> et pas<sionem> dare intendit (unfinished; ends during gloss on *Categories*, p. 65.13).

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, 910, fols 147r-162v.

Affiliation: C15, C16, C17 and C21.

Literature: de Rijk, *Logica modernorum*, I, 120; Marenbon, ‘Vocalism’, 55-58; de Libera, *Universaux*, 50, *Généralités*, 348; Iwakuma, ‘*Vocales revisited*’

C21

Date: probably 1130s -1150s

Type: fragment - only preface and very beginning of commentary on the first lemma survive). There is not enough of the first comment to be sure whether it is a composite or problem commentary.

Incipit: <I>ncipiunt Cathegorie Aristotelis: quia hoc nomen predica-
menta sonat apud latinos hoc idem sonat . . .

Explicit: ... ut suas purgent doctrinas ab his per quae possunt inpe-
dire.

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, 910, fols 143r- 144r.

Affiliation: C15, C17 and C20.

Literature: de Rijk, *Logica modernorum*, I, p. 120; Senko, *Repertorium*, II,
p. 131; Marenbon, 'Vocalism' 55; Iwakuma, 'Prologues'

C22

Date: almost certainly after 1120; probably mid-twelfth century.

Type: note on logical problems (fragment).

Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale 13368, f. 179v

Edition: Dal Pra, 'Sulla dottrina', 393- 5.

Literature: Dal Pra, 'Sulla dottrina', 396-9; Peter Abelard, *Scritti di log-
ica*, xix, n. 13 (Dal Pra mistakenly says that the piece is found on fol.
79v)

C24

Title: Incipiunt de categoriis pauce.

Date: mid- or late-twelfth century.

Type: problem commentary

Incipit: Querendum est cur dicit Aristoteles denominativa ...

Explicit: ... et corruptio corrupto substantiale sit.

Manuscript: St Gall, Stiftsbibliothek, 833, pp. 7-17.

Literature: Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii*, lxix, n. 77; Grabmann, *Kom-
mentare zur aristotelischen Logik*, pp. 46-7.

C25

Author: a follower of Alberic

Date: mid- to later- 12th C.

Type: fragmentary beginning of composite commentary.

Incipit: Summus et dux peripateticorum ...

Explicit: ... ratio uero substantiae diuersa secundum nomen.

Manuscript: Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, vpl 2237,
ff.27r-28v.

Literature: Iwakuma, 'Prologues'

Notes: This commentary was discovered by Yukio Iwakuma, who has provided me with information on it. It refers to ‘Magister noster Albericus’ (f. 27r), though also to ‘Magister noster’ and, most frequently, ‘Magistri nostri’.

C26

Author: a member of the school of *Nominales*.

Date: c. 1200.

Type: composite

Manuscript: Oxford, Bodleian Library D’Orville 207.

Edition: Ebbesen, ‘Anonymous D’Orvillensis’ Commentary’

Literature: Lewry, ‘Liber Sex Principiorum’; Ebbesen, ‘Two Nominalist Texts’, 429-40 (extracts); Ebbesen, ‘Opinion’, 70-71 (short extracts); Ebbesen, ‘Anonymous D’Orvillensis on the Categories’; Thomson, *Catalogue*, I, 154.

C27

Author: ‘Ros.’ (see *Remarks*)

Title: Incipiunt Ros. Glossulae categoricarum, quae auree gemme uocantur.

Date: probably between 1120 and 1140

Type: composite.

Incipit: Praedicamentum diuersas habet acceptiones ...

Explicit: ... contraria in se suscipere potest.

Manuscript: Milan, Archivio Capitolare della Basilica Ambrosiana M2, fols. 1ra-15rb.

Remarks: The existence of this commentary was first noted by de Rijk. The *incipit* was first noticed by Yukio Iwakuma, who has transcribed the text except where illegible and made his transcription available to other specialists. On the attribution, see above, p. 150.

Literature: Iwakuma, ‘*Vocales Revisited*’ (brief mention)

C28

Date: late 12th or early 13th C.

Type: The ending of a composite commentary, from the beginning of Chapter 14 (77: 19; 15a14).

Incipit: Non videtur secundum philosophicam sententiam ...

Explicit: Et de praedicamentis ista sufficient.

Manuscript: Uppsala, Universitetsbibliotek C.924, f. 74r-v.

Literature: Ebbesen, 'Anonymi Parisiensis', pp. 253-54.

C29

Date: Mid-twelfth century

Type: Notes, which begin in the middle of a discussion of 1a20 (47 :19 ff.) and end with a general comment on the beginning of Chapter 5(2a12; 48:32 ff.)

Incipit: Dici de subiecto tribus modis dicitur. Dici de subiecto est esse universale ...

Manuscript: Vienna, Wien, Österreichische Staatsbibl., BPL 2486, f. 4r

Explicit: 'hoc universale animal est secunda substantia' 'hoc universale homo est secunda substantia'.

Remarks: The master from whose teaching the notes derive refers to one of Alberic's ideas, but rejects it.

C30

Date: It, or the commentary from which it is copied, seems to be from lifetime of Abelard, since Master P. is referred to in the present.

Type: A single comment in a group of miscellaneous logical notes; probably taken from a composite or problem commentary, but it might just be a note.

Incipit: Quantitas alia continua, alia discreta. Quidam dicunt quod non ponenda sit haec divisio 'quantitas alia simplex, alia composita' ...

Explicit: Unde in qualitate est ut forma, in aere vero ut accidens in subiecto.

Manuscript: Vienna, Österreichische Staatsbibl., BPL 2486, f. 6v

Literature: De Rijk, 'Some New Evidence', 38 [extract]

C31

Date: Twelfth century

Type: fragment (on denominatives etc.). Perhaps just a note.

Incipit: <D>enominativa `vero dicuntur' id est illae res dicuntur denominativae Cathegorie Aristotelis: quia hoc nomen predicamenta sonat at apud latinos hoc idem sonat . . .

Explicit: ... vel quam substantiales differentiae aggregatae praeter genus conveniens efficiunt.

Manuscript: Paris Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 544, f. 138r-139r

Literature: Iwakuma, 'Vocalism Revisited', 86.

C32

Date: no later than c. 1150

Type: probably composite, but because only the very first part of the commentary, after the prologue, survives, it is impossible to be sure.

Incipit: [N]ec de huius operis auctore nec de auctoris intencione constabat apud ueteres. Super his ergo Boecius consulamus ...

Explicit: ... aliquid sit qualitatem id est quale aliquis sit. (Breaks off abruptly, commenting passage beginning 48 :20; 1b25)

Manuscript: Cambridge, St John's College 100, ff. 113r-v

Literature: Thomson, *Catalogue*, II.

Remarks: There is an ascription in a fourteenth-century hand, "Expositio Egidii super Predicamenta". The discovery of the commentary is due to Rod Thomson, who noticed that this section of the composite manuscript dates from the second quarter of the twelfth century.

C33

Date: Twelfth century

Type: Notes, often in the form of questions, closely related to passages from the end of the section on quantity and to the section on relation.

Incipit: Dicit Aristoteles quantitati nihil esse contrarium. (cf. 57:1; 5b13)

Explicit: ... in proprio autem esse consideratae relationes faciunt divisionem generis. (The discussion is related to the passage beginning 59:17; 6b29)

Manuscript: Munich clm 14735 ff. 33v-34r.

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CHAPTER 6

Robert Kilwardby on the simultaneity of correlatives

Paul Thom

The Aristotelian category of relatives is studied in three works by Robert Kilwardby (d.1279) – the *Notulae super Librum Praedicamentorum*¹, the *De Natura Relationis* and his Questions on Book I of the *Sentences*. In this paper I outline the treatment of relatives in those works, focusing on one of the supposed properties of correlatives – their simultaneity by nature. I compare the three treatments with one another and discuss their exegetical and philosophical merits.

Introduction

The simultaneity of correlatives is to be distinguished from another of their properties, namely their reciprocity.² Kilwardby sees this difference as one between linguistic and ontological levels – reciprocity being a linguistic matter, simultaneity at least partly an ontological one.³

The reciprocity of relatives can be understood as follows. Every relation has a subject and an object (or as Kilwardby puts it, a start-

1. Alessandro Conti kindly supplied me with a working text in electronic form.

2. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b29. *Aristoteles Latinus* I-1 19,3: “Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur.”

3. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio II dub.6: “... dat duo propria, quorum primum est ex parte dicere, secundum ex parte coniuncti vel esse.” Lectio II dub.12: “... convertentia quae se habet sicut passio eorum quae sunt ad aliquid est secundum casualem habitudinem, sicut dicitur ‘filius patris filius’ et convertitur; convertibilitas autem sive conversio quae est coniuncta cum simul esse natura est convertibilitas secundum esse et non esse hoc modo, ‘Si pater est, filius est’ et e converso, et si non erit, non est e converso.”

ing-point and an end-point).⁴ Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates. He is the subject of the relation of paternity, and Socrates is the object. We can, of course, make the object a subject and the subject an object; but if we do that we are dealing with a distinct relation. If we make Socrates the subject and Sophroniscus the object, we are dealing with the relation of filiation, which in a sense is the opposite of the relation of paternity,⁵ or in modern terminology is the converse relation.

One must distinguish relations from relatives. A relation inheres in its subject as an accident. The opposite relation also inheres in its subject as an accident. Subjects may be designated in one of two ways: either independently of the relations that inhere in them, or else by denomination from those relations. When the subject is designated by denomination from the inhering relation, it is said to be a relative. Every relative has a correlative, namely the subject of the opposite relation, designated by denomination from that opposite relation. Let R be a relation, and let cR be its opposite (its converse). Let R_n be R 's subject as denominated from R , and let cR_n be cR 's subject as denominated from cR . Then the reciprocity of relatives is expressed by the formula

Reciprocity R_n is related by R to cR_n , and cR_n is related by cR to R_n .⁶

This should be understood as the general form of a double meaning-rule which gives the meaning of ' R_n ' through that of ' cR_n ', and gives the meaning of ' cR_n ' through that of ' R_n '.

Of itself, reciprocity does not imply that if one correlative (e.g. a master) exists then the other correlative (a slave) exists; however,

4. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 10 dub. 5: "... dat intentionem unius extremorum, scilicet tantum existentis ex parte finis et non ex parte principii."

5. Aristotle, *Categories* 10, 11b24 speaks of pairs of *relatives* as being opposed, but Kilwardby also allows pairs of *relations* to be opposed. See Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 17 dub.4: "Sed hoc solvitur per hoc quod habent naturam oppositionis eo quod non possunt simul esse in eodem secundum quod relativa sunt, quia non sunt relativa neque dicuntur ad se invicem secundum quod accidit ea esse in eodem, quia paternitas in uno non ponit filiationem in eodem, sed interimit respectu eiusdem."

6. Compare Ackrill 1963:100.

Aristotle goes on to address this existential question. He asks whether relatives must be simultaneous by nature. Simultaneity by nature can be expressed by the formula:⁷

Simultaneity If an R_n exists, a eR_n exists.

Categories 7, 7b15-8a12 claims that natural simultaneity does seem to be a peculiarity of correlatives, but Aristotle goes on to consider a putative counter-example to this claim.⁸ The counter-example concerns relative terms like ‘knowledge’ and ‘perception’. It seems that the correlatives of these are respectively ‘the knowable’ [*to epistēton*] and ‘the perceptible’ [*to aisthēton*]; but knowledge seems not to be simultaneous by nature with the knowable, nor perception with the perceptible, because while the existence of knowledge implies that of the knowable, it seems that the implication is not reversible:

For as a rule it is of actual things already existing that we acquire knowledge; in few cases, if any, could one find knowledge coming into existence at the same time as what is knowable. Moreover, destruction of the knowable carries knowledge to destruction, but destruction of knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. For if there is not a knowable there is not knowledge – there will no longer be anything for knowledge to be of – but if there is not knowledge there is nothing to prevent there being a knowable. Take, for example, the squaring of the circle, supposing it to be knowable; knowledge of it does not yet exist but the knowable itself exists. Again, if animal is destroyed there is no knowledge, but there may be many knowables.⁹

The argument leaves us with an inconsistent triad of the following form (where Aristotle has ‘knowledge’ and ‘perception’ in place of ‘A’, and ‘the knowable’ and ‘the perceptible’ in place of ‘B’):

7. *Categories* 7, 7b15.

8. *Categories* 7, 7b15-8a12.

9. *Categories* 7, 7b24-35. Ackrill translation.

- (1) A and B are correlatives
- (2) A and B are not simultaneous by nature
- (3) All correlatives are simultaneous by nature.

An inconsistent triad demands a solution, and can be solved at two different levels. Logically – in order to restore consistency – a satisfactory solution must abandon or modify one of the three propositions. Dialectically, something more than this is required: a dialectical solution must not only be consistent; it must also account for the appearances, by explaining why it is that the three propositions *appear* to be true together. This may be achieved by distinguishing two different senses of some of the key terms, giving one logical solution for one set of terms, and another for another. Alternatively, since a dialectical solution is concerned with explaining the appearances, it may involve substituting for one of the terms a term that could be mistaken for it. In the present instance, it would be appropriate to distinguish different types of correlative, or different senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘the knowable’ (or related terms).

In the case of the present inconsistent triad, there is also an exegetical question. Aristotle’s Inconsistent Triad appears to pose counter-examples (knowledge and the knowable) to the thesis that correlatives are naturally simultaneous. The exegetical question is, Are these genuine or merely apparent counter-examples? A given dialectical solution’s answer to this question depends on how it deals with the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowable’. If it classifies them as correlatives and as non-simultaneous – i.e. if it takes propositions (1) and (2) to be true of these terms – then its answer is that Aristotle has given a genuine counter-example to the thesis that all correlatives are simultaneous, and that accordingly that thesis is to be rejected. If it classifies these terms in some other way, then its answer is that Aristotle’s counter-example is merely apparent, and that simultaneity by nature may well be a property of all correlatives.

If the exegetical question is answered in the negative (not all correlatives being naturally simultaneous), a further – and philosophical – question arises. Since all correlatives exhibit Reciprocity, if not all exhibit Simultaneity, the question is: what is it (in addition to

Reciprocity) that determines whether a given pair of correlatives possess Simultaneity?

We shall find Kilwardby offering answers to these logical, dialectical, exegetical, and philosophical questions.

Notulae

The *Notulae* on the *Categories* dates from around 1237-40 when Kilwardby was in Paris. It comprises 21 *lectiones*, of which numbers 10 and 11 contain the main discussion of our topic. The *dubia* in *Lectio* 10 deal with the order of the categories, the question whether relations are a single genus of beings, the distinction between relations and relatives, the directedness of relatives and their correlativity. The *dubia* in *Lectio* 11 deal with the difference between contraries and relative opposites, the way in which relatives admit of more and less, and two properties of relatives (reciprocity and natural simultaneity). We begin with Kilwardby's division of relatives.

The Division of Relatives

Kilwardby approaches Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad about the simultaneity of knowledge and the knowable by distinguishing different types of relatives, *and* different senses of 'knowledge' and 'the knowable'.

Types of relatives

He offers two divisions of relatives, the first based purely on linguistic considerations, while the second mixes the linguistic with the ontological. The first of these divisions is based on the different ways in which one term can be described as being relative to another. It contrasts those relatives that are said of other things [*dici aliorum*] with those that are said relatively in any other way [*dici quomodolibet aliter ad aliud*]. The difference concerns the different linguistic markers of correlativity. As we saw earlier, R_n and cR_n are correlatives when an R_n stands in the relation R to a cR_n . In inflected languages, such a correlativity can be marked by putting cR_n into the

genitive or ablative case and saying something like ‘A double is a double of a half’ or ‘The greater is greater than the lesser’.¹⁰ But in other cases, a preposition or a prepositional phrase has to be used and the object is in the accusative or dative (as in ‘A mountain is called great in relation to another mountain’).¹¹ Thus we have the following fourfold division.¹²




Figure 1. Kilwardby’s first division of relatives in the *Notulae*.

Kilwardby clearly has in mind the *Categories* first definition of relatives, which defines them by reference to the grammatical cases through which they are expressed:

We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some way in relation to something else.¹³

However, he cautions against thinking that relatives expressed in the genitive case are more truly relatives than those expressed in other cases; for, he says, sometimes these are relatives only in their verbal expression and not in their essence, but rather by virtue of

10. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b29; *Aristoteles Latinus* I-1 19,3-5: “ut servus domini servus dicitur ... et maius minore maius.”

11. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b8; *Aristoteles Latinus* I-1 18,15-17: “ut mons magnus dicitur ad montem alium (magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur), vel simile simile alicui dicitur.”

12. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, *Lectio* 10 *dub.* 6 Note: “Intellige ergo in hoc genere genus generalissimum esse ‘ad aliquid’ vel hoc quod dico, ‘relatio’; genera intermedia et species dicamus esse, ‘dici aliorum’, ‘dici quomodolibet aliter ad aliud’; species autem specialissime huius ‘dici aliorum’: ‘dici genitive’, ‘dici ablative’; huius autem ‘dici quomodolibet aliter’: ‘dici accusative’, ‘dici dative’; ‘dici’ autem ‘sic genitive’, ‘sic dative’, ‘sic ablative’, etc., sunt individua.”

13. *Categories* 7, 6a36-37. Ackrill translation.




Figure 2. Kilwardby's second division of relatives in the *Notulae*.

something added to their essence.¹⁴ The truest relatives are such through their very essence. For them, to be is to stand to something else in a certain way [*horum enim esse est ad aliud quodammodo se habere*]. Others are relative through something added to their essence. These others are relative *secundum modum sive secundum dictionem*, not *secundum esse et secundum veritatem*. Since *scientia* is said of *scibile* in the genitive case, Kilwardby's remarks here serve as a reminder that thus far we have no ground for supposing knowledge to be more, or less, truly a relative than anything else.

Our author now moves from Aristotle's grammatically-based classification of relatives to a division based on a mixture of linguistic and ontological considerations. His basic contrast here is between relatives *secundum dictionem* and *secundum esse*; but we must understand his talk of relatives *secundum dictionem* to mean those that arise *solely* on the basis of language, because according to him all relatives depend partly on language.¹⁵

Within the class of relatives *secundum dictionem* he includes those, such as *habitus*, *scientia* and *pictura*, which, though spoken of as rela-

14. Kilwardby, *Notulae* Lectio 10 Note: "Nec intellige ex iam dictis quod si genitive, quod verissime aut verius quam dative vel accusative; potest enim dici genitive et tamen esse ad aliquid secundum dictionem solum aut per aliquid additum suae essentiae, sicut habitus dicitur alicuius habitus, aut manus alicuius manus, sed illud verissime dicitur ad aliquid cuius esse est ad aliud quodammodo se habere sicut dicemus in sequentibus."

15. Kilwardby, *Notulae* Lectio 11: "... communius sunt ad aliquid quae secundum dictionem quam quae secundum esse."

tives, are really qualities, and acquire relative being only through something added to their essence. For instance, the relativity of a picture arises not from what it is (a coloured surface), but from something added to that, presumably its representational aspect. He also includes states which are spoken of as relatives by courtesy of a genus to which they belong. Contrasted with both these groups are relatives *secundum esse*, such as double and half, or great and small. Relatives *secundum esse* seem to satisfy Aristotle's second definition of relatives:

Those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something.¹⁶

Kilwardby asks why it is that in certain instances the reciprocity of relatives preserves the same grammatical case, while in other instances it doesn't; and he suggests that this grammatical difference corresponds to an ontological one, namely the difference between correlatives which are what they are in mutual relation to one another, as against those which are such that the first is *per se* relative to the second but the second is relative to the first only because the first is relative to it. Knowledge and the knowable are related in this latter way.¹⁷

The ontological distinction here comes from *Metaphysics* V (Δ).15, where Aristotle sets correlatives that stand to each other as measure and measurable (like the knowable and knowledge), against those that are related as multiple to submultiple (like double and half) or

16. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 8a31-32. Ackrill translation.

17. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio 11 dub.9*: "Et causa huius sumitur secundum causam modorum significandi, quam non considerat logicus set supponit inesse. Vel potest dici quod quaedam sunt relativa quae id quod sunt sunt ad aliquid, quorum quidem comparatio aequaliter incipit ab utroque extremorum, ut sunt 'duplum' et 'dimidium'; et huiusmodi non habent differentiam casuum in comparatione, sed maxime comparantur secundum genitivum casum, qui est maxime conveniens relationi; quandoque tamen secundum dativum, secundum quod est sumere dativum loco genitivi. Quaedam autem relativorum non sic se habent, sed est eorum comparatio quod una extremitatum per se est ad aliam, et non e converso, ut patet in 'scientia' et 'scibili'; 'scientia' enim per se dicitur ad scibile, 'scibile' vero non dicitur ad scientiam nisi per scientiam, unde quasi per denominationem est ad aliquid, et ideo dicitur ablativum, 'scibile scientia scibile'."

as exceeding to exceeded or as what is able-to-act relative to what is able-to-be-acted-on.¹⁸ Correlatives of the first type are not mutually dependent. Knowledge is what it is in relation to something else, but the knowable stands in relation to knowledge only because knowledge is relative to it. It is the knowable, not the knower, that is the measure.¹⁹

Given that knowledge is related *per se* to the knowable but the knowable is not related *per se* to it, *dub.*14 of *Lectio* 11 presents two arguments that are designed to show that the knowable is always [*omnino*] relative. Kilwardby is concerned to dismiss both arguments.

The first argument is that since to be knowable is to have a passive potentiality in respect of a certain act, and the knowable is always so called on the basis of a potentiality, and because potentialities are so called by way of a relation, the knowable is in every case relative.²⁰

The second argument has it that since the knowable is said by way of relation to knowledge, and since a relation terminates not in one but in two extremes, it's necessary to posit something else by which its relation is terminated, and this can only be knowledge. Thus, if we posit the knowable we must posit knowledge.²¹

His solution to the first argument invokes the principle that a genus may be relative while its species are not.²² This principle is found in *Categories* 6 (where the example is grammar and knowledge), and also in *Metaphysics* V (Δ).15, 1021b3 (where the example is

18. On this threefold distinction, see King 2003: 36-38.

19. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V (Δ).15, 1020b26-32; 1021a26-30.

20. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio* 11 *dub.* 14: "Sequitur postea de scientia et scibile, et quia scibile determinat potentiam passivam respectu alicuius actus, omnino a potentia ad actum dicitur secundum viam relationis, ut habetur in *IX^o Metaphysicae*, videbitur scibile omnino ad aliquid se habere."

21. *ibid.*: "Et praeter hoc: cum scibile ad scientiam <M 28va> dicatur secundum viam relationis, ponemus relationem <P 55vb> aliquam esse ex parte scibilis; non est autem relatio terminata in uno extremo sed in duobus, et necesse est tunc ponere aliquod alterum ad quod terminetur sua relatio, et hoc non potest esse nisi scientia: posito ergo scibili, necesse est ponere scientiam inesse."

22. *ibid.*: "Primum solvitur per hoc quod non accidit speciem esse ad aliquid, quamvis genus ad aliquid dicatur, sicut se habet disciplina et grammatica: et ideo non est necesse scibile ad aliud se habere, quamvis potentia ad aliquid se habeat."

doctoring and knowledge). The principle applies to the present case because the relativity of the genus (potentiality) doesn't entail that of the species (the knowable), except *secundum dictionem*.

His answer to the second argument is that the knowable is not always relative, since by 'the knowable' we may refer to something in its own nature,²³ i.e. we may refer to it independently of its relativity to being known.

According to this analysis, knowledge and the knowable fall into two different members of Kilwardby's second division. The quality that is knowledge falls into the first member: it becomes a relative through the addition of something relative to its essence. But the knowable falls into the second member: it is relative through its genus, the potential. Accordingly, Kilwardby goes on to distinguish two senses of 'the knowable' – the knowable as a potentiality together with an act of being known (which always stands to something), and the knowable as a potentiality without an act of being known (which doesn't).²⁴ This distinction will be crucial for his solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad.

The Notulae Solution

In defining simultaneity by nature, Kilwardby refers to Augustine.²⁵ The reference is in fact to the Pseudo-Augustinian *De Decem Categoriais*, which speaks of the simultaneous rise and fall of correlatives.²⁶

23. *ibid.*: "Ad postea quaesitum: solvitur per hoc quod non dicitur omnino ad aliquid scibile; quod enim dicitur ad aliquid debetur omnino scientiae et non naturae ipsius, sicut intendit Aristoteles in V^o *Metaphysicae*."

24. *ibid.*: "Scibile ergo dicitur dupliciter, scilicet potentia scibile et actu scitum, et sic se habet omnino ad scientiam; vel potentia scibile et non actu scitum, et sic non se habet: et ita, si ponatur scibile inesse ut actu est, necesse est scientiam ponere inesse aliquo. Nequaquam sunt igitur instantiae apparentes ut hic intendit Aristoteles."

25. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio 11 dub.12*: "Unde 'simul natura' dicitur hic ut simul natura dicitur esse ab Augustino, simul esse secundum ortum et occasum; haec enim posita se, ponunt, destructa se, destruunt."

26. Pseudo-Augustine, *De Decem Categoriais, Aristoteles Latinus* 1.1-5: 155,12-15: "Tunc ergo et vere et proprie ad-aliquid dicitur cum sub uno ortu atque occasu et id quod iungitur et id cui iungitur invenitur: ut puta servus et dominus, utrumque vel simul est vel simul non est ..."

Given this notion of simultaneity, and given Kilwardby's distinction between the knowable that is actually known and the knowable that is only potentially known, we can deduce his solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad as applied to knowledge and the knowable. If the knowable is considered as an unactualised potentiality, then proposition (1), that knowledge and the knowable are correlatives, is true only *secundum dictionem*; but if the knowable is taken as an actualised potentiality, proposition (1) is true *secundum esse*. By contrast, proposition (2), that knowledge and the knowable are *not* simultaneous by nature, is true only when knowledge is considered as a quality, or when the knowable is taken as an unactualised potentiality. It is false when knowledge is considered as a relative and the knowable is taken as an actualised potentiality. So, proposition (3), that all correlatives are simultaneous by nature, is true of correlatives *secundum esse*, but not true of correlatives *secundum dictionem*. Considering the four resultant cases, we see that in no case are propositions (1), (2) and (3) all true together. For mutually dependent *secundum esse* correlatives, proposition (3) is true – such correlatives are simultaneous by nature – and therefore the *Categories* counter-examples must be merely apparent.

Kilwardby's view is that the knowable – in his artificially contrived sense – is the *secundum esse* correlative of knowledge and is simultaneous with it. On the other hand, for correlatives that are not *secundum esse* or not mutually dependent, proposition (3) is false – such correlatives may not be simultaneous by nature – and therefore the *Categories* counter-examples must be genuine. So much for the exegetical question.

The *Notulae*'s answer to the philosophical question, of what turns reciprocating relatives into simultaneous ones, is that simultaneous relatives need to be *secundum esse* and they need to be mutually dependent.

However, it is not at all clear that other apparent exceptions to the simultaneity of correlatives can be dealt with in an analogous manner. Kilwardby considers the case of things related to one another by priority and posteriority, but his treatment of this case is quite different from that of knowledge and the knowable. That which is prior, considered under the concept of priority, is simulta-

neous by nature with that which is posterior, considered under the concept of posteriority; but that in which the priority inheres is prior to that in which the posteriority inheres.²⁷

De Natura Relationis

Whereas the *Notulae* is a question-commentary on Aristotle's text, the *De Natura Relationis*, dating from after 1250 when Kilwardby was in Oxford, comprises a sequence of 35 questions on various subjects connected with the category of relatives. Some of the matters discussed arise from purported difficulties in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the *Liber Sex Principiorum* and Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Generalities concerning relatives and their abstract relations are followed in Ch.4 by an elaborate division of the category. Chs. 5 and 6 deal with the question whether a relative enters into the definition of its correlative. Chs. 7 to 9 deal with contrariety among relatives. Ch.10 discusses the problem (arising from the *Liber Sex Principiorum*) whether when two things are similar to one another, they are similar by virtue of one similitude or two numerically distinct similitudes. (Kilwardby favours the latter view, which he describes as *forte veriora quam ea, quae tradit auctor Sex Principiorum*.²⁸) Discussion of knowledge, the knowable and the simultaneity of correlatives begins at Ch.11 ('On correlatives, one of which is essentially relative and the other accidentally'). Ch.12 distinguishes between knowledge as it is *in* a subject (the knower) and knowledge as it is *of* a subject (the knowable). The former is *per se* a quality, and is a relative only *per accidens* (namely *per genus*); the latter is *per se* a relation, or a relative.²⁹ Ch.13 is about relatives *secundum dictionem*. Ch.14 explains the sense in which knowledge, considered in relation to its subject matter, is a relative essentially, even though the knowable is relative only accidentally. There follows a discussion of the question whether opposites are

27. Kilwardby, *Notulae* Lectio 11 dub.13: "... prius, sub ratione illa qua est prius, est simul cum eo quod est posterius, sub ratione illa qua est posterius; id tamen cui accidit prioritas est prius eo cui accidit posterioritas et non simul. Similiter autem intellige et in aliis."

28. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 10, 18,13-14.

29. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 12, 19,29-32; 20,5-7.

relatives (Chs.15-7), and about the relativity of When and Where, Position and Having (Chs.18-20). The discussion enters theological waters at Chs.21-22, 25-27, and 34, where Kilwardby's doctrines about relatives are applied to creatures and the creator, in the context of Augustine's treatment of these matters in his *De Trinitate*. The relativity of prime matter is dealt with in Ch.23. Ch.24 analyses the sense in which a relative or a relation may be a substance. Chs.28-32 engage in an extended disputation on the prior and posterior, considered as correlatives. Ch.33 applies the doctrine of relatives to foreknowledge and predestination.

The Division of Relatives

Kilwardby begins his investigation of the division of relatives by observing that since relatives exist only in respect of other things, their division should proceed through a consideration of those other things.³⁰ The fundamental distinction he draws is that between essential relatives (whose being depends on that of their correlative) and accidental ones (where this is not so). On this basis he distinguishes those pairs of correlatives which are essentially relative to each other, from those where one is essentially relative to the other while the other is only accidentally relative to it. Knowledge and the knowable are of this second sort.³¹ An excerpt from his division is shown in Figure 3.

30. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 4, 7,9-11: "Et nota, quod quia res huius generis non sunt nisi respectus aliarum rerum, oportet per considerationem aliarum rerum et earum diversas ad invicem habitudines hoc genus dividere hoc modo."

31. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 11, 18,21-38: "... illud dicitur essentialiter relativum, cuius esse dependet ab existentia alterius, illud autem per accidens, cuius esse non dependet a correlativo, v.g.: sensus non est nisi per sensibile, et hoc neque in actu primo neque in actu secundo. Organum enim sensus ex sensibilibus est et ipsum completum est per actionem sensibilibus. Ipsum etiam sentire est quoddam pati a sensibili factum in sensu, sed sensibile perfecte existit et completur tam in actu primo quam in actu secundo sine actione sensus, et ideo sensibile est per accidens relativum et sensus essentialiter. Et sicut dixi de sensu et sensibile, ita est de intellectu et intelligibili et de scientia et scibili et omnibus huiusmodi, in quibus, si subtiliter inspexeris, unum illorum habere rationem primi, quod non iuvatur a reliquo, ut sit, et alterum rationem secundi, quod iuvatur a reliquo, ut sit, et illud secundum




Figure 3. Kilwardby's division of relatives in *De Natura Relationis* (Excerpt).

The De Natura Relationis Solution

The *De Natura Relationis* reconsiders and deepens the *Notulae's* definition of natural simultaneity. The author explains that for correlatives to be simultaneous by nature, what is required is not the mutual implication of their *actual* being, but the mutual implication of the sort of being that is appropriate to their natures.³² This revision allows Kilwardby to maintain that the temporally prior and the temporally posterior, considered as correlatives, are simultaneous by nature, because “if the prior is now, or if it is not now but will be, then the posterior will be” and so on.³³ Given this revised definition

propterea essentialiter refertur ad primum, sed primum non secundum nisi quia secundum ad ipsum; unde et a secundo sequitur consequentia ad primum et non convertitur et, si sensus est, sensibile est et non e converso, et si scientia est, scibile est et non e converso, ut ostendit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis.”

32. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 32, 44,35-45,4: “Correlativa enim simul esse natura, sic intelligo, quod ad esse unius sequatur esse alterius reciproce, et ad non esse unius non esse alterius reciproce. Et hoc non est, quod ad esse unius actuale sequatur esse alterius actuale, sed quod ad esse uni debitum a natura sua, sequatur esse alteri debitum a natura sua ... 46,2-6: ... et exinde etiam patet, quomodo intelligendum sit correlativa esse simul natura; hoc enim non est, quod sint simul secundum existentiam vel tempus vel simul secundum ortum et occasum, ut prius determinabatur, sed quod invicem per necessariam consequentiam ponant vel interimant esse sibi naturaliter debitum.”

33. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 32, 45,22-23.

of natural simultaneity, the *De Natura Relationis* solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad comes down to three points.

First, the knowable is relative to knowledge; but while it is essentially relative, the knowable is relative to it merely accidentally. Thus, knowledge and the knowable do not form a pair of essential correlatives. There is, however, another pair that are essential correlatives, namely the knower [*sciens*] and the known [*scitum*].³⁴

Second, knowledge is not simultaneous by nature with the knowable; rather, the knowable is prior by nature. The known, however, is simultaneous with the knower.

Third, when one correlative is essential and the other accidental, they are not simultaneous.³⁵

34. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 11, 19, 1-11: "Nota tamen, quod pluraque huiusmodi relativorum non incongrue possunt reduci ad relationem essentialem per commutationem nominum designantium potentias in nomina significantia actiones et passiones, et forte nisi esset penuria nominum, omnia possent v.g.: sensus et sensibile ex parte sensus referuntur essentialiter, et ex parte sensibilis accidentaliter, et ideo, si sensus est, sensibile est et non convertitur, similiter scientia et scibile et huiusmodi. Sed sentiens et sensatum, sciens et scitum utrobique referuntur essentialiter, et ideo sequitur, si sentiens est, sensatum est et e converso, et si sciens est, scitum est et e converso. Sed hoc est, quia actio essentialiter refertur ad passionem, et passio essentialiter ad actionem, et neutra potest esse sine altera sed simul sunt tempore et origine et duratione." The point about *sciens* and *scitum* is to be found in Averroës's commentary on *Metaphysics* Δ, Text 20, 165-171: "Et existimatur quod illud, cuius genus est relativum, est etiam relativum. Sed ista existimatio accidit secundum hoc quod scientia est modi relativorum quae referuntur ad invicem propter hoc quod conveniunt in eodem, sicut aequale et simile. Aequalia enim sunt relativa quia conveniunt in eodem. Et quia existimatur quod scientia est huiusmodi, quia est idem in quo conveniunt sciens et scitum, continget ut medicus sit ex hoc modo relativorum."

35. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 28, 37, 26-35: "Tandem quaeritur de illa famosa proprietate correlativorum, quod videntur simul esse natura, ut dicit Aristoteles in Praedicamenta; videtur enim habere instantiam universaliter in omnibus illis, quorum unum refertur essentialiter et alterum accidentaliter, quorum unum iuvat ad esse alterius et non e converso, ut praedictum est. Ideo sequitur, si sensus est, sensibile est et non e converso, et si scientia est, scibile est et non e converso, et haec instantia vera est, et ideo Aristoteles in Praedicamentis non dicit, quod omnia, quae sunt ad aliquid sunt, sunt simul natura, sed quod videntur esse simul natura, et postea instat in praedictis, scilicet sensu et sensibili, scientia et scibili, et non solvit, quia verae sunt instantiae."

He notes that there seem to be counter-examples to his claim that essential correlatives are always simultaneous. Part and whole are correlatives, both of which are essentially relative; and yet part is prior to whole. The same seems to be true of half and double, of cause and caused, of principle and principled, of father and son, and others. In all these instances, an argument of the following form might be advanced: the cause, in so far as it is a cause, is prior to the caused; and the cause as such is relative; and so, as relative, it is prior to the caused. Kilwardby's answer is that correlatives, both of which are essentially so, are simultaneous by nature so long as they are taken *ratione relationis* and not *ratione rei*.³⁶

This distinction seems to be the same as the one he invoked in the *Notulae* to deal with the case of priority and posteriority. Here, however, it combines with the distinction between essential and accidental relatives, to form the basis of a systematic treatment. The two distinctions are mutually orthogonal, creating four possible cases. (1) When correlatives are mutually essential (like the knower and the known) and are considered *ratione relationis*, they are simultaneous by nature. (2) When one correlative is accidental to the other (like knowledge and the knowable) and they are considered *ratione relationis*, they are not simultaneous by nature. (3) When they are mutually essential and are considered *ratione rei*, they are not simultaneous by nature. (4) When one is accidental to the other and they are considered *ratione rei*, they are not simultaneous by nature. The overall position of *De Natura Relationis* concerning correlatives taken *ratione relationis* and not *ratione rei* is summarised in Table 1.

36. *Ibid.*, 38,3-8: "... sed facile solvitur. Quia in nomine causae duo sunt relatio a qua nomen imponitur et res cui inest relatio et cui nomen imponitur, et ratione rei prior est causato, ratione relationis, simul est cum eo, et ideo fallit consequentia rationis, quia in prima propositione fit reduplicatio ratione rei, in secunda ratione relationis, et eodem modo solvenda est similis ratio, si fiat in aliis."

| | | Correlatives | |
|--------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | Essential in both directions | Accidental in one direction |
| Reason | By reason of their relation | Simultaneous | Non-simultaneous |
| | By reason of the things | Non-simultaneous | Non-simultaneous |

Table 1. Kilwardby's solution (*De Natura Relationis*)

The Sentences Commentary

Question 74 of Kilwardby's commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences* is about relatives and relations. Here, a preliminary argument about knowledge and the knowable is posed in the following form:

Again, knowledge is referred to the knowable not only *secundum dictionem* but also *secundum esse*, but in reverse the knowable to knowledge only *secundum dictionem*, as Aristotle teaches.³⁷

His attitude towards the simultaneity of correlatives is stated as follows:

It is to be said therefore that 'Relatives are simultaneous by nature' is not to be understood in such a way that the actual being of one always follows from that of the other, but that from the being naturally due to one there follows the being naturally due to the other If however the relatives are impossible, then from the actual being of one there follows the future or past being of the other.... In the same way with correlatives if perhaps they relate to the possible being of their counterparts³⁸

37. Robert Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum* q. 74: 8-10.

38. *Ibid.*, q. 74: 255-266.

Comparison of the three works

The *De Natura Relationis* does not exhibit the same interest in linguistic matters that is found in the *Notulae*. All the same, there is considerable continuity between the two works. Both rely on the distinction between correlatives that are mutually essential and those that are not. And both invoke a distinction between cases where a relative is designated by reference to the relation that inheres in it, and cases where it is designated independently of that relation. But the treatment of the natural simultaneity of correlatives in the *De Natura Relationis* marks an advance over that in the *Notulae* because of its revision of the definition of simultaneity and more broadly because of its more systematic approach.

The treatment of the simultaneity of relatives in the *Sentences* commentary appears to be the same as in the *De Natura Relationis*.

So far as the treatment of the simultaneity of correlatives is concerned, the similarities and differences between the three works could be seen as pointing to a process of critical reflection on the early work, resulting in a theoretical reworking of the same philosophical position into one that is more ontologically oriented, more conceptually focused, and less artificial.

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CHAPTER 7

The Theories of Relations in Medieval Commentaries on the *Categories* (mid-13th to mid-14th Century)

Costantino Marmo

o. Introduction

The few general studies of medieval theories of relations that have appeared during the last 20 years have shed light on the general purpose of such theories and their development.¹ It is clear that the medievals were interested in the theories of relations mainly because of their theological implications, and these implications were taken into account not only by theologians but also by some 13th- and 14th-century Parisian Masters of Arts. Nonetheless, modern attempts to sketch an outline of the development of theories have not paid due attention to the many extant commentaries on the *Categories*, and in particular not to those from the second half of 13th century. Filling this gap is the first aim of this paper, but I also wish to point to another field of medieval thought where the theory of relations had strong implications, that is the field of semantic or more broadly semiotic theories.

i. Some general questions discussed in the 13th and 14th centuries

Aristotle's *Categories* 7 and *Metaphysics* V.15 are the main sources for a theory of relations in the 13th and 14th centuries. In the first text, Ar-

1. Cf. Henninger 1989; Marmo 1992; Brower 1996, 1998, 2001, 2005.

istotle discusses two general definitions of relative things (toward something, πρὸς τι) and some of their general features. He holds, in particular, that they are a peculiar kind of accident that inheres in substances and refers to something else. In the *Metaphysics*, he adds a threefold distinction of relative accidents, exemplified by (i) the relation between what is double and its half, (ii) the relation between what heats and what is heated (or between what acts and what undergoes the action), and (iii) the relation between what is measurable and its measure, or what can be known and the knowledge of it (1020b26-32). In all these cases, Aristotle conceives relation as a kind of accident which inheres in a subject, i.e. as a monadic property and not as a dyadic or polyadic one, as Brower (2005) rightly points out.

In the *Categories* Aristotle examines two definitions of relative. The first definition, at the beginning of ch. 7, says that

we call the following sort of things relative [*literally*: toward something]: all those things said to be just what they are *of* or *than* something, or *toward* something in some other way.²

The second comes, after a long and critical discussion about the properties of relative things, as a correction of the first one:

relative things [*litt.* towards something] are rather [defined as] those things for which this is their very being: to be toward another in a certain way.³

These texts and their interpretations were the starting point for all the classifications of relations in the second half of the 13th century.

2. Arist., *Cat.* 7, 6a36-37 (transl. in Brower 2005, § 2.2). The Latin translation provided by Boethius runs as follows: “Ad aliquid vero talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud” (*Aristoteles Latinus, Cat. Editio composita*, p. 18).

3. Arist., *Cat.* 7, 8a31-32 (transl. in Brower 2005, § 2.2). The Latin translation by Boethius was the following: “sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodam modo habere” (*Aristoteles Latinus, Cat. Editio composita*, p. 22).

Many medieval philosophers and theologians in this period share the general assumption that lies behind Aristotle's discussion, namely that relations are monadic properties or forms inhering in individual subjects and pointing to something else. They also agree on the fact that *every relation links two, and only two, subjects or elements (extrema)*: the subject of inherence and the so-called 'term' (*terminus*) of the relation, the proper *relativum* and the *correlativum*.⁴ The standard examples are *similarity* and *fatherhood*. Similarity is a relation that holds between two individuals who share the same quality, whiteness for instance; furthermore, similarity is a symmetrical relation (*relatio aequiparantiae*) because the same term, i.e. 'similar', can be predicated of each of the individuals; and according to so-called 'non-reductive realism',⁵ each individual is the subject of inherence of the property of being white (which is the ground or *fundamentum* of the relation) and is also the subject of inherence of the relational property of being similar; finally, this property has as its term (*terminus*) the other individual that shares the property of being white (and the relational property of being similar). Fatherhood, however, is a relation that holds between two individuals one of whom is the parent of the other (or, we might say, is one of the causes of his/her birth): in this case only one of them can be called by the denominative noun 'father' derived from the relational 'fatherhood', which indicates a real property existing in that individual as its subject while having the other individual as its term, that is the son (the relation of fatherhood therefore is asymmetric – *relatio disquiparantiae* –, sonhood being the converse relation).

Besides this general assumption, I must also mention some ontological assumptions that are not equally shared by all my authors. Virtually all 13th-century authors, and some of those from the 14th century as well, take relations to be real accidents, although *sui generis*, existing as such in individual subjects and really connecting those individuals to other individuals. Others, notably Ockham

4. It means that relations were not conceived of as polyadic properties (*pace* Brower 2005), as is clear from the discussions about signification (see Rosier-Catach 2004, chapt. 1).

5. I follow the taxonomy proposed by Brower 2001 and 2005.

and Buridan in the 14th century, deny the existence of such properties and consider relations to be concepts that human beings form in their minds, but admit that these concepts are fit to describe the world as it is, so that relations are mind-independent: the truth of a proposition of the form ‘aRb’ does not depend on some intellect thinking it.⁶ That is why Brower (2001 and 2005) labels both groups of philosophers as realist, but the former ‘non-reductive’ and the latter ‘reductive’ ones. Peter Auriol, who maintains that all relations are mind-dependent (*relationes rationis*), belongs to neither group.⁷

In the questions on the *Categories* devoted to relations, the Masters of Arts of the last decades of the 13th century discuss a more or less fixed set of questions, which includes

- the ontological status of relations (are they real or only mind-dependent?);⁸
- the distinction between a relation and its ground (*fundamentum*);⁹
- the existence of a *genus generalissimum* (and what is its name: *relatio* or *relativum*?);¹⁰
- the types and properties of relations (such as the simultaneity of the terms of a relation, be it symmetric or not; and so on);¹¹

6. Cf. Henninger 1989: 131.

7. See also Henninger 1989. I would prefer to call ‘realists’ only the first group (from Albert the Great to Scotus), while putting the members of the second group among ‘anti-realists’, distinguishing, though, between ‘objectivists’, like Ockham who acknowledges the independence of relations from the activity of the mind, and ‘subjectivists’, like Auriol who denies it.

8. See Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 42, 203-204; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, qq. 46-47, 64-68; Thomas Sutton, *In Cat.*, in Conti 1985, 205-207; Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 23, ms. Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, 3540-47, ff. 89v-90v; John Buridan, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 10, 71-74. William of Ockham discusses the questions in his *Quodlibet* VI, q. 25, 678-682; q. 30, 698-701.

9. See Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 43, 205; Anonymus Matritensis, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 29, 160; Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 42, 134-137.

10. See Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 40, 201; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. in Praed.*, qq. 53-54, 74-76; Anon. Matritensis, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 27, 158; Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 41, 131-134; Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 25, ff. 91r-92v; John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 25, 423-439; John Buridan, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 11, 82-83.

11. See Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. in Praed.*, qq. 55-58, 76-80; Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. in Praed.*, qq. 25-27, 98-101; Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, qq. 26-28, ff. 92v-

- the inherence of accidents in their subjects as a kind of relation;¹²
- finally, the unicity of the relation that holds between two subjects (be it symmetrical or asymmetrical).

The changes of opinions, from Martin of Dacia in the early 70s to Radulphus Brito in the 90s, are often very slight and subtle. All authors acknowledge the extra-mental reality of relations;¹³ and deny that the category of relation includes both real and mind-dependent relations:¹⁴ the two kinds of relation are not species of the same *genus generalissimum*, because, as Scotus says, “there is nothing that univocally applies to what exists outside the soul and what exists only in our mind”,¹⁵ or, as Brito holds,

mind-dependent relations do not fall as such under the category of relation, only real relations do so, because in *Metaphysics* VI the Philosopher divides what exists outside the soul into the ten categories.¹⁶

The linguistic turn of William of Ockham represents a radical shift in the ontological interpretation of categories and relations. For him there exist no real entities corresponding to our relational concepts;¹⁷ relations are rather connotative terms or concepts, which stand for real individual substances or qualities while connoting

96r; John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 27, 447-453; John Buridan, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 12-13, 86-99.

12. See Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 47, 208-209; and Anon. Matritensis, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 34, 164-165; John Duns Scotus, *Quodl.*, q. 3, 82 (cf. Marmo 1989, 148-149).

13. Cf., for instance, Thomas Sutton, *In Cat.*, in Conti 1985, 206.

14. See Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 42, 203; John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 25, 428; Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 23, f. 90r.

15. John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 25, 427: “non omni enti est aliquid univocum, nec etiam omni enti naturae est aliquid univocum; igitur multo magis nec aliquid erit univocum enti et non-enti, sive enti rationis”.

16. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 23, f. 90r: “Nota tamen quod relatio rationis non est [illa relatio que] in predicamento relationis per se, set solum relatio realis, quia Philosophus, 6^o Methafisice, diuidit ens uerum extra animam in X predicamenta”.

17. William of Ockham, *Ord.*, I. d. 30, q. 3, 34off.

other individual substances or qualities. Furthermore, other traditional distinctions, such as that of real vs. mind-dependent relations, lose their relevance in Ockham's philosophical discourse. As will be clear in what follows, this change is not without consequences for his theory of signification.

2. Slight changes in non-reductive realist positions in the second half of the 13th century

Some slight changes can be recorded among the Parisian Masters of Arts of the second half of the 13th century. Following a rather traditional interpretation of the two definitions of *ad aliquid* in chapter 7 of the *Categories*¹⁸ some commentators, such as Gentilis of Cingoli, a Bolognese master of arts from the end of the 13th century, refer the first to the *relativa secundum dici*, and the second one to the *relativa secundum esse*.¹⁹ This position is referred to as *opinio communis* and rejected by Scotus.²⁰ Other commentators, however, think that the first definition includes both *per se* and *per accidens* relatives (such as *knowledge* and its object), while the second definition regards exclusively *per se* relatives (such as a *father* with respect to his son or vice versa).²¹ For some commentators, for example, Angelus of Arezzo (a pupil of Gentilis of Cingoli), the first distinction includes the second one, so that the couple *per se / per accidens* is included in the relatives *secundum esse*;²² other commentators, in particular the authors of question commentaries, simply pass over in silence the problem of the relation between the two sets of relatives.

Duns Scotus holds that the first definition of *ad aliquid* has nothing to do with relations or relative concepts:

18. See for instance, Lambert of Auxerre, *Logica*, 80.

19. Gentilis of Cingoli, *Sententia et notabilia sup. lib. Praed.*, ms. Firenze, BN, Conv. Soppr., (S. Croce), J.X.30, f. 35va (in Marmo 1992, 384)

20. John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 26, 442.

21. See Petrus de Sancto Amore, *Sententia et notabilia sup. lib. Praed.*, ms. Paris, BN, Nouv. Acqu. Lat. 1374, f. 25rb (in Marmo 1992, 387)

22. See Marmo 1992, 384-386.

We have to say that relatives do not divide into *relativa secundum esse* and *relativa secundum dici*, because if we take properly the members of the division, a *relativum secundum esse* is no more a relative than a dead man is a man.²³

In another question about the property of simultaneity of relatives, Scotus does, however, make use of the second distinction, that between *relativa per se* and *relativa per accidens*, and exemplifies it by means of the traditional examples of *scientia* and *scibile*: the first of which refers to the second *per se*, while the second refers to the first *per accidens*, that is, only because the first one refers to it.²⁴ In Brito's questions on the *Categories*, on the other hand, we find no reference to the distinction between *relativa secundum dici* and *relativa secundum esse*; and even if in q. 24 he makes use of the distinction between relation *per se* and relation *per accidens* as applied to science and its object,²⁵ in the following question he seems to change his mind. After having mentioned again the examples of *scientia* and *scibile*, in a marginal addition to question 25, he adds that *scientia* is not a relative term or a relation, but rather a quality (a *habitus*) which can exist in the human mind without referring to its object. There is, however, another relative accident, with which knowledge is joined: that of conformity with its object, as this is essential for a cognitive habit to be knowledge in the strictest sense of the word.²⁶ When this conformity is missing, because the thing or the object of knowledge does not exist, then the knowledge through which we know *that that thing ex-*

23. John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 26, 443: Dicendum igitur quod relativa nullo modo dividuntur in relativa secundum esse et relativa secundum dici, quia sumendo membra praecise, relativum secundum dici non est magis relativum quam homo mortuus est homo.

24. John Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 27, 449-450.

25. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 24, f. 91r: "Cum dicitur quod in deo est relatio, dico quod relatio cause ad causatum et principii ad principiatum est relatio per accidens, quia causa non refertur (causatur *ms.*) ad causatum nisi quia causatum ad causam refertur; modo, talis relatio fundatur in altero extremo, quia per se refertur; et ideo ista relatio fundata est in causatis et principiatibus et non in deo, sicut in scibili et scientia, quia scibile per se non refertur ad scientiam, nisi quia scientia refertur ad scibile, ideo ista relatio que est inter scibile et scientiam est in scientia."

26. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 25, f. 92v *in mg.*

ists and has certain properties ceases to exist; but the same does not apply to the knowledge through which we know *the causes by which* the thing may exist and the properties that the thing will have if existing, the sort of knowledge by which we know something about rain or eclipses even when they do not actually occur.²⁷ In such cases, the conformity relation is independent of the actual existence or non-existence of the object of knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is no more a *per se* relative and *scibile a per accidens* relative, but both refer to each other in virtue of the unique relation of conformity that connects them, as Brito explicitly says in his commentary on *Priscianus minor*.²⁸ This change, as I will show, has some consequences for Brito's theory of signification.

3. The implications of the theories of relations for the theories of signification: Brito and Ockham

3.1. Modists' theory of signification

Before returning to Brito, I would like to recall some of his predecessors' theories about signification in order to show how they depend on the theory of relations. Martin of Dacia, for instance, in his *Modi significandi*, defines the *dictio* as a phonic expression (*vox*) that has a *ratio significandi aliquid*, that is, one which is able to signify something; Martin adds that:

<dictio> means for me something composed of a signifying phonic expression and thing signified.²⁹

27. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 27, f. 94r-v. Brito's position is the same as Boethius of Dacia's, cf. Ebbesen 2000: 150-152.

28. See also Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. in Prisc. Min.* I, q. 22, 169: "est eadem relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile et e converso et intellectus ad intelligibile et e converso."

29. Martin of Dacia, *Modi significandi*, Pro., 8: "<dictio> dicit enim michi aliquid compositum ex voce significante et re significata." I leave the term *dictio* untranslated because, in Modistic theory, it is not yet a word, lacking the *modi significandi* (or *rationes consignificandi*).

In his commentary on the *Categories*, Martin deals very quickly with a problem that will emerge frequently in the following generations of commentators on the *Sophistici Elenchi*: whether the *ratio significandi* that the intellect adds to the phonic expression is something *really* added to it or not. His answer is that it isn't, but he fails to clarify the nature of this *ratio*. His commentators take him to task for this. Thus Gentilis of Cingoli criticises Martin's definition of *dictio*, and claims that the *dictio* is no more composed of the *vox* and the thing signified (*res significata*), than the *circulus vini* is composed of the sign and the sale of wine; it is rather composed of the *vox* as its matter and the *ratio significandi* as its form.³⁰ Petrus Croccus, commenting on Alexander of Villadei's *Doctrinale*, adds that this form is a *respectus*, that is, a relation. Almost all the Modist commentators on the *Sophistici Elenchi* hold that a *dictio* is a unity of *vox* and *ratio significandi*, often adding that the latter is to be considered as the substantial form of the *dictio* itself, as if linguistic units were natural substances rather than artificial objects. This evolution of the notion of *dictio* reveals a tendency to give objective (if not real) existence to the relation of signification (and consequently to the *modi significandi* or *rationes consignificandi* that are added to the *dictio* in order to produce a *pars orationis*). On this background, the discussion in Martin of Dacia's commentary on the *Categories* about whether the relation is really added to the phonic expression starts to look like a preventive defense against a tendency to picture linguistic properties as objective (or real) accidents.³¹

Radulphus Brito plays a peculiar role in this story, but on another point of grammatical doctrine, namely the integration of the so-called *modi significandi passivi* into the theoretical framework of modism as found, for instance, in Thomas of Erfurt's treatise.³²

30. See Marmo 1994, 114-115.

31. Master Simon, commenting on the *Modi significandi*, would go further on this way maintaining that "ipsum significatum non est in uoce significatiua formaliter, set intentionaliter et similitudo signati quodammodo est in ipsa uoce" (cf. Marmo 1994: 135).

32. *Modi significandi passivi* were already present in Peter of Auvergne's commentary on the *De interpretatione* and in the Anonymi Ebbeseniani commentators on the *Elenchi*, but their inclusion in the framework of the *grammatica speculativa* was not yet accomplished.

Brito's undertaking depends exactly on the slight change in his theory of relations I mentioned above. Before him, both *ratio significandi* (or the sign) and *ratio consignificandi* (or the *modus significandi*), for all their being classified as mind-dependent relations, were also conceived of as asymmetric *per accidens* relations (or relatives), on the model of the relation between knowledge and its object, where only the former refers *per se* to the latter, but not conversely: the *res significata* (or the *modus essendi* or property of the signified thing) does not refer *per se* to the linguistic sign, but only *per accidens* because the *dictio* (or *pars orationis*) refers to it. All the discussions about the subject of the *modi significandi* are based on this premise. This picture holds, however, only for the first generation of Modists (Martin and Boethius of Dacia).

When the *modi significandi passivi* are introduced the picture changes. The relations involved in this case are two. Master Simon, commenting on the *Modi significandi*, is very clear about that:

This active relation of signification, as well as any other relation, necessarily has a ground in two elements, the subject and the term ... then I say that the active relation of signification is in the phonic expression as in its subject and in the signified thing as in its term ... The passive relation of signification is in the signified thing as in its subject and in the phonic expression as in its term.³³

The model is no more that of knowledge, but rather that of similarity or fatherhood, since the two relations are both present, and one cannot exist without the other (since they are *simul natura*). The principle behind this multiplication of relations, is the one used by other commentators for determining the number of (real) accidents: they follow the number of subjects. As Martin of Dacia says:

33. Master Simon, *Comm. sup. Modi sign.*, ms. Brugge, Sted. Op. Bibl. 535, f. 65vb: "Ista ratio significandi actiua, sicut et quelibet alia relatio, de necessitate fundatur super duo extrema, scilicet subiectum et terminus... et ideo dico quod ratio significandi hec actiua est in uoce ut in subiecto, in re significata ut in termino... Ratio autem significandi passiuua est in re significata sicut in subiecto et in uoce sicut in termino." (See Marmo 1994, 32).

The number of accidents depends on the number of subjects.³⁴

This principle is used to determine how many relations exist between two similar things or between father and son,³⁵ and is explicitly appealed to by Master Simon in the case of signification.³⁶ Radulphus Brito, however, rejects this principle, and refuses to accord relevance to the distinction between *relativa per se* and *relativa per accidens*. Having revised the way to consider the relationship between knowledge and its object, he can reintroduce the analogy between *sign-signified thing* and *scientia-scibile*³⁷ and maintain that:

There is only one relation which makes the phonic expression signify and the thing be signified.³⁸

Transferring this parallel to the level of the *modi significandi* generates the famous thesis that *modi significandi activi* and *passivi* are *formaliter* identical: this means exactly that only one relation connects the *pars orationis* to the *modi essendi* of the signified thing and vice versa.³⁹

3.2. Ockham's theory of signification

If one considers, very quickly, Ockham's theory of relations and its influence on his theory of signification, one could probably reach an explanation of some puzzling phrases at the beginning of his *Summa logicae* where he distinguishes between two senses of 'sign'. Here is his text:

34. Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 45, 207: "Accidens capit numerum a numerositate subiecti."

35. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 51-52, 73; Anon. Matritensis, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 31, 162; Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 45, 207.

36. Master Simon, *Comm. sup. Modi sign.*, f. 66ra (see Marmo 1994, 33, n. 33).

37. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Prisc. Min.*, I, q. 22, 169: "sicut se habet scientia ad scibile et intellectus ad intelligibile, sic se habet vox significans ad rem significatam... Sed est eadem relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile et e converso et intellectus ad intelligibile et e converso. Ergo eadem est relatio per quam vox refertur ad rem significatam... et e converso."

38. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Prisc. Min.*, I, q. 22, 170: "Eadem est ratio per quam vox est significans et per quam res est significata."

39. Cf. Marmo 1994, 158.

The word ‘sign’ has two different senses. In one sense a sign is anything which, when apprehended, brings something else to mind. Here, a sign need not, as has been shown elsewhere, enable us to grasp the thing signified for the first time, but only after we have some sort of habitual knowledge of the thing.⁴⁰

Here Ockham presents a rather traditional notion of sign, clearly derived from Augustine’s, making explicit, though, its property of being a secondary knowledge. Almost nothing new here, then. But then come the examples:

In this sense of ‘sign’ the phonic expression is a natural sign, as any effect is a sign of its cause, and as the barrel hoop is a sign of wine in the tavern.⁴¹

At a first reading one might say that Ockham is here talking about the phonic expressions (not only human) that following Aristotle (*De int.* 1) were classified as naturally signifying, that is as symptoms or indexes of internal states of mind (emotions or concepts) which are their causes.⁴² But his addition of the *circulus vini* makes things more problematic than modern commentators usually acknowledge.⁴³ The hoop of the barrel (or the circle of branches) used as a sign has nothing to do with indexes and the wine does not appear to be its cause in any sense. What is Ockham here talking about? I believe he is trying to subvert the traditional way of dealing with signs. Let’s see how and why.

40. William of Ockham, *Summa Log.*, I.1, 8-9 (Engl. transl. in Loux 1974: 50): “scien- dum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem uenire, quamuis non faciat mentem uenire in pri- mam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actuaalem post habituaalem ei- usdem.”

41. William of Ockham, *Summa Log.* I.1, 9: “Et sic uox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat unum in taberna.”

42. Cf. Roger Bacon, *De signis* I.8-14, 83-86.

43. See, for instance, Tabarroni 1989, 200-206; Michon 1994: 34-43; Panaccio 2004: 47-51

First of all, as Ockham affirms in other contexts,⁴⁴ this kind of sign is inferential in nature: the sign is part of the premise of an inference that concludes an existential proposition whose subject is the thing signified (or its name).

Second, both examples might be taken as standard instances of conventional signs. This is not necessary, however, for the *vox*: notice that here he does not say what its meaning is. An answer might be found in another traditional example of a natural sign, such as the *gemitus infirmi* or the *risus*, that Ockham uses elsewhere for explaining the natural signification of concepts.⁴⁵ In this case, the *vox* works as a carrier of its meaning because it is caused by it,⁴⁶ but it is clear that a linguistic expression is not caused by any concept, being just a phonic sign which is coordinated to a concept that has the same meaning.⁴⁷ Thus a question can be raised: is Ockham here talking about linguistic expressions or not? Whatever answer one might give to this question, the example of the hoop and the wine in the cellar remains troublesome. Is he saying that the hoop signifies naturally the wine and that, *qua* sign, it is an effect of the wine? I don't think so. Maybe one has to refer the explicative clause about the causal relation only to the first example, leaving aside the second one. I would like to suggest, however, that Ockham is here saying that not only the *vox* but also the hoop signifies naturally, albeit in a completely different sense from the traditional one.

If we read again the description of the first sense of sign, the picture is maybe clearer: there is an inferential link between the sign *qua* individual thing and its meaning (again *qua* individual thing) or, rather, between our apprehensions of them, and this explains how signs of the first kind work. In my view, Ockham is here saying that the actual apprehension of such a sign produces the retrieval of a habitual knowledge of the thing signified, which, in his theory of habits, is the partial and *natural* cause of actual

44. Such as the discussion about knowledge in William of Ockham, *Ord.* I. d. 3, or about angelic communication in *Rep.* II, q. 16.

45. William of Ockham, *Summa Log.* I.15, 53.

46. Cf. William of Ockham, *Ord.* I. d. 3, q. 9, 547.

47. Cf. William of Ockham, *Summa Log.* I.1, 7-8.

knowledge of it.⁴⁸ This is the only sense in which one could say that the hoop signifies naturally the wine: the apprehension of the hoop (in a certain position above the entrance door of a building, maybe) enables the cognitive subject to produce the apprehension of the thing signified, triggering the natural device of the passage from the habitual to actual knowledge of something. From Ockham's examples we are entitled to extend this explanation to the case of the *vox*, holding that a *vox* signifies naturally in this sense, too: the apprehension of a phonic expression makes the hearer pass from habitual to actual knowledge of the thing signified.

In my opinion, the important thing is that Ockham carefully avoids using the traditional distinction between natural signs, grounded on real relations, and arbitrary/conventional signs, based on relations of reason. There is no need here to refer to natural/real relations or to mind-dependent relations in order to explain how signs of the first kind work: representative or inferential signs are all natural because they are based on a natural mechanism such as the actualization of a habitual knowledge. The reason why I think this is the core of this text is that, as Ockham explains elsewhere, his theory of relations renders otiose the traditional distinction between mind-dependent and real relations:

Even if 'relation of reason' is not a philosophical word (it is not found in Aristotle's philosophy, I believe), I follow common usage in holding that there is such a thing as a relation of reason and say that real relation and relation of reason must be distinguished. That is clear because, when a thing is not such as it is indicated to be by an abstract or concrete relational term without intervention of the intellect, then it is a relation of reason. But, when a thing is such as it is indicated to be by an abstract or concrete relational term without any operation of the intellect, so that this operation has no weight in this case, then it may be called a real relation.⁴⁹

48. Cf. William of Ockham, *Ord.* I. d. 3, q. 9, 544-545. On Ockham's theory of habits, see Fuchs 1952.

49. William of Ockham, *Quodl.* VI, q. 30, 699: "licet relatio rationis non sit vocabulum philosophicum, quia credo quod non invenitur illud vocabulum in philosophia Aristotelis, ponendo tamen propter communia dicta relationem rationis esse aliquid, dico quod relatio realis et rationis distinguuntur. Quod patet, quia quando sine ope-

An indirect confirmation of this hypothesis is provided by the fact that the description of the second type of signs contains no mention of natural relations, but only of its cognitive import and of supposition:

In an other sense a sign is anything which brings something to mind and (1) can supposit for that thing; or (2) can be added to a sign of this sort in a proposition (e.g. syncategorematic expressions, verbs, and other parts of speech lacking a determinate signification); or (3) can be composed of things that are signs of either sort (e.g. propositions). Taking the term 'sign' in this sense the phonic expression is not the natural sign of anything.⁵⁰

Ockham, in his classification of signs, deviates from the mainstream of the 13th century, leaving aside the traditional ground for the main subdivisions, that is the distinction between real and mind-dependent relations.⁵¹ Since the distinction is philosophically irrelevant and is only a question of words or of different connotations, Ockham is able to give a unitary account of signification,⁵² based on the acknowledged ability of both kinds of sign to bring something else to cognition,⁵³ whereas previous classifications of signs such as ps.-Kilwardby's, distinguished between kinds of signs on the basis of

ratione intellectus res non est talis qualis denotatur esse per relationem vel per concretum relationis, tunc est relatio rationis. Sed quando res est talis qualis denotatur esse per relationem vel per concretum relationis sine omni operatione intellectus, ita quod operatio intellectus nihil facit ad hoc, tunc potest dici relatio realis." Cf. *Exp. in Praed.*, 13, §12, 267; *Ord.*, I. d. 30, q. 5, 385; d. 35, q. 4, 470-473.

50. William of Ockham, *Summa Log.* I.1, 9 (Engl. transl. in Loux 1974, 50-51): "Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem uenire et natum est pro illo supponere uel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et uerba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, uel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc uocabulum 'signum', uox nullius est signum naturale."

51. See pseudo-Kilwardby, *Comm. in Prisc. Maiorem*, I.1.1, 3. Roger Bacon implicitly used this distinction only to further subdivide the *signa ordinata ab anima* (cf. *De signis*, I.10-11, 84-85).

52. See, for instance, William of Ockham, *Summa Log.* I.33, 95-96.

53. Cf. Panaccio 2004, 49-50.

the two kinds of relation; but since these were falling in very different categories, the concept of sign couldn't be but equivocal: all signs, for Ockham, work just in the same way, from the *circulus vini* to the statues, from the linguistic expressions to the *gemitus infirmorum*, the only exception being concepts which produce a primary instead of a secondary cognition. Furthermore, this feature does not introduce equivocity between the two senses of sign.⁵⁴

4. Conclusions

To end, I would like to show a further interesting trait of the discussion about relations in *Categories* commentaries. As I hinted at above, various commentators make reference to or discuss the problem of divine relations. Peter of Auvergne, for instance, when coping with the question "whether relation is substance", adduces as an argument in favour of a positive answer the fact that there are relations, but no accidents, in God;⁵⁵ he replies that being-in-God is a different sort of being-in from the one relevant to creatures. Radulphus Brito discusses the same question and uses the same argument, but his answer makes use of the distinction between *relativa per se* and *per accidens*: the relation between what is caused and its cause is *per se* (just like that between *scientia* and *scibile*), while there is a relation between *causa* and *causatum* only because of the first (which means that this is a relation *per accidens*). The relations of causality and of being the first principle of everything, concludes Brito, do not really exist in God, but they are ascribed to God because of our way of understanding his reality.⁵⁶ In all the cases discussed, realists have

54. Differently from what Michon 1994 holds.

55. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 48, 69; cf. Martin of Dacia, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 39, 199-200; Anon, Matritensis, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 26, 156-157; Simon of Faversham, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 40, 129-131, Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 24, f. 90v-91r.

56. Radulphus Brito, *Quaest. sup. Praed.*, q. 24, f. 91r. This question maybe reflects a different stage in a possible evolution of Brito's thought about relations as compared to the marginal addition to q. 25, see above; as a matter of fact, in his later commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, he never mentions the distinction between relations *per se* and *per accidens*, while discussing the relationships between God and creatures at

to argue against the reality of relations in God, in order to preserve divine simplicity. Later on, John Buridan will turn the exception into the model, and a ground for arguing against the reality of relational accidents:

I therefore propose the opposite conclusion, namely that by relative terms we do not signify any other things than those signified by absolute terms ... This conclusion applies clearly to such terms as 'cause', 'caused', 'principle' and 'what is derived from it' (*principiatum*). God is the cause and principle of every other thing and the causality by which he is cause is not a thing that is added to him and inheres in him ... Analogously, since God, who is simply supremely absolute according to his substance, is the cause of every other thing without the relation of causality added to him, without this implying any contradiction, this can apply to other [causes] too.⁵⁷

Passing to the topic of the implications of the theories of relations for semantic theories, we should notice an important feature of the theory of sign. As was clear at least since the first half of the 13th century, the sign relation is not a simple binary relation, but involves a third item: "some intellectual interpretation" of the thing that works as sign.⁵⁸ Since medieval theories of relations envisage only binary relations holding between two elements (*extrema*), how could a triadic one be accounted for? The answer given in the 13th century was: such a relation is not a simple but a double binary relation. Richard Fishacre for instance, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, when ex-

the beginning of II book (*Quaest. In II Sent.*, qq. 2-4, ms. Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, Aldini 244, ff. 37ra-va).

57. John Buridan, *Quaest. in Praed.*, q. 10, 71: "Ideo pono conclusionem oppositam talem, scilicet quod non significantur per terminos relativos res aliae ab illis, quae significantur per terminos absolutos ... Ista conclusio patet primo de istis terminis relativis 'causa' et 'causatum', 'principium' et 'principiatum'. Nam Deus est causa et principium aliorum et causalitas qua ipse est causa non est res sibi addita inherens ... Et similiter si Deus, qui est simpliciter absolutissimus secundum eius substantiam, est causa aliorum sine causalitate et relatione sibi addita, ita quod hoc non implicat contradictionem, et hoc bene poterit de aliis." Cf. *Summulae in Praed.*, § 3.4.1., 48-49.

58. As C.S. Peirce would have said, the sign relation is irreducibly triadic in nature (CP 8.332).

aming the case of the verb *dare*, says that there is one relation between the one who gives and the receiver, and another between the one who gives and the thing given; and he proceeds in the same way with *significare* and *signum*. Hence the debates among theologians about the priority between the two relations that make up a sign, the one between sign and signified thing, and the one between sign and interpreter (or user). As Irène Rosier-Catach has explained in several works,⁵⁹ Bonaventure took one side and Bacon the opposite. After them, however, the second relation almost faded away. Instead, as we can see in both Brito and Ockham, the grammarians' and the logicians' point of view prevails, the view, that is, that assigns to language some regular and objective properties, independent of its users; almost no room was left for a pragmatic approach to language, which would take into account the relation between signs or language and their users or interpreters in accordance with Charles Morris' definition of pragmatics.

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59. Rosier-Catach 1994, 2004.

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CHAPTER 8

Fourteenth-Century Debates about the Nature of the *Categories*

Fabrizio Amerini

Introduction. Demonstration vs. Derivation of the Categories and the Nature of the Categorical Table

Two general and, in a way, preliminary problems concerning Aristotle's *Categories* are the extension and the nature of the categorical table. In many respects, these problems can be tackled separately. The demonstration of the sufficiency (exhaustivity without overlap) of the categorical table is independent of the answer interpreters are disposed to give to the question concerning the nature of the items falling under the categories. Such a demonstration is likely to sound more persuasive if the interpreter takes an ontological interpretation of the *Categories*: if he understands the categories as a classification of things. For if he embraces a linguistic interpretation and assumes that the categories are a classification of the signifying terms in language, he will encounter more difficulties in proving the sufficiency of the table. An opponent might argue that, since terms are imposed in a conventional way to signify things, the categorical table too has been imposed conventionally, and from this conclude that the categories can be multiplied arbitrarily.¹ A similar situation can occur, however, even if interpreters subscribe to the ontological

1. See, for example, Walter Burley, *Super Predicamenta*, f. c 3 vb: "Et si dicatur quod sensus divisionis est iste, quod singulum incomplexorum aut est vox significativa substantiam, aut qualitatem et sic de residuis, contra: secundum illud hec divisio non fieret in decem membra, quia multo plures possunt esse voces incomplexae, et forsan infinite sunt, quarum quelibet significat aliquid decem predicamentorum, tam in diversis idiomatibus quam in eodem idiomate. Ergo si hec divisio foret in voces incomplexas, significantes decem predicamenta, hec divisio fieret in plura membra quam in

interpretation, since someone could argue that, at least in principle, it is possible to discover other kinds of things or modes of being of things than those which fall under the ten categories.² Regardless, therefore, of which answer an interpreter favours to the question about the nature of the categorial items, he may need independent arguments to prove the sufficiency of the categorial table. In practice, though, the two sides seem to agree that it is impossible to demonstrate sufficiency, because there seems to be no way to exclude the two counterfactual situations mentioned above. Since no argument can be given to exclude the possibility that some new (ontological or linguistic) category may be introduced or discovered, it follows that no argument can be given to establish that the categories are ten and only ten. This does not, however, entail that the division into ten, and just ten, categories, as proposed by Aristotle, cannot be justified.

One might think that accepting the impossibility of proving the sufficiency of the categories was restricted to such commentators as wanted to maintain both the full extension of the categorial table and its ontological value. This is a false impression, however, for the interpreters advocating the ontological interpretation but admitting a shorter list of the categories (a solution widely adopted in the first half of fourteenth century) also accept that impossibility. In the first half of the fourteenth century, in particular, it becomes a standard position that it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate the sufficiency of the categorial table, while it is perfectly possible to explain the derivation of the ten categories. John Buridan, for example, explicitly asserts the impracticability of any demonstration. Buridan gives only one argument for this point: according to Aristotle's doctrine, the ten categories cannot be derived from a common concept that is univocally predicated of them, for they express the fundamental and most universal kinds of concepts that we can have of things. If we cannot point to a concept above the categories, it follows that we cannot indicate any rule of derivation of the cate-

decem, immo quasi in membra infinita; quod est absurdum.”; also see John Buridan, *Quaestiones Praed.* 3, p. 17-18.92-96.

2. See, for example, John Buridan, *Quaestiones Praed.* 3, p. 19.131 sq.

gories; therefore, we cannot explain the exhaustiveness of our categorial concepts. Buridan thus concludes that we are unable to elaborate any *a priori* and deductive demonstration of the sufficiency of the categories, since we lack any premise containing concepts that are more general than those of the categories. Yet for Buridan, the impossibility of tracing back each category to a common concept is what nonetheless allows us to derive their number. Such a derivation however – Buridan observes – cannot be but empirical and *a posteriori*, obtained by means of some sort of pragmatic or inductive procedure; as a result, it turns out to be intrinsically provisional.³

Buridan's distinction between demonstrating and deriving the categories is not new. In his late *Commentary on the Categories* (1337 ca.), Walter Burley formulated a position that is in many respects similar to that of Buridan. Burley also distinguishes the question of the sufficiency from that of the derivation of the categories. First, Burley recalls that there is a 'modern trend', paradigmatically exemplified by William of Ockham, that narrows down the extra-mental relevance of the categorial table to two categories (i.e. Substance and Quality).⁴ Supporters of such a position nonetheless propose a derivation of the entire table. Ockham, for example, thinks that the ten categories can be elicited from the rhetorical practice of asking questions about a thing. Second and more explicitly, Burley records the existence of two possible ways of deriving the ten categories – the *predicative* one put forward by Thomas Aquinas,⁵ and the *ontological* one proposed by John Duns Scotus.⁶ Nonetheless, he affirms the impossibility of demonstrating their exact number.⁷

3. Cf. John Buridan, *Quaestiones Praed.* 3, p. 19.131-146. See also *Summulae in Praedicamenta* 3.1.8, pp. 18-19.8-24.

4. Cf. Walter Burley, *Super Predicamenta*, f. c 3 vb-c 4 ra.

5. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.* 5.8.890-892. On Aquinas's deduction of the categorial table, see Wippel 1987.

6. Cf. e.g. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Metaph.* 5.5-6. On Scotus's theory of categories, see Pini 2002 and Pini 2005. In particular, on Scotus's derivation of the categories, see Pini 2003.

7. Cf. Walter Burley, *Super Predicamenta*, f. c 4 ra-b: "Intelligendum est quod, quamvis numerus predicamentorum non possit demonstrari, tamen aliqui acceperunt sufficientiam predicamentorum sic: dicunt quod predicamentum sumitur a modo predi-

These observations show that, although they finally elaborate different accounts of the nature of the categories, Burley and Buridan share the idea that demonstrating and deriving the sufficiency of the categories are different procedures. Moreover, both assume that the demonstration and derivation of the categories are problems that are distinct from that of determining the nature of the categorial table. In what follows, I shall not dwell further on the issue of the demonstration vs. derivation of the categories. Contemporary scholars have investigated this topic extensively. These brief comments about Burley and Buridan are intended to justify my initial assertion that fourteenth-century commentators regarded these problems as more or less unrelated to the problem of determining the nature of the categories and disjointed from it. In the following, I shall limit myself to discussing some arguments concerning the two interpretations of the nature of the categories singled out above.

1. Burley's Criticism of the Linguistic Interpretation of the *Categories*

Burley's *Commentary on the Categories* reveals that in the first decades of the fourteenth century the linguistic and the ontological interpretations were considered as the two competing accounts of the *Categories*. In particular, Burley is of the opinion that the ontological interpretation must be preferred to the linguistic one and that it was also the interpretation that Averroes and Avicenna elaborated.⁸ Burley notes that the most common strategy for supporting

candi et modus predicandi sumitur a modo essendi, et sic sunt duo modi principales essendi. (...) Aliter accipiunt alii sufficientiam predicamentorum sic: omne quod est, vel est per se existens vel alteri inherens (...).”

8. *Ibid.*, f. b 6 ra: “In hoc libro principaliter determinatur de vocibus secundum quod sunt significative rerum. Et ideo in hoc libro determinatur tam de rebus quam de vocibus, principaliter tamen de vocibus. Hec est intentio Boetii et Simplicii et multorum aliorum. Alia est opinio Avicenne et Averrois, quam credo esse veriorem, quod in hoc libro determinatur de rebus principaliter et ex consequenti et secundario de vocibus. Dicit enim Avicenna in prima parte sue *Logice* (...).”; f. c 2 ra: “Hec enim est sententia ipsius Averrois, qui in ponendo hanc primam divisionem dicit hic: Rerum

the linguistic interpretation – adopted, for example, by Boethius and Simplicius – consists in putting emphasis on some formulations in the *Categories* that can only be explained in a linguistic fashion: in ch. 1, for example, Aristotle explains the difference between homonymous, synonymous, and paronymous items in terms of the different ways of predicating a name and its definition of things; in ch. 2, 1a16 ff., and in ch. 4, Aristotle speaks of items that are *said* of something else with or without combination, and, as one could easily conclude, no extra-mental thing can be *said* of another thing if not by way of a linguistic intermediary; in ch. 5, 3b10 sq., Aristotle speaks of primary and secondary substances with respect to what they signify, but it is clear that only words can be properly said to signify.⁹ Throughout the *Categories*, interpreters can find similar formulations to supporting the linguistic interpretation. Burley knows these passages, but nonetheless thinks that they may be easily reinterpreted to suit the ontological interpretation (in the way we shall illustrate in the following sections). Moreover, Burley raises a fundamental objection to the linguistic interpretation: if such an interpretation were right, all the categories would be reduced to that of Quality, since each linguistic term falls under the category of Quality.¹⁰

Burley's argument, appears not to be particularly compelling to the supporter of the linguistic interpretation. First of all, if the categories are said to classify signifying terms of language, such terms cannot be included in the category of Quality for the simple reason that the categories are not supposed to classify things but terms. Second, even granting that all linguistic terms belong to the category of Quality, such a conclusion would not carry any very drastic

significatarum per dictiones, quedam sunt simplices significate per dictiones simplices (...).”

9. *Ibid.*, f. c 2 ra: “Res non dicuntur sed voces, ideo hec est divisio in voces. (...) Ex quibus videtur quod Philosophus in illa divisione loquitur de vocibus significantibus et non de rebus significatis.”

10. *Ibid.*, f. b 6 rb-va: “Si iste liber principaliter esset de vocibus, sequeretur quod decem predicamenta essent decem voces; sed omnis vox est in genere qualitatis; ergo decem predicamenta sunt in genere qualitatis, et sic non esset nisi unum genus generalissimum, scilicet qualitas.”

consequences, since it would show that terms belong to the category of Quality only when they are considered according to their *linguistic* or *syntactical* form, but this does not entail that every term, *semantically* considered, belongs to one and the same category.

Leaving aside the efficacy of Burley's argument, it is worth noting that, while arguing against a purely linguistic interpretation of the *Categories*, Burley does not exclude a semantic interpretation of them. Specifically, he seems to think that a certain 'ontological' version of a semantic interpretation can serve to reconcile the linguistic and the ontological interpretation to a certain degree. Let me clarify this point. According to the supporter of the linguistic interpretation, the *Categories* must be explained as a classification of terms; advocates of the ontological interpretation, instead, insist that they are a classification of things. The two proposals could be harmonized if one were disposed to read the *Categories* in a semantic manner. If one assumes indeed that the *Categories* classify things *qua* signified, that is, things in the way they are signified by linguistic terms, to state that the *Categories* classify things is not far from stating that they classify the linguistic counterparts of those things. What changes is that in one case, the emphasis is put on things, so that the supporter of the ontological interpretation can conclude that the *Categories* classify *primarily* things and *secondarily* terms, while in the other case, the emphasis is put on terms, so that the supporter of the linguistic interpretation can invert this order of priority and conclude that the *Categories* classify *primarily* terms and *secondarily* things. A semantic approach to the *Categories* seems to permit reconciling the ontological with the linguistic interpretation: the *Categories* classify things as signified by terms or – which amounts to the same thing – terms as signifying things. A semantic approach thus rules out two extreme interpretations of the *Categories*: *either* that the categories can be explained either as a classification of things *qua* externally existing, *or* as a classification of terms as such. On a semantic account of the *Categories*, opting for the linguistic or the ontological interpretation can be seen as a question of emphasis.

Burley takes the semantic interpretation of the *Categories* to be the right interpretation. Moreover, he seems to think that the different emphasis mentioned above can be reabsorbed in what we called an

‘ontological’ version of the semantic interpretation. It is along these lines that Burley understands Simplicius and Boethius’s claim that the *Categories* is a classification of signifying terms of language: the *Categories* are a classification of things although things are considered as expressed by words.¹¹ For Burley, there is no doubt that the *Categories* is a classification of things. Nonetheless he is aware that a merely ontological interpretation clashes with the scholastic practice prescribed in the curriculum of the Faculty of Arts, where the *Categories* was taught as the first of Aristotle’s *logical* writings. This is the reason why many philosophers opted for a linguistic interpretation. According to them, the *Categories* deals with the atomic parts of standard linguistic propositions, while *De interpretatione* focuses on the propositions themselves and the remaining books of the *Organon* on the different kinds of argument and syllogism.¹² It is in order to solve this problem, connected to the place of the *Categories* within the *cursus studiorum* of the Faculty of Arts, that Burley elaborates his distinctive doctrine of real propositions. If interpreters are willing to grant that some propositions predicate things of each other, argues Burley, nothing prevents them from reading the *Categories* as a treatise dealing with the basic and simple kinds of things that can make up a proposition. Nonetheless, Burley concedes that things are not presented in the *Categories* in the way they exist extra-mentally but as signified by words. Specifically, he argues that the *Categories* classifies each extra-mental thing that can be part of a real proposition as mirrored by a standard linguistic proposition. Thus, at some places Burley acknowledges that certain notions introduced by Aristotle – like the fundamental relationships of being in something else and

11. *Ibid.*, f. c 3 vb: “Dico ergo quod Aristoteles in ista divisione dividit significata per voces incomplexas in decem res primas, scilicet in decem predicamenta. Et cum dicit Boetius quod Philosophus dividit ea que significant, dico quod verum est, sed non ex primaria intentione, sed ex secundaria intentione: ex primaria dividit rem significatam per vocem incomplexam in decem res, ita quod sensus divisionis est ille: quilibet res significata per vocem incomplexam aut est substantia aut quantitas et cetera.”

12. *Ibid.*, f. b 6 va: “Secundum dubium est quia videtur quod in libro *Predicamentorum* determinetur principaliter de partibus enunciationis, de quibus determinatur in libro *Peryermenias*; sed partes enunciationis non sunt res, sed voces vel conceptus.”

being said of something else (*Categories*, ch. 2), or the notion of simple predicable (*Categories*, ch. 4) – can be indifferently referred to the signifying terms of language or to the things signified by such terms.¹³ This shows that Burley considers the semantic interpretation as the privileged interpretation of the *Categories* and that, significantly, he regards it as fully compatible with the ontological interpretation. The semantic interpretation effectively becomes a version of the ontological interpretation with just a weak metaphysical commitment.

What conclusion can we draw from all this? In spite of Burley's celebrated 'extreme realism', Burley shows prudence when he has to explain the extra-mental involvement of the categorial table. He subscribes to the Avicennian view that the *Categories* classifies things insofar as they are the subject of some specific intentional properties or second intentions. This is an application of the general Avicennian tenet that the subject-matter of logic consists of second intentions as applied to first intentions.¹⁴ Since second intentions can be attached to a thing only when it is present to or existing in the mind according to an 'objective' modality of existence, and a thing can be in this state only when it is cognized, it follows that things can underlie intentional properties only when they are cognized. Two points, then, emerge about Burley's explanation of the *Categories*. First, it is evident from his commentary that Avicenna's doctrine of essence exerted a strong influence on his reading of the *Categories*: for Burley, the work classifies the external things' forms insofar as they exist objectively in the mind, and when forms are considered in

13. *Ibid.*, f. c 2 ra-b: "Mihi tamen videtur quod hec divisio sit in membra communia tam rebus quam vocibus, quia tam in vocibus quam in rebus reperiuntur complexum et incomplexum, ut ostensum est, et ideo hec divisio non precise est in res nec in voces, sed est in communia, scilicet in complexum et incomplexum."; f. b 6 va: "Dico ergo quod liber predicamentorum est de rebus secundum quod eis insunt intentiones secunde. (...) Ad illud dubium recole me dixisse et in scriptis reliquisse quod intellectus potest facere propositionem ex quibuscumque (...) et ideo aliqua propositio componitur ex rebus extra animam, aliqua ex vocibus, aliqua ex conceptibus."

14. See the previous footnote; and *Super Praedicamenta*, f. c 6 ra-c 7 rb. For more details on Burley's Realism, see Conti 1990; Karger 1999; Conti 2000; Cesalli 2007. See also the classic Shapiro 1960 and Shapiro 1962.

such a way, they are neutral to the aspects of particularity and universality. Such objectively existent forms are moreover the formal or primary signification of terms. Second, it is also clear that, for Burley, the *Categories* must be properly accounted for as a logical treatise entailing a definite ontology (viz. predicative, bipartite, that is, exhausted by substantial and non-substantial items, and presumably hylomorphic) rather than as a specific treatise of ontology.

2. Problems with the Ontological Interpretation of the *Categories*

An ontological interpretation such as Burley's relies on – so to speak – a Principle of Categorial Plenitude: each thing, or each aspect, form or mode of being of a thing (whether it exists inside our outside the mind), must fall under at least and at most one category.¹⁵ It is known that such a principle is not innocuous and encounters serious problems in the case of the last six categories, and also with Relation, since it is difficult to distinguish a real relation from its foundation.¹⁶ Authors who put forward a linguistic or even a con-

15. As has been said, for Burley, the categories classify things as signified by simple words (*incomplexa*), but not every simple word falls under the categories. For instance, Burley excludes from the categories simple words signifying *ficta*. See *Super Praedicamenta*, f. c 4 ra: “Intelligendum est hic quod non omne incomplexum significat substantiam vel qualitatem et cetera, quia hoc nomen ‘chimera’ est incomplexum et tamen non significat substantiam, quantitatem vel qualitatem. Idem iudicium est de quocumque alio nomine fictivo. Omne tamen incomplexum significans rem extra animam creatam per se unam, aut significat substantiam aut qualitatem et cetera.” This means that only those predicables that can have a reference in external reality can be properly categorized.

16. Burley has two arguments for the real distinction between a relation and its foundation (*Super Praedicamenta*, f. e 7 va – e 8 ra). First, the Argument of Intension and Remission of Forms: suppose that two things *a* and *b* are similar as to their whiteness and that *a* is whiter than *b*; then, if the whiteness of *a* decreases in intensity, the relationship of similarity increases in intensity. This different attitude proves that whiteness and similarity pick out different entities in the world. Second, the Argument of Contradiction: suppose that the relationship of similarity is really identical with its foundation, say whiteness, and that the same holds for the relationship of dissimilarity; it follows that similarity and dissimilarity are really identical with whiteness, and this entails a contradiction.

ceptual interpretation of the *Categories* usually point to two complications that make both the ontological interpretation and its weak version, the semantic interpretation, inconsistent.

2.1. First Complication: There Are Things That Can Belong to More Than One Category

The first complication is that some thing appears to be classifiable into different categories, or to be signifiable by terms that can be classified into different categories. This is precisely the argument advanced by John Buridan for excluding an interpretation of the *Categories* like Burley's. The examples given by Buridan are those of heat and of Socrates.¹⁷ Consider the case of Socrates. For Buridan, Socrates belongs to the category of Substance insofar as Socrates is a man, but also to that of Quality insofar as Socrates is white and to that of Relation insofar as Socrates is supposed to be the father of a son. Unlike Burley, Buridan adopts a strongly 'semantic' version of the semantic interpretation, hence deriving the distinction of the categories from the different semantic attitudes that terms display when they are predicated of what counts as a primary substance.¹⁸ Buridan's argument does not appear a knock-down one, either. The supporters of the ontological interpretation could easily counter that nothing can belong to more than one category if such a thing is taken under the same aspect. Socrates, understood as such, can be said to belong only to the category of Substance, while Socrates the White cannot be said to belong to the category of Quality: it is not Socrates the White or Socrates insofar as he is white, but Socrates' whiteness which properly belongs to the category of Quality; Socrates can belong to that category only *per accidens* or *per reductio-*

17. Cf. John Buridan, *Quaestiones in Praed.* 3, p. 17.89-92. See also *Summulae in Praedicamenta* 3.1.5, p. 14-15.5-31.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 18-19.96-130, esp. 96-101: "Sed sumuntur [*scil.* praedicamenta] ex diversis intentionibus, secundum quas termini sunt diversimode connotativi vel etiam non connotativi. Ex quibus diversis connotationibus proveniunt diversi modi praedicandi terminorum de primis substantiis; et ita directe et immediate distinguuntur penes diversos modos praedicandi de primis substantiis."

nem but not *per se*. The same can be said for Socrates and the category of Relation. This first strategy of attack on the ontological interpretation therefore seems to fail.

2.2. Further Complication: There Are Things That Cannot Be Classified in Any Category

The second complication I referred to above is the mirror image of the first one, and occurs in those cases in which a thing cannot be *per se* classified as falling into any category. For many theologians, this is the case of God, for example.¹⁹ But medieval philosophers also discuss other and more philosophically interesting cases – such as that of the status of secondary substances or of time – showing how problematic it is to uphold the Principle of Categorial Plenitude when grounding the ontological interpretation. Unlike the first one, this second strategy for attacking the ontological interpretation seems to succeed. Here I cannot take into consideration all the details of such cases; I am rather interested in discussing a pair of philosophical intuitions that turn up in such cases. I shall consider each of them in turn.

2.2.1. Things Can Be Categorized Differently According to their Different Descriptions. Hervaeus Natalis vs. Durand of St. Pourçain on the Problem of Classifying Cognition

One possible way to dismiss the ontological interpretation is to prove that some thing can be classified into different categories, not however according to the different real aspects of that thing, as argued by Buridan, but according to different descriptions of it. The argument is the following: if a thing *T* belongs to a certain category *C*₁ when taken according to a given description *D*₁ and belongs to another category *C*₂ when taken according to a different description *D*₂, then *T* cannot be *per se* classified in any category *C*. An interesting case is offered by the late medieval controversies over the nature of intellectual cognition and concepts. Must concepts, understood as the end-products of cognition, be categorized as sub-

19. See Tabarroni 2003.

stances, or as qualities, or even as passions or habits of the mind? Moreover, must cognition be classified in the category of Action or into that of Relation? For the sake of brevity, I shall leave aside the question of the categorization of concepts, on which a great discussion was kept going at least from Duns Scotus onward, limiting my attention to the latter question.

As the debate between the Dominicans Durand of St.-Pourçain and Hervaeus Natalis shows, interpreters can have good reasons for accounting for cognition both as an action and as a relation. Durand, for instance, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, book I, d. 27, stresses the intransitive nature of the action of cognition, since cognizing like seeing is an activity that ends with the achievement of itself, and no concept is left once the process of cognition is over.²⁰ For Durand, when we cognize an external thing, we are exerting just the action of cognizing that thing and this action is the actual goal of our intentional activity of cognizing a thing. Cognition has no real effect on the thing that is cognized: that is, cognition does not confer any additional kind of being (real or intentional) on a thing, but limits itself to modifying really the mind that actually performs the action of cognizing a thing.

Hervaeus Natalis thinks that the account of cognition as an intransitive action is inadequate, for it encounters problems in explaining mental predication and concept formation. First, he objects that, if one is inclined to treat cognition as an action, it is in any case preferable to account for it as a special kind of transitive action. Although cognition is not directly aimed at the formation of a concept in the way the action of building is directed towards the construction of a house, nonetheless an act of cognition realizes itself in such a way that once it is over, it leaves the mind with a concept. Hervaeus, however, thinks that it is much better to categorize cognition as a relation. Accounting for cognition as an action short-circuits the standard categorial theory of paronymy or denominative predication. Hervaeus explains this point by criticizing

20. See Durand of St.-Pourçain, *Super Sent.* 1.27.2, f. 771a-vb (p. 801-807.93-255). On the debate between Hervaeus and Durand on cognition, see Friedman forthcoming; Amerini 2009; also see Koch 1927.

Radulphus Brito's account of first and second intentions. Unlike Radulphus,²¹ Hervaeus holds that every form can denominate only the subject in which it inheres and never the object to which it relates, just as the form of whiteness can denominate as white only that in which it inheres and the form of paternity can denominate someone as father only if it inheres in him.²² Accordingly, Hervaeus argues that if cognition were only an intransitive action that coincides with the direction of our mind towards the external world, certainly we could be said to be cognizing an extra-mental thing (since the form of cognizing inheres in us), but such an action or mind's direction would not suffice to establish that the external thing is cognized by us, just as the form of paternity is insufficient to justify our calling somebody else a father or even a son. Therefore, concludes Hervaeus, nobody is authorized to equate the 'active' property of cognizing an external thing, which is proper to the mind, with the 'passive' property of being cognized, which instead pertains to things. In order to better characterize the passive condition of being cognized, Hervaeus thinks that it is preferable to account for intellectual cognition as an instance of relation and hence to explain it, *qua* relational entity, as the conjunction of a relation and its converse relation. In particular, cognition is the outcome of a real relation, the 'active' one that our mind bears to the extra-mental thing and which has its foundation in the act of cognition, and of a relation of reason, the 'passive' one that the extra-mental thing bears to our mind and that is grounded upon the converse relation of cognizing itself. Here matters are quite complicated, but for our purposes it is enough to notice that, for Hervaeus, such a relation of reason is the metaphysical condition that permits the application of the ordinary categorial pattern of denominative predication to the mental sphere, and also the attribution of the accidental property of being an intention or being cognized to a thing.²³

21. Cf. e.g. Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones Porph.* 8A, p. 116.

22. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibeta* 2.8.3, f. 48ra-49vb; *De verbo* 1.2, f. 10vb-11rb. I reappraise the whole debate between Hervaeus and Durand in Amerini forthcoming A.

23. Hervaeus formulates this explanation of intentionality in many places, but extensively in the *Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*, in the II and III *Quodlibet*, and in the *Tractatus de verbo*. For a comprehensive reconstruction of Hervaeus's theory of intellectual

From an Aristotelian point of view, both accounts seem to be well-based. Durand, in particular, in his *Commentary on the Sentences* refers to *Metaphysics* IX.6, where Aristotle presents cognition as a kind of actuality and as a kind of active potency,²⁴ while Hervaeus has in mind such texts as *Metaphysics*, V.15, and *Categories*, ch. 7, where Aristotle introduces the connection between the agent and the patient, or the knowledge and the knowable, as a case of relation.²⁵ Contemporary readers are left with the impression that it is impossible to settle the debate between them since both of them crucially fail to recognize that the categorial doctrine in some way collapses when applied to cognition. Intellectual cognition seems to be a special kind of intransitive action and, like every intransitive action, intellectual cognition ends with the realization of itself; in particular, such an action is completely fulfilled by putting two things, a cognizing subject and a cognized object, in relation to each other.

2.2.2. *There Are Things That Escape the Categorical Classification. Hervaeus Natalis vs. Peter Auriol on the Status of Secondary Substances*

The difficulty of classifying such entities as cognition and concepts is one possible complication for supporters of the ontological interpretation. Another line of attack is seen in what may be called the Aggregation Argument. Normally, medieval interpreters of Aristotle's *Categories* agree that composite entities such as Socrates the White or the musical man are excluded from the categories. They are beings *secundum accidens*, while the *Categories* classify only beings *secundum se*. The constituents of Socrates the White (i.e. man and whiteness) can be categorially classified, but not the entire aggregate. This situation seems to occur also in the case of secondary substances. If primary substances raise no particular problem (and the interpreters agree in putting them into the category of Substance), paradigmatic

cognition and intentionality, see Koridze 2006 and De Rijk 2005: 251-302. For the discussion of some crucial aspects of his theory, see Pinborg 1974; Perler 2002: 294-313; Amerini 2005a: 103-140; Doyle 2006; and Amerini 2009. On the connection between intentions and denomination, see also De Libera 1999. For more on the problem of the categorization of intentions, see Robert 2010.

24. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 9.6 1048b18 sq.

25. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 5.15 1020b26-32; *Cat.* 7 7b22 sq.

secondary substances such as *man* or *animal* seem to be treatable as aggregates of some more elementary and independently identifiable components. If this is the case, they cannot belong to the category of Substance. Medieval commentators on the *Categories* seem to have had the same problems with secondary substances that the contemporary interpreters of Aristotle have²⁶: on the one hand, in the *Categories* 5 Aristotle explicitly includes secondary substances in the category of Substance; but on the other hand, in *Metaphysics* VII.13, he argues extensively that no secondary substance (and, in general, no universal item) is substance. With respect to the nature of the *Categories*, the dilemma can be presented as follows:

- If interpreters hold an ontological interpretation and take the *Categories* as a classification of ten abstract and distinct forms or kinds of being, they can account for each non-substantial category as a distinct kind of formal being which the substance exhibits. In this case, secondary substances fully belong to the category of Substance, since they are supposed to express the essential or primary formal kind of being that a primary substance exhibits. The major problem for the interpreter, in this case, is to maintain the substantiality of primary substances.
- If, however, interpreters want to preserve the substantiality of primary substances and at the same time a maintain an ontological interpretation, they ought to opt for reading the *Categories* as a classification of concrete things and of their modes of being. In this case, though, the interpreter has the problem of justifying the substantiality of secondary substances.

Since medieval commentators on the *Categories* commonly concede that primary substances are substance, they were forced to call into question the substantiality of secondary substances. From this perspective, the supporters of the linguistic interpretation could easily prove that the ontological interpretation is an inadequate reading of the *Categories* because it leads to ruling out secondary substances from the category of Substance. One simple way of showing this consists in arguing that secondary substances, as Aristotle proves in

26. See Loux 1991: 196 sq.

the *Metaphysics*, do not have any separate and concrete counterpart in the external world. But the supporters of the linguistic interpretation might also have another, more intriguing, reason for proving that secondary substances cannot be counted as genuine tokens of substance.

This reason revolves around the mind-dependent nature of secondary substances. Already Aquinas had pointed out on several occasions that a paradigmatic instance of secondary substance such as *man* is a complex entity that displays two characteristics: first, it can exist as such only in the mind, since the existence of universal substances in the extra-mental world can never be experienced,²⁷ and second, it is intrinsically composed of two parts, viz. an extra-mental thing's nature, on the one hand, and the intentional property of being universal and predicable, on the other hand.²⁸ The procedure imagined by Aquinas for granting *man* the two above characteristics can be summarized in the following way. When the extra-mental nature of a particular thing is cognized, it becomes the subject of the intentional properties of being universal and being predicable. It is not the nature insofar as it exists outside the mind or insofar as it actually exists in the mind that is the subject of universality and predicability, but the nature taken as 'neutral' to universality and particularity. This Avicennian 'indifferent' nature can be actually endowed with those properties only when it is understood as present to the mind. In order to make this point clear, Aquinas introduces a distinction between two ways of considering a nature understood as existing in the mind: the 'indifferent' nature, once it is cognized, can exist in the mind either as the potential or the actual subject of universality and predicability. This means that *man* can be featured either as an item (i.e. the 'indifferent' nature) that, once it has been cognized by the mind, is potentially *composed with* universality and predicability, or as an item that is actually *composed of* nature and universality/predicability. In the first case, *man* can be treated as a simple and mind-independent being, and precisely as the collection of

27. See e.g. *Exp. Metaph.* 7.11.1536.

28. See e.g. *ST* 1.85.2.ad 2; *Quaestiones Pot.* 5.9.ad 16; *Exp. Metaph.* 7.13.1570. Aquinas extensively illustrates the nature of *man* in the *De ente et essentia* 2.

those properties that can be essentially and universally predicated of external men; in this sense, *man* can be said to belong to the category of Substance. In the second case, *man* can exist only in the mind, and *qua* the actual subject of the intentional properties of being universal and being predicabile; in this sense *man*, being an aggregate, can neither belong to a category nor be essentially predicated of external things.

Aquinas is not as explicit about the relationship between the two components as one would expect him to be, but there is evidence that he was confident that a sharp distinction between the mind-dependent intentional property and the mind-independent nature can be defended in each phase of the process of concept formation. This distinction justifies the double characterization of *man* indicated above and explains, for Aquinas, why in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle excludes *man* from being a substance, as opposed to what happens in the *Categories*.²⁹ Other philosophers and theologians, such as John Duns Scotus, were much more cautious in granting such a possible distinction between the nature as existing in the mind and the set of the intentional properties that can be predicated of it. This more cautious position, which tends to portray a secondary substance as an inextricable aggregate of two elements, was to be Peter Auriol's, while Hervaeus Natalis was to advocate Aquinas's view.

Hervaeus's position looks like a most straightforward example of a 'realistic', but not Platonic, account of secondary substances. In his *Treatise on second intentions*, Hervaeus assumes that every singular and universal thing, say Socrates and man (both of which he calls first intentions), belong to the category of Substance. The term 'Socrates' refers to a thing that exists, as such, in the extra-mental world, while 'man' to a thing that can exist only in the mind, as a unified object obtained by means of an act of abstraction. As a result, Hervaeus argues that *man* must be properly described as a thing to which the property of being universal accrues accidentally, rather than as an actual compound of thing and universality. The property of being universal accrues to a thing precisely when the

29. See *Exp. Metaph.* 7.13.1575. For more details on the role played by Avicenna's doctrine of essence in Aquinas's account of the categories, see Pini 2004.

thing is actually cognized by the mind: that is to say, precisely when the thing bears a relation of reason to the mind. Picturing *man* in this way is necessary – observes Hervaeus – if one wants to avoid counting a predication such as ‘man is an intention’ as a case of *per se* predication. Technically, Hervaeus states this point by codifying Aquinas’s implicit distinction between ‘to be composed with (universality)’ (*compositum huic*) and ‘to be composed of (universality)’ (*compositum ex hiis*).³⁰ This distinction reveals a core conviction of Hervaeus’, namely that it is possible to say, in each phase of the process of natural cognition or categorization of external things, where the contribution given by the world ends and where that given by the mind begins. According to Hervaeus, when we refer to *man*, we are dealing with a compound entity, since we find in *man* two elements, viz. an underlying extra-mental and real nature, and the character of universality, which, being an intentional product of the mind, supervenes upon that nature. For Hervaeus, definition is the suitable instrument for spelling out the features of the underlying nature and hence for marking off the nature from the character of universality that the mind attaches to it.

While Hervaeus argues for the full substantiality of secondary substances (although he endows them with a merely mental existence), he denies with force that second intentions, such as *universality*, *species*, and the like, can belong to any category. Hervaeus’s fundamental principle is that the categories are a classification of extra-mental things and of their modes of being, so that only what is real can be categorized (and this is independent of whether the real thing actually exists, as such, in the external world, like Socrates, or only in the mind, like man). This is the way in which Hervaeus understands the division of being into mental and extra-mental introduced by Aristotle at the end of book VI of the *Metaphysics*, with only the latter articulated into the ten categories).³¹ On this

30. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *SI* 3.1, p. 418 sq.

31. Cf. e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, *SI* 2.1, p. 371: “Illud quod distinguitur contra ens divisum in decem praedicamenta, distinguitur contra omne esse reale. Nam omne esse reale continetur in aliquo praedicamentorum, vel sicut species, vel sicut differentia, vel sicut principium eius quod est in genere. Sed secunda intentio est huiusmodi, quia dicit esse rationis quod Philosophus distinguit contra ens divisum in decem

interpretation, Hervaeus removes the mental dimension of objective or intentional being (i.e. that of the being of reason or second intentions) from categorial classification.

In order to clarify this aspect, let me say something more about how Hervaeus describes a second intention such as *species*. On his account, *species* can be taken (i) formally or abstractly, and (ii) materially or concretely. (i) Formally or abstractly considered, *species* indicates a merely rational property of a relational kind (i.e. specificity or being a species), namely the relational property that the mind can attach to a thing's cognized nature when it compares such a nature with other cognized natures. In our case, when the mind reflects on a cognized thing such as *man* and compares it to another cognized thing, say *animal*, it can obtain both the intentional property of *being a species* and that of *being a genus*. From an epistemic point view, *species* just like any other second intention expresses a cognitive relation, and more precisely that which a thing, once cognized, bears to our mind when our mind is comparing that thing to other cognized things (or to the external things from which the cognized thing has been derived: this happens in the case of such intentions as *universal*, *predicable*, and the like). For this reason, Hervaeus holds that *species*, although it does not express a true relation, nonetheless can be treated as a quasi-relation, since it serves a function similar to that of a true relation: *species* expresses the predicative relation that the cognized thing *man*, for instance, bears to the cognized thing *animal*.³² (ii) Materially or concretely considered, however, *species* ex-

praedicamenta vi^o *Metaphysicorum*. Ergo intentio secunda distinguitur contra esse reale.”; 2.2, p. 380: “Secunda intentio, et ens rationis quod distinguitur contra ens divisum in decem praedicamenta, deficit a quacumque entitate in quocumque praedicamento. Alioquin non distingueretur contra ens commune divisum in decem praedicamenta tanquam deficiens a toto ambitu eius.” Aristotle's text referred to is *Metaph.* 6.4. 1027b28-34. On Hervaeus Natalis's realism, see Amerini 2005b.

32. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *SI* 2.4, p. 399: “Genus, species, et consimilia communiter dicuntur significare quasdam relations sive habitudines. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod praedicta entia rationis, sicut non sunt substantia nec qualitas, sic nec sunt relationes reales in genere relationis existentes. Et hoc patet ex supradictis quia talia non dicunt aliquod ens reale existens in aliquo praedicamento. Tamen, licet non sint relationes reales, magis assimilantur relationibus quam aliis entibus. Et minus recedunt a ratione relationis quam a ratione aliorum praedicamentorum.”

presses nothing but a first intention, for instance *man*, so that *species* does not refer to anything different from that to which *man* also refers.³³ In conclusion, both formally and materially considered, *species* cannot be in any category.

I shall not dwell further on the details of Hervaeus's theory of intention. What has been said should suffice to show that he works with a restricted categorial model, since he admits that there is a part of being that escapes the categorial classification. While, on the one hand, he elaborates an ontological interpretation of the *Categories*,³⁴ on the other hand, he postulates a region of being – that populated by second intentions or beings of reasons, like *species* – that is outside the categorial table. Such a region of being can be structured in analogy to the domain of real being (in the domain of beings of reason, one can find quasi-substances, quasi-qualities, quasi-relations, and so on), and, to a certain degree, this is necessary in order to extend the standard categorial theory of predication to the mental realm. But properly speaking, the categorial table cannot absorb such entities, for if it were to do so, Hervaeus claims, one would fall back into a Platonic realism of universals.

Paradoxically, the qualifications introduced by Hervaeus sound like an argument against his ontological interpretation of the *Categories*. There are two problems with Hervaeus's explanation of the categories: first, the difficulty of giving an epistemological procedure for distinguishing the contribution of the world from that of the mind; second, the double status of a universal intention such as *man*, which is reflected by the double status of a second intention such as *species*: if the inclusion of *man* in the categories depends on the different considerations we can have of it, it follows that *man* in itself can be said neither to belong nor not to belong to the categories. In one respect, *man* can be seen as an extra-mental thing and a substance. This especially holds when *man* occurs in a predicate-position within a standard essential proposition, namely when it does the job of shorthand for a collection of properties that can be essentially predicated of the external particular men to which the

33. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *SI* 4.1, p. 458-459, 468-470.

34. See *Quodlibeta* 1.9, ff. 18vb-22rb, esp. 20va-22rb.

subject-term refers. In this case, *man* can be accounted for as a first intention. But in another respect, *man* can exist only in the mind, as Aquinas had recognized in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. In this case, *man* is considered as such, namely as the subject of some intentional properties; as a consequence, in this case *man* must be accounted for as a second intention, or at least as the foundation of such second intentions as *species*, *universal*, *predicable*, and the like. In one respect, therefore, *man* can be included in the categories, in another it cannot. The case of *species* can be managed in a similar way: in one respect, *species* designates something that is aggregated of a first and a second intention, but in another respect, it only designates a first intention in which a second intention can accidentally inhere and be founded. In the first case, *species* cannot be reduced to any category, in the second case it seems to be classifiable under one category or another.

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Peter Auriol rejects ten points of Hervaeus's theory of intentions. With respect to the present issue, it is worth noting that Auriol criticizes Hervaeus's conception of the categories precisely concerning the possibility of distinguishing the cognized thing (e.g. man) from the mode of cognition (e.g. universality). The fifth defect of Hervaeus's theory, according to Auriol's list, is the removal of second intentions from the categories.³⁵ What is wrong with this exclusion? Auriol thinks that two points of Hervaeus's argument are problematic: first, the argument invoked by Hervaeus for removing second intentions can be applied to first intentions as well;³⁶ second, the limitation of the range of validity of the categorial table suggested by Hervaeus is unjustified. Auriol rectifies both points. As to the first, he argues that each category is divided into primary and secondary items; since secondary substances are none other than intentions, it follows that first intentions can belong to the categories.³⁷ In other words, Auriol suggests that the property of being an intention is not an obstacle to

35. Cf. Peter Auriol, *Super Sent.* 1.23.2, p. 723.24-25.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 723.25-28.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 724.1-7.

a thing's inclusion in a category.³⁸ Thus, if *man* can be classified under the category of Substance, the same must be true for *species* too. In addition, Auriol struggles to prove that every second intention is not just a relation in a metaphorical way, but properly satisfies the formal condition, that is to say, the definition, of relation.³⁹ This conviction leads Auriol to his second point. Auriol thinks that it is better to invert Hervaeus's line of reasoning and extend the range of validity of the categorial table instead of restricting it. For this purpose, Auriol suggests returning to Boethius and Simplicius's linguistic interpretations of the *Categories*, and therefore explain the categorial table in an old-fashioned way, as a classification of simple predicable items.⁴⁰ *Prima facie*, no reference to the inner structure of the classified items referred to by simple predicables seems to be relevant for a correct categorization of those items. So if the *Categories* are supposed to classify some basic linguistic *incomplexa*, only what is syntactically (or externally) an aggregate or *complexum* must be excluded from the *Categories*, and this holds both for real and intentional aggregates.⁴¹ Auriol accepts this conclusion, but not unqualifiedly. For while he endorses this 'more logical' or conceptual

38. Cf. *Super Sent.* 1.36.3 ad 6. Here Auriol argues that the categories do not classify things as they are precisely in the extra-mental world, for otherwise only particulars would fall under the categories.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 725-726.27-7.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 724.12-23 ; also see p. 728.22-26: "Si etiam ulterius diceretur quod predicamenta secundum hoc non sunt decem genera entium sive rerum-cuius oppositum dicit Boetius in *Predicamentis*-, dicendum quod Boetius accipit 'ens' et 'rem' in suo toto ambitu prout claudit omne concepibile, sive sit ens reale sive ens rationis."

41. *Ibid.*, p. 726.7-14: "Est igitur considerandum quod istud dictum procedit ex falsa ymaginatione. Ymaginantur namque communiter loquentes quod distinctio predicamentorum sit distinctio verarum rerum, et quod nichil sit in predicamentis nisi sit vera res; et innituntur quammaxime verbo Philosophi in VI *Metaphysice*, qui postquam divisit ens in entia in anima et entia que sunt extra, dicit quod dimittamus ens quod est in anima, et tunc assumit ens quod est extra et dividit illud in decem predicamenta. Hec autem ymaginatio non est vera." Auriol gives two reasons for excluding the *Categories* be a classification of things in themselves: first, like Buridan, Auriol stresses that something (such as the heat) can be classified in different categories; second, there are some categorial items (such as time) whose being can be established only by means of a mind's act (see pp. 726-727.14-11).

explanation of the categories, he also devotes a great part of his theory of intentions to showing that a secondary substance such as *man* is an intention in its own right and that this does not prevent it from being classified under a category. Incidentally, this is also what makes him conclude, against Hervaeus, that it is all right to say that ‘man is an intention’ is a *per se* predication.⁴² In order to avoid inconsistency with his own view of secondary substances as aggregate entities in which a nature and its intentional properties are joined together in an indistinguishable way, Auriol distinguishes a logical from a metaphysical explanation of the *Categories*.⁴³ Accordingly, *man* is a metaphysically composite entity just like *species*, being a composite of an external thing’s nature and some intentional properties, and so it cannot be put *per se* in any category. Metaphysically speaking, the categories must be accounted for as a classification of things *qua* extra-mentally existing, and in this sense, the categorial table is capable of catching only singular substances and singular accidents. More specifically, Auriol argues that only five categories – Substance, Quality, Quantity, Action, and Passion – are in some way able to pick out extra-mental entities; the remaining categories collect only linguistic items that in various ways refer to the metaphysical items included in the above five categories. Things are different for the logician, since *man* is a simple predicable item, just like *species*, and as such it can be classified under the category of Substance. In brief, Auriol requires that the logical items classified in the cate-

42. *Ibid.*, p. 719.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 727-728.16-3: “Vel possumus dicere quod metaphisicus multo aliter dividit entia – qui considerat modos essendi rerum – quam logicus dividat dicibile in complexum in decem predicamenta; omnem enim vocem dicibilem et predicabilem necesse est reduci ad aliquod predicamentum secundum logicum. (...) Tenendum est itaque pro regula generali quod omnis vox incomplexa – quam Philosophus vocat ‘dicibile’ – significans conceptum aliquem positivum est vere in predicamento, sive illi conceptui correspondeat res similis in existentia (cuiusmodi sunt ‘Sortes’ et ‘Plato’ et <cetera> nomina individuorum), sive huiusmodi conceptus sint res que sunt extra per intellectum posite in esse intentionali alio et alio (cuiusmodi sunt ‘animal’, ‘homo’, ‘albedo’ et ‘color’ et cetera nomina substantiarum secundarum aut accidentium que possunt dici res secunde), sive conceptus ille sit totaliter formatus ab intellectu, sicut ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘sillogismus’ et sic de <ceteris> intentionibus secundis.”

gories must satisfy two conditions: (1) they must be simple in structure, and (2) they must be predicable of external things. It follows that not every simple predicable item belongs to a category. Indeed, for Auriol, this is true only for such predicable items as are really simple, and only those that are subordinated to a positive and simple concept are such. Privative and negative predicables belong to the categories only in a reductive way, while fictitious predicables do not belong to any category.⁴⁴

Peter's position raises many problems which I cannot consider here. Here is one that is intimately related to the topic of this paper: if simple predicables (*incomplexa*) are such as are subordinated to simple concepts, and the *Categories* are supposed to classify them,⁴⁵ it will be difficult to keep second-intention predicables in the categories.⁴⁶ The reason is that their corresponding concepts are obtained by comparing or combining first-intention concepts. Peter's criticism of Hervaeus is nonetheless of a certain philosophical interest. Among other things, it shows that in the age of Peter and Hervaeus some topics such as the categorization of mental entities, states and processes, the extension of the standard categorial theory of predication to the mental realm, the metaphysical status of universal predicables, were all regarded as central for a correct understanding of Aristotle's *Categories*. In particular, Peter's distinction between a logical and a metaphysical reading of the *Categories* seems to have been considered as the key to reconciling the ontology of the *Categories* with that of the *Metaphysics*. Historically, however, the proposed reconciliation was not new. Already Aquinas had employed such a distinction to make sense of the *Metaphysics*' argument that the universal is always said of a subject and, since what is said of a subject is not a substance, the universal is not a substance⁴⁷ – an argument which clearly conflicts with the doctrine of *Categories* 5. In the corre-

44. See the previous footnote. Also see *Super Sent.* 1.23.2, p. 728.7-26, and pp. 729-731.

45. See *Super Sent.* 1.23.2, p. 724.12-14: "Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* dividit omne dicibile incomplexum – quod non est aliud quam vox significans simplicem conceptum – in decem predicamenta"; also Proem. 6.5.

46. For more details on Auriol's doctrine of categories, I refer to Amerini forthcoming B.

47. *Metaph.* 7.13 1038b15-16.

sponding passage of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Aquinas argues that the metaphysician considers the things as they are in themselves, and as a consequence, he takes as equivalent the categorial relations of being in something else and of being predicated of something else. For the metaphysician, thus, no secondary substance is a substance, for it is metaphysically predicable of – or reducible to – a primary substance. The logician, on the other hand, differentiates between the two categorial relationships, and to him all secondary substances are substance, since they are said of primary substances but are not in them, and only this latter condition counts as relevant for ruling out a thing from the category of Substance.⁴⁸ The distinction became fairly standard in commentaries on the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*. Peter Auriol, though, significantly modifies Aquinas's argument, since he not only appeals to predication but also to the composite nature of secondary substances in order to remove them from a metaphysical categorization of beings. This is the result of Auriol's account of intentions. As already mentioned, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, I, d. 23, Auriol strives to prove that every secondary substance is an intention in its own right, and that, *pace* Hervaeus, within it the extra-mental thing's nature and the property of being an intention are inseparably mixed.⁴⁹

3. Conclusion

The rise of the theory of intentionality and the related debates on the nature of intellectual cognition and concepts gave medieval philosophers and theologians an occasion to rethink the nature of Aristotle's *Categories*. Here I have presented a pair of significant cases: first, that of the categorial classification of intellectual cognition and second, that of the categorial classification of secondary substances. Obviously, there are other situations where the mind is called on to play a role in identifying and distinguishing categories from each other. Peter Auriol, for instance, puts a particular emphasis on the category of time, developing what Aristotle says at the

48. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Metaph.* 7.13.1576.

49. Cf. Peter Auriol, *Super Sent.* 1.23.2, pp. 715-716.19-2, 716-719, and 737-738.22-3.

end of the *Metaphysics*, VI.4. In recent years, this aspect of Auriol's thought has been accurately investigated by other scholars.⁵⁰ I think, however, that much must still be done in order to appreciate the full impact of the debates about the relationship between categories and intentions on the medieval interpretations of Aristotle's *Categories*.

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50. Cf. e.g. Kobusch 2004.

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CHAPTER 9

The Status of Categories and its Epistemological Stakes in the Fourteenth Century: The Case of Blasius of Parma

Joël Biard

Blasius of Parma's *Questions on the Logical Treatises of Peter of Spain* contains, as one might expect, a treatise on categories. As the general title of the work indicates, this is not a systematic exposition of the subject, nor a literal commentary on Peter of Spain's text, but a series of questions, seventeen in all, which are either about general problems concerning predication, or about particular categories. In this treatise, Blasius develops a theory of categories which owes much to Ockhamism, be it directly or indirectly.

Blasius of Parma also wrote works on mathematics and natural philosophy. In natural philosophy he does not engage in a systematic logico-linguistic analysis of concepts and statements, as John Buridan had done half a century before. Nevertheless, a certain number of logical procedures are invoked and applied. In the case of the categories, his taking resort to logical procedures is usually occasioned by the problem of the status of the *significata* of the categories, that is the question of knowing if they signify something specific.

A reductionist conception of categories

Blasius' general conception of categories can be qualified as 'reductionist' in the sense that only two categories (substance and quality) have a direct and absolute signification. We do not find in his text any explicit statement on the point, as we do, for instance, in John Buridan, but it is clearly manifested by his treatment of quantity and relation.

Rejecting Walter Burley's alternative position, Blasius follows William of Ockham and John Buridan in taking categories in general to be terms, whose modes of signification and reference are to be analyzed, and not sorts of being. The term 'predicament' is a metalinguistic term, which designates a series of terms, ordered according to superiority and inferiority, from the most common to the less common, and predicable one of the other by essential predication.¹ The relation that is here indicated presupposes a precision Blasius has given previously, according to which "all that is predicated of another thing concerns, qua predicate, more things than that which is its subject qua subject".² This does not only imply a priority of direct predication over indirect or improper predication; it is clearly a matter of providing a purely extensional understanding of the relation between the different terms of the same categorial series. The term which is predicated in a proper and direct predication ought to refer to more things than the subject term; this is what marks its superior position in the categorial line³. This is also how Blasius interprets Porphyry, both in treatise III on categories and in treatise II (which contains only one question) on predicables.

The term 'predicament' is also used in another and complementary sense: since in each of these series, there is one term which is most general (for example 'substance'), it is that term which will be used to designate such a series of terms. Categories, then, are classes of terms, and each of them is characterized by the sort of question about primary substances that they can be used to answer, i.e. by their semantic properties:

1. Blaise de Parme, *Questiones super tractatus logice magistri Petri Hispani* (henceforward: *QTL*), III, 1, p. 227: "Predicamentum est sui termini debito modo ordinati secundum sub et supra, predicabiles de se invicem predicatione essentiali"; see also *QTL*, II, qu. un., p. 207: "Predicamentum est ordinatio terminorum secundum sub et supra de se invicem predicabilium essentialiter". Cf. the end of section 1 of Ashworth's essay, below.

2. *QTL*, II, qu. un., p. 207: "Omne quod de alio predicatur, ut predicatum est, in plus se habet quam illud quod subicitur sibi, ut subiectum est"; repeated a few lines below: "predicatum ut sic in plus se habet quam subiectum ut sic."

3. *QTL*, III, 2, p. 232: "Isti termini imaginandi sunt in una et eadem linea."

The categories are divided according to the division of the terms which have different modes of signifying, connoting and asking .⁴

That is why, when Blasius raises the question, which had been unavoidable since Burley's commentary on *Categories*, whether categories are terms or things, he gives the following general answer:

Only terms can be placed in a category and in no way external things, inasmuch as these are opposed to terms.⁵

As already indicated, these fundamental positions about the status of categories are not original: Blasius works within a widespread 14th-century tradition gathering Ockhamist and Buridianian teachings on that point.

On the other hand, Blasius does not explicitly raise the question of the number (the 'sufficiency') of categories, as he did for the Porphyrian 'predicables' in the lone question of Treatise II.⁶ Neither does he divide the categories into those which have an absolute signification and those which have a connotative signification. We shall have to examine, in each case, the categories which are the most sensitive from this point of view.

Quantity: extension

The first one, of course, is the category of quantity. The problem with which we are concerned is treated in two steps. First, in the first question dedicated to quantity, question 5 of treatise III: "Is the quantified substance distinguished from its quantity, or is it the same thing as its quantity and its extension? In other words, I seek to know behind these words if all quantity is a substance or a quality".⁷ This initial formulation of the problem sees it from the

4. *QTL*, III, 15, p. 320: "Predicamenta sunt divisa secundum divisionem terminorum habentium diversum modum significandi, connotandi et interrogandi."

5. *QTL*, III, 2, p. 234: "solum termini sunt ponibiles in predicamento, nullo modo res extra distincte contra terminos."

6. *QTL*, II, p. 204 *sqq.*; especially pp. 207-209.

7. *QTL*, III, 5, p. 263: "Utrum substantia quanta distinguatur a quantitate eius, vel

point of view of extension, or continuous quantity. Further on, the question is completed from the point of view of number, or discrete quantity.

In the first of these questions, Blasius answers in two steps, first according to a logical determination, then according to a physical determination. The logical determination is itself divided in two. First, the problem is treated on a metalinguistic level, as the identity of a term of the category of substance with a term of the category of quantity; secondly, as the identity of signified things. Only the second part is problematic and really pertinent. In that second part of the logical determination, Blasius lays down a series of conclusions about the identity or non-identity of quantity with substance or with quality.

Let us notice, by anticipation, what was indicated right from the title of the question: quality is here treated in the same way as substance. In other words, as in the Ockhamist doctrine, there are two categories whose absolute status is not questioned (that is to say that to a category of terms corresponds properly and directly a sort of things): substance and quality.

Paradoxically, Blasius does not tackle head-on the question of the real identity of a quality with its quantity or extension, although this question had been crucial for the conception of physical body since the thirteenth century and had become once more the object of attention due to the Ockhamist position and the debates to which it had given rise. Yet he takes it up when he takes into consideration the physical aspect of the question, and examines it at length in question 6 on book I of the *Physics*⁸. He there manifests caution, maybe because of the consequences for the sacrament of the Eucharist, which he mentions explicitly⁹. He successively develops both

idem sit quod sua quantitas et extensio ; sive queram sub his verbis : utrum omnis quantitas sit substantia vel qualitas.”

8. *Quaest. Phys.*, 2^a lectura, ms. Vat. lat. 2159 (dated 1397), f^o 71va-74rb.

9. See *Quaest. Phys.*, f^o 74ra : during the discussion of a difficulty (knowing if the extended whiteness is identical to its extension), Blasius of Parma evokes the sacrament of the Altar as an argument in favour of the distinction between quality and extension : “vides quod in Sacramento Altaris est albedo et extensio, et non est dubium fieri non quanta, et hoc arguit quod ista albedo est extensa per extensionem sibi

positions. However, reductionist arguments are somewhat favoured.

In the logical determination of Question III. 5 of the *Tractatus logice*, the theses are general, although the examples are for the most part numerical. The first conclusion affirms clearly the real identity of the thing designated by a quantitative and by a qualitative term.

(1) Some quantity is a quality (*aliqua quantitas est qualitas*); the example is that of a whiteness of a foot. If we think of the consequences for the Eucharist¹⁰ linked to the status of the quantity, it is clear that such a formulation makes the position of Thomas Aquinas impossible, according to whom a quantity is the subject of the qualities of transubstantiation.

(2) There is a quantity which is not a quality. The immediate meaning is simple: we take two qualities, their quantity (here the *binarius*, the number 2, or perhaps a pair) is not a quality because it is in no subject. This raises the question, to which we shall have to come back, of the status of mathematical terms, especially of numbers. The following conclusions only develop this initial intuition.

(3) There is a quantity that is neither a substance nor a quality.

(4) There is a quantity that is neither a substance nor substances, neither a quality nor qualities – we take as an example a pair formed by a substance and a quality.

I put aside conclusions (5), (6) and (7) and mention only conclusion (8), which comes back to the identity of a thing to which quantitative terms refer: a pair, *binarius*, can be the centuple of another *binarius*, if we think of two ants and two men. Here the centuple ratio is not between quantitative terms themselves (that would be a non-

condistinctam⁹; the fact is all the more noticeable as it is rare to see Blasius appeal to arguments of a theological nature.

10. It is precisely about the same example that Blasius evokes the sacrament of the Altar in the *Physics*.

sense) but between their referents. Therefore, quantitative terms do not supposit for anything but substantial (or qualitative) terms.

If we now look at what Blasius calls the ‘physical determination’, things are simpler. But is it here really about physics ? It is again about the theory of categories, considered from a metaphysical point of view, and with evident consequences in the field of natural philosophy. Blasius speaks here again without any nuance:

Concerning the third article of the question, one must not doubt this conclusion: All quantity is a substance or a quality.¹¹

The ontological basis is no less clear:

Whichever thing is demonstrated, it is either a substance or an accident ... if it exists by itself, then it is a substance, if it is inherent in some other thing, then it is an accident.¹²

In fact, Blasius gives the arguments of the position that would admit a distinction between substance and quantity, he even grants that each position could be sustained with some persuasive force;¹³ in fact, he seems to think that most of the authorities are in favour of this position,¹⁴ and surely he is mainly thinking of Peter of Spain, on whose text he is commenting. However, even if this position may be rationally supported, it implies paradoxical consequences, for example that we could remove extension and preserve Socrates, re-

11. “Pro tertio articulo questionis non est dubitandum de hac conclusione : omnis quantitas est substantia vel qualitas” (*QTL*, III, 5, p. 269).

12. *QTL*, III, 5, p. 269: “quacumque re demonstrata, ipsa est substantia vel accidens ... Si est per se existens, sic est substantia, si est alteri inherens, sic est qualitas” The unrestricted range of this thesis and its status as a principle are underlined: “Immo habetur pro principio in quacumque Facultate quod omne quod est aut est substantia vel accidens”.

13. *QTL*, III, 5, p. 269: “Et quia ista materia est sustentabilis pro utraque parte ...”.

14. *QTL*, III, 5, p. 269 : “... una opinio ponit hanc conclusionem : substantia quanta non est sua quantitas vel extensio Ista tamen videtur esse vera propter ... multas auctoritates Aristotelis et aliorum sapientium”.

move corporeity and preserve a man, and still more curious things¹⁵. Furthermore, he claims, it has the defect of resting on the methodological principle of divine omnipotence in order to attest the separability *de jure* of naturally inseparable things.

He exposes more briefly the position which identifies substance and quantity, drawing above all the consequences: we have to admit that one and the same *substantia quanta* can be under different extensions, smaller or bigger, because of a local movement. This thesis, formulated in typically Ockhamist terms, implies that extension is considered as a disposition of the substance, and not as a quantity, which would be really distinct; the only means of thinking an extensional variation of one and the same substance is to reduce it to a movement of its parts¹⁶.

Quantity: number

From Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham, the connection between substance and extension was at the centre of the discussion about the status of quantity. That is why, in chapter 44 of the first treatise of his *Summa logicae*, William of Ockham briefly mentions discrete quantity and dedicates most of his argumentation to the connections between the point, the line or the surface, or more generally between continuous quantity and substance or quality¹⁷.

Blasius of Parma, for his part, writes at greater length about number. There is here, without any doubt, an evolution which is characteristic of his treatise. First, he makes number the subject of a special question (III.9), which is rather short, but whose formulation explicitly raises the problem of 'reduction': "Is number the

15. See more details in Biard 2003a.

16. In the initial arguments, Blasius introduced several explanations on the sphericity of a piece of wax, in order to prove that this sphericity is different from the substance itself. Here, it would thus be suitable to refute these arguments, which were going in the direction of the other position, however "probabilis". He, nevertheless, implies that their refutation does not cause any major problem: "Si tamen quis velit tenere partem oppositam, iudicat per se ad eas" (*QTL.*, III, 5, p. 271).

17. See William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, p. 132-139.

things which are numbered, or is it distinguished from them?”¹⁸ The arguments in favour of a distinction rest especially on the possibility of numbering and counting regardless of the real state of things, while the argument against the being of number takes up a process applied elsewhere to the point, namely the impossibility of assigning to it the status of substance or of accident. As for the solution, after having mentioned, but also contested, the distinction between numbering number, numbered number and number by which we number¹⁹, Blasius establishes, this time without any hesitation or nuance, the identity of number and of things numbered: “Number is the very things that are numbered.”²⁰ This identity is clearly founded on the identity of reference (supposition) of the terms in a proposition such as ‘These ten horses are a number’ (*isti decem equi sunt numerus*). So a numerical term or concept does not refer to something distinct, which would have a specific mode of being or subsisting. Blasius however states that if we understand by ‘number’ the words or the concepts by which we count, then there is not identity, for then number is an accident of the soul.

Secondly, the importance of the question of number, relatively to that of extension, stands out owing to the fact that Blasius has dedicated a good part of question 5 to the identity of number and things numbered, although it ought to be dedicated to extension. Indeed, conclusions 2 to 8 (i.e., all the conclusions save one), concern numbers. In a previous article²¹, I did not sufficiently realize the importance of this point and the significance of these conclusions. First they affirm the non-identity, in a certain sense, of quantity and quality. In conclusions 2 and 3, the quantity (the *binarius*), is not a quality nor a substance, because it is qualities (i.e. *several* qualities). The formulations “There is a quantity which is not a quality” (*aliqua est quantitas que non est qualitas*), “There is a quantity which is not a substance nor a quality” (*aliqua est quantitas que non est substantia nec*

18. “Utrum numerus sit res numerate vel distinguatur ab eis” (*QTL.*, III, 9, p. 289-292).

19. *QTL.*, III, 9, p. 291 : “Ex istis conclusionibus evidenter apparet quod distinctio premissa posita tam ab antiquis quam a modernis est nullius valoris”.

20. “Numerus est ipse res numerate” (*QTL.*, III, 9) ; cf *Quaest. Phys.*, I, 6, f° 72vb.

21. See footnote 15.

qualitas)²² allow the possibility of some conceptual independence of what is signified by the subject, but these theses assimilate the reference of these terms either to one or several qualities (conclusions 1, 2 and 3), or to one or several substances, material or immaterial, or even to one quality and one substance (conclusion 4)²³.

Nevertheless, in such cases, we shall be able to realize operations on numbers only by attributing to them a certain unity, even a signification which cannot totally be reduced to reference. The point is not examined in depth, but the last two conclusions already progress in this direction. The 7th shows that if we reduce number to its reference, some numbers will be neither equal nor unequal (*e.g.* two men and two intelligences). The 8th, in a complementary manner, shows that in the same perspective, a *binarius* could be a hundred times bigger than another (two men and two ants). Either of these hypotheses would make arithmetic impossible. But, for Blasius, the value of mathematics (arithmetics, geometry, theory of proportions) is a fact, and so must be accounted for. We cannot, therefore, limit ourselves to this point. In order to overcome this difficulty, we have to consider, more briefly, another category, that of relation, and then reflect on its use in the field of mathematics.

Relation

Blasius dedicates three questions to relation. The last, qu. 14, asks

Whether relation is something distinct from the things related and designated by the terms of the category *ad aliquid*, i.e., I wish to ask in this question whether fatherhood is different from the thing which is the father, and whether dependence is something different from that which is dependent.²⁴

22. . See *QTL*, III, 5, p. 267.

23. . See *QTL*, III, 5, p. 267-268 ; we find the same formulations in *Quaest. Phys.* I, 6, f^o 72vb.

24. . *QTL*, III, 14, p. 314: "Utrum relatio sit res distincta a rebus invicem relatis et importatis per terminos de predicamento ad aliquid, ut velim querere in illa questione utrum paternitas sit ista res que est pater vel distincta a patre, et dependentia sit res distincta a dependente".

The treatment is rather short, and the solution establishes without ambiguity that “relation is not a thing distinct from the things signified by the terms of the category *ad aliquid*”, so that “dependence is the dependent thing itself”, and that relation is “the things related to each other” (*ipse res invicem relate* – I correct the edition p. 316), except in the case of terms which do not refer to external things, i.e. metalinguistic statements, in which the terms themselves are the significates. The only justification of his claim is a reference to an argument *ad oppositum*, according to which the position of such a dependence would imply an infinite process. This conception of relation would be made explicit and unfolded in Blasius’ mathematical texts.

To summarize, Blasius develops, in a perspective that is close to that of Ockham, a reductionist conception of categories in which quantity and relation are reduced to substances and qualities. However, we must notice that, concerning quantity, he does not spend as much time on extension, a question which is decisive for the status of material body, as he does on number.

Epistemological stakes

If we now take into consideration other texts of Blasius of Parma, and in particular his *Questions on Thomas Bradwardine’s Treatise on Proportions*, we see that his conception of categories and the implied ontology, are related to a conception of the status of mathematics, and of the relation between mathematics and natural philosophy. To make this clear, we must start from the category of relation.

Indeed, the ratio (in latin *proportio*), which is the subject of Bradwardine’s treatise, and then of Blasius’ questions, is defined as a *habitus*. Question 2 discusses the following definition:

Consequently, in the second question, it is asked whether a ratio is, properly speaking, the relation (*habitus*) of two quantities to each other.²⁵

25. Blaise de Parme, *Questiones circa tractatus proportionum magistri Thome Bradwardini* [henceforward: *QTP*], qu. 2, p. 6r: “Consequenter secundo queritur utrum proportio proprie dicta sit duarum quantitatum unius ad alteram habitudo.”

The term *habitus* is a classical one. We find it in the version of the *Elements* of Euclid, composed by Campanus of Novara in the 13th century,²⁶ and it was taken up by Thomas Bradwardine.²⁷ In his *Questions on the Meteorologica*, Blasius attributes this definition to Euclid.²⁸ The formulations clearly indicate a relation of something to another thing, *unius ad alteram*. During the argumentation, Blasius considers a consequence as another example of *habitus*, and further on he evokes a comparison. Indeed, this definition is not the real object of the question, contrary to what the title suggests. The question is “Which thing is a ratio ?” (*Que res est proportio?*), and this second formulation introduces a more ontological interrogation about the connection between the relation itself (more precisely, the mathematical ratio as relation) and the things put in relation. The main conclusion is the following: “A ratio is things which are related to each other”,²⁹ and this is affirmed again in the reply to the contrary arguments.³⁰

At that stage, the ratio, one of the central objects of the mathematical theory of the period, and furthermore for the mathematization of physical phenomena, is characterised in a way which makes use of the reductionist conception formulated in logic. We find the same process in another question, question 4, about the ratio between the diagonal and the side of the square, and in this case such a reduction is presented, in the case of geometrical concepts, with an interesting accuracy:

26. See H. L. L. Busard 2005 (*Campanus of Novara*), p. 103, df. 3: “Proportio est duarum quantaecunque sint eiusdem generis quantitatum, certa alterius ad alteram habitudo.”

27. Thomas Bradwardine, *Tract. de proportionibus*, p. 66, l. 8-10: “Proportio autem quae proprie est accepta, in solis quantitibus reperitur. Quae definitur hoc modo: Proportio est duarum quantitatum eiusdem generis unius ad alteram habitudo.”

28. *Quaest. meteororum*, I, qu. 3, ms. Vat. Chigi O. IV. 41, f^o 61va-vb: “Dico primo quod proportio est duarum quantitatum alterius ad alteram certa habitudo, et hec diffinitio habetur ab Euclide V^o *Elementorum* et a Thoma Barduardino.”

29. “proportio est res invicem proportionate” (*QTP*, 2, p. 63).

30. *QTP*, 2., p. 65.

I say that if you intend to speak like philosophers, who say that lines are not distinguished from surfaces, nor surfaces from bodies, then it must be conceded that the diameter of the square is the square itself and that the side of the square is also the square itself.³¹

This language (or this mode of thinking) is therefore that of ‘philosophers’ – and we must probably understand by that expression ‘natural philosophers’, particularly physicists, while also allowing it a larger scope since logic and ontology are concerned.

Geometrical concepts are situated at a level which is different from the categories of substance or quantity, or even of number and things numbered. We can, however, detect the same tendency to reduce some concepts, considered as having no proper and direct reference, to a ‘thing’ to which all the concepts of that series refer, namely body. Surely, ‘body’ is still a mathematical concept, pertaining to continuous quantity, but we could again ask about it the question about the reduction of extension to substance. We are indeed engaged in the same process, the same approach, even if we stop, here, at a stage which is not the last.

Another interesting precision is the outlined dissociation between “speaking like philosophers” (*loqui ut philosophi*) and “the way of mathematicians” (*modus mathematicorum*).³² The first approach leads to reduction, logical as well as metaphysical; the second imagines for example lines that are indivisible according to width:

But different is the way of mathematicians who imagine lines which are indivisible according to width.³³

But we must not believe that this approach is to be depreciated, condemned in the name of philosophy: we are in a treatise where Blasius discusses the properly mathematical value of this or that

31. *QTP*, 4, p. 86. “... dico quod si intendis loqui ut philosophi, dicentes lines non distingui a superficiebus nec superficies a corporibus, tunc erit concedendum quod dyiameter quadrati erit ipsum quadratum, et idem de costa ipsius quadrati.”

32. This point is examined in greater depth in Biard, 2003b.

33. *QTP*, p. 86: “Sed alius est modus mathematicorum ymaginantium lines indivisibiles secundum latitudinem.”

definition. On the one hand, consequently, Blasius remains true to his logical and metaphysical conceptions, recalling that the determinations of quantity, numbers or extensions, do not signify things that would be distinct; from that point of view, consequently, numbers must be assimilated to things that are numbered, lines and surfaces to bodies, ratios to the things related. Blasius refuses to hypostatize mathematical objects. On the other hand, he needs to confer a certain validity on mathematical conceptual instruments, in particular on the theory of ratios. Indeed, the fact of limiting ourselves to the point of view which combines elements of logic, physics and philosophy would not only remove all ontological consistency from the ratio, but would also lead to paradoxes, impossible to sustain mathematically. In particular, since the ratio is reducible to things which are related, the ratio between the numbers 2 and 3, for example (or, if we go to the end of the reduction, between 2 things of some sort and 3 things of another sort³⁴), would be the same as the ratio between 3 and 2, or the double ratio (*proportio dupla*) would be the same as the subduple ratio (*proportio subdupla*), and more generally “the same thing is a ratio of a greater inequality and a ratio of a smaller inequality”.³⁵ This opposition between the mathematical and the philosophical way of speaking is underlined in question 3 of the *Questions on the treatise on proportions*, which must be read in connection with the previously mentioned passages from the *Questions on logical treatises*:

when arithmeticians speak of number, they distinguish number from things which are numbered, and in no way do they consider numbered things, but natural philosophers take number for numbered things.³⁶

34. Which implies that the word ‘ratio’ should be used in a broad sense, and not in a narrow sense as the ratio between two quantities of the same sort ; but such a broader use is allowed.

35. *QTP*, 2, p. 64; The expression ‘the same thing is’ underlines the identity of reference ; a ratio A/B is of greater inequality if A is superior to B, and of lesser inequality if B is superior to A. See also Biard & Rommevaux, « Introduction » to *QTP*, p. 18.

36. *QTP*, 3, p. 70: “... dum arismetrici loquuntur de numero, distinguunt numerum

So they do not reduce number to things and treat it, we may say, as an ‘object’ to which they give some autonomy. For if mathematicians were to proceed “as philosophers”, mathematics would be emptied of all content. The point is formulated through an objection, which threatens the very existence of a treatise on ratios:

We cannot say that the relation (*habitus*) is things which are related to each other, as are a man and a donkey, since then a relation would be nothing, as nothing is a man and a donkey.³⁷

Being neither a substance (since only the singular is a substance), nor an accident (since an accident could not be subjectively in two distinct substances), the ratio would be nothing, would not be a thing.

In question 5, Blasius in the reply to an objection comes to characterize the *modus mathematicorum*:

I say that if one conceives of a ratio as things which are related to each other ... the antecedent of the argument must be conceded. ... But if one conceives of a ratio according to its formal reason, the antecedent must be denied.³⁸

Mathematicalia are not treated as independent substances, as they might be by Platonists, but the formal reason, that is to say the active mode of conceiving, becomes the proper object of the mathematician, and is treated and handled as such. The same procedure is

contra res numeratas, et nullo modo considerant de rebus numeratis, sed philosophi naturales capiunt numerum pro rebus numeratis.”

37. *QTP*, 2, p. 62-63: “Non potest dici quod habitudo est res invicem proportionate sicut sunt homo et asinus, quia tunc nichil esset habitudo, sicut nichil esset homo et asinus”; at the end of the sentence, we must understand ‘nothing’ (nihil) as ‘not a thing’; this brings us back to a position which is discussed as much in Buridan as in the condemnations of Nicolas of Autrécourt.

38. *QTP*, 5, p. 94: “Dico quod capiendo proportionem pro rebus proportionatis ... concedendum est tunc antecedens rationis. ... Sed capiendo proportionem secundum eius rationem formalem, antecedens est negandum.” See also p. 91: “et quia iste modus loquendi est inconsuetus, loquar nunc de proportionem secundum rationem formalem ...”.

applied, as we have seen, to lines and surfaces, as it is to the question of indivisibles and of the continuous.³⁹

This duality of point of view is not proper to the *Questions on the Treatise on Proportions*. We find it again in many other texts by Blasius of Parma. Thus taking a point to be indivisible is proper to the mathematician, while from a physical point of view everything is divisible. In his *Questions on Generation and Corruption*, Blasius shows the contradictions that would result from the position (the ‘imagination’, as is the term used for mathematics) of physical indivisibles;⁴⁰ similarly the question “Does the sphere touch the plane in one point?”⁴¹ shows the contradictions which would result from transferring the mathematical concepts of point, line and sphere to natural philosophy. On the other hand, in mathematics, Blasius is more cautious concerning composing a continuum out of indivisibles.⁴² The mathematical concept of point is indeed an imagined indivisible, while the physicist takes it rather as an infinitely small thing.⁴³

This opposition between mathematical and physical concepts is particularly clear in the *Question on the Contact between a Sphere and a Plane*. Blasius appears very dependent on a certain Buridianian tradition, as much for the definitions of the point as for the general direction of the question towards a problem in the epistemology of mathematics. But what is new, is that Blasius clearly distinguishes the physical treatment and the mathematical treatment of the question (even if the details are sometimes confused). There, Blasius develops once more a reductionist ontology for the term ‘contact’, which is a relational term:

I presuppose first, as it is true in the things, that the contact of bodies is the bodies touching each other.⁴⁴

39. See *QTL*, III, 10, p. 293-298.

40. . *Quaest. de gen. et corr.*, I, 15, ms. Vat. Chigi O IV 41, f^o 23va.

41. “Utrum sphaera tangit planum in puncto”. See Biard & Rommevaux 2009, which contains an introduction, the edition of the question and a French translation.

42. See Biard 2009.

43. We find clear allusions to these different conceptions in question 11 of the *Questiones circa tractatum proportionum*, ed. cit., p. 192.

44. “Et presuppono primo, ut est rei veritas, quod tactus corporum est corpora sese

Above all, he develops the thesis according to which mathematical concepts do not have real referents, at least not proper and absolute referents. For natural philosophy, the fact of admitting the being of the point, the line and the surface would generate contradictions. After having set forth such contradictions, which result from the parallel between the concepts of point, line and surface on the one hand, and his reductionist ontology on the other, Blasius announces that he will determine the question “first physically and then geometrically”. Physically speaking, all geometrical conclusions are false, since they consider something which does not exist. Nevertheless, these statements make sense if we understand them *conditionaliter* or *ex suppositione*. I shall not here go into the details of this treatment, which combines logical and mathematical considerations,⁴⁵ From a purely logical point of view, one could try to reduce the problem to a question of connotation and syncategoremata. But Blasius’ aim is not such a semantical reduction. On the contrary, by autonomizing this mode of conceiving, this *ratio formalis*, he aims to produce by means of the imagination some *mathematicalia* which can be manipulated as such, opening the conceptual space in which mathematics may be unfolded.

Conclusion

The logical and ontological basis of the study of categories is not so far from the Ockhamist doctrine: two categories of absolute terms, and a strong reductionist approach to such categories as quantity and relation. We have noticed, however, that in comparison to that model, the general balance is slightly modified. On one hand, in the treatment of quantity, the place dedicated to number is as important as the one dedicated to extension. On the other hand, the category of relation is presented, not from the perspective of theological problems, but from the perspective of the mathematical theory

tangentia.” Blasius will come back several times to this point in the course of the question.

45. All this has been set forth in details in our *Introduction* to the edition quoted above (footnote 41).

of ratios and proportions. So Blasius of Parma proposes an epistemology of mathematics which takes up some suggestions made by Buridan or made in texts close to those of Buridan. But the place given to it is definitely more prominent, in accordance with the general orientation of Blasius' works – let us not forget that in Italy his *Questions on the treatise on proportions* were discussed in natural philosophy until the 16th century.

These developments probably show the impossibility of maintaining a purely extensional vision of the signification of concepts if we want to give sense to mathematics – which is a reasonable aim. Blasius does not turn to a mathematical Platonism, as was often to happen after the translation of Proclus' commentary on book I of Euclid's *Elements* in the 16th century. But he does not stick with abstractionist statements, as was frequently the case in the beginning of the 14th century. The autonomization of the formal reason (which is not a concept abstracted from sensible things) allows, without treating mathematical substances as real beings, to unfold mathematics at its own level of being without regard to any logical or philosophical theses that might be incompatible with its results.

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CHAPTER IO

Domingo de Soto on the *Categories*: Words, Things, and Denominatives

E. J. Ashworth

Despite humanist attacks, notably by Petrus Ramus, Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* retained their place in university education throughout the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century. Indeed, as late as the 1660s the logic notes in John Locke's early manuscripts are largely devoted to predication, the five predicables, and the ten categories,¹ and in his *Essay concerning human understanding* Locke found it necessary to complain about those "bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy" who "think the Ten Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things".² Original and sustained discussion of these matters is, however, harder to find. Most textbooks cover the issues only in a summary fashion, and such a leading commentator as Agostino Nifo wrote no commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* or on the *Categories*. Domingo de Soto is one exception. His substantial commentary on the *Categories*, combined with commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, was published 18 times between 1543 and 1598, mainly in Salamanca, but with one edition in Louvain and five in Venice.³

1. See Ashworth forthcoming.

2. Locke, *Essay*, III.x.14, p. 497.

3. Lohr 1988: 431. For a general summary of Soto's position, see Bos 2000. For a useful introduction to medieval views, see Pini 2002. For Soto on equivocation, see Ashworth 1996. Bos and Ashworth give different dates for Soto's birth, but Angel d'Ors (in private correspondence) supported the view that 1494 is the correct date. I owe much to Angel d'Ors († 2012) for his useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

In his commentary, Soto addresses the main questions faced by medieval and Renaissance thinkers, namely does the work deal with words or things, and why is it classified as an introduction to logic? He then takes up a number of subsidiary questions, two of which I shall discuss below. First, why does the work begin with the discussion of equivocals, univocals and denominatives? Second, are denominatives really like equivocals and univocals in relevant respects? In what follows I shall begin by sketching Soto's main conclusions about the nature and purpose of Aristotle's *Categories* as a whole. This will lead me into a discussion of predication, and what it is that we predicate. I shall then turn to the subsidiary questions about why the work opens as it does, and about the status of denominatives.

1. The Nature and Purpose of Aristotle's *Categories*

I begin with the question of whether the *Categories* is about words or things. Here we should note that Soto, like many of his predecessors, assumed that 'words' included mental terms or concepts as well as written and spoken words, so that Simplicius's listing of a third view, that the *Categories* is about concepts,⁴ was not a subject of discussion for Soto. Walter Burley, whom Soto occasionally cites, had begun his preface to the *Ars vetus* by considering all three candidates for the subject of logic, and, after stating that an intention was the concept of a thing, had argued that logic was concerned with second intentions insofar as they were added to first intentions.⁵ In the prologue to his last commentary on the *Categories*, Burley only considered things and words, and argued that the *Categories* was principally about things, though once more he insisted on their re-

4. Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 13.

5. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. a 2rB-vA. He wrote (sig. 2rB): "Et est dicendum secundum Avicennam in *Logica* sua quod logica est de intentionibus secundis adiunctis primis." He added (sig. a 2vA): "Non enim determinatur in logica de homine nisi in quantum est species, vel subiectum vel predicatum propositionis, vel in quantum est terminus in syllogismo Similiter non determinatur de vocibus in logica, nisi in quantum significant res ut eis insunt intentiones secunde."

lation to second intentions such as *genus* and *species*.⁶ Paul of Venice, whom Soto also cites, had argued against Burley that the logician is concerned not only with things in relation to second intentions, but in themselves and according to their modes and properties.⁷

Soto himself lists three possibilities (*In Cat.*, pp. 106B–107A). One is the standard view put forward by Boethius, that the *Categories* is about words insofar as they are significative of things.⁸ The second is the view that the *Categories* is about things, and here he cites Averroes and Eustratius. The final view is that of the nominalists, who hold that the *Categories* is about words alone. The point to be emphasized here is that on the first two views, logic and ontology are normally taken to be parallel, in that categorial terms mirror real ontological divisions, whereas the nominalists denied any such parallelism.⁹

Soto summed up his answer to the question of whether the *Categories* is about words or things by giving five theses. I will start with the first three. Thesis one is that both words and things are put in categories.¹⁰ If one takes the ordered sequence *man, animal, living, body, substance*, then one can say that with respect to things, man is a rational animal, and that an animal is a living thing able to sense,

6. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vA–vB. Burley's two earlier commentaries were presumably unavailable to Soto.

7. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 79rA–vB. He writes (fol. 79vA) “Sequitur quod logicus non solum considerat 10 predicamenta per respectum ad intentiones secundas ut Burlaeus asserit ... logicus videtur considerare predicamenta non solum per respectum ad intentiones secundas sed magis secundum se et secundum ea que accidunt eis tanquam modi aut proprietates.”

8. Boethius, *In Categorias*, cols. 159C–160B.

9. I say ‘normally’ because not all those of a realist persuasion believed that there were exactly ten categories.

10. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p.107A: “Prima, tam res quam voces ponuntur in praedicamento ... Probatur. Homo a parte rei est animal rationale, et animal est vivens sensibile, et vivens est corpus animatum, et corpus est substantia corporea; ergo in rebus ipsis, puta in quocunque homine, est animal contractum per rationale ad esse hominis, et vivens contractum per sensibile ad esse animalis, et pariter reliqua superiora genera, atque adeo res sunt in praedicamento Quod vero nomina ponuntur in praedicamento probatur. A qualibet essentiali convenientia abstrahit intellectus formalem conceptum adaequatum eius, ergo qualis est ordo in rebus, talis est in istis nominibus, ‘homo’, ‘animal’, ‘vivens’, ‘corpus’, ‘substantia’, tanquam in rerum signis.”

and so on. Hence we can say of things themselves that in every man, *animal* is contracted by *rational* to bring about the *esse* of *man*, and in every animal, *living thing* is contracted by *able to sense* to bring about the *esse* of *animal*. All this is confirmed by *Metaphysics* 5 where Aristotle divides real being (*ens reale*) into the ten categories. On the other hand, wherever there is an essential agreement in things, the intellect abstracts formal adequate concepts of the essential agreements involved, and so, just as there is an order in the real things, there is an order in the names ‘man’, ‘animal’ and ‘living’. Thesis two is that not only names but things are predicated.¹¹ Things are predicated really and objectively, and names are predicated instrumentally and as signs of things. Although names are predicated more properly, things are predicated more principally. Thesis three is that the book of *Categories* is about things insofar as things are signified by names, and about names insofar as they signify things, but it is more principally about things.¹² Soto claims that this is the view of Pseudo-Augustine in the *Categoriae decem*, and of Avicenna.

This rapid outline of Soto’s first three theses has obviously raised a number of issues which need to be addressed, including the nature of a category, the nature of predication, the nature of the things predicated, and the nature of second intentions. To begin with the first issue, Soto denied that the word ‘praedicamentum’ supposed only for the highest member of each category. Instead, he described a category or *praedicamentum* as an ordering (*ordinatio*) of predicates of which the higher are predicated quidditatively of the lower, and his example is the sequence *man, animal, living, body, substance*.¹³ This is

11. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 107B: “Non solum nomina sed res etiam praedicantur: res quidem realiter, et obiective, sed nomina instrumentaliter et tanquam rerum signa; et quamvis nomina forte magis proprie, tamen res principalius.”

12. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 109A: “Liber praedicamentorum est de rebus in quantum nominibus significantur, et de nominibus in quantum significant res; sed principalius tractat de rebus.”

13. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 106A: “Est ergo praedicamentum praedicatorum ordinatio, quorum superiora de inferioribus quidditative praedicantur. Ut series illa quae in arbore Porphyrii ante oculos posita est: puta, homo, animal, vivens, corpus, substantia Igitur praedicamentum non supponit, ut aliqui arbitrantur, pro generalissimo.”

not a new description. In the thirteenth century Lambert of Auxerre (or Lagny), for instance, wrote that a category is “ordinatio predicabilium in linea predicamentali”.¹⁴ Soto linked his remarks to the claim that since the subject of the *Categories* is the *praedicamentum*, it considers only what is “ponibile in praedicamento” (*In Cat.*, p. 106B). Once more his description seems to be closely linked to a standard claim, namely that the material subject of the *Categories* is “ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere”: a simple predicabile being which can be ordered in a genus.¹⁵ Later he claims that no matter how people stand with relation to the priority of words or things, they all agree that a *praedicamentum* is a *praedicatorum series* (*In Cat.*, p. 109B).

2. Soto on Predication

We now have to ask what predication is for Domingo de Soto. Properly speaking, it is the linguistic act of affirming or denying something of a subject (*In Cat.*, p. 107A, 108B), and he writes that predication is not brought about in things, but is only exercised in the mind, in utterance, or in writing (*In Cat.*, p. 108B, reading ‘fit’ rather than ‘sit’). The act of predication is expressed in a proposition, and, contrary to Walter Burley, whom Soto attacks at some length (*In Cat.*, p. 107A–B, pp. 108B–109A) propositions themselves are not to be found among things.¹⁶ They are resolved into nouns and verbs, and they have properties such as being exclusive or exceptive which depend on syncategorematic terms. It is their significates that are things, not the propositions themselves. On the other hand, there is a sense in which things are indeed predicated. Names signify things, for they are instrumental signs, and the purpose of using names in a linguistic predication is to reveal truths about things, especially about their essential natures. Insofar as the knowledge of quiddities is the true end of essential predication, we can say that although names are properly predicated, things are not only “really and ob-

14. Lambert, *Logica*, p. 50. He explained that “Predicabile idem est quod dicibile.”

15. See Ashworth 1997: 288. Burley uses the phrase: *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vA.

16. See Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vB–c 4vA.

jectively” predicated (*In Cat.*, p. 107B) but are principally predicated (*In Cat.*, p. 108A).¹⁷

If we ask what these things are that are principally predicated, we have to make a distinction between individual things and universal things. As Soto argues in his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, singulars, such as Socrates, are never properly predicated. They are natural subjects, and can be predicates only in some extended sense.¹⁸ On the other hand, there are no separate or separable universal things. Soto is quite clear on this point.¹⁹ Everything in the world is really individual and singular (*In Porph.*, p. 30B). Universals are predicated of things and exist in things (*In Porph.*, p. 30B), for Peter is a man through humanity and white through whiteness, but they are only rationally distinguished from individuals.²⁰ Moreover, while things are species and genera in a simple sense (*simpliciter*) before the action of the intellect, given that Peter and Paul are men, and that men are animals,²¹ nothing is an actual universal until it has been abstracted by the intellect, for to be an actual universal is to be an actual intelligible.²² In his commentary on the *Categorías*, Soto

17. For text, see Appendix One: On Predication.

18. Ashworth 2004: 533-535.

19. For discussion, see van der Lecq 2000: 309-325.

20. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 32B: “... sicut enim Petrus non est albus nisi per albedinem quae est in illo, ita non est homo, nisi per naturam hominis quae est in illo; ergo universale est in singularibus. Rursus, ratio hominis secundum esse materiale quod habet in Petro non potest esse in Paulo, quia in Petro est facta haec per conditiones singulares, quae repugnant Paulo; ergo non habet quod fit [or ‘sit’?] universalis vel communis nisi per abstractionem intellectus a conditionibus singularibus cuiuscunque individui. Abstrahi vero per intellectum nihil aliud est, pro nunc, quam concipi conceptu communi. Itaque homo ipse singularis quatenus est obiectum huius conceptus universalis *homo* dicitur universale, Et dicitur ratio communis, et natura hominis, et hoc est universale distingui ratione a singularibus.”

21. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 37A: “Res nihilominus ante quamcumque operationem intellectus sunt simpliciter species et genera Itaque, licet sine operatione intellectus, non sint universalis in actu; tamen sufficit ut sint species et genera, quod Petrus, verbi gratia, sit homo, et Paulus sit homo, et homo sit animal, et equus sit animal.”

22. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 36B: “Res non est universale in actu nisi quando actu abstrahitur species intelligibilis a phantasmatis. Probatur: esse universale in actu est esse intelligibile in actu, quia universale est obiectum intellectus, sed res non est intelligibile in actu nisi quando actu abstrahitur eius species”

adds that to say that things are predicated in a basic sense (*fundamentaliter*) before the operation of the intellect is just to say, for example, that the *ratio* of man is in Peter substantially, and the *ratio* of whiteness is in Peter accidentally. Actual predication occurs when the intellect actually considers one thing as a subject, that of which something is said, and another thing as predicate, that which is said of another (*In Cat.*, p. 108A). Things are then said to be predicated “passively and objectively” (*In Cat.*, p. 108B).²³

At this point, further distinctions need to be made. Intelligible species or concepts of the intellect are universals *in repraesentando*, but not universals *in praedicando* (*In Porph.*, p. 28B; cf. *In Cat.*, p. 108A). The former are formal concepts, which exist as acts or qualities of mind; the latter are objective concepts, which are the objects immediately signified by the formal concepts.²⁴ Real singular things such as men and animals as considered by the intellect are in the intellect objectively, and, as the objects of the concepts *man* and *animal*, are universals.²⁵ They can also be called ‘first intentions’ because *man* and *animal* are what is first conceived by the mind, and they are not relational, even though they are called ‘first intentions’ because of a relation to the intellect. In this they are unlike second intentions such as *genus* and *species*, which are not only beings of reason (*entia rationis*) rather than real beings, but are also relations of reason, brought about by the mind’s reflection on and ordering of its first intentions.²⁶

23. See Appendix One for texts relating to this paragraph.

24. *In Porph.*, p. 30B: “... notandum est duplicem esse conceptum. Alius est formalis, qui est qualitas potentiae cognoscitivae, qua res formaliter cognoscimus; et alius est conceptus obiectivus, qui est formaliter obiectum immediate significatum per conceptum formalem, puta per notitiam.”

25. *In Porph.*, p. 33A: “Universalis sunt in rebus, sed universalitas est obiective in intellectu ... res ipsae singulares in essendo, quatenus sunt obiecta horum conceptuum *homo*, *animal*, et similibus, sunt universalis.”

26. *In Porph.*, pp. 38B–39A: “Est igitur prima intentio id quod primo concipitur de re, id est, id quod convenit rei de se sine respectu ad operationem intellectus. Et secunda intentio est id quod secundo concipitur de re, id est, proprietas quae consequitur in re per operationem intellectus Ex quo sequitur primo, quod si intentio accipitur formaliter, utraque est ens reale, ut puta subiective et realiter existens in intellectu. Si vero accipitur obiective, prima intentio est ens reale, sed secunda intentio est ens

The issue of first and second intentions brings us to Soto's last two theses. Thesis four is that things are considered in relation to the second intention 'to be predicated', given that they are considered as ordered in predication.²⁷ Here Soto says that he is seeking a middle road between Burley, who held that logic was concerned with things only as they were the basis for such second intentions as *genus* and *species*, and Paul of Venice, who denied this (*In Cat.*, p. 109B).²⁸ The final thesis is that whereas Porphyry's *Isagoge* considered second intentions as such, the *Categories* focuses on first intentions as the basis for predication.²⁹

Soto's discussion of the last two theses allows him to answer the question of why the *Categories* is classified as a work of logic rather than of metaphysics (*In Cat.*, p. 109B). This question had become important in the thirteenth century, with the recovery of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and it was normal to maintain that the metaphysician and the logician approach the categories from different viewpoints.³⁰ Soto is no different. The metaphysician, he argues, considers such second intentions as *genus* and *species* in order to explain the nature of things, whereas the logician reverses the process and considers things as they will be employed in predication. Moreover, while the

rationalis. Sequitur secundo quod prima intentio non est relatio, nam natura hominis, natura animalis, et quaecumque res mundi, est prima intentio, quamquam denominatur sic per respectum ad intellectum, quia est primum cognitum. Sed secunda intentio est relatio rationis."

27. *In Cat.*, p. 109B: "Negari non potest quin considerentur hic res in ordine ad secundum intentionem, quae est praedicari Est enim differentia inter logicum et metaphysicum, quod logicus tractat de rebus, ut cognoscat earum intentionis praedicandi; metaphysicus vero econverso, si tractat de intentionibus, ut 5. *Met.* tractatur de genere etc., id facit, ut explicet naturas rerum."

28. For references, see above, notes 6 and 7.

29. *In Cat.*, p. 109B: "Non considerantur hic secundae intentiones quemadmodum in praedicabilibus. Non enim definitur hic quid sit genus aut species, aut aliud universale, sed explicantur naturae substantiae, quantitatis, etc., ut in particulari cognoscatur quid de quo praedicatur praedicatione generis aut accidentis, etc. Quocirca considerantur proprietates substantiae et aliorum praedicamentorum secundum esse reale, ut recipere magis et minus, recipere contraria etc. Sed tamen omnia tractantur, ut inde sumatur iudicium praedicationis."

30. Pini 2002:19–27.

purpose of Porphyry's *Isagoge* was to explain the nature of *genus*, *species*, and other universals, the purpose of the *Categories* is to explain the nature of substance, quantity, and the other categories in order to know what can be predicated of what. As a result, the logician has to consider the properties of substances and accidents according to their real being, as apt to be qualified by more and less, to receive contraries, and so on. All this is done in order to "provide the judgement of predication". A little later, Soto argues that whereas the metaphysician considers things according to their natural and absolute being, the logician considers them as they come under the operations of reason, and give rise to different kinds of predication, such as *per se* and accidental. Moreover, he does not consider second intentions directly (as in the *Isagoge*) but rather things, in order to know whether to classify them under *genus*, *species* or *accident*. (*In Cat.*, pp. 110B–111A). As a result, the *Categories* is indeed suitably placed as an introduction to logic. Logicians have to know about such universals as *genus* and *species*, and how they apply to real substances, qualities and so on, as a precondition for the production of correct definitions and demonstrations, but they cannot do this without a study of categories (*In Cat.*, pp. 110A–111A). Here it is important to remember that logic was not viewed as the construction of purely formal systems, but as a way of reaching truths, and that this does indeed require some general consideration of what our propositions and formal arguments might be about.

3. Divisions of Aristotle's *Categories*

We must now turn to a more detailed consideration of the first part of the *Categories*. The work was often divided into three parts containing fourteen chapters. The first part takes up the *antepredicamenta* which are preliminary to the main discussion, the second discusses the ten categories themselves, and the final part discusses the *postpredicamenta*, those properties and conditions that follow from the categories (*In Cat.*, p. 112A). So far as the first part was concerned, there was some disagreement about whether the fourth chapter (Aristotle, *Cat.*, 1b25–2a10), which gives a rough list of all the categories, belonged here or in part two. The Conimbricenses,

like Ockham, opted for part one, Soto, like Pseudo-Aegidius, for part two.³¹ Accordingly, he divides the discussion of *antepraedicamenta* into three chapters. The first presents three definitions, the second gives the two-fold division into things said with and without combination, and the third adds three rules. He notes that whereas he takes this list to present three types of *antepraedicamenta*, divided into seven particular *antepraedicamenta*, Paul of Venice had listed five, namely equivocals, univocals, denominatives, subject and predicate (*In Cat.*, p. 112A).³² In order to explain why the *Categories* begins as it does, Soto states that equivocals come first of all because nothing can be put in a category until necessary distinctions have been made (*In Cat.*, p. 112A); and he gives the standard account of how equivocals, univocals, and denominatives are related to the categories. Equivocal or analogical things and terms, notably *ens*, are related to all the categories, univocal things and terms involve the relationship of superiors to inferiors within one category, and denominative things and terms involve the relationship of one category to another (*In Cat.*, p. 112B).³³

4. Denominatives

This reference to denominative things, however, raises a problem. There was little dispute about the claim that there are equivocal and univocal things, and a special vocabulary had long been developed to distinguish between things (*equivoca equivocata*, *univoca univocata*) and words (*equivoca equivocantia* and *univoca univocantia*) (*In Cat.*, p. 112B).³⁴ Indeed, Soto claimed that this division supported his third thesis, that Aristotle intended to treat of things in relation to names, and names in relation to things (*In Cat.*, p. 113A); and he noted later that his own theory of denominatives was intended to support the same thesis (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). Nonetheless, the traditional account of

31. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 138; Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, col. 302. For Pseudo-Aegidius, see Guilelmus Arnaldi, *Expositio*, fol. 15rA.

32. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 79rA.

33. See, e.g., Lambert, *Logica*, pp. 64–65; Guilelmus Arnaldi, *Expositio*, fol. 15rB, Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. 4vA–vB; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 80rB.

34. Ashworth 2003: 135.

denominatives suggested that they had to be treated differently. There is certainly the vocabulary to distinguish between *denominativa denominata* and *denominativa denominantia* (*In Cat.*, p. 114A), but the very definition of denominatives seems to tie them to words, for, following the translation by Johannes Argyropulos that Soto used, “those are called denominatives which have the appellation of a name from something with a difference only in case-ending; for instance, *grammaticus* has its appellation from *grammatica* and *fortis* from *fortitudo*.”³⁵ Such a definition seems, Soto commented, to support the nominalist view that denominatives just are those concrete accidental terms which have a clearly different case-ending from the abstract accidental terms from which they are derived (*In Cat.*, p. 114A–B).³⁶

Nonetheless, Soto argued that this construal was inconsistent with what Aristotle had actually said. First, Aristotle was clearly talking about things, just as he was in his definitions of equivocals and univocals (*In Cat.*, p. 114B). Here Soto is in agreement with Paul of Venice, who also argued that Aristotle had defined only denominative things.³⁷ Burley, who was more nuanced, said simply that Aristotle’s description could be understood just as much of things as of words.³⁸ Second, if Aristotle had intended to define denominatives with respect to words, he would not have said that concrete terms are derived from abstract terms, for this is contrary to what the grammarians tell us about derivation.³⁹ For instance, ‘justitia’ comes from the genitive of ‘justus’ with the addition of ‘tia’ (*In Cat.*, p. 114B).⁴⁰ Third, it is clear from what Aristotle said about appella-

35. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 111B “Denominativa ea dicuntur quae ab aliquo nominis appellationem habent, solo differentia casu; ut à grammatica grammaticus appellationem habet, et à fortitudine fortis.”

36. See William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 147 (on the strictest sense of ‘denominative’); John Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, pp. 11–13.

37. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85rA.

38. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB.

39. This problem was an old one: see, e.g., Lambert, *Logica*, p. 66; Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158A; Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, pp. 12–13.

40. For this example of a derivation, see Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158A; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85vA. (Paul often followed Albertus very closely.)

tion that the name ‘white’ does not have its appellation from whiteness, for it is snow that is called white, not the word itself (*In Cat.*, p. 114B).⁴¹ Soto suggests that in their interpretation of the reference to appellation the nominalists confuse a term’s signification or connotation of an abstract entity with the process whereby a thing receives appellation from that entity. This remark about the nominalists is borne out by what Marsilius of Inghen wrote, and Paul of Venice quoted: “Denominatives are concrete names differing from their abstracts only in their ending so far as the utterance is concerned, <and> connoting the thing which their abstracts signify.”⁴² On the other hand, Soto remarked, realists have a problem too, because the reference to case-endings is hardly applicable to things (*In Cat.*, pp. 114B–115A).

In order to understand Soto’s solution of these problems, we must first of all consider his list of the things which are involved in the process of denomination (*In Cat.*, p. 114A).⁴³ Whiteness (*albedo*) is the thing denominating a white thing (*res denominans album*). Peter, in whom whiteness inheres, is the denominated thing (*res denominata*). The white thing (*album*) is the denominative (*denominativum*), though, using the distinction between *denominativa denominata* and *denominativa denominantia*, we can also regard the word ‘album’ as a denominative. However, we must realize that it is the thing which is white which has its appellation from whiteness (*In Cat.*, p. 114B). Soto goes on to discuss the problem of translating what Aristotle wrote (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). The old translation by Boethius uses the phrase ‘according to a name’ (*secundum nomen*), and runs: “those are

41. Walter Burley made a similar point in his middle commentary on the *Categories* (see unpublished edition by Alessandro Conti).

42. Marsilius, *In Cat.*, fol. 19vA: “Denominativa sunt nomina concreta, a suis abstractis differentia quantum est ex parte vocis solum in fine, connotativa illud [*pro istius*] quod sua abstracta significant.” Soto only refers to Marsilius as he is cited by Paul of Venice, but Paul quotes this very passage as follows: *In Cat.*, fol. 84vB: “Denominativa sunt nomina concreta, a suis abstractis quantum est ex parte vocis solum in fine differentia, connotativa [*sunt*] istius quod eorum abstracta significant.” Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, p. 12, remarks that to have appellation here is for the term to connote something beyond what it supposits for.

43. For texts relating to the following discussion, see Appendix Two.

said to be denominatives which have appellation from something according to a name with a difference only in case-ending.”⁴⁴ According to Soto, people always take it that the phrase ‘according to a name’ governs the word ‘appellation’, and this is why Argyropoulos used a genitive in his translation, “those are said to be denominatives which have the appellation of a name from something with a difference only in case-ending.” However, Soto argues, the phrase ‘according to the name’ should be taken as governing ‘with a difference in case-ending’, so that the passage ought be read like this: “denominatives are things (*res*) which have their appellation from something, from which according to the name they differ only in case-ending.”⁴⁵

A lot depends on how ‘appellation’ is to be interpreted here. On the face of it, appellation has to do with what a thing is called, and this comes through in Burley’s discussion of denominative things. He illustrates what it is for something, Socrates, to be called a grammarian denominatively by saying that Socrates is called this from the quality which is grammar because the name he receives on account of that quality differs from the name of the quality only by its word-ending.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Paul of Venice took up Albertus Magnus’s definition of appellation as coming from the verb ‘pello’, whose meaning includes ‘strike against’, ‘touch’, and ‘move’,⁴⁷ and said that to have appellation is to be moved or touched by something not part of the denominative’s nature. Such words as ‘homo’ and ‘rationale’ are not properly denominative because, although men and rational beings receive denomination according to the names of the abstract entities involved, they do not receive appel-

44. Aristotle, *Aristoteles Latinus*. I 1-5, p. 5: “Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus et a fortitudine fortis.”

45. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 115A: “Denominativa sunt res quae ab aliquo, a quo secundum nomen solo casu differunt, appellationem habent.”

46. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB: “Verbi gratia, Sortes ‘grammaticus’ dicitur denominative ab illa qualitate que est grammatica, quia nomen quod Sortes contrahit ab illa qualitate que est grammatica differt a nomine illius rei, scilicet qualitatis, sola cadentia, id est, terminatione vocis.”

47. Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158B.

lation.⁴⁸ Paul's intent is to emphasize that the process of appellation involves a relationship between a real quality and a real thing that receives the quality, and not just a relationship between two names, even though that is also involved. As I read Soto, he is struggling to make the same point in somewhat different terms.

Accordingly, Soto goes on to state that Aristotle is not talking about the derivation of concrete from abstract words, for that is the grammarians' business; rather, he is focusing on the fact that a particular denominative, such as a white thing, is the product of an individual's reception of a quality from another thing, namely, whiteness. The fact that it is *called* 'white thing' is related, but secondary. As a result, a denominative name should be defined, not with reference to any supposed derivation from an abstract term, but with respect to its signification (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). A denominative name such as 'white thing' (*ly album*) is a name which formally signifies a form in accordance with the *ratio* by which it names the form's subject (*In Cat.*, p. 115A–B),⁴⁹ and so one should say that a concrete term signifies a form by connoting its subject rather than that it signifies a subject by connoting its form (*In Cat.*, p. 115B).⁵⁰ Soto ascribes the first view to Averroes, whom the realists follow and he ascribes the second view to Avicenna, whom the nominalists follow.⁵¹ He does not mention Burley's view that 'album' signifies the aggregate of a subject and whiteness, so that the significate of the abstract term is part of the significate of the concrete term.⁵²

48. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85rA. "Non tamen omnia concreta neque omnia adiectiva <sunt denominativa>, sed ista que habent appellationem, id est, a subiecto pulsiorem Propterea 'homo' ... et 'rationale' ... non sunt proprie denominativa, quia etsi recipiunt denominationem secundum nomen suorum abstractorum, tamen non recipiunt appellationem neque sunt appellativa quasi a subiecto pulsa per recessum a natura illius."

49. The sense of *ratio* here is illuminated by Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 114A: "... nomen rationis intelligatur definitio. Est tamen adnotandum, quod eodem redit si nomine rationis intelligatur conceptus obiectivus, quae est ratio significata in rebus"

50. See Appendix Two for the text.

51. For more information, see Ebbesen 1988: 107–174.

52. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rA.

Soto's final point about denominatives is that, contrary to the standard interpretation, and here he cites Pseudo-Augustine, they do not form a medium between univocals and equivocals (*In Cat.*, pp. 115B–116A).⁵³ Instead, they fall between univocals and multivocals or heteronyms, those cases where two different words pick out two different things. A denominative word or thing is neither entirely different from the denominating word or thing, nor is it entirely the same.

Soto had taken up the general issue of the relationship of denominatives to equivocals and univocals at the beginning of his Question about all three (*In Cat.*, 117A). A problem arose because on a narrow definition of 'univocal' as confined to the essential predication of genus, species, difference and *proprium*, univocals and denominatives were mutually exclusive.⁵⁴ Burley held that the groups overlap, claiming that a term is univocal if it has one definition, description, or *quid nominis* definition, and it is equivocal if it has more than one *quid nominis* definition, so that a denominative term can be either univocal or equivocal.⁵⁵ Soto agreed that the groups overlap. He said that the same word could be univocal, equivocal, and denominative, and he instanced the word 'sanum' which is said univocally of healthy animals, analogically of animals, urine and medicine, and denominatively in relation to 'sanitas'.

5. Answers to Objections

In his answers to doubts, Soto uses his theory of denominatives to settle some of the standard counter-examples to Aristotle's definition. What about concrete and abstract terms from the category of substance, such as 'homo' and 'humanitas' (*In Cat.*, p. 116B)?⁵⁶ Why

53. Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae decem*, p. 138; Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 49. Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, col. 327, claimed that Augustine and Simplicius were correct.

54. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 146. Cf. Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, p. 13.

55. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5vA. Cf. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 146.

56. See Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 159A; Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 190; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vA.

should ‘humanus’ not be the denominative of ‘homo’,⁵⁷ or ‘aureum’ of ‘aurum’⁵⁸ when ‘homo’ and ‘aurum’ are neither abstract nor accidental? Why should terms such as ‘grammatica’ and ‘musica’ used of females not be denominative?⁵⁹ Or ‘studiosus’, even though it does not look as if it is linked to its corresponding abstract, ‘virtus’ (*In Cat.*, p. 116B)?⁶⁰ What these counter-examples have in common is that they raise the question of what to say about words used for transcategorial predication when they do not meet the most restrictive definition of denominatives as involving only things with accidental intrinsic properties, and as being expressed by words whose beginning is the same and whose ending is different.

Soto’s answer to all the counter-examples (*In Cat.*, p. 120A) is very similar to Burley’s account of denominatives in the broad sense, an account which Burley attributed to Aristotle.⁶¹ ‘Homo’ and ‘humanitas’ do not count, because they are not a genuine example of concrete and abstract, but are such only *secundum rationem* (*In Cat.*, p. 120A).⁶² On the other hand, there is no reason to say that only accidental predicates are involved, for ‘humanum’ and ‘homo’ are perfectly legitimate, as are ‘aureum’ and ‘aurum’, among other examples (*In Cat.*, p. 120A–B). Nor is there any reason to say that only intrinsic predication is involved, for ‘sanum’ is said denominatively of urine, which is a sign of health, just as much as of the ani-

57. Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 188; Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5vA; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84rB.

58. For similar examples, see Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84rB.

59. Boethius, (‘musica’) *In Categorias*, col. 168D; Roger Bacon (‘grammatica’), *Summulae*, p. 187; Simplicius, (‘musica’), *In Cat.*, p. 50; Guilelmus Arnaldi (‘grammatica’), *In Cat.*, fol. 15rB; Paul of Venice (‘musica’), *In Cat.*, fols. 83vB–84rA, (‘grammatica’), *In Cat.*, fol. 84 rA.

60. This comes from Aristotle, *Cat.* 10b6–10: see *Aristoteles Latinus*, I 1–5, p. 67; Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 187; Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 50; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vB. The cases of ‘musica’ and ‘studiosus’ are absolutely standard.

61. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB–vA. Cf. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, pp. 146–147.

62. Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 159A, wrote: “haec inflexio facta est ad similitudinem accidentis et non de ipsa rei natura”; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vB, said that denomination must come “ab alio, non tantum alietate rationis sed alietate realis.”

mal which possesses health.⁶³ All connotative terms which signify an accident of some sort or, like the substantial terms cited, are presented in the mode of an accident, will count as denominative, and this is what Aristotle intended (*In Cat.*, p. 120B).⁶⁴ Presumably we can think of ‘humanum’ as a connotative term presented in the mode of an accident when it is said, for instance, of laws (‘leges humanae’: *In Cat.*, p. 120B). On the other hand, the criteria of a similar beginning and a different case-ending do matter. ‘Grammatica’ said of a woman is not denominative but straightforwardly equivocal,⁶⁵ and ‘studiosus’ is not a denominative term because it is different in form from ‘virtus’ and different in signification from ‘studium’ (*In Cat.*, p. 120B).

Soto ends his discussion with a brief reference (*In Cat.*, pp. 120B–121A) to the distinctions between three kinds of denominatives given by Marsilius of Inghen, and reported fully by Paul of Venice.⁶⁶ These are: (1) denominatives *in voce* alone, such as ‘homo’ and ‘humanitas’; (2) denominatives *in re* alone, such as ‘studiosus’ and ‘virtus’, and (3) denominatives in both *vox* and *res*. Paul of Venice had called the first two groups denominatives *secundum quid*, and he included ‘grammatica’ in the second group.⁶⁷

63. Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, pp. 188–189, said that ‘sanum’ was denominative when said of an animal, but not when said of urine, and Burley said that it was denominative said of urine only in a broad sense (Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB–vA). Strictly speaking, a denominative term must concern only intrinsic accidents. Paul of Venice (*In Cat.*, fol. 84rB) seems to allow extrinsic accidents as well.

64. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 120B: “In summa, omnia connotativa quae significant accidentis vel habent se ad modum accidentis sunt denominativa. Et ideo dixit Aristoteles generaliter ‘quaecunque habent ab aliquo nominis appellationem’, sive ab accidenti, sive a substantia, sive a parte, sive a toto, sive ab intrinseco, sive ab extrinseco.”

65. Guilelmus Arnaldi, *In Cat.*, fol. 15rB, allowed it to be denominative, because he appealed to *modi significandi* rather than case-endings, and the Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, cols. 329–330, followed him in this.

66. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84vA–vB; Marsilius, *In Cat.*, fol. 19rB. Where Soto has ‘in re’, Paul has ‘in significatione’ and Marsilius ‘significatione’.

67. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85vA–vB.

Conclusion

To conclude, what I find striking about Soto's discussion of the parts of the *Categories* that I have chosen to focus on is not only that he provides a coherent and thoughtful discussion, but that he displays the strong influence of the tradition of Oxford realism found in Walter Burley and Paul of Venice. It is easy to think of Soto as a Renaissance Thomist, but in fact, he was a well-read eclectic.

Appendix One: On Predication

[*In Cat.*, p. 108A] Sed quod nomina magis proprie praedicentur, probatur per primum argumentum supra factum. Praedicari enim sicut dici magis proprie convenit vocibus quam rebus. Item, quia propositio proprius est in nominibus, quam in rebus.

Quod vero res principaliter praedicentur, probatur, quia propter unumquodque tale et illud magis; sed nomina solum praedicantur tanquam instrumenta et rerum signa, ergo res principaliter praedicantur.

Alia enim est ratio proprie praedicationis, et alia est ratio principalis praedicationis. Proprietas namque consistit in significatione verbi 'praedicari', quod vocibus proprius convenit; et principaliter praedicari consistit in hoc quod res sunt finis, cuius gratia nomina praedicantur. . . .

Est tamen adnotandum, quod quemadmodum de universalibus dictum est, quod habent quidem fundamentum in re, sed fiunt universalia in actu per operationem intellectus, ita res ante operationem intellectus fundamentaliter praedicantur, quod nihil aliud est quam rationem, verbi gratia, hominis, inesse Petro substantialiter, et albedinem inesse accidentaliter. Sed actu praedicantur, quando intellectus actu considerat unum sub ratione praedicati, puta quod de alio dicitur, et aliud sub ratione subiecti, videlicet de quo aliud dicitur.

[p. 108B] . . . quamvis magis proprie verba dicantur et praedicentur, nihilominus passive et obiective res ipsae dicuntur et praedicantur. Dicimus enim et narramus res gestas.

[pp. 108B–109A] Dicendum ergo est, quod quamvis in rebus sint praedicatum et subiectum, nihilominus praedicatio non fit in rebus,

sed solum exercetur in mente, voce, aut scripto. Itaque in hac vocali, ‘homo est animal’, non solum vox praedicatur de voce, sed principaliter ratio animalis de ratione hominis. Immo profecto aptius loquebantur antiqui dicentes, voces non praedicari passive, sed praedicare; ut quemadmodum extrema huius propositionis, ‘homo est animal’, significant res, et res significantur per voces, ita voces praedicant rationem animalis de ratione hominis, atque adeo res praedicatur de re.

Appendix Two: On Denominatives

[*In Cat.*, p. 114A] Tertia definitio est denominativorum Atqui dubitare quis forte potest quid hic definiat Aristoteles, utrum nomina denominativa, ut sunt *ly* ‘album’, *ly* ‘musicum’, et similia, an res potius quas haec nomina significant et pro quibus supponunt. Ubi notandum primum est, quod in denominatione tria est a parte rei considerare, puta rem dominantem, rem denominatam, et denominativum. Verbi gratia, albedo est res denominans album, et Petrus in quo est albedo est res denominata, atque ideo album est denominativum. Sed denominativum quemadmodum de aequivocis dictum est, potest accipi, et pro denominativo denominato, puta pro re alba, et pro denominativo dominantem, scilicet pro hoc nomine ‘album’.

[p. 114B] At vero quamvis nomina denominativa forte hoc modo describi possent, tamen sensus hic nihil attingit mentis Aristotelis, qui re vera denominativa pro rebus denominatis definiit.

(i) Primo quia eodem verborum tenore definiit denominativa quo aequivoca et univoca. Sed illa manifeste definiit pro rebus, ut ostensum est; ergo denominativa.

(ii) Praeterea quia si denominativa definisset pro vocibus, non dixisset concretum ab abstracto descendere, nam in vocibus saepe contingit contrarium sed res quae est album habet appellationem ab albedine.

(iii) [pp. 114A–115A] Et postremo hoc sit manifestum ex verbis Aristotelis cum ait “Denominativa sunt quae ab aliquo habent nominis appellationem.” Enimvero nomen ‘album’ non habet appellationem ab albedine, sed nix est quae ab albedine habet appella-

tionum albi. Quocirca nominales hanc particulam Aristotelis nullatenus possunt adaptare suae definitioni – explicat enim denominativum habere appellationem ab abstracto, per hoc quod est, denominativum significare abstractum de formali – cum tamen significare seu connotare abstractum, et recipere ab illo appellationem, res sunt diversissimae ... quemadmodum nominales illam particulam, ‘habere appellationem ab aliquo’, non possunt terminis adscribere, ita neque reales illud quod est, ‘differre casu ab alio’, possunt rebus accommodare. Et (ni fallor) illa particula, ‘secundum nomen’, rem fecit obscuram.

[pp. 115A–B] Hinc sequitur Aristotelem non intelligere concretum derivari ab abstracto. Hoc enim negotium grammaticorum est, ad voces pertinens, apud quos plura sunt abstracta quae potius formantur a concretis, ut ‘sapientia’ a dativo de ly ‘sapiens’, addita ‘a’, et omnia fere nomina in ‘entia’ a suis concretis. Sed solum dicit quod denominativum, puta res alba, accipit appellationem a re quae est albedo.

Quo fit ut neque nomen denominativum debeat definiri per derivationem ab abstracto, sed per suam significationem, ut ars servetur praedicamentorum, qua res in ordine ad nomina, et nomina in ordine ad res definiuntur.

Nomen ergo denominativum est nomen formaliter significans formam, ea ratione qua denominat subiectum, ut ly ‘album’. Quare potius dicendum est concretum significare formam connotando subiectum . . . quam significare subiectum connotando formam.

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CHAPTER II

Trouble about the Fourth Species of Quality: The *forma artificialis* between Realists and Nominalists

Sven K. Knebel

In the categorical sense of the word, ‘being’ means natural being. My topic, the dispute concerning the *forma artificialis*, indicates that what I am going to talk about concerns the scope of the categories. Aristotle himself addressed the issue in the second book of the *Physics*, where the distinction between nature and art was related to the notions of form and matter.¹ I will, however, leave Aristotle aside. Instead, I call your attention to a number of what Charles Lohr labelled ‘Renaissance authors’ of Latin Aristotle commentaries. How is it to be explained that, in spite of its most impressive records 17th-century Aristotelianism was rapidly losing ground? I take this to be an open question, and I take it for granted that the well-known story about a scientific revolution, which took place in about 1640 and made Aristotelian wisdom look pale, cannot account for the fact. As for logic, we know that the anti-Aristotelian propaganda was carried on by quite other people than tough scientists. I shall argue that it may not have been due to sheer prejudice that Aristotelianism met the indignation of the beaux esprits.

Since Jacques Maritain’s *Art and Scholasticism* many scholars have tried hard to conceal the gap between mediaeval philosophy and aesthetics.² In vain. No Aristotelian would ever have claimed that being susceptible to the beauties of art is man’s *proprium* because he is a rational animal. At any rate, the Renaissance was the first period

1. Aristotle, *Ph.* II.1.193b8-12.

2. Speer 1994: 948.

in the history of art whose masterpieces did not pass unnoticed by contemporary philosophy. What was the Aristotelian school philosopher doing while Neoplatonic art literature hailed the artist as a divine mind who blessed the world with new terrestrial paradises?³ I shall focus on Spanish culture, for in those days it was Spain that gave shelter to Aristotelianism. 17th-century Spain also contributed greatly to what we might call the start of the *Genieästhetik*. Suffice it to say that Pedro Calderón not only styled the art of painting the “art of arts”. In one of his plays, he did not shrink from representing the Creator as the paradigmatic painter: “In the beginning was the canvas” (*en el principio era el lienzo*).⁴ However, even the 17th-century Aristotelians, who are said to have been more erudite than were their 14th-century predecessors, were far from making Aristotelianism proof against the reproach that it was a bit too sober in aesthetic matters. Baroque art had little to say to “Baroque scholasticism”⁵. Baroque art and Baroque scholasticism did not really match. The vertiginous decoration of Jesuit churches did not impose on the Jesuit schoolman. A number of influential schoolmen even challenged the basic assumption that we are entitled to distinguish ontologically between artefacts and physical objects. Hence, two questions will be addressed. Might the medieval notion of *forma artificialis* have been a tool of genuine aesthetic insight? If so, why did Baroque scholasticism promote an account of the *forma artificialis* which would seem utterly unfit for that purpose?

At a crucial place in the 1644 philosophical chef d’oeuvre of the Roman Jesuit schoolman Pietro Sforza Pallavicino (1607-67)⁶, Michelangelo pops up: in the same way that the Last Judgment could not have been produced accidentally, our universe cannot be a random configuration of atoms. The modern Democritean is being addressed:

3. “... con l’arte dell Architettura noi potiamo andar formando varii Paradisi terreni.” Zuccaro, *Idea*, p. 43.

4. Cf. Poppenberg 2008: 421ff. The quotation is taken from *El pintor de su deshonra*.

5. This notion is from Eschweiler 1928: 307. Cf. Eschweiler 1931: 253-85.

6. Knebel 2001a: 502-19; Knebel 2001b: 454ff.

Don't you see, that you might equally hold that if some native tribe were accustomed to blot the walls with colours, over time the very configuration might happen to obtain which we admire in Michelangelo's Final Judgment?⁷

That sounds promising. However, we only find here a time-honoured commonplace from Cicero, the Jesuit having been quick to substitute the letters which make up Homer's *Iliad*⁸ with the pixels of Michelangelo's famous painting. Nothing justifies the assumption that Michelangelo's painting attracted the philosopher's attention for its own sake. Anything else would have been equally suitable to make the point at issue. This point is purely epistemological: although this very combination of pixels is no less possible than any other event, common sense will dismiss the hypothesis of a random event. From the dismissal it must be inferred that this well ordered combination is a work of art. For this reason, the human mind must be credited with having the power to discern between random events and works of art.

Pallavicino, this champion in the fight against atomism, did at least recognize the singularity of the configuration of pixels which made up the Last Judgment: *singularis colorum dispositio*.⁹ This *dispositio* is a certain effect, from which the corresponding kind of cause can be inferred. Since there is order, the effect must be due to a superior mind rather than to a random generator. One would not call this a very bold assertion. Nevertheless, in Pallavicino's own school context people would rather not have been ready to accept the ontology which backed up this claim. For Jesuit Aristotelianism was just about to ruin the philosophical tools which the tradition might have provided for the analysis of works of art. The fate of the so called 'artificial form' (*forma artificialis*) in Suarezianism is telling. In his famous 1597 *Metaphysical Disputations*, Suárez himself explicitly de-

7. "Nonne vides, similiter si mos esset apud aliquas gentes, ut pigmenta in parietes temere diffunderentur, conformatura fuisse aliquando illam ipsam distributionem, quam aspiciamus in Iudicio Bonarrotæ?" Sfortia Pallavicinus SJ., *Philos. moralis* 1.2.43, p. 145 (= Del Bene, p. 476b).

8. Cicero, *De div.* 1.13.23.

9. Sfortia Pallavicinus, *Philos. moralis*, p. 144.

nied that what the artist adds to matter, the artificial form, might not equally be due to a random cause.¹⁰ Two Suarezians, Juan de Lugo and his pupil Rodrigo de Arriaga, expanded on that line of thought.

Lugo (1583-1660), first in Valladolid, later on at the Collegio Romano (where he was Pallavicino's teacher, too), and finally a cardinal, unfortunately is not very well known to the scholars of the history of philosophy, since of his works only several treatises on Aquinas are in print.¹¹ Arriaga (1592-1667), for his part, is one of the most prominent 17th-century Jesuit philosophers. His *Cursus philosophicus*, first published in 1632, became a best-seller. The last edition is from 1669. Both Lugo and Arriaga received entries in Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique*.

According to the practice of the time, Arriaga's chapter on nature and art is to be found in the disputations on the second book of the *Physics* (see the appendix). To the Aristotelians, a work of 'art' was the product either of a composition, of a subtraction or of a transfiguration.¹² Chemical products were left aside.¹³ Thus, instances would be: buildings, mechanical devices, sculptures, paintings, armed units. In order to explain what it is that makes a work of art such, Aristotelian hylomorphism provided the notion of an 'artificial form', which was explained in the same way as the 'substantial form' of any natural thing. It was commonly accepted, however, that the artificial form is ontologically an accident,¹⁴ and that it is

10. "... interdum contingit similem formam vel figuram [sc. artificialem] ab agente naturali fieri casu ex concursu plurium causarum." Suárez SJ., *Disp. met.* 16.2.17, p. 580a.

11. Cf. Baciero SJ. 1966-67. Arriaga did not absolve his philosophical studies by Lugo, but he accompanied Lugo during a good deal of his academic career. Cf. the self-testimony of 1644 as quoted in Sousedík 2009: 80. As for the school context, cf. Knebel 2001b: 437ff., 449f.

12. Thomas Aquinas, *Phys.* 1.12.11; Guillelmus de Ockham, *Summula philos. nat.* 1.20, p. 210f.

13. Ockham, *Exp. in Phys.*, p. 271; Ps.-Duns Scotus, *Phys.* 2.1, p. 104a.

14. "... omnes formae artificiales sunt accidentales." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa th.* 3.66.4. Cf. *Perih.* 1.4.5; *Metaph.* 7.2.8; *Metaph.* 8.3.17. - "... artificialia componuntur ex naturalibus tanquam ex materia, et ex formis artificialibus, quae sunt accidentia. Cuiusmodi formae sunt figurae, vel compositiones seu uniones." Gualterus Burla-

never the principle of motion.¹⁵ While the natural form was said to penetrate matter, the artificial form was said to remain on the ‘surface’.¹⁶ For this reason, in the treatment of categories the artificial form was usually ranged within the fourth species of Quality.¹⁷ That was the place for those features of a thing which can be visualized¹⁸ and which we refer to when say that it is ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’.¹⁹ As for pictures, the artificial form, therefore, must not be confounded with the subject of the representation.²⁰

cus, *In Phys. exp.*, f. 37va.

15. “Numquam forma artificialis est principium motus eius, in quo est.” Aegidius Romanus, *Exp. in Phys.*, f. d5ra. Later on a controversial issue between Aristotelians and Cartesians. Cf. Ioannes a S. Thoma OP., *Curs. phil.: Nat. philos.* 1.9.3, p. 185f.; Regius, *Philos. nat.*, p. 69f. The clockwork, however, served as an instance as early as in the 15th century: “Arguitur: Horologium est res artificialis et in quantum talis movetur, quia arte causatur motus eius: Igitur.” Usingen, *Parvul. Philos. nat.*, f. 13r.

16. “... in producendo formam artificialem agens solum in superficie agit.” Vera Crucis OSA., *Phys.*, p. 73b. – “Forma artificialis sola superficie materiae consistit ulterius non transiens, naturalis vero materiae viscera penetrat.” Ruvius [Rubius] SJ., *Comm. in Phys.*, p. 190.

17. “‘Artificiale’ ... 2^o modo capitur pro forma ipsius artis, et sic ‘artificiale’ non est aliud quam quaedam dispositio terminativa quantitatis causata ab artifice per artem mediante intellectu practico et voluntate. ... ‘Artificiale’ 2^o modo captum est ens per se, reponibile in praedicamento qualitatis in quarta specie.” Magistri, *Quaest. sup. tota philos. nat.*, f. c5va. In the same vein: Burlaeus, *Sup. art. vet.*, f. f7rb; Monte, *Summul. exp.*, f. irva; Dorp, *Comp. Log.*, f. g3va/b; Ioannes Dullaert, *Quaest. sup. Phys.* 2.2, f. 50va (“opinio [...] conformior dictis Philosophi”); Parreut, *Exerc. vet. artis*, f. qiv; Soto OP., *In Isag. etc. comm.*, p. 233a/b; Smiglecius SJ., *Log.* 11.3, p. 417.

18. Thomas Aquinas, *Phys.* 7.5.5. In contrast to the substantial forms which are not perceived by the senses: *De an.* 2.2.1.3.

19. Simplicius, *In Cat.*, CAG 8, p. 261, 31-32; Boethius, *In Cat.*, PL 64, col. 250D-51A. Hence Burlaeus, *Sup. art. vet.*, f. f7ra; Suárez, *Disp. met.* 42.3.15-16, p. 615a; Collegium Complutense OCD., *Disp. in Dial.*, p. 262b. In contrast with this: Soto, *In Isag. etc. comm.*, p. 233a.

20. Commenting on Aristotle, *Cat.* 8 10a11: “‘Figura’ ... prout dicit qualitatem resultantem ex terminatione quantitativa ... est qualitas ad quartam speciem pertinens ... Prout est figura alicuius rei, in cuius signum ponitur, ... sic ‘figura’ accepta, pro signo vel imagine representativa alicuius, non pertinet ad genus qualitatis, sed, cum dicat respectum, ad genus relationis pertinet.” Bellovisis OP., *Comp. diff. terminorum* 167, f. 104v. Here are fused: Thomas Aquinas, *Phys.* 7.5.5; *III Sent.* 16.2.1 ad 1.

Neither must it be confounded with the artist's design, the 'idea'. Why not? Not because the scholastic notion of 'idea' prior to Suárez²¹ could also stand for the external paradigm and thus was not fit to stand for something in the mind.²² After all, there was an affinity between the notion of an artificial form and the notion of the ideas of the divine Creator.²³ The crucial point was that, according to Aquinas, the artificial form did not properly stand for the artist's objective, but rather for the result of his finishing stroke.²⁴ As long as it existed only in the artist's mind, it was said to enjoy only a virtual mode of being.²⁵ Its actual mode of being is a material one. It is an *opus operatum*.²⁶ Before the work is done, the artificial form resides rather in the hand than in the mind, and rather in the tool than in the hand.²⁷ Hence, for the sake of aesthetic analysis, the 'artificial form' might have provided something which would have been very useful to have, and for us it is remarkable to see that this notion turned out to be a dead end. Whereas in many other respects 17th-century Aristotelianism is the missing link between medieval and modern philosophy, its treatment of the artificial form certainly did not pave the way for anything afterwards. Let us now consider the details.

21. Cf. Renemann 2004.

22. Hübener 1977: 42ff.

23. Theodoricus Carn., *Lect. in De Trin.*, p. 169; Thomas Aquinas, *II Sent.* 12 (exp. text.).

24. "Forma ... artificialis est similitudo ultimi effectus, in quem fertur intentio artificis." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa th.* 3.78.2; *Summa th.* 1.16.1.

25. "... formae artificiales habent duplex esse, unum in actu secundum quod sunt in materia, aliud in potentia secundum quod sunt in mente artificis, non quidem in potentia passiva, sed activa." Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.* 36.2.1. - "... forma in mente artificis existens ... est principium activum productionis formae artificialis in materia." Dominicus de Flandria OP., *Quaest. sup. Met.* 7.14, f. C8rb. - "... forma artificialis ... est ... ab idea artificis." Parra OP., *In Phys. comm.*, p. 271b.

26. "... 'ars' dicit formas artificiosas, quae sunt aliquod opus operatum ..." Oña OM., *Sup. Phys. comm.*, f. 111rb. - "... forma artificialis non est eiusdem naturae cum arte, nec cum idea in mente artificis existente. Hinc etiam formae naturales dicuntur 'vivae', artificiales vero 'mortuae'." Aler SJ., *Phys.*, p. 372b.

27. "Forma artis, quae est in mente artificis, hanc exequitur manus, et cadit in instrumentum, et hanc suscipit ferrum ... Sed tamen est magis determinata ad materiam in manu quam in mente, et iterum in malleo quam in manu. Maxime autem in ferro est determinata, eo quod ferrum materialiter suscipit eam." Albertus Magnus, *De int. et intell.* 1, 4, quoted after Capreolus, *Def. theol. S. Thomae Aquin.* t.6, p. 39b.

Some people think – Arriaga tells us – that in these works of art the artificial form is something distinct from all parts and places – *ubicationes* – of the thing itself, and that this form isn't nature's product, but the artist's product. This opinion is entirely improbable. I am of the firm conviction that, e.g., a painting's artificial form is nothing else than all the pixels and their respective places, since we perceive the painting by the very fact that we perceive the pixels together with this or that place on the canvas without perceiving any artificial form in addition.²⁸

So far from the spectator's point of view. From the artist's point of view things look no different. Since the artificial form is not the objective but the outcome of the artist's endeavour, it is the effect of an activity whose objective consisted of modifications in matter and place. To add something here, to remove something there, is all that it amounts to. And the same effect might be produced by accident.²⁹ The realm of the unreal, the so called 'beings of reason', would be another instance of the class of those effects which Suarezianism took to be pure outcomes – beings *per resultantiam*.³⁰ In fact, as early as in the 12th and 13th centuries some schoolmen had tried to lump the artificial forms together with the chimaeras.³¹

Lugo and Arriaga are quite explicit about the artist's point of view:

28. Arriaga SJ., *Curs. phil. Phys.* 6.8, p. 319a/b (see appendix). Notice that my translations are rather free. Strictly speaking, 'pixels' is, of course, an anachronism. Arriaga talks of *colores*.

29. "... hae formae artificiales solum sunt modi quidam accidentales ..., et ad illas non est per se actio physica; quamvis enim intentio artificis ad illas per se tendat, et ideo tali modo dirigit per artem actionem suam, ut formam intentam inducat, tamen actio ipsa, per quam exequitur intentionem suam, non terminatur per se et immediate ad talem formam, sed ad aliquem alium modum, ex quo talis forma resultat. Semper enim hae formae fiunt per motionem localem, quae proxime terminatur ad Ubi, et inde resultant variae figurae artefactorum ...". Suárez, *Disp. met.* 16.2.18, p. 580a. Cf. Morisani SJ., *In Log., Phys., Eth. Apotelesma*, p. 315/16: "... ars enim effectum suum producit per motum localem, res naturales secundum locum varie disponendo et coordinando: unde talis vel talis figura resultat, ut patet in arte pingendi, quae liquores coloratos variis locis collocat, ex quibus resultat talis imago ...".

30. Suárez, *Disp. met.* 54.2.3.5, p. 1019a/b.

31. Suárez's predecessors for this point of view: Theodoricus Carn., *Lect. in De Trin.*, p. 167; Henricus a Gandavo, *Quodl.* 7.1, f. 255r.

The artificial form is no achievement of the art, no new accidental entity distinct from the prior accidents. Rather it consists in the places of these or those parts taken together with the negation of other parts to be there.³²

Art resides in the brain. The way down to the pixels on the canvas is too long for art to be the efficient cause of their configuration.³³ Even granted that the artificial form is achieved by art, it would, however, still consist in nothing else but in the pixels and their places and non-places, respectively.³⁴

Lugo's and Arriaga's theory was pervasive among the Jesuits about 1650.³⁵ How is this success to be explained? To be sure, there was a broad Aristotelian agreement that the artificial form must not be hypostasized,³⁶ as even the substantial form was forbidden to exist apart from matter. Nevertheless, the degree of contempt with which art was here dealt with is remarkable. This theory was not only a slap into the face of the *Genieästhetik*, but it denied the truism that a distinction is required between the work of art and the physical object.³⁷ In 1637, the extremely well-informed Scotist philosophers Matri and Belluto labelled this theory 'nominalistic'. Hence the ontology of the artificial form would have been a matter of dispute between the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna*. Whereas the realists were said to take the

32. "Sentio ..., figuram artificialem non addere aliquod positivum supra ubicationes partium, sed esse tales ubicationes partium cum talibus negationibus ... Forma artificialis non est aliquod accidens productum de novo per artem diversum ab accidentibus, quae sine arte haberent[ur], sed ubicationes talium partium cum negatione ubicationum aliarum partium, quae ablatae sunt." Lugo SJ., *Disp. de sacram. Euch.* 8.30, p. 825a/b.

33. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.16. Similarly Lerma OP., *Comm. in Phys.*, p. 137.

34. Arriaga, *Curs. phil.* ed. 1669, p. 371b (see appendix); from the rejoinder to Richard Lynch.

35. "... estque [sc. sententia] inter recentiores ferme communis." Compton-Carleton SJ., *Philos. univ. Phys.* 17.2.3, p. 276. Cf., e.g., without any discussion, Alphonsus SJ., *Disp. in Phys.* 9.31, p. 205a; Giattini SJ., *Phys.* 4.5, p. 148; Ioanniz et Echalaz, *Philos. Phys.* 7.8, p. 84/85; Aler, *Phys.*, p. 373/74.

36. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* 8.3.17; 11.2.18: Even Plato did not take the *formae artificiales* to be ideas.

37. Patzig 1981: 121. Cf. Wollheim 1981: 10-30.

artificial form to be ontologically a surplus, an ‘absolute entity’ induced by the artist, the nominalists were said to claim that we are in no way entitled to take it for an enrichment of what there is.³⁸ The two Scotists’ testimony is confirmed by earlier ones. As early as in the 15th century, the nominalists were known to have sacrificed, among other things, the artificial form to their principle of parsimony.³⁹

In fact, Lugo’s and Arriaga’s theory was part of the on-going success story of William of Ockham. This statement is not meant to support what has rightly been criticized as the *Nominalismus-Legende*, i.e. as an other ‘whiggish’ attempt to rewrite history.⁴⁰ The disapproval of a really distinct artificial form, which would be induced into matter by the artist, was a frequent and characteristic item in Ockham’s treatment of the *Physics*.⁴¹ When Averroes linked the artificial form to accidental being, Ockham says, he had nothing else in mind but that it is accidental for any natural thing to be transformed into a work of art.⁴² The artist’s contribution confines itself to locomotion, i.e. to that sort of movement, by which no new entities come into being.⁴³

38. “... quaeri solet, an forma artificialis distinguatur ab ente naturali, et quomodo. Nominales ... negant ullo modo distingui a parte rei ... Opposita opinio est Realium asserentium formam artificialem esse accidens reale absolutum de quarta specie qualitatis rebus naturalibus superadditum artificis industria, ideoque artificiale realiter distinguunt ab ente naturali ... Hoc additum esse entitatem absolutam” Mastrius de Meldula & Bellutus OFM., *Curs. phil. t.2 Phys.* 6.52, p. 169b/70a.

39. “Solet hic dubitari, an res artificiales realiter a naturalibus distinguantur per formas artificiales eis superadditas. Et tenet Burleus, quod sic ... Ochanistae autem tenent oppositum, videlicet, quod artificialia non distinguuntur realiter a naturalibus per novas formas artificiales superadditas, sed solum secundum rationem” Gaetanus de Thienis, *Recoll. sup. Phys.*, f. 20vb. Similarly Vera Cruce, *Phys.*, p. 72b. In 1518, the *forma artificialis* is mentioned by Johannes Eck in the context of the “non ponenda pluralitas”, quoted by Seifert 1978: 62. 139; Hübener 1983a: 75.

40. Hübener 1983b.

41. Ockham, *Summ. philos. nat.* 1.20, p. 208-13; *Quaest. in Phys.*, p. 723; *Exp. in Phys.*, p. 247-270. Among Ockham’s 14th-century partisans are: Ps.-Duns Scotus, *In Phys.* 2.1.8.11, p. 104b/05a; Ugolinus de Urbe Veteri, *In Phys.* 2.10 (Utrum formae artificialium sunt aliquae entitates abstractae distinctae realiter ab omnibus rebus naturalibus?), MS. Seminario Casale de Monferrato Cod. D. 17 f. 59va-60va, as quoted by Eckermann 1972: 19.

42. Kobusch 1990: 90f., with reference to Ockham, *Exp. in Phys.*, p. 251.

43. “... artifex nihil agit nisi movet localiter; sed movens localiter non causat rem

Few late-mediaeval schoolmen challenged this account with straightforward realism. I can only refer to Ockham's adversary Walter Burley,⁴⁴ to the Parisian Scotist Jean Le Maître⁴⁵ and to the Parisian Thomist Peter Crokaert (ca. 1465-1514).⁴⁶ The same holds true for 17th-century Jesuit Aristotelianism. There were some realists,⁴⁷ but the vast majority shrunk back from tough realism. Even most Scotists, for instance, Petrus Tartaretus, preferred soft realism: the tenet that the artificial form is a distinct entity, to be sure, but a relation rather than a quality: the interrelation of the pixels. The artist was credited with having effected this arrange-

novam ...” Ockham, *Summ. philos. nat.* 1.20, p. 210. – “... quando artifex solum operatur et non natura, non fit nova res secundum se totam, sed tantum adquisitio vel deperditio loci.” *Exp. in Phys.*, p. 271.

44. “... oportet, quod res artificiales aliquid reale addant super naturalia, quia aliter non haberent aliquid in se, per quod differrent a naturalibus. Cum igitur ex re naturali fiat res artificialis ..., oportet in re artificiali, ut in statua, aliquid novum fieri, quod non praefuit in re naturali. Illud autem novum est res artificialis vel forma rei artificialis. Sed circa hoc contingit dubitare, quia moderni philosophantes dicunt, quod res artificiales non important res vel formas distinctas a rebus naturalibus tanquam a suis subiectis ...” Burlaeus, *In Phys. exp.*, f. 37ra. Other 14th-century champions of realism granted this claim only plausibility: Bonetus OFM., *Quattuor volumina*, f. 82ra (“satis probabiliter”).

45. “... sequitur, contra Nominales, quod forma artificialis est entitas realiter distincta a quolibet ente naturali et realiter sibi inhaerente. ... Forma artificialium est aliquid reale et positivum, superadditum enti naturali, et a qualibet ente naturali realiter distinctum. Primum patet, quia omne obiectum sensus est aliquid reale et positivum; sed forma artis est obiectum sensus, quia forma artis nihil aliud est quam figura, quae est sensibile commune. Secundum patet, quia cuiuslibet actionis realis debet esse aliquis terminus realis superadditus materiae illius actionis; sed actio artificialis est realis: ergo habet terminum realem superadditum materiae artis, et illud non est aliud quam forma artis. Tertium patet, quia corrumpitur forma artis quolibet naturali existente in ipso artificiali remanente: ergo artificiale distinguitur realiter a naturali.” Magistri, *Quaest. sup. tota philos. nat.*, f. c5va-c6rb.

46. “... dicitur, quod omnis forma artificialis distinguitur a re naturali ut forma domus distinguitur realiter a lapidibus et lignis et omnis figura distinguitur realiter a re figurata.” Crockart OP., *Quaest. in Phys.*, f. e4rb. The author devotes the question an extraordinarily thorough discussion (e4ra-e5va).

47. I mention Ruvius [Rubius], *Comm. in Phys.*, p. 194; Ruiz de Montoya SJ., *De scientia Dei*, p. 870a.

ment. After all, it was worth its money.⁴⁸ That was Pallavicino's opinion, too. But the Suarezians declined soft realism.

What is the rationale for the nominalistic stance? It certainly was not a hallmark of nominalism right from the outset. Historically, it needed Burley's intervention,⁴⁹ before a widely held and pretty un-specific philosophical opinion⁵⁰ became a hallmark of nominalism. It is worth mentioning that Ockham had seen no reason to refute Duns Scotus on that score.⁵¹ When Burley, for his part, acted as the champion of the artificial forme⁵² he nowhere alluded to any con-

48. "Dubitatur ..., utrum figura distinguatur a re figurata, et utrum sit entitas absoluta sive respectiva ... Nec imaginor, quod ibi acquiratur aliqua res absoluta ... Ideo non pono figuram esse aliquam qualitatem. Et si quis dicat: ergo artifex non facit nisi talem ordinem, quando aliquid operatur, - dico, quod verum est, et finaliter recipit pecunias propter talem ordinem, quem facit. ... Dicant ergo illi, qui ponunt, talem figuram esse rem absolutam, quid sit praeterquam ille ordo partium?" Tataretus, *Artium cursus* Phys. 2.2.3, f. c3ra. With reference to this text restated and further explained by Mastrius / Bellutus, Phys. 6, 53, p. 170a/b. See also de la Fuente OFM., *Quaest. physicae*, p. 416a/b ("relatio quaedam superadveniens"). The 17th-century Scotism had to cope with fact that the *Questions on the Physics* wrongly attributed to Duns Scot followed nominalism in this matter.

49. Burlaeus, *In Phys. exp.*, f. 36vb-37vb (referring to Ockham, *Summ. philos. nat.* 1.20): "Aut artifex solum facit motum localem aut aliquid praeter motum. Si solum facit motum localem, sequitur, quod solum motus localis est finis intentus ab artifice, quia ubi nihil est actu praeter operationem, ibi operatio est finis. ... Si vero detur, quod facit aliquid aliud, oportet illud esse novum. Quod est propositum. Nec est dicere, quod non solum facit motum, sed etiam motum novum terminantem novum motum: quia sic artifex faceret nec intenderet nisi loca nova vel nova *ubi*. Quod videtur inconueniens." (37va; the reading 'terminantem novum motum' seems doubtful)

50. "... forma pure artificialis ... potest acquiri per solum motum localem, cum non sit aliud quam ordo vel dispositio." Durandus a S. Porciano, *In IV Sent.* 1.4.18, f. 29ora.

51. Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaest. sup. Metaph.* 7.12.56, p. 212; *IV Ord.* 12.4.19, p. 766.

52. Burlaeus, *In Phys. exp.*, f. 37rb, disputes against Ockham: "Item, quaero, an artifex facit aliquid aut nihil. Non est dare, nihil: quia sic ars non esset habitus factivus, quoniam ille habitus, quo nihil potest fieri, non est factivus (quod est contra Philosophum 6^o *Ethicorum*, qui ponit artem esse habitum factivum). Si vero detur, quod artifex facit aliquid: aut igitur facit novum vel antiquum. Non antiquum: quia sic faceret prius factum : quod nihil est facere. Relinquitur igitur, quod artifex faciat aliquod novum, et, per consequens, res artificialis aliquod novum includit, quod tamen non includitur in re naturali. Quod est propositum. - Sed forte diceretur, quod

nection with his own prior refutation of Ockham's theory of universals.⁵³ Therefore, a partisan of the nominalistic account of universals like Arriaga⁵⁴ certainly was not compelled to engage himself on that score. Grant that the agenda of nominalism was to change the focus from the structure of reality to the conceptual activity.⁵⁵ Then its account of the artificial form did not even fit very well into this agenda. What Arriaga is not willing to accept is a whole as distinct from its parts. The reason for the artificial form's lacking any ontological surplus beyond the combination of pixels and places is that it cannot even epistemologically claim such a surplus. There is no more to be seen in a painting than the combination of pixels and places. This argument, however, goes far beyond the nominalistic agenda, since nobody would have denied that a universal term, 'man', serves to do more than indicate its class extension. We can have the universal terms in our minds, we can define them, we can put them under

artifex facit antiquum esse aliquale, quale non fuit, v.g. artifex facit, quod aes sit statua, cum tamen prius non fuit statua. – Sed illa cavillatio non valet, quia quaero sicut prius: Aut facit aliquod novum aut antiquum? Non antiquum: quia hoc est facere prius facta. Ergo facit aliquid novum. – Item, cum artifex facit, quod aes sit statua, aut facit aliquam rem extra animam, vel solum facit illud complexum, vz. 'aes est statua'. Si primum, habetur propositum: quia rem extra animam prius non existentem facit. Igitur facit rem novam. Si vero facit illud complexum, vz. 'aes est statua', sequitur, quod artifex nihil facit nisi novas propositiones et nova complexa. Quod est valde inconueniens. – Si vero dicas, quod ipse facit novam denominationem, quaero: Aut illa denominatio est aliqua res extra animam, vel non? Si sit res extra animam: aut igitur nova, vel antiqua, sicut prius. Et si detur, quod nihil est extra animam, sequitur, quod artifex solum facit novas res in anima. – Et si dicatur, quod artifex non facit novas propositiones, sed facit illud, quod significatur per propositionem – unde artifex facit, quod ita est in re sicut ista significat 'aes est statua' -: est aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: tunc artifex nihil facit. Si aliquid: aut igitur novum, aut antiquum. Si novum: habetur propositum. Si antiquum: tunc artifex nihil ageret nisi prius facta. – Item, si illud, quod haec propositio 'aes est statua' [significat], sit aliquid: aut est ens in anima, aut extra animam. Si sit ens in anima: tunc artifex non faceret nisi conceptus et cognitiones, et sic idem faceret artifex cogitando solum, quod facit manibus operando. Quod est absurdum. Si vero detur, quod sit extra animam: aut igitur novum, vel antiquum. Et deducatur sicut prius.”

53. Burlaeus, *In Phys. exp.*, f. 8rb-9vb.

54. As for Arriaga's nominalism cf. Caruso 1979: 81-84; Sousedík 2009: 88-96.

55. Hübener 1983b: 101/02.

higher-level predicates, we can discuss their supposition, and so forth. Thus the mind can occupy itself with universals, but it cannot occupy itself with artificial forms, for they neither spring from the artist's mind nor are what the spectator grasps. Arriaga's point would surely be missed, if we advanced in its favour – as a younger Jesuit actually put it – that any slight variation of the respective set of pixels would make a particular representation of Mary something quite different.⁵⁶ Arriaga, too, mentions a representation of Mary – a sculpture, not a painting – but only in order to show that the artificial form includes negative features,⁵⁷ not in order to show that a particular artificial form will fail to obtain when there is some shortcoming in the removal of the superfluous parts.

What was going on here? In a way, Arriaga's claim sounds less strange if we take Aristotelian psychology into account. Aristotelianism held that colour, not figure, is the proper object of sight. From this Arriaga inferred – and at least the Scotists did agree – that what affects sense perception, the sensible species, does not represent multiple shades of colour. Instead, every shade has got its own, particular species. Thus, there is not an overall representation of a

56. "Communis veraque sententia affirmat formam artificiosam, statuæ verbi gratia, non esse aliquid distinctum ab omnibus partibus statuæ et earum ubicationibus, et carentia aliarum partium et ubicationum. Probatur, quia positus his partibus cum tali distantia inter se, et ablatis aliis, intelligitur forma artificiosa statuæ. Quod hæc partes et earum ubicationes constituent inadæquate formam artificiosam, patet, quia ablatis partibus vel mutatis ubicationibus earum deficeret forma artificiosa ... Quod in pictura clare conspicitur. Nam si coloribus ita dispositis, ut Beatam Virginem repræsentent, novos colores adiiçeres, statim pictura illa desineret esse imago Beatæ Virginis. Ergo in ratione imaginis artificiosæ constituitur per hos et illos colores ita ubicatos et inter se distantes, et per carentiam aliorum." González de Santalla SJ., *Disp. in Phys.*, MS. BU Salamanca 1352, f. 79v/80r. Later on, the author was elected the Jesuits's 13th general. To him, Rome is indebted for the erection of S. Ignacio with Pozzo's famous painting at the ceiling. See this piece of information from a Jansenist journalist: "... on ne voyoit paroître aucun bâtiment, jusques à ce que le P. Tyrso Gonzales, qui en ceci, et en beaucoup d'autres choses, avoit des vûes différentes de celles de ses Predecesseurs, resolut d'y mettre la main. La chose a réussi à l'étonnement de tout le monde ..." Freschot, *La cour de Rome*, p. 69.

57. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.9. See appendix.

sensible object. There are only varying sets of sensible species.⁵⁸ Hence, if Arriaga was called a ‘nominalist’, this label could not be meant to refer to his decomposition of the artificial form into a set of pixels. This sort of ‘pointillism’ would have been quite compatible with soft realism.

This is what Arriaga himself takes for granted when he turns to the very account of the artificial form, which I called ‘soft realism’, and which afterwards actually was to be put forth by two adversaries of Arriaga, the English Jesuit Thomas Compton-Carleton (1591-1666) and the Irish Jesuit Richard Lynch (1610-76), both of them authors of splendid *Cursus philosophici*. Arriaga writes:

Other philosophers grant that the artificial form is nothing really distinct from the parts and their respective places. They add, however, that it nevertheless does not properly consist in these places. The argument is that the artist does not aim immediately at the places of the pixels, but rather at the pixels’ distance from each other and on their whole configuration. When the golden or wooden chalice is being carried from A to B, they argue, it remains the same chalice and keeps the same artificial form, without its having the former set of places: Thus, these places were not the chalice’s artificial form either. Likewise in a painting. Who would hold that a painting is made a different one dependent on its being displayed on the market-place, in the church or at home? But its respective places then are certainly different. Hence its artificial form did not consist in these places, but in the distance of its parts from each other. Since this distance remains the same, wherever the painting or the chalice might be displayed, the artificial form, too, remains always the same.⁵⁹

Thus, soft realism drew a distinction as regards the extent to which the artificial form can be analysed in terms of pixels and places. It

58. Arriaga, *De anima* 4.233-34, p. 710b. Cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, *Curs phil.* t.3 *De anima* 4.74, p. 75a: “Dicendum est ... species divisibiliter ab obiecto produci. Probatur ... de obiecto heterogeneo et dissimilari constante ex coloribus valde diversis; nequit enim albedo v.g. et nigredo, aut rubedo ab eadem specie repraesentari, cum sint specie omnino distinctae; sed idem obiectum, puta imago, potest ex istis coloribus formari: ergo etc.” For ‘Scotistic’ Psychology, cf. Knebel 1997.

59. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.12.

can be so if you take the ‘places’ to be the immutably interrelated places rather than the absolute coordinates within space: *non in ordine ad locum, sed in ordine ad se*.⁶⁰ It can be so, if you talk about the pixels’ position in a “qualitative” manner: *situs qualitative sumptus*.⁶¹ The artificial form, then, is the necessary and sufficient condition for a work of art to keep its numerical identity over spatial change. That sounds reasonable. What fault might nominalism have found in this account? How could there be a more deflationary account? In fact there was such a one.

“This opinion”, counters Arriaga, “is still less probable than the former and can be criticized more clearly.” In short, Arriaga finds an inconsistency in that the pixels’ distance from each other is being credited with being the necessary and sufficient condition for a work of art to keep its numerical identity, while on the other hand the combination of pixels and places is said to be the only real feature in a painting. According to Arriaga, the distance adds nothing over and above the places – just as the contrast of black and white adds nothing over and above the juxtaposition of black and white.

For this reason, I argued that this account is even more improbable, since the former posited a superfluous form only, while this latter one does not posit anything distinct from the places, which the distance might consist in, yet nevertheless maintains that this distance, not the places, be the artist’s product, and that the places perish, but the distance not likewise. That’s nonsense.⁶²

It makes no sense to distinguish between a persistent interrelation of the pixels and changeable coordinates of space, if the artificial form is defined to be not only an “aggregate”,⁶³ but an “aggregate of places” (*aggregatum ex ubicationibus*),⁶⁴ and if these places are to be un-

60. Compton-Carleton, *Phys.* 17.2.6, p. 276. Hence Lossada SJ., *Curs. phil.* t.2 *Phys.* 2.1.3.13, p. 307a: “... artificialis forma ... est figura partium in ordine ad se vel ad totum, quae dici potest figura intrinseca et quasi organica.”

61. Lyncaeus SJ., *Univ. philos. schol.* t.3 *Metaph.*, p. 210.

62. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.13-14. See text in the appendix.

63. Thomas Aquinas, *Qu. de anima* 10 ad 16.

64. Lugo, *De sacram. Euch.* 8.32, p. 826a.

derstood to be the very coordinates of space. This, indeed, is the basic assumption of the account advanced by Lugo and Arriaga. It reduced the Aristotelian category ‘position’ (*situs*) to the coordinates of space.⁶⁵ What in other quarters would have been spelt out to be a categorical relation was spelt out by these thinkers as a bunch of extrinsic denominations.⁶⁶ What we are facing here is the same nominalism regarding Relation as that which Joel Biard’s paper in this volume rehearses with respect to mathematical entities.

What follows from the assumption that the artificial form coincides with the coordinates of space? Arriaga is quite explicit about it:

Hence I conclude that whenever a work of art is being carried from A to B the artificial form physically undergoes an alteration insofar as the set of places changes, with which it is partially identical ... One might object: anybody who moves a statue from its place would then be the efficient cause of an artificial form, since he will be the cause of the respective set of places, in which the artificial form consists. I answer: quite so. Anybody who moves the statue from its place, physically produces a new, partially different artificial form.⁶⁷

According to Arriaga, its place is so indispensable a feature of what makes up the identity of a work of art that with a change of place it does not remain numerically the same thing. This view is difficult to accept, as it already was for his contemporaries.⁶⁸ Fun has been

65. “... Dixi in *Philosophia*, extensionem actualem partium in ordine ad locum non esse aliquod accidens, quale ab aliis ponitur distinctum ab ubicationibus partium, quod idem perseveret, quando corpus localiter movetur, sed esse ipsasmet ubicationes partium ...” Lugo, *De sacram. Euch.* 8.34, p. 826b/27a. – “... [Situs] non distinguitur realiter ab Ubicatione.” Arriaga, *Log.* 12.21, p. 167a.

66. “Dicendum censeo, relationem a fundamento et termino summum ratione nostra distingui ... De relationibus *praedicamentalibus* nulla est difficultas in nostra sententia negante, eas proprie esse relationes, sed solum denominationes extrinsecas ab utroque extremo desumptas.” Arriaga, *Log.* 12.19, 12.57, p. 166a. 176a.

67. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.14-15. See text in the appendix.

68. “Et quidem prorsus ridiculum est, quod concedit Arriaga ... physice loquendo mutari saltem inadaequate ... formam artificialem, quotiescumque loco mutatur res artificiosa ... Hoc sane prorsus incredibile est ...” Mastrius / Bellutus, *Phys.* 6, 52, p. 170a. – In the later editions of his work, Arriaga himself quotes his fellow Jesuit R.

made of Kant's aesthetics because, if they were right, the arabesque of a wall-paper would be the purest manifestation of beauty. Arriaga's notion of a work of art in a way is no less bizarre. It seems to have been abstracted from baroque sundials, while the performance arts, for instance, simply are not taken into account.⁶⁹

Anyway, it would be too counter-intuitive to hold that an artist plays no other part in the artificial form's coming into being than a furniture remover or merchant.⁷⁰ Arriaga accepts at least this much:

Nevertheless one will not take the statue's remover for the statue's author, for he did not originally induce the places in this specific distance from each other. Rather, that kind of disposition which results from the statue's being removed is a consequence of the original disposition without there being any need of a productive power in the remover.⁷¹

But do we not fall back, then, into soft realism? Arriaga would not grant this. The persistence of the distance between the places is accounted for by an explanation which might be labeled 'nominalistic' in yet another sense. Physically the artificial form is altered by the transport, but from our point of view and morally speaking it is not altered, since there are other sets of places incessantly following each other to the effect that the places always keep up the same interrelation.⁷²

Lynch's disapproval. See Lyncaeus, *Univ. philos. schol.*, p. 210, as quoted by Arriaga, *Curs. phil.* ed. 1668, p. 371b.

69. A partisan of Arriaga's, Aler, *Phys.*, p. 373a, at least distinguishes from the *forma artificialis operis relictis post artem* (architecture, painting, sculpturing) the special problem of the performative arts: "... forma artificialis artium aliarum ... est ipsa operatio."

70. "institor imaginum": Aler, *Phys.*, p. 373b.

71. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.15. See text in the appendix.

72. Arriaga, *Phys.* 6.14. (Text in the appendix) - "Si figura consistat in ubicationibus (quod non pauci falsum putant), commutatis his numero ubicationibus in alias similes, figurae sunt physice numero distinctae, at moraliter eadem, nam perinde se habent quoad apparentiam." Ribadeneira SJ., *Tr. de volunt. Dei*, p. 510. - "... quando movetur localiter ab uno loco in alium..., distantia partium inter se ... *metaphysice* loquendo non perseverat eadem, cum non maneat eadem ubicatio partium, sed solum moraliter et vulgariter ... Dicitur autem *moraliter* perseverare eadem, quamdiu post artificis operam sic manent partes inter se dispositae, ut absque novo artificio

That is, a work of art can claim only a ‘moral’ identity. Although it is made a different one by its being carried from A to B, it keeps its identity, since what is changing is something utterly indifferent. In Jesuit scholasticism things were called ‘morally’ identical if for specific purposes their numeric diversity was regarded to make no difference.⁷³ For instance, the notion of ‘moral identity’ saved the numerical identity of material substances over time: the identity of a ship, all of whose single parts may have been exchanged; the identity of an animal, which conserves itself by metabolism. ‘Moral identity’, in contradistinction to ‘physical identity’, is ‘popular and apparent’;⁷⁴ it is a fictitious one, to be sure, but not in any pejorative sense. Fictions were an indispensable means of Roman legal science in order to deal with the realities of life. This ‘identity-as-if’ in application to works of art is the core feature of the theory we are talking about. In 1613 this theory made its appearance in the schools.⁷⁵ I take this to be a notable event in the history of Aristotelianism just because the theory is so bizarre.⁷⁶ For bizarre it is. As Compton-Carleton put it at the time: the canvas need only be rolled up, and there will no longer be any ground for attributing this moral identity to the painting.⁷⁷

possint similem distantiam et proportionem ad invicem retinere ... Vides, quantum sit moralitatis in hac perseverantia eiusdem figurae artificialis, licet physice loquendo eius intrinseca constitutiva varientur.” Lugo, *De sacram. Euch.* 8.33, p. 826a/b. The context with Lugo is the casuistry of canonical law: the distinction between the change a chalice undergoes in its ordinary use and another class of changes – if it was broken and had to be fixed –, which require a new consecration.

73. Cf. Knebel 1994.

74. Kirwan ex-SJ., *Metaphysical Essays* 108, p. 50.

75. “... Hoc modo olim explicui formam artificialem in II. lib. *Physicorum*, quam doctrinam video postea placuisse philosophis recentioribus, quorum aliqui scripta sua typis mandarunt” Lugo, *De sacram. Euch.* 8.33, p. 826b. Lugo taught his philosophy course at León in 1612-15.

76. Arriaga here met the disapproval also by González de Santalla, *In Phys.*, f. 80v/81r: “Concedit sequelam [sc. mutari formam artificiosam, quoties cathedra mutatur de uno loco in alium] P. Arriaga asserens mutari inadaequate figuram et formam artificiosam physice loquendo, quoties res artificiosa movetur, in ordine tamen ad apprehensionem nostram et moraliter loquendo non mutari figuram, quia succedunt aliae ubicationes eodem modo distantes inter se ac priores. Nihilominus neganda est sequela ...”

77. “Contra ..., quantumcumque quis hominis alicuius imaginem in charta depictam

We may therefore doubt that moral identity was meant to be a serious solution in this case. It was meant, dialectically, to be a feeler. As such, however, it was soon about to lose all its charm. “Voilà un fou” was the rejoinder of Claude Buffier (1679-1737), an 18th-century French Jesuit, to the objection that what we take to be a work of art might turn out to be a random effect.⁷⁸

This foolish objection, however, is an accurate rendering of the basic conviction of Buffier’s 17th-century Spanish fellow Jesuits. The Spanish Suarezians face-lifted Nominalism in order to give it new support by theoretical patterns which had already stood their test elsewhere and the extension of whose scope presumably was the hidden agenda of the whole dispute.

There is, on the one hand, the systematic distinction between a ‘physical’ and a ‘moral’ mode of being, by means of which Suarezianism ontologically made sense of legal fictions.⁷⁹ There is, on the other hand, the superposition of the Aristotelian ontology of substance and accident by a new *res-modus*-ontology. That it is here or there, its *ubicatio*, is perhaps the paradigm case of what the Suarezians took to be a thing’s *modus*. Recent scholarship acknowledges that the reconstruction of reality by means of a couple of *modi* was a quiet revolution.⁸⁰ Wolfgang Hübener has traced the impact of Jesuit thought on space and place till Otto von Guericke and his fa-

complicet et chartam illam in unum quasi globum convolutam manu comprimat, adhuc dicitur propriissime hominis imaginem manu gestare, et tamen ubicationes notabiliter mutantur, et caput iam in imagine est pectori vel pedibus forte proximum: ergo non consistit figura artefacti in ubicationibus in ordine ad locum.” Compton-Carleton, *Phys.* 17.2.5, p. 276. Restated by Lossada, *Phys.* 2.1.3.10, p. 306a/b. 78. “... à un homme qui demandera qu’on lui prouve que c’est une intelligence, et non le pur hasard, qui a formé et qui entretient la régularité d’une horloge, pour toute preuve on ne lui répond rien, et l’on dit seulement ou plus haut ou plus bas: *Voilà un fou.*” Buffier SJ., *Tr. des premières vérités* 292, p. 128. As for Buffier’s connection with the Scottish philosophy of *common sense* cf. Wilkins 1969: 113ff.

79. For the medieval notion of legal fictions cf. Walther 2008: 437ff. I cannot go here into the details. I dealt with the ‘moral’ mode of being some time ago when I explored the origins of aleatory probability in the wake of Molinism: Knebel 2000: 488-519; Knebel 2003; Knebel 2007: 39ff. As for semiotics particularly cf. Meier-Oeser 1997: 197ff. 276.

80. Leinsle 2006: 363.

mous Magdeburgian hemispheres.⁸¹ To what extent does the connection between existence and being at a certain place affect the object's ontological constitution? That is the underlying question. Contrary to what Leibniz was to hold later on, Suarezianism held that its being here rather than there must be conceived of to be an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic denomination of the object.⁸² In this light, a change of place affects the thing deeply. Regarding a work of art, the movement from one place to another affects, says Lugo, such an object's *intrinseca constitutiva*. Since Lugo and Arriaga, for this reason, have resort to 'moral' identity, and since this notion is thus transferred from items which are subject to change in time to items which are subject to change in space, it is not altogether clear why ordinary substances should not also be drawn into the scope of this very notion.⁸³ 'Hylomorphism without the doctrine of act and potency': Professor Sousedík's formula for the peculiarity of Arriaga's Aristotelianism⁸⁴ is a happy one. It encapsulates an Aristotelianism which was endangered by the invasion of corpuscular philosophy.⁸⁵ But perhaps the even more rewarding question would go the other way round: are we sure that the early modern renaissance of atomism for its part was not heavily indebted to the 'Aristotelian'

81. Hübener 1985: 91ff.

82. Suárez, *Disp. met.* 51.1.15, p. 976a. The same doctrine is defended by Lugo.

83. Not particularly with regard to the *forma artificialis* in Arriaga's teacher Hurtadus de Mendoza SJ., *Disp. de univ. philos. Phys.* 14.37, p. 468: "Dices, mutari ubicationem non mutata figura, ut, quando homo fertur sella gestatoria. Sed id impossibile est in omni sententia, quia saltem figura est passio ubicationis, quia situs est partium dispositio resultans ex ubicatione, quae est fundamentum distantiae partium. Deinde, semper mutatur figura, quia est talis dispositio corporis in ordine ad locum, et licet non mutetur distantia partium inter se, mutatur tamen totus ille modus, qui essentialiter priori respondebat spatio: et datur alia ubicatio, qua partes, servata eadem distantia inter se, respondeant spatio diverso, ut si Deus homini sedenti auferat sessionem et pro illa subroget aliam novam, vel sedem annihiletur et reproducat iterum sedens, hic modos figurae mutasset. Vulgo tamen dicitur, 'eamdem' retinere figuram, quia partes aequae distant inter se: et, ut melius explicaret Aristoteles hanc vulgarem conceptionem, adhibuit praedicamentum de situ" – Restated by Lugo, *De sacram. Euch.* 8.29, 8.35, p. 825a. 827a.

84. Sousedík 2009: 100 ("Hylemorphismus ohne Akt-Potenz-Lehre").

85. Cf. Knebel 2006.

school philosophy? The usual confrontation of Aristotelianism and atomism is certainly simplistic. To be sure, when the ostentatious dispute about atomism was enacted by two leading philosophers of the Minims, both of them took for granted that there was such an opposition. But the fate of our topic in this dispute is telling: The well-known nominalistic stance helped to make a case against Aristotelianism, whereas Aristotelianism identified itself with a realism more uncompromising than ever before.⁸⁶ The *Genieästhetik*, we might venture to say, was a feature of Aristotelianism reinvented.⁸⁷ As historians, however, we must be on our guard against a false divide between the atomistic account of the artificial form and standard Aristotelianism. The success of Lugo/Arriaga not only represents a certain stage right within the Aristotelian school philosophy. It also shows that the disputes within school philosophy did matter – in spite of all these sneering beaux esprits.

Appendix

Rodericus de Arriaga SJ.: *Cursus philosophicus*, Antverpiae 1632

[319a]

Physica disp. 6 sect. 2 *De composito artificiali*

Ex cognitione compositi artificialis perfectior evadet cognitio naturae, de qua in presenti. – Adverte, non esse sermonem de eis artefactis, respectu quorum ars nihil efficit nisi applicare agentia naturalia, quibus applicatis natura producit aliquem effectum, ex mixtione et destillatione corporum, et in productione aliquorum animantium ... Et de his non est sermo, sed praecise de his quae proprie sunt

86. Palanco OMinim., *Dialogus phys.-theol.* 57.483-88, pp. 272a-76b; Saguens OMinim., *Atomismus vindic.* 10, pp. 268-86 (“Quam male sentiant Aristotelici de figura”).

87. “Dum illa imago et figura est in mente artificis ideata praecellenti ingenio, negare audebis ideam illam importare veram realitatem obiectivam excogitatam mente et ingenio artificis in abstracto? ... Sed nunquid, dum ipsemet artifex ingenioso labore ... ipsam realitatem obiectivam exprimit et imprimit, nullam omnino realitatem in materia de novo efficit?” Palanco, *Dialogus phys. theol.* 57.486, p. 275a.

entia artificiosa, ut v.g. de pictura, statua etc., circa quae primo dubitatur quid sit artificialis forma.

(n. 8) Nonnulli arbitrantur, in eiusmodi artefactis formam artificialem esse aliquid distinctum ab omnibus partibus et ubicationibus rei artificiosae, et eam formam produci non a natura, sed ab artifice. Haec sententia omnino est improbabilis, [319b] ideoque dicendum puto, formam artificialem, picturae v.g., non esse quid distinctum ab omnibus coloribus et eorum ubicationibus. Probatur evidenter, quia eo ipso quod intelligamus eos colores cum tali et tali ubicatione in tabula, nulla alia forma artificiali superintellecta, intelligitur pictura; sicut in characteribus, quia etiam sunt entia artificiosa, nihil aliud est necesse intelligere, nisi atramentum hoc vel illo modo ubicatum. Idem clarius intelligitur in statua lignea vel lapidea: nam praecise per ablationem superfluarum ac impediendum partium (quod solum praestat statuarius dedolans vel lignum vel marmor) ceterae quae remanent sine ulla nova forma et distantias et proportionem expressivam hominis retinent, efficiuntque statuam; ergo ibi non producitur forma artificialis distincta a partibus ligni taliter ubicati et a carentia partium redundantium. (n. 9) Patet consequentia: quia praecise auferendo partes aliquas ligni non potest artifex positivam formam substantialem producere in his quae remanent: nam eas reliquit ut antea, et solum ab eis alias separavit. Et confirmo: si separasset alias diversas, ita ut non fecisset statuam, certe non habuisset diversam actionem specie, et tamen tunc non produxisset ullam formam physicam, ergo neque iam. Patet consequentia, quia eadem actio in specie nequit iam esse productiva formae substantialis vel accidentalis, iam vero non.

[320a] (n. 12) Alii Auctores, cum affirmant formam artificialem non esse aliquid reale distinctum a partibus et earum ubicationibus, addunt tamen, eam non consistere formaliter in ipsis ubicationibus. Et moventur, quia artifex non intendit producere ubicationes colorum v.g., sed illam distantiam et coordinationem colorum inter se. Confirmant, quamvis vas aureum vel ligneum mutetur localiter, adhuc est idem vas, et habet eandem formam artificialem, sed tunc non habet easdem ubicationes quas antea, ergo ubicationes non

erant forma artificialis vasis. Idem est in pictura. Quis enim dicat, diversam esse picturam ex eo quod sit in foro, vel in templo, vel domi? cum tamen certum sit, ubicationes illius esse diversas in templo, et diversas in foro, etc. Ergo illa forma artificialis non consistebat in ubicationibus, sed in distantia partium inter se, quae, cum maneat eadem, quocumque feratur pictura vel vas, manet etiam eadem forma artificialis.

(n. 13) [om. ed. 1669:] *Haec opinio improbabilior est praecedenti, impugnaturque clarius, quia ipsius Auctores nihil agnoscunt reale in pictura, nisi colores et eorum ubicationes: nam forma artificialis non est distincta realiter ab his duabus rebus in eorum sententia, dum sic argumentor: Artifex non producit colores, ergo solum producit eorum ubicationes, sed, per te, artifex producit formam artificialem, ergo haec non est distincta ab ubicationibus. Patet consequentia, quia forma producta ab artifice non est aliud per te quam ipsae ubicationes, alioquin iam adderes cum prioris sententiae Auctoribus formam aliquam artificialem distinctam a partibus et earum ubicationibus, quod a te negatum est.*

[add. ed. 1669:] *Huius sententiae videtur esse Pater Lynceus, qui lib. 3 Metaph. t. 7 num. 44, cum immediate ante dixisset situm esse speciem ubi, sicut homo est animalis, subiungit haec verba: "Hinc intelligi potest, quidnam sit forma artificialis sive figura, qua aurum v. g. prius rude ... eruditur et calix efficitur; nihil etenim est quam situs partium calicis, non ubicative, sed qualitative sumptus, necnon carentia aliarum partium" etc. Haec ille, qui et infra num. 46 ait, opinionem nostram maxime circa mutationem physicam figurae esse "inverisimilem et ex ipsis terminis supra fidem"; nullum tamen argumentum contra eam adducit. Dixi, Lynceum videri esse huius sententiae, nam cum nihil penitus ponat quam situm, nobiscum re ipsa convenit. Dum vero addit, nostram sententiam esse inverisimilem, opponi nobis satis clare videtur. Deinde ego, ut verum fatear, non capio, quid sit illud "figura et situs non ubicative, sed qualitative". Cum enim nulla entitas sit nisi ubicationes, quid denotat adversativa illa "non ubicative"? Et quid illa "sed qualitative"? Nam esto dicat nobiscum, ubi esse qualitatem et non modum, totum tamen hoc est independens a puncto praesenti, et sive ubi sit qualitas, sive modus, semper debet figura physice mutari, dum res movetur loco, ac proinde recidit in id, quod in nobis dixit esse "inverisimile". Quidquid ergo de eius mente sit, sententia paulo ante posita facillime reiicitur, quia cum eius Auctores nihil aliud ponant quam ubicationes et carentias superfluarum partium, manifeste colligitur, cum artifex, pictor*

v.g., colores non producat, sed pure pte eis det ubicationes, et nihilominus producat formam artificialem, colligitur, inquam, hanc nihil aliud dicere supra partes ipsas colorum quam ubicationes illorum et superfluarum carentiam.

Confirmatur: quia distantia omnium rerum inter se non est aliquid distinctum ab earum ubicationibus, sicut diversitas inter albedinem et nigredinem non est aliquid distinctum ab entitate albedinis et nigredinis ... Sed, per te, distantia partium est forma artificialis, ergo forma artificialis sunt ipsae ubicationes, a quibus non distinguitur ea distantia. (n. 14) Et propterea dixi, hanc sententiam esse improbabiliorē praecedenti, quia illa solum [32ob] ponebat unam formam otiosam, haec autem, cum nihil distinctum ab ubicationibus ponat, in quo consistat distantia, ait tamen produci distantiam, non vero ubicationes: has destrui, illam non, quod omnino repugnat.

Ex his infero, physice loquendo, mutari inadaequate figuram et formam artificialem, quotiescumque loco mutatur res artificiosa, quia tunc mutantur ubicationes, a quibus non distinguitur talis figura saltem inadaequate. Mutatur etiam distantia partium, quae in ipsis ubicationibus adaequate consistit: in ordine autem ad apprehensionem nostram, et moraliter loquendo, non mutari figuram, quia succedunt aliae ubicationes eodem modo distantes inter se ac priores; sicut, moraliter loquendo, eodem modo dicitur quis stare vel sedere, sive habeat has sive illas ubicationes, dummodo sint omnino similes inter se, et sive feratur huc sive illuc in sede. Et hinc responsum est argumentis adversariorum.

(n. 15) Sed obiicies: Ergo qui movet figuram, v.g. statuam, erit causa illius formae artificialis, cum sit causa ubicationum, in quibus consistit forma artificialis. Respondeo, hominem moventem figuram physice loquendo producere novam et distinctam inadaequate formam artificialem, quia producit novas ubicationes; non tamen censi ullo modo esse artificem vel auctorem illius figurae, quia non primo produxit eas ubicationes distantes inter se et constituentes formam artificiosam, sed potius ex dispositione priori ab artifice producta necessario sequitur secunda ad motum localem illius figurae, et hoc sine ulla arte requisita in movente figuram.

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CHAPTER 12

The *Categories* in Lutheran Denmark

Sten Ebbesen

This essay is about the fate of the *Categories* in Lutheran Denmark in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it should be understood that the story would hardly be significantly different if I had chosen a Northern German Lutheran principality instead.

Three major forces determined the fate of philosophy in sixteenth-century Northern Europe: scholastic tradition, humanism and Lutheranism. Two of these were fundamentally anti-scientific.

Most of Northern Europe was only just beginning to be influenced by renaissance humanism at the time of the Lutheran reformation. Lorenzo Valla's ranting attacks on the ten categories and much else in traditional logic will have been known by very few. Some more probably knew of Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, which had appeared in print in 1515, thirty years after the author's death. Agricola's preference for topical argumentation over demonstration was to exert a deep influence on developments in the North. Valla's and Agricola's humanistic line was further developed by Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée) in the 1540s-60s. Ramus tried to replace both ordinary logic and metaphysics with a jargon logic founded on a set of elementary topical relations. By the 1580s Ramism reached Denmark.

The Lutheran reformation was, among other things, an anti-philosophical movement. Luther was deeply suspicious of all branches of philosophy save logic. Melanchthon was a little more liberal, but not all that much.

Melanchthon ran the reformed university of Wittenberg, and he was the man who laid down the rules for university education in all Lutheran lands. He is often entitled *Præceptor Germaniæ*, but might

well deserve also the title of *Præceptor Daniae*. When the twin kingdoms of Denmark and Norway went Lutheran in 1536, the king (Christian III) invited Melanchthon to come and reorganize the one university of his territories, the University of Copenhagen (founded 1479), but he had to content himself with one of the great *præceptor's* assistants by the name of Johann Bugenhagen.¹

According to the new statutes, the university was to have just two philosophical chairs, one in dialectic and one in natural philosophy. The dialectician was required to spend quite a bit of his time on rhetoric and Roman poetry, but his main job was to teach Melanchthon's *Erotemata dialectices*,² and so dialectician after dialectician did until the end of the sixteenth century, though the last ones to do so obviously were very tired of being obliged to use the book. Strangely, it was left for the professor of natural philosophy to give a weekly lesson on Aristotle's logic, preferably based on the Greek text, but a Latin translation could be used instead.³ In practice, it seems that the *dialectic* soon took over that job.

1. For further information about philosophy at the University of Copenhagen in the 16th and 17th centuries, see Ebbesen & Koch 2003. All the Danish logicians mentioned in this essay are dealt with there, but not with a focus on their views on the *Categories*.

2. Norvin 1940: 30: "Secundus Lector erit Dialecticus. Hic quatuor ordinariis diebus tantum tradat aliquam breuem et planam Dialecticam, qualis est Cesarii, aut absolutior et commodior illa Philippi Melanthonis. Hac absoluta, adiungat elementa Rhetorices, uidelicet libellum Ciceronis ad Herennium, aut potius elementa Rhetorices a Philippo scripta, que his temporibus sunt accommodatiora. His absolutis enarret unam Ciceronis orationem, in qua monstret usum illorum preceptorum, nec addat plures orationes aut autores. Postea statim redeat ad Dialecticam. Hanc enim assidue in Scholis inculcari oportet. Et cogat hic lector auditores ediscere precepta, et inter docendum ab eis ea reposcat. ... Alteram lectionem legat die Lune et Martis, alias Vergilium, alias Ouidii Metamorphosin, alias partem aliquam Liuii." No Copenhagen *dialectic* seems to have availed himself of the permission to use Johannes Cæsar's *Dialectica* from 1520 instead of Melanchthon's work.

3. Norvin 1940: 31-32: "Quintus Lector Physicus. Hic quatuor ordinariis diebus tradat primum ordine compendium aliquod Physices ... Preterea unus dies et certa hora ei statuatur, ut semel in hebdomada legat ordine totam Aristotelis Dialecticam Grece, ut in Schola ars Methodi et perfecta Dialectica conseruetur. Si uero Grece hoc non potest, legat ex aliqua commodiore translatione Aristotelis latine. Ita tamen ut semper apud sese conferat latina cum Grecis ante lectionem, ne sepe, ut fit, aliena a

So let me start with a look at Melanchthon's work.

Melanchthon defined dialectic as the art of teaching in the right way, orderly, and clearly.⁴ Dialectic is to be applied to all matters that men ought to be taught,⁵ and it only differs from rhetoric in its lack of embellishment of the argumentation.⁶ Although he does not say so explicitly, the book makes it amply clear that the sort of teaching he is really thinking of is the teaching of Christianity. Melanchthonian universities were seminaries with the purpose of breeding Lutheran pastors.

Melanchthon thought Agricola's *De inventione dialectica* was a good book, but he also thought that some acquaintance with the categories and other parts of traditional logic might be useful to a pastor.

His approach to the subject is influenced by late-medieval nominalism in that he holds that universals are words⁷ and underlines the point that everything that is, is *eo ipso* singular.⁸ He also holds that a universal is a mental act that paints a picture which is common in the sense that someone carrying it around in his mind can apply it to several individuals after having made a comparison between each

sententia auctoris dicat. Et forte hoc in principio magis proderit, donec Schola possit habere uirum, qui ista Grece tradat."

4. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 513: "Dialectica est ars seu via, recte, ordine, et perspicue docendi."

5. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 514: "Circa quas res versatur Dialectica? Circa omnes materias seu quaestiones, de quibus docendi sunt homines."

6. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 515: "Quid differunt Dialectica et Rhetorica? ... Dialectica circa omnes materias versatur, et rerum summas propriis verbis nude proponit, nec unam sententiam pluribus verbis aut adhibitis luminibus figurarum pingit. Sed Rhetorica addit ornatum in his materiis, quae orationis copia et splendore illustrari et varie pingi possunt." Similarly in *Elementa rhetorices* cols. 419-420: "Tanta est dialecticae et rhetoricae cognatio, vix ut discrimen reprehendi possit. ... Verum hoc interesse dicunt, quod dialectica res nudas proponit. Rhetorica vero addit elocutionem quasi vestitum. Hoc discrimen etsi nonnulli reprehendunt, ego tamen non repudio."

7. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* cols. 519-520: "Universalis dicuntur, quia sunt gradus vocabulorum communium. ... Species est nomen commune, proximum individuis, de quibus praedicatur in quaestione, Quid sit ... Genus est nomen commune multis speciebus, et praedicatur de eis in quaestione: Quid sit"

8. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 520: "Tenenda est sententia vera et rectissime tradita a Boethio: Omne quod est, eo ipso quod est, singulare est, id est: Quaecunque res in natura vere et positive est quiddam extra intellectionem, est singularis per sese."

individual and the mental picture. Such a mental act or picture – he is not consistent on this point – is what Aristotle called a species and Plato an idea.⁹ Melanchthon provides no explanation of the relation between the concepts and the corresponding words.

A category is defined as “a series (*ordo*) of genera and species under one most general item, which signifies either substance or accident”, and, he continues,¹⁰

The whole table containing the categories is a brief table of the totality of things <and> distributes substances and the accidents of substances. If we were to unfold the categories completely, we should have to talk about all parts of nature. Now we just recite the naked list of words, which, however, is useful because thus we learn the limits within which all thought must be kept, so that, namely, we start from the highest word ‘being’ (*ens*), and then consider the various natures as its branches, as it were, and ask about the thing confronting us whether it is a substance or an accident, and in which branch of substances or accidents it should be put.

So, the list of categories is one of the ways in which we can, and must, conceptualize the world’s constituent parts. However often Melanchthon speaks of the categories as words, he nevertheless as-

9. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 520: “... communis illa imago cervi, quae vocatur species, non est quiddam extra intellectionem, nec est, ut Graeci loquuntur ὑποστάμενον, seu hypostasis. Sed est revera actus intelligendi, pingens illam imaginem in mente, quae ideo dicitur communis, qua applicari ad multa individua potest, ut circumferens in mente imaginem cervi, agnoscit cervos ubicunque oblatos, figuram ad imaginem in mente conferens. Nec aliud Plato vocat Ideas, quam quod Aristoteles nominat species seu εἶδη.”

10. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 526: “*Quid est Praedicamentum?* Est ordo generum et specierum sub uno genere generalissimo, quod aut substantiam, aut accidens aliquod significat, quia tota haec tabella, quae continet praedicamenta, est exigua tabella universitatis rerum, distribuit {distribuens *scribendum?*} substantias et substantiarum accidentia. Ac si integre explicanda essent praedicamenta, de omnibus naturae partibus dicendum esset. Nunc nuda vocabulorum series tantum recitatur, quid ipsum tamen utile est, quia discimus, quibus limitibus includenda sit omnis cogitatio, videlicet, ut a summo vocabulo Entis exorsi, postea diversas naturas, velut ramos consideremus, et quaeramus de re proposita, an sit substantia, aut accidens, et in quo ramo substantiarum aut accidentium collocanda sit.”

sumes a strong ontological foundation. Nor is he bothered by the equivocity of being. Having listed the categories he says:¹¹

They are called most general, i.e., highest, genera because from them one goes straight to the word that is the first of all in the nature of things, being, that is.

And his first piece of information about substance is:¹²

A substance is a being (*ens*) that truly has a being (*esse*) of its own and is not in anything else so that it owes its being to its subject. This definition is common to God and created substances.

Because of the difficulty of understanding God, we may, however, use a narrower definition for ordinary purposes, viz.¹³

A substance is a being (*ens*) that has a being (*esse*) of its own and supports accidents.

Concerning each category Melanchthon finds something to say of relevance to Christian teaching. Thus the fact that mental habits are a species of quality occasions a long excursus on virtues and vices, secular as well as theological.

Melanchthon's treatment of relations contains many medieval features. He starts with a distinction between absolute names and relative ones, the absolute being those that signify substances,

11. Melanchthon, *Erroremata* col. 528 "Dicuntur autem genera generalissima, id est, summa, quia ab his proxime acceditur ad vocabulum, quod inter omnia in rerum natura primum est, videlicet Ens. Ut igitur ordo rectius teneri possit, supra ordines praedicamentorum semper memineris collocandum esse vocabulum Ens, ut in inquisitione rerum habeat mens quasi metam, ubi resistat. Si enim sine fine vagaretur, fierent incerta et confusa omnia."

12. Melanchthon, *Erroremata* col. 528 "Substantia est Ens, quod revera proprium esse habet, nec est in alio, ut habens esse a subiecto. Haec definitio communis est Deo, et creatis substantiis."

13. Melanchthon, *Erroremata* cols. 528-9: "Est ergo satis accommodata definitio: Substantia est Ens, quod habet proprium esse, et sustinet accidentia."

quantities or qualities,¹⁴ and later introduces the distinctions between *relativa secundum dici* and *secundum esse*,¹⁵ and between real relations and relations of reason. In order not to look scholastic, he defends the last-named distinction by claiming that it is neither otiose nor a recent (i.e. medieval) invention, for it may be found in Ammonius.¹⁶

Perhaps the most interesting part of the whole chapter is the treatment of relational entities that are not natural but introduced by human institution or divine will, such as a border-post or a schoolmaster.¹⁷ In the former case the foundation is a stone, in the latter a person, but they are what they are in virtue of their directedness towards their respective *termini*. I know of no medieval precedence for this type of *relativa*. One remark made in passing also deserves to be noticed:¹⁸

Traditionally, schoolmen have called the following words transcendent, because they are common to many categories: ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘true’, ‘good’. But ‘true’ and ‘good’ rightly belong among the relatives.

We are offered no explanation why this is so, but the reason seems to be that ‘good’ and ‘true’ indicate a relation to the divine measuring rod.

14. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 544: “Nomina alia dicuntur absoluta, alia relativa. Absoluta sunt nomina significantia substantias, aut quantitates, aut qualitates.”

15. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 546: “Alia sunt relativa secundum dici, alia secundum esse.”

16. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 551: “Relationum aliae sunt reales aliae rationes. Haec distinctio nec ociosa est, nec recens, sed ab Ammonio etiam recitata.”

17. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 552 “Scholasticus est persona ordinata voluntate Dei, ad discendam doctrinam generi humano necessariam de Deo et de aliis rebus bonis, ne extinguatur noticia Dei inter homines, sed servetur Ecclesia, et multi fiant haeredes vitae aeternae, et servetur disciplina, et habeant homines alias honestas utilitates ex artibus, ut ex Medica curationes morborum, ex Arithmetica computationes, ex Geometria mensuras, ex Astronomia anni cognitionem, et alias utilitates.”

18. Melanchthon, *Erotemata* col. 554: “Usitate in scholis nominarunt haec vocabula transcendentia: Ens, unum, verum, bonum, quia communia sunt multis praedica-
mentis, sed verum et bonum recte inter relativa recensentur.”

One notable feature of Melanchthon's chapter on categories is the complete absence of the *Antepredicamenta*. He does not even offer an excuse for omitting them.¹⁹ The *Postpredicamenta* are treated, but he seems unhappy with Aristotle's apparently arbitrary choice of a few ambiguous words – 'opposite' etc. – at the expense of others.²⁰

Very little is preserved of whatever the Copenhagen professors may have written in the first decades after the reformation. By the late 1570s sources begin to be available, and by then Peter Ramus was beginning to exert considerable influence on several professors, as he was to continue to do until about 1620, though few dared openly profess their allegiance to the heretical idol – although this did not show in his writings, he was a Calvinist, and Calvinists were almost worse than Papists in the eyes of the Danish authorities. Generally, the Danish crypto-Ramists contented themselves with placing the doctrine of the topics immediately after that of the categories, but some went further.

One of the early Danish Ramists, Jacob Madsen (Jacobus Matthiæ in Latin) took upon him to demonstrate what Ramus' *lex iustitiæ* meant for logic, which deals only with matters of mind and reason. The Ramist law of justice required homogeneity for each discipline: any scientific proposition belongs in just one discipline and only propositions with the right sort of mutual coherence belong together. For the contents of the *Categories*, this meant that the *Antepredicamenta* should be left to grammar, and while certain of the single categories really pertain to theology, physics, geometry or some other discipline, the general system belongs to no particular discipline, and so not to logic:²¹

19. Cæsarius, of whose book Melanchthon approved, had kept the antepredicaments, and in general followed Aristotle much more closely than Melanchthon.

20. Melanchthon, *Ertemata* col. 56r: "Postquam utcunque exposita est doctrina de predicamentis, adiecta est commonefactio de paucis quibusdam vocabulis ambiguis, cum multo plura recenseri potuissent."

21. Matthiæ, *Doctrina de ratione docendi discendique* 43-44: "In logica, quæ ut ait Arist. lib. I. cap. 8. Post. mentis et rationis tantum est. In hac primum est nomen, verborum homonymorum, synonymorum, paronymorum, adeoque orationis doctrina: quæ doctrina Grammaticæ propria est, ut ipse Arist. Top. ait: Utile est, inquit, observare

A category is nothing but a classification of homogeneous things by most general, subaltern and most special. But this classification of things is not particular to dialectic, for such a *kategoria* and classification of things is nothing but art in general. For art is nothing but the method, gathering, disposition and ordering of homogeneous things by genus, subalternate genera and most special items. For in this way arithmetic is the correctly ordered *kategoria* of numbers, and geometry the correctly ordered *kategoria* of magnitudes.

Accordingly, Professor Madsen praises Agricola for having omitted the categories in his dialectic.²² As so often with the Ramists, Madsen's attack on the categories is an almost verbatim quotation of their great idol. The word 'classification' in my translation renders *descriptio*. But soon people were to talk about the categories as *classes*.

One of the last Copenhagen professors of dialectic to use Melanchthon was Hans Poulsen Resen (Johannes Pauli Resenius,

quot modis vocabulum accipiatur. Sed hæc de vocabulis consideratio non est propria Dialecticæ. Deinde in Dialectica est doctrina prædicamentorum et inventionum {*misprint for* intentionum ?} tradita. Est autem Prædicamentum nihil aliud nisi rerum homogenearum per generalis<si>ma, subalterna et specialis<si>ma descriptio. Hæc autem rerum descriptio Dialecticæ propria non est. Est enim talis rerum κατηγορία et descriptio nihil aliud [est] quàm ars in genere. Ars enim nihil est aliud quam rerum Homogenearum per Genus, genera subalterna et specialis<si>ma, Methodus, comprehensio, dispositio, ordinatio. Sic enim Arithmetica rectè descripta numerorum. Sic Geometria rectè descripta magnitudinum κατηγορία est" I take it that Matthiæ is here using *descriptio* in the sense of *descriptio*. His source is easily identifiable: Ramus, *Scholae dial.* 4.10, p. 112: "Video autem Categoriam esse catogorematum homogeneorum ordinationem et descriptionem per generalissimum, subalterna, specialissima." *Ibid.* p. 114: "Sed tamen res intelligatur; sitque Categoria, homogeneorum descriptio per generalissimum, subalterna infima. Quæ categoriæ definitio, nihil aliud est, quàm {sic!} artis et scientiæ vera methodo dispositæ definitio: Ars enim, est rerum homogenearum per generalissimum, subalterna, specialissima, comprehensio et ordinatio: Sic Arithmetica numeros, Geometria magnitudines methodicè traditas complectentur {sic!}." On pp. 116-17 Ramus throws synonyms and homonyms out of logic and sends paronyms to the *locus a coniugatis* in the *Topics*. Notice that 'catogoremata' is Ramus' Greek for 'prædicabilia'.

22. Matthiæ, *Doctrina de ratione docendi discendique* 45: "Doctrina igitur Prædicamentorum, i.e. artium omnium Dialecticæ Homogenea non est. Unde est <quod> Rodolphus qui accuratissimè Dialecticam subduxit eam doctrinam, ut non Homogeneam prætermisit."

1561-1638), who held the job in the 1590s. In the form of a series of disputations he developed an elementary handbook of logic of his own, a version of which was printed in 1605 for use in the schools of Denmark and Norway. Resen lived at a time when Ramism, while strong in some protestant countries, was beginning to be replaced by a new Aristotelianism in Wittenberg and other leading Lutheran universities. The Neo-Aristotelian wave was motivated first and foremost by the wish to be able to enter into discussions with Jesuits without falling through for lack of training in metaphysics and logic. The Lutherans were not afraid of learning from their enemies, so Suárez was much read, and in logic the new Aristotelianism took its cue from the somewhat Averroistic Paduan professor Zabarella and his *De natura logicæ*, which had appeared in 1578.

Resen is a transitory figure between the 16th century and Neo-Aristotelianism. His treatment of the categories contains some loans from Melanchthon, but none of any real significance. Melanchthon's interesting ideas about the category of relation have left no trace, and 'true' and 'good' are explicitly counted as transcendentals.²³ Resen also deviates from Melanchthon by including the *Antepraedicamenta*.

Resen divides logic into a *pars generalis* and a *pars specialis*, and in so doing he owes a debt to Zabarella, who had counted the doctrine of predicables, categories, propositions and general syllogistic as *pars communis*, the treatises on demonstrative, dialectic and sophistical syllogisms being the *pars propria*. But Resen crosses this division with a semi-Ramistic distinction between *apprehension* and *comprehension*. Apprehension deals with simple concepts, comprehension with combinations of concepts. The result is the following:²⁴

23. Resenius, *Στοιχειώσις logicarum præceptionum* disp. II.2: "Transscendentia, sev τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, superiora sunt heic, quæ summorum generum rationem legitimam transgrediuntur eminenter: ut Ens, (Res, aliquid,) unum, verum, bonum &c."

24. The table represents the structure of Resen's *Parva Logica* from 1605. With negligible variations the same system is presented in his *Στοιχειώσις logicarum hypothesisium* and *Στοιχειώσις logicarum præceptionum*.

| Apprehensio | Categorica | | Topica | Pars generalis |
|--------------|--|-------------------|-------------------------|----------------|
| | Prædicabilia | Categoriae | Loci | |
| | <i>Isagoge</i> | <i>Categoriae</i> | | |
| Comprehensio | diacrisis axiomatica | | diacrisis syllogistica | |
| | <i>De Interpretatione</i> | | <i>Analytica Priora</i> | |
| Methodus | <i>Analytica Posteriora, Topica, Elenchi</i> | | | Pars specialis |
| Ordo | | | | |

The important feature of this division of logic is the place given to the *loci*, on which the humanistic-Ramistic tradition laid so much weight. Dialectical syllogisms belong in *pars specialis*, but the *loci*, i.e. the fundamental relations that link one simple concept to another, are introduced as a part of the theory of simple concepts, and immediately after the predicables and categories.

In 1611 *doctor medicinae* Caspar Bartholin (1585-1629) returned to Copenhagen after several years of studies abroad. He was all of 26 years old, and he already had considerable experience in how to become someone in the academic world. With Bartholin the university acquired a pure-bred Neo-Aristotelian, who had learned his logic in Wittenberg under one of the new movement's foremost proponents, Jakob Martini (1570-1649). In 1608 Bartholin published the first version of a handbook of logic that was to undergo several revisions and many reprints in several places – most of them outside Denmark.²⁵

25. For an English-language introduction to Bartholin's logic, see Ebbesen 2001.

Bartholin drops Resen's compromise between humanism and traditional Aristotelianism. He divides logic in the same way as Zabarella, and he takes the *Antepraedicamenta* seriously. He is not in doubt about the equivocity – or more precisely, analogy – of being: *ens* is used equivocally, that is, analogically, of substance and accidents and of God and creatures.²⁶

There was a current debate whether Aristotle's *Categories* is really a work of logic or of metaphysics. Bartholin is somewhat unclear about the ontological status of the categories, but he is adamant that they do have a foundation in reality. As for which philosophical discipline Aristotle's work really belongs to, he opts for logic, but mainly because Aristotle himself thought that was where it belonged, and he ought to know what he was writing about.²⁷

A similar willingness to bow to tradition appears when Bartholin asks if there must be exactly ten categories. Much like John Buridan some three hundred years earlier,²⁸ Bartholin acknowledges that there is no proof whatsoever that the list is the optimal one, but he accepts it all the same because it is traditional.²⁹

26. Bartholinus *Logica major* 44v-45r: “Æquivoca consilio seu analogiâ ... definitiones partim easdem partim diversas habent. Suntque triplicia. 1. Similitudine ... 2. Proportionione ... 3. Relatione & attributione ... ubi genus ad alteram speciem propendit magis, diciturque; genus analogum, quod magis principaliter de una specie dicitur, minus & secundariò de altera; ut Ens de substantia & accidente, de Deo et creaturis.”

27. Bartholinus *Logica major* 57v: “Philosophi nostri auctoritates hîc prævalent; qui, quid in prædicamentis trataverit, omnium optimè novit. Is ergo doctrinam hanc non inscripsit, περὶ τῶν ὄντων, sed περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν. Unde prædicamenta, dicuntur summa genera Logico; At Metaphysico summa rerum entia, quia σχέσιν categoricam non curat.”

28. See Ebbesen 2005: 252, and also Amerini in the present volume.

29. Bartholinus *Logica major* 56r: “Quamvis autem hæc ita facillimè solvi omnia queant, quæ denarium numerum impugnant; tamen non negandum magis numerum hunc ex recepta Philosophorum (*Pythagoræorum præcipuè, ut fuit Architas, quibus solus denarius perfectus*) sententiâ et consuetudine constare, quàm firmâ demonstratione.” Cf. *Commentarij Collegij Conimbricensis* 263: “Peripateticam igitur, & veram sententiam, quæ dena statuit prædicamenta, si quidem præter antiquorum, & recentium Philosophorum auctoritatem, euidentiam non habet, vt aliqui falso existimarunt, aliqua ratione confirmemus.”

A few reminiscences of Melanchthon may be detected, as when he explains that “a *notio* (concept) is a picture or representation of some thing that the mind has encountered.”³⁰

Bartholin’s type of Neo-Aristotelianism is anything but exciting, though he does adopt the new fashion of speaking about classes: “The categories are classes of simple beings”.³¹ He only rarely provides the standard entertainment of his age, that is, twisting common sense for the sake of theology, and, being a protestant, he can even reject one such twisting to which catholics were committed, and claim that inherence is essential to accident.³² The interpretation of Aristotle is based on that of the late 13th century, but none of the characteristically medieval contributions to logic is allowed to play a role. Thus supposition is a non-word. Later in the 17th c., several writers tried to recover some medieval theory, but that was of only scarce relevance to Aristotle’s *Categories*.

The first important attempt to pep up Neo-Aristotelianism by putting Aristotle’s book to new use was due to the German Georg Gutke (1589-1634), whose theories achieved a break-through in Denmark in the 1650s, a generation after they had first been presented in a book entitled *Logicæ divinæ seu Peripateticæ libri duo*.³³ In the process of pepping up Aristotelianism the Gutkians approached Ramist views on a number of points, but based on different foundations. Their principal aim was to find a way to make logic a really useful hand-maiden of Lutheran theology.

30. Bartholinus *Logica major* 19r: “Est autem notio rei imago vel effigies animo objecta.”

31. Bartholinus *Logica major* 50r: “Incomplexa tantum pertinent ad Categorias, quæ sunt classes Entium simplicium.”

32. Bartholinus *Logica major* 64r: “Estque inhærentia de essentia Accidentis, per quam Accidens differt à substantia.”

33. Gutke was a pupil of Jakob Martini. For his life and work, see Sparr 2001: 582-585. The first edition of his *Logica divina* appeared in Berlin in 1626 (so Risse 1964: 361 n. 363). The first Danish Gutkian I have found is one Paulus Andreæ Arhusius (Danish: Poul Andersen fra Århus) who in 1651-52 issued a series of twelve disputations under the common title of *Exercitationum Logicarum Disputationes* (about which see Ebbesen & Koch 2003: 192-195).

The Gutkians made the *Ante-* and *Postpraedicamenta* the foundation of their logic. Their main idea was this: the principle of contradiction, ‘it is or it is not’, is the foundation of all truth; therefore the doctrine of affirmative and of negative predication must be the foundation of all logic. The elements of affirmative predication are presented in the *Antepredicamenta*, those of negative predication in the *Postpraedicamenta*.³⁴ From the *Antepredicamenta* the Gutkians focus on the notions of synonymy and paronymy, that is univocation and denomination in traditional Latin terminology. In predication one wants either to provide information about the subject’s essence or about something inessential, yet relevant. In the first case, the predication is synonymous and the predicate is a genus, differentia or species; in the second case the predicate is an accident, whether proper or common, and the predication is denominative.³⁵ In this way the Porphyrian predicables were fitted into the system of the *Antepredicamenta*. The most important Danish Gutkian, the theologian Christian Nold in 1666 summarizes some of the main points of this doctrine as follows:

Any term is either consentaneous or dissentaneous. A consentaneous term is affirmatively related to some other term. There are two types, the nominal and the real. The former agrees only in name [with some other term], as is the case with equivocals, whereas the latter also agrees thing-wise, and is either synonymous and agrees essentially, or paronymous and agrees extra-essentially. ... A dissentaneous term is related negatively to some other term, and is either disparate or

34. Cf. Gutkius, *Logica divina* 62 (at the beginning of ch. II): “*Logicæ est docere modum distinguendi conceptus affirmativè disponi aptos à conceptibus negativè disponi aptos.*” After which follows the treatment of synonymy and paronymy. Later, on, at the beginning of ch. IV, on p. 250: “*De Formali instrumento Logico, quod vulgo Post-prædicamentum salutatur quidem, sed juxta rerum veritatem continet modum distinguendi conceptus negativè disponi aptos à notionibus affirmativè disponi aptis.*”

35. Cf. Gutkius, *Logica divina* 80: “*Synonymon prædicamentale est, quo notantur conceptus à creaturis deprompti, dividiturque in genus, Speciem, & differentiam.*” *Ibid.* 130: “*Paronymon Prædicamentale est, quo notantur conceptus primi à creaturis deprompti, qui non essentialiter alios respeciant, dividiturque in Proprium, & accidens.*”

opposite; the former is equally incompatible with several others, as *man* with *sun*, *moon* and *stone*; the latter is more incompatible with one than with another, and is either relative, contrary, privative, or contradictory.³⁶

Nold's "contradictory terms" are infinite terms like *non-man*, which may be called contradictory to *man* because *tertium non datur*.³⁷ Nold is not confusing term-negation with sentence-negation, in fact he holds that there are no infinite verbs, because in *non-currit* and the like we actually have a negation of the copula and not an infinitization of the verbal content. Regrettably, however, he also considers *cold fire*, *white blackness*, *blind seeing* and *deflowered virgin* as instances of contradictory terms being joined.³⁸

The Gutkian system appealed to Nold and his likes because it offered the prospect of a *logica divina* sharing fundamental traits with ordinary logic. Synonymous and paronymous predication could also be found in the sphere of theology, and even in the sphere of non-entities.³⁹

In fact, Nold's logic is ready to deal with all sorts of terms, be

36. Noldius, *Logica recognita* 41-46: "Terminus ... est consentaneus, vel dissentaneus. consentaneus alium terminum respicit affirmativè: et subdividitur in nominalem, vel realem. ille consentit tantùm secundum nomen, ut æquivoca: hic consentit etiam secundum rem. et est vel synonymicus, qvi consentit essentialiter; vel paronymicus, qvi consentit extra-essentialiter. ... Terminus dissentaneus, alium terminum respicit negativè, estque vel disparatus, vel oppositus. ille, cum pluribus pugnat æqualiter: ut homo cum sole, lunâ, lapide. hic, magis pugnat cum unô quàm cum altero: et est relativus, contrarius, privativus, vel contradictorius."

37. Nold had late 13th-century precedent for classifying infinite nouns as contradictory, as appears from Marmo 2003, but it is unclear whether there is a causal connection.

38. Noldius *Logica recognita* 47: "contradictorius, est inter ens et non-ens; estque vel explicitus, cum additur particula non, ut homo non-homo: vel implicitus, (dictus contradictio in adjecto) quando tale aliquid termino tribuitur, per quod termini essentia evertitur. ut ignis frigidus, alba nigredo, cæca visio, virgo deflorata."

39. Cf. Gutkies, *Logica divina* 63: "Modus distinguendi conceptus affirmativè disponi aptos à conceptibus affirmativam dispositionem respicientibus peragitur per exactam cognitionem Synonymorum & Paronymorum, h.e. quando Logica docet, omnem conceptum affirmativè disponi aptum, sive is à rebus divinis, sive à transcendentibus, sive creatis sit depromptus, notare titulo vel Synonymi vel Paronymi."

they supra-predicamental, predicamental, or infra-predicamental.⁴⁰ All of these fall into ordered representational classes, within which one can see a super- and subordination much as in a traditional Porphyrian tree.

The infra-predicamental realm is populated by fictive, negative and syncategorematic terms.⁴¹ Among the fictive ones we find not only the chimera and her close relatives, purgatory, Papal primacy and the Calvinist decree (a reference to the Calvinist doctrine of God's decree about predestination), but also all second intention terms and universals *in essendo vel afficiendo* – to be carefully distinguished from what had often been called *universalia in prædicando*. Among the negative ones we find (a) those that negate truth, including, i.a., deformity of body, intellect, or signification (i.e. falsehood); such as negate the good, i.e. the words for evil, a motley crowd including, e.g., the loss of the original image (the loss of man's original likeness to God), work in the sweat of one's brow, tyranny, bad memory, blindness and original sin. Nold distributes all of his examples in a neat table with classes, subclasses, and sub-subclasses.⁴²

Supra-predicamental terms are real: they signify realities. They fall in two classes, that of the mystical terms and that of the transcendental ones.⁴³ The mystical class contains words for the entities peculiar to Christian theology, such as *Sacred Scripture*, *Word of God*, *The Persons of the Trinity*, *God's providence* and the like,⁴⁴ and there is a syn-

40. Noldius *Logica recognita* 69: "Ordines Logici differunt à Metaphysicis. Præcipuè latitudine seu objecto, et fine. Ordines Metaphysici exhibent nonnisi ens determinatum: illud enim in disciplinis inferioribus, (quibus Metaphysica hoc quod habent assignat) non tractatur. At ordines Logici etiam extendunt se ad non-ens et entia ficta: imò ad mystica, et ad entia in abstractò, quin et ad modos."

41. Noldius *Logica recognita* 108: Ordo infra-prædicamentalis est ordo repræsentatiuus terminorum fictorum, negativorum, & syncategorematicorum.

42. The examples are taken from a table in Noldius *Logica recognita* 110-111. Cf. *ibid.* 44: "Curæ hic nobis sunt, non quævis *synonyma* & *paronyma*, sed *prædicamentalia*. Nam dantur etiam *supra-prædicamentalia*, & *infra-prædicamentalia*. ... *Synonymicè infra-prædicamentali-ter* se respiciunt: cerberus & ens fictum, purgatorium & non ens."

43. Noldius *Logica recognita* 74: "Ordo supra-prædicamentalis, est ordo repræsentatiuus categorematum realium, mysticorum vel transcendentalium."

44. List in Noldius *Logica recognita* 75-78.

onymous supra-predicamental relationship between *God* and the three divine persons, between *Law* or *Gospel* and *God's Word*, whereas there is a paronymous supra-predicamental relationship between *God* and his attributes, *God* and *man*, the *Eucharistic host* and the *body of Christ*.⁴⁵

The transcendental terms include the highest terms in the three realms of philosophy: Gnostology, Noology and Ontology – a recently invented tripartition.⁴⁶

While Nold thought it important to arrange terms in predicational hierarchies, he was not too enthusiastic about the Aristotelian categories. He did distribute predicamental terms over ten categories, but at the same time he taught that the number 10 has its origin in Pythagorean superstition, and in fact there are only five accidental categories, namely quality, motion, when, quantity and relation.⁴⁷

In 1701 a schoolmaster called Søren Glud (Severinus Gludius, 1662-1705) published a brief introduction to logic based on Nold's expansive book. This epitome of Nold was standard fare in Danish and Norwegian schools far into the 18th century. But that was just

45. Noldius *Logica recognita* 44: “synonymicè supra-predicamentaliter se respiciunt: Deus & tres divinitatis personæ, Lex vel Evangelium & verbum Dei, substantia et ens, unitas, veritas, &c. & affectio, Deus et substantia Metaphysica. ... Paronymicè autem supra-predicamentaliter se respiciunt: Deus & eius attributa, Deus & homo, panis eucharisticus & corpus Christi, vinum eucharisticum & sanguis Christi, attributa entis inter se et ens.”

46. Noldius *Logica recognita* 78-79: Heading: “Classis, seu representatio, Terminorum Transcendentalium.” Follow examples, including *scibile*, *conceptus*, *abstractio*, *notio*, *principia*, *ens*, *affectio entis*, and then: “Unò verbo: ad classem terminorum transcendentalium pertinent omnes communissimi trium supremarum disciplinarum termini: quæ sunt *Gnostologia* seu scientia de scibili quæ scibili, *Noologia* seu *habitus intelligentiæ* circa rerum affinitatem ad principia, & *Ontologia* sive *Metaphysica*, de ente quæ ente.” The triad of gnostology, noology and ontology had been introduced by the Wittenberg theologian Abraham Calov (1612-1686), about whom see Sparr 2001: 575-578.

47. Noldius, *Logica recognita* 80: “Placuit hîc sequi tritam orbitam: propter rudiores. Sed si quis nostram amat sententiam (fertur enim numerus hic esse ex supersitione Pythagoræ, qui nihil existivavit perfectum, nisi quod constaret ex denariò) habebit Classes accidentium non nisi quinque, et illas hoc ordine: Qualitatem, motionem, (actionem et passionem) quando, quantitatem, et relationem.”

the usual story about school-books lagging some generations behind scholarship.

Already in Nold's own lifetime the Aristotelian categories were subjected to more scathing criticism than his. In the 1660s Baconians and Cartesians made their entry on the Copenhagen scene, and they clearly professed what was perhaps latent in Nold as well as in Ramus, namely that only one type of predication is needed, so that all the categories may be collapsed, or, if more than one line of predication is needed, this will be on the basis of a totally different ontology.

Not by accident, the advent of this new line of thought coincided with the incipient collapse of Lutheran orthodoxy. Soon logic would cease to be considered a handmaiden of theology. But if it was not even a necessary auxiliary force to keep Calvinist and Papist enemies at bay, or if those enemies were no longer thought to be great threats, what was the use of it?

There was a hard time ahead for logic, and Aristotelian logic in particular. But we still talk about the *quality* of tomatoes.

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